

A JUNGIAN STUDY OF SHAKESPEARE



The Visionary Mode

MATTHEW A. FIKE




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Matthew A. Fike

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In Memory of Hal Kosiba and Cindy Stiles

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- Chapter 2: “Disappointment in *The Merchant of Venice*,” *ANQ* N.S. 7.1 (1994): 13–18; and The Jungian Society for Scholarly Studies (2006).
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- Chapter 4: “The Primitive in *Othello*: A Post-Jungian Reading,” *Jung: the e-Journal of The Jungian Society for Scholarly Studies* 1 (2005), <http://thejungiansociety.org/Jung%20Society/e-journal/Volume-1/Fike-2005.html>.
- Chapter 5: The Thirty-Second International Congress on Medieval Studies (1997); “Gertrude’s Mermaid Allusion,” *British and American Studies* 2 (1999): 15–25; repr. in *On Page and Stage: Shakespeare in Polish and World Culture*, ed. Krystyna Kujawska Courtney (Krakow: Towarzystwo Autorów, 2000), 259–75.

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Rock Hill, South Carolina

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EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

All quotations by Shakespeare are cited parenthetically and are taken from *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, ed. David Bevington, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992). Abbreviations for play titles are self-explanatory. All quotations from C. G. Jung's *Collected Works* are cited parenthetically rather than in the notes and are to volume and paragraph/page numbers. Works by Jung are abbreviated as follows:

CW—*The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. Sir Herbert Read, et al. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. 20 vols. Bollingen Series 10 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1953–1979).

MDR—*Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, ed. Aniela Jaffé. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

MHS—*Man and His Symbols*, ed. C. G. Jung, et al. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964).

One other abbreviation is used:

OED—*The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. 20 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

All biblical quotations are taken from the following:

The Geneva Bible: A Facsimile of the 1560 Edition, ed. Lloyd E. Berry (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

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INTRODUCTION

Great poetry draws its strength from the life of mankind, and we completely miss its meaning if we try to derive it [only] from personal factors. Whenever the collective unconscious becomes a living experience and is brought to bear upon the conscious outlook of an age, this event is a creative act which is of importance for a whole epoch. A work of art is produced that may truthfully be called a message to generations of men.

Jung, "Psychology and Literature" (CW 15, 153/98)

The *Collected Works of C. G. Jung* culminates in a 732-page index that includes only eight entries on Shakespeare, which reference passages in only two of his plays—*Julius Caesar* and *Macbeth*. The little genuine value in Jung's comments on these plays suggests that the greatest psychologist of the early twentieth century, whose erudition takes a whole volume just to catalog, seems relatively unaware of the world's greatest literary mind.¹ Jungian psychology would be substantially different and richer if Shakespeare had influenced Jung in the way that Sophocles inspired Freud, but psychology's loss is literary criticism's opportunity. Even today, more than seventy years after the publication of the first notable Jungian literary criticism by Maud Bodkin,² some relevant Jungian concepts remain unapplied to Shakespeare, and some of the existing Jungian studies are neither totally accurate nor sufficiently thorough. There is clearly much more to be said, and this study will not be the last ever published on Shakespeare and Jung.

It would be as impractical to apply every Jungian concept to Shakespeare, as it would be to psychoanalyze all of the plays and poems. Instead this book's five chapters pair a subset of psychological concepts from Jung's *Collected Works* with illustrations from Shakespeare's plays. Some Shakespearean topics that have not yet been adequately discussed receive deeper Jungian analysis, and other topics receive

Jungian analysis for the first time. The result is not an impossibly comprehensive pairing of all of Jung with all of Shakespeare but an attempt to say more about less and to break new ground in the following areas: the collective unconscious in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, myth and syzygy in *The Merchant of Venice*, the trickster and inflation in *The Henriad*, the primitive in *Othello*, and shadow and anima in *Hamlet*. More specifically, the collective unconscious is a hub from which manifestations emanate as archetypes (trickster, anima) and as psychological concepts (syzygy, inflation, and the primitive). What further sets *A Jungian Study of Shakespeare: The Visionary Mode* apart from other studies is that it seeks to deepen Jungian criticism of Shakespeare by applying thorough definitions of terms. Each chapter draws extensively on Jung's rich discussions in the *Collected Works* in order to use his concepts' breadth and nuances to illuminate the plays, frequently in new and surprisingly helpful ways.

Although Jung is virtually silent on Shakespeare's works, he does articulate a theory of literature in two essays.³ "On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry" (1922) begins by asserting that only "the process of artistic creation can be a subject for psychological study" (CW 15, 97/65). The Freudian sexual approach to creative process then comes under harsh critique because it equates art with neuroses that stem from childhood; it is "essentially a medical technique for investigating morbid psychic phenomena" (CW 15, 104/69). Since "a work of art is not a human being, but is something suprapersonal" (CW 15, 107/71), a more expansive and appropriate theory sees literary content not only as signs or symptoms but also as symbols. Such a work may come into being in either of two complementary ways. Writers, like craftsmen, may fashion a text by using a high degree of conscious attention to detail and (with respect to Freud) a good deal of their own personalities; this is the introverted approach to creative process. But, in an "extraverted" process, they also allow a work of art to flow through them from the suprapersonal, which Jung identifies as the collective unconscious. Art that arises in this second way is an autonomous complex, meaning that it takes on a life of its own apart from personal intention and pushes its way into consciousness: the poet becomes a conduit for a literary work whose origin lies outside the individual psyche and whose meaning continues to unfold for successive generations as human development enables new insights. Although Jung states that art so conceived has its source not in the personal unconscious but in the collective unconscious, he immediately

acknowledges that both contribute to the process of creation. Common sense suggests that the poet cannot exclude influence from the personal psyche or the suprapersonal and that the artistic production must arise from a mixture of the two. Finally, Jung asserts what critics have come to know well—the idea that literature conveys the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Of course, his definition of “archetype” in the *Collected Works* is changeable, and his essay on poetry is no exception: archetypes are not “inborn ideas” but “inborn possibilities of ideas”; and an archetype is also a “primordial image” or “a mythological figure” (*CW* 15, 126–27/81).⁴ The term “archetype” covers not only the inborn human potential for representation but also the specific images and patterns that follow from such potential, particularly in mythology. Literature, then, is the product of a writer’s response to archetypes and, in turn, activates archetypes within the reader or theatrical audience. Jung has this to say about the archetypal image as it appears in literature: “By giving it shape [‘a local habitation and a name,’ one might say], the artist translates it into the language of the present” so that his culture, when ready, can experience the transpersonal. The shaping metaphor anticipates my treatment of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* in chapter 1, and Jung’s nexus of archetype and mythology relates to my exploration of *The Merchant of Venice* in chapter 2.

Jung’s essay on analytical psychology and poetry concludes with a statement that, while not explicitly about Shakespeare, sounds surprisingly relevant to him and conveys a truth that aligns nicely with New Historicist criticism:

[T]he man who takes to the back streets and alleys because he cannot endure the broad highway will be the first to discover the psychic elements that are waiting to play their part in the life of the collective. Here the artist’s relative lack of adaptation turns out to his advantage; it enables him to follow his own yearnings far from the beaten path, and to discover what it is that would meet the unconscious needs of his age. Thus, just as the one-sidedness of the individual’s conscious attitude is corrected by reactions from the unconscious, so art represents a process of self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs. (*CW* 15, 131/83)

Jung adapts the Christian commonplace of the broad highway by opposing it not to the straight and narrow way but instead to “the back streets and alleys” of secular culture. The artist draws strength

and inspiration not from mainstream public culture, where persona reigns, but from out-of-the-way places, where the unconscious manifests more naturally because people are in closer touch with the archetypes. Paradoxically, the lack of accommodation in high society provides an advantage: the way for an artist to excel is to pay attention while dwelling on the fringes of society, which is exactly what Shakespeare did, especially during the so-called “lost years,” when he was living in London and immersing himself, though not yet well-known for doing so, in the world of the theater. The art that results from such immersion, Jung concludes, achieves a compensatory relationship with society, a point closely analogous to Steven Mullaney’s assertion that the theater, operating in “the margins of early modern society,” functions much like comments written in the margins of a book.⁵ It is precisely in and for these margins that Shakespeare wrote his plays.

Like his essay on poetry, Jung’s second essay, “Psychology and Literature” (1930), centers on his disagreement with Freud concerning the nature of the unconscious—personal for Freud, personal and collective for Jung. Although a work of literature may reflect minor aspects of the artist’s life, art is not “a mere symptom” of personal psychological disorder but also transcends the personal (*CW* 15, 134/86). Thus Jung posits two types of literature that correspond to the introverted and extraverted processes of creation: the psychological, which stems from the artist’s personal unconscious; and the visionary, which comes through the artist from the collective unconscious. Whereas the first relates to the artist’s conscious life and is psychologically understandable, the second originates in “the hinterlands of man’s mind,” involves “primordial experience,” “transcends our human feeling and understanding,” and provides “a glimpse into the unfathomable abyss” (*CW* 15, 141/90). At this point Jung mentions, as examples, William Blake’s poetry and painting, Herman Melville’s *Moby Dick*, and Rider Haggard’s novels; but surely Shakespeare qualifies as a visionary artist as well. As I argue in chapter 1, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* nicely illustrates the psychological/visionary divide and enacts a poet’s visionary experience through Bottom’s encounter with Titania: he does not understand what has happened to him; he knows only that something dream-like occurred, and he is motivated to have Peter Quince record it in a ballad. Similarly, Theseus’s negative comment on the imagination, which actually conveys Shakespeare’s positive view of the poet, illustrates the way that, according to Jung, material from a realm largely unknown flows through the writer—“a

vehicle and moulder” or “instrument of his work”—to a receiving public (*CW* 15, 157/101, 161/104). The “primordial experience” is “dark and amorphous,” requiring “mythological imagery to give it form” (*CW* 15, 151/96). The result of Jung’s visionary approach—contrary to his starting point in the other essay—is to place the critic’s emphasis on the work of art rather than on the artist. Literature needs continual unfolding and reinterpretation because its mysteries are anchored in the collective unconscious, which transcends complete human understanding at a particular historical moment. As part of that unfolding, *A Jungian Study of Shakespeare: The Visionary Mode* deals with the unknowable nature of the collective unconscious (chapter 1), the primitive mentality that experiences the archetypal world more directly than modern thinkers can (chapter 4), the role of myth in representing unconscious material (chapter 2), and that material’s specific manifestation as archetypes—trickster, shadow, and anima (chapters 3 and 5).

The transpersonal realm is so elusive that even Jung himself speaks of it in metaphor and simile: “It is nothing but a tremendous intuition striving for expression. It is like a whirlwind that seizes everything within reach and assumes visible form as it swirls upward” (*CW* 15, 151/97). As in the essay on analytical psychology and poetry, however, he makes what appear to be conflicting statements about the relationship between the collective unconscious and the related imagery. On the one hand, “In itself it [‘primordial experience’] is wordless and imageless,” needing “mythological imagery to give it form.” On the other, “what appears in the [artist’s] vision is the imagery of the collective unconscious” (*CW* 15, 151–52/96–97). This seeming contradiction appears elsewhere in Jung’s statements on the same relationship: archetypes are mere *possibilities* of representation; yet their realm, the collective unconscious, is “a treasure-house of primordial images” (*CW* 7, 110/70). Jung’s comments probably express complementary psychological processes rather than binary oppositions: archetypes are psychological potentialities that enable cultural image making to take place. To employ a metaphor from visual art, if the potentiality is the canvas and the image is the paint, then a painting arises from a two-part archetypal process. Jung’s statements evidently use “archetype” to describe both parts. The distinctions between archetype (potentiality), archetypal image (a cultural accretion), and symbol (an image with multiple meanings) will prove helpful in unpacking Othello’s description of Desdemona’s handkerchief in chapter 4.

“Psychology and Literature” holds that a poet’s access to the transpersonal is not without cost. To begin with, Jung states that “the manifestations of the collective unconscious are compensatory to the conscious attitude, so that they have the effect of bringing a one-sided, unadapted, or dangerous state of consciousness back into equilibrium” (CW 15, 152/97–98). “Whenever conscious life becomes one-sided or adopts a false attitude, these images ‘instinctively’ rise to the surface in dreams and in the visions of artists and seers to restore the psychic balance, whether of the individual or of the epoch” (CW 15, 160/104). Chapter 1 touches on this principle of compensation in relation to dreams—what is a deficit in waking life appears in good measure while asleep and vice versa. But this psychic balance does not obtain to the same degree in the artist’s life: “A special ability demands a greater expenditure of energy, which must necessarily leave a deficit on some other side of life” (CW 15, 158/103). A prime example would be Adrienne Rich, who found constant tension between “the energy of creation and the energy of relation”—that is, between poetry and family.⁶ Shakespeare must have experienced the same dichotomy between his work in London and his family in Stratford. He might not have been so prolific or successful in art or business if he had brought his wife and children with him. According to Jung’s train of thought, Shakespeare compromised his family life for the sake of his art.

While ideas in Jung’s two essays on literature do apply to Shakespeare, the dearth of references to Shakespeare in the *Collected Works* partly accounts for the limited number of book-length Jungian studies of the plays and only a scattering of articles. Still, it is worth considering how previous Jungian critics relate to and illuminate my own project. In the five chapters that follow, I make extensive use of critical opinion to bolster and distinguish my own arguments; therefore, this introduction, rather than presenting a comprehensive summary, critiques the most important studies, the majority of which are books. Like their Freudian counterparts, Jungians have found *Hamlet* to be particularly fertile ground for psychological reading, and the following remarks emphasize that play.⁷

The application of Jungian psychology to Shakespeare began with the publication of Maud Bodkin’s *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of Imagination* (1934), which touches on *Othello* and *Hamlet* but not in ways that inform my respective interests in the primitive and the anima.⁸ One must skip ahead nearly four decades, to Alex Aronson’s *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare* (1972), which is useful

not only because it speaks directly about Hamlet's anima problem but also because, in an earlier section, it addresses the shadow. The author quotes Jung's belief that becoming conscious of the shadow is the first step toward individuation: "The meeting with oneself is at first the meeting with one's shadow."⁹ Whereas Aronson later notes that Hal is to Falstaff as persona is to shadow, *Psyche & Symbol* is not sufficiently clear about the manner in which Hamlet projects his shadow or about his inability to affirm the anima without first integrating the shadow. Aronson does hold that Hamlet never "integrates the shadow he projects,"¹⁰ an assertion that I show in chapter 5 to be unfounded. Thus, while *Psyche & Symbol* addresses the key issues, it does not sufficiently integrate Jungian thought or reach the right conclusion about Hamlet's individuation process.

The 1980s saw the publication of two further Jungian studies of Shakespeare. H. R. Coursen's *The Compensatory Psyche: A Jungian Approach to Shakespeare* (1986)—the longest and arguably the best of all the studies of Jung and Shakespeare—was followed by Johannes Fabricius's *Shakespeare's Hidden World: A Study of His Unconscious* (1989).¹¹ As the title of the former suggests, the most important concept in Coursen's study is compensation, which Jung calls "a balancing or supplementing of the conscious orientation" with material from the unconscious (CW 6, 694/419). What is repressed in consciousness grows to great magnitude in the unconscious. Hamlet's hyperintellectual denial of the feminine, for example, gives rise to negative anima, which he projects in a variety of inappropriate ways, the most relevant for my study being his frequent allusions to prostitution. Coursen makes only scattered references to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, which surely enacts a similar compensatory relationship—Athens is to consciousness as the woods are to the unconscious; but Fabricius approximates this point by rightly noting that the play concerns a "*coniunctio oppositorum*, or fusion of the mind's conscious and unconscious halves."¹² If Coursen had dealt with that play at greater length, he would have noted the opposition between the two settings (one compensates for the other), whereas Fabricius emphasizes the synthesis of the psychological qualities that the settings represent. Although Fabricius distorts the play by asserting that "the psychodynamics of autism fully account for the mysteries of Oberon's Wood," he solidly claims that Bottom's dream "*duplicates . . . mystical experience, which in his case assumes the form of an involvement in a primal act between the two parental halves of his own unconscious*"

(Fabricius's emphasis). Fabricius and I also agree that Weston A. Gui's more literal view of Bottom's experience "*as a primal act fantasy*" (Fabricius's emphasis) is an over-reading.¹³ As I argue in chapter 1, the evidence suggests that his experience with the Fairy Queen is not sexual but merely sensual.

In the 1990s, two excellent Jungian studies of Shakespeare appeared, both relevant to my work on the visionary mode: Barbara Rogers-Gardner's *Jung and Shakespeare: Hamlet, Othello, and The Tempest* (1992); and Sally F. Porterfield's *Jung's Advice to the Players: A Jungian Reading of Shakespeare's Problem Plays* (1994).¹⁴ Both critics describe the relationships between characters in terms of the archetypes. Rogers-Gardner argues, for example, that Othello projects his shadow onto Iago and his anima onto Desdemona, much as she projects her animus onto Othello. The critic also touches on Othello-as-primitive, though her chapter conveys little that Jung has to say about primitives, an omission that I correct in chapter 4 by reading the Moor in light of Jung's full and somewhat problematic definition of the term. For Rogers-Gardner, whereas Othello is caught between anima and shadow and cannot affirm the one because he does not first acknowledge the other, Hamlet is caught between, and fails to integrate, the anima and the warrior archetype. Porterfield directly addresses Hamlet's need to acknowledge the shadow, and without citing it she echoes Rogers-Gardner's idea that he encounters the anima in Ophelia. Porterfield further considers Laertes to be Hamlet's shadow and Hamlet himself to be a trickster, but the ensuing conflation of trickster and shadow shares a problem with Rogers-Gardner's take on the primitive: namely, a term is used without much awareness of Jung's actual definition. I attempt a more satisfactory explanation of the trickster-shadow relationship in chapter 3 in connection with Falstaff, Shakespeare's consummate trickster figure.

My own interpretation of *Hamlet* relies partly on an analogy to *Measure for Measure*, another play that nicely supports a Jungian reading. Aronson emphasizes the conflict between Angelo's public persona and "the true nature of his unconscious," which Isabella activates.¹⁵ But Porterfield and Edward F. Edinger in *The Psyche on Stage: Individuation Motifs in Shakespeare and Sophocles* (2001) take the analysis further.¹⁶ Both critics hold that characters represent parts of the psyche; for example, the Duke is the Self, Angelo the persona, and Isabella the anima. Nor is there much difference in their thesis statements: Porterfield stresses *enantiodromia*, which means "the

emergence of the unconscious opposite”; Edinger focuses on *coniunctio oppositorum*, which means “the union of opposites and the birth of new possibilities.”¹⁷ By whatever name, the key idea for all three critics is that the play deals with the consequences of repressing an archetype and with the resulting need for the Self to push the psyche toward acknowledgement of one’s own neglected qualities as part of the individuation process. But whereas Aronson and Porterfield hold that the persona is responsible for repressing the shadow, Edinger emphasizes that the ego represses the anima. Although Porterfield’s analysis is the most extensive and nuanced of the three, Edinger’s approach is more useful for my argument in chapter 5 that Hamlet and Angelo both suffer from anima repression.

Edinger, however, cites neither Aronson nor Porterfield; and the most recent pair of Jungian studies published since the turn of the century also neglect previous major studies. These newest books are Kenneth Tucker’s *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology: A Reading of the Plays* (2003) and Ryder Jordan-Finnegan’s *Individuation and the Power of Evil on the Nature of the Human Psyche: Studies in C. G. Jung, Arthur Miller, and William Shakespeare* (2006).¹⁸ Tucker does not cite any of the studies mentioned above, and Jordan-Finnegan cites only Coursen’s. Duplication inevitably results: both critics hold that Hamlet’s main function is thinking, but Jordan-Finnegan appears unaware that Tucker has already made this observation. Stranger still, the two critics reach exactly opposite conclusions about Hamlet. Tucker suggests that “Hamlet is never able in this world to achieve psychological equipoise” (individuation is impossible for people like Hamlet).¹⁹ Jordan-Finnegan maintains that “Hamlet comes to a readiness and a balance unlike any other character within the play.”²⁰

My own analysis shows that individuation is not impossible for Hamlet: he makes some progress but does not fully achieve individuation because he runs out of time. A further difference between my study and those of Tucker, Jordan-Finnegan, and the others is this: whereas these studies attempt a more comprehensive but less in-depth inquiry into the play, *A Jungian Study of Shakespeare: The Visionary Mode* zeroes in on the anima, delves more deeply into Jung’s discourse in the *Collected Works*, and yields a new and deeper understanding of Hamlet’s relationship with that repressed part of his psyche.

Having touched on the highlights and shortcomings of the major previous Jungian studies of Shakespeare, I turn now to a series of snapshots of the following five chapters. Chapter 1 uses *A Midsummer*

Night's Dream to establish that Shakespeare is indeed concerned with the visionary mode, in which art conveys archetypal material through the artist's connection to the collective unconscious: the play not only dramatizes the psyche in ways that highlight the archetypes' roles but also transcends the collective unconscious in its emphasis on spirit. The vehicles for accessing the unconscious are dream, imagination, and vision. To begin with, Hermia's snake dream, to which the Freudians have flocked, receives a Jungian rereading in which the snake represents transformation and regeneration. Imagination also enables one to access the collective unconscious, as Theseus's well-known critique of the poet ironically makes clear. And Bottom's "most rare vision" (4.1.203) enables him to tap the collective unconscious and perhaps to soar beyond it into the realm of spirits or at least allegorizes such transport. Shakespeare more readily affirms an afterlife for individual consciousness than does Jung, for whom spirits are sometimes considered ambulant archetypes. Similarly, in *Pyramus and Thisbe*, the lion represents the sexual libido and therefore the personal unconscious, whereas moonlight figures forth the collective unconscious or something beyond it.

Chapter 2 explains that Jung views myth in much the same way that he views dreams—as expressive of unconscious material. More specifically, myth probably originates in the collective unconscious, comes to light in and through the personal unconscious, manifests as projection, and compensates for conscious experience. The key mythic material in *The Merchant of Venice* is the "love duet" between Jessica and Lorenzo at the beginning of act 5, and frequent references to disappointing circumstances earlier in the play provide a context for understanding the love banter as conveying at least an unconscious fear of marital disappointment. The mythical allusions themselves illustrate the animus/anima syzygy (that is, the union of opposites); and other syzygy pairs in which disappointment obtains—Jessica and Shylock, Endymion and Diana, Hercules and Hesione—also suggest relational problems. This proliferation of contrasexual pairs may reflect a relational current in Shakespeare's own personal unconscious: namely, disappointment in his marriage. In any case, the syzygy pairs in the love duet illustrate Jung's concept of "inflation," the "process of identification with a mythic double or archetypal image."²¹ Into these pairs, Jessica and Lorenzo put what they do not know that they know. In particular, the lovers' references to Jason and Medea resonate

with Jung's statements, which link these mythical figures to disappointment and psychic chaos. Ultimately, although the play rightly points to divine grace and spiritual life, Shakespeare's conclusion that humans cannot hear the celestial music (5.1.60–65) implies that all earthly experience is subject to disappointment.

Chapter 3 examines in detail Jung's statements on inflation and the trickster in order to illuminate Falstaff's frequent allusions to a biblical myth in *The Henriad*—the story of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16. I aim to augment the work of Edith Kern, which appears to be the only previous treatment of Falstaff as a trickster, and to correct overly sunny statements on Falstaff's biblical allusions by Roy Battenhouse and Harold Bloom.²² By delving back into Paul Radin's study of the trickster, for which Jung wrote his essay "On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure,"²³ chapter 3 achieves a more objective analysis in which Falstaff illustrates the trickster archetype in numerous ways, particularly as a projection of Prince Hal's shadow and as a collective shadow figure. The fat knight also relates to the high and low of positive and negative inflation, and the latter type eventually leads to some awareness on his part of his unconscious and thus to some degree of individuation. That is, Falstaff's identification with Lazarus ultimately suggests the trickster's humanization and a way out of the cycle of inflation.

Whereas chapter 3 augments Kern's analysis of the trickster archetype in *The Henriad*, chapter 4 critiques and augments previous Jungian criticism of *Othello*, which overlooks the primitive, treats it as an obvious premise, or does not consider it in the context of Jung's extensive and widely varied statements on the subject. This chapter deepens the archetypal approach by discussing the play in terms of the primitive mentality (*participation mystique*, literally mystical participation) that ultimately thwarts Othello's individuation. When Jung's racist rhetoric is subjected to postcolonial critique, what emerges is the helpful concept of the psychologically archaic—areas of the psyche that are less conscious and less differentiated. Then a post-Jungian emphasis on the archaic illuminates Desdemona's attraction to the Moor, war, fetishism, the supernatural, and the signifying process that surrounds the handkerchief. In addition, Jung's subdivisions of the feminine archetype, which he calls the "four stages of eroticism" (*CW* 16, 361/174), enhance the significance of the sibyl, an archaic figure with civilizing influence. Shakespeare's use of the primitive culminates

in *Othello*'s final comparison of himself to two primitives (Indian and Turk); he dies a broken man, aware that projection has caused his downfall.

Othello has received a good deal of attention from Jungians, but there is more Jungian criticism of *Hamlet* than of any other Shakespeare play. In chapter 5, I devote a section to summarizing and honoring previous thought but focus on Hamlet's anima and, in particular, on the role of the shadow in anima integration, as well as the anima-mermaid-*meretrix* (prostitute) nexus. As others have noted, acknowledging the shadow is a necessary step toward affirming the anima. I augment previous studies by drawing on James Hillman's *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* to suggest that Ophelia is a *femme à homme* (a woman who derives her identity from [sexual] relations with men) and that Hamlet suffers from depersonalization (detachment from the positive anima).²⁴ Because of repression, Hamlet is possessed by the negative anima whose image is the courtesan or prostitute, and his psychological situation comes more clearly into focus in light of the male-female relations (Angelo/Isabella, Lysimachus/Marina) and the actual prostitution in *Measure for Measure* and *Pericles*. A specific image of negative anima—the mermaid, on which Jung comments helpfully—receives historical summary; and the play's key mermaid allusion, Gertrude's speech to Laertes, reflects the nature of Ophelia and the queen. As for Hamlet, his encounter with the pirates suggests that he does integrate his shadow, but he does not have time to integrate his anima and to achieve a proper relationship with a woman.

This study takes a post-Jungian, corrective stance as regards Jung's view of spirits as ambulant archetypes, his racially charged remarks about the primitive, and his notion that a man uses up his masculinity as he grows older. But the Shakespearean works dealt with in the following pages all illustrate Jung's "visionary mode" because they relate to the collective unconscious. *A Midsummer Night's Dream* portrays various ways of accessing, and transcending, the collective unconscious. Images of the trickster in *The Henriad* and of the anima in *Hamlet* originate in the collective unconscious but manifest in various images like Falstaff, the mermaid, and Ophelia. And whereas myth captures and conveys truths from the collective unconscious in *The Merchant of Venice*, a "primitive" mindset—*participation mystique*—impedes the apprehension of truth in *Othello*. Along the way, Jungian theory functions alongside other helpful critical approaches—particularly

myth criticism, biblical literary criticism, and postcolonial theory. Jung, I believe, would consider such a combination to be very much in the eclectic spirit of the *Collected Works*. Let us now begin our journey by considering the play that directly comments on the visionary mode—*A Midsummer Night's Dream*.

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CHAPTER 1



THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS AND BEYOND IN *A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM*

A great work of art is like a dream; for all its apparent obviousness it does not explain itself and is always ambiguous.

Jung, "Psychology and Literature" (CW15, 161/104)

As noted in the introduction, Jung's theory of poetry, laid out in two essays, presents a direct challenge to Freud. "On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry" states that "a work of art is not a disease, and consequently requires a different approach from the medical one." Jung goes on to claim that "although a psychology with a purely biological orientation can explain a good deal about man in general, it cannot be applied to a work of art and still less to man as creator." These statements constitute the crux of Jung's critique of Freudian literary criticism. He is wrong, of course, in the second: the exploration of literature from a psycho-biological point of view—what Jung calls "personal criteria"—does not exclude the possibility that art may also be "supra-personal . . . a thing and not a personality" and that it can also "be judged by personal criteria" (CW15, 107–8/71–72). "Psychology and Literature" correctly states that there are indeed two partially overlapping categories of artistic creation: the *psychological*, which always arises "from the sphere of conscious human experience" and is presumably amenable to medically based critique; and the *visionary*, which may reflect both the personal unconscious and the

elusive realm of the collective unconscious (*CW* 15, 139–41/89–90, 152/97). If literary criticism should consider the impact of both the personal and collective dimensions of the unconscious on a writer's work, it is problematic for a Freudian psychological approach to crowd out a Jungian visionary interpretation.

A brief overview of the scholarship confirms that a Jungian visionary perspective on *A Midsummer Night's Dream* has indeed been neglected. Franz Riklin's 1968 article, "Shakespeare's 'A Midsummer Night's Dream': A Contribution to the Process of Individuation," may be the only substantial Jungian study to date. Of course, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is included in two valuable studies of dreams—Marjorie B. Garber's *Dream in Shakespeare: From Metaphor to Metamorphosis* and John Arthos's *Shakespeare's Use of Dream and Vision*. But aside from these studies and a few others such as Thelma N. Greenfield's "Our Nightly Madness: Shakespeare's *Dream* without *The Interpretation of Dreams*," the major psychological criticism of the play has been Freudian. Studies in this vein range from excellent articles like Norman N. Holland's "Hermia's Dream" and Louis Adrian Montrose's "Shaping Fantasies': Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan 'Bottom's Dream.'" In fact, for a generation, Freudian psychology has so dominated the interpretation of the play that virtually no attention has been paid to the complementary Jungian perspective, an omission that this chapter attempts to correct.¹

Shakespeare's text allegorizes Freudian sexual anxiety and echoes Elizabethan views on the imagination, positions held by previous critics, which I will discuss and enhance from a Jungian psychological perspective. Moreover, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*'s dramatization of psychological processes—dream, imagination, and vision—is compatible with a Jungian visionary approach because what is depicted reflects and occasionally transcends the archetypes of the collective unconscious. This book argues that Shakespeare's plays enact manifestations of the collective unconscious, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* supports its existence more directly than any other play. It is fitting, then, to examine Jung's statements on his most important concept before exploring its relevance to our first play.

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

The key distinction in Jung's theory of the unconscious is that it has two compartments—the personal, which is the extent of the unconscious for Freud, and the collective or transpersonal. Jung develops the distinction in two essays, “The Personal and the Collective (or Transpersonal) Unconscious” (1917) and “The Concept of the Collective Unconscious” (1936) (*CW* 7, 97–120/64–79; 9i, 87–110/42–53). Here is Jung's definition of the personal unconscious:

The personal unconscious contains lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness. It corresponds to the figure of the shadow so frequently met with in dreams. (*CW* 7, 103/66)

Jung advances the following definition of the collective unconscious:

In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents. (*CW* 9i, 90/43)

Elsewhere, Jung states that the collective unconscious “contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual” (*CW* 8, 342/158). It is the “phylogenetic substratum” or the evolutionary layer of the psyche; and he also calls the collective unconscious a “treasure-house of primordial images” (*CW* 9i, 518/286; 7, 110/70). Because of the repetition of human experience from time immemorial, patterns called archetypes become engrained in this collective unconscious. In his two essays, Jung describes them as forms, preexistent forms, universal forms, universal thought forms, mythical images, primordial images, motifs, collective representations, instinctual patterns, and possibilities of ideas. All of these terms participate in the impersonal nature of the

collective unconscious; unlike the neuroses of the personal unconscious, the archetypes are “non-ego” (CW 7, 113/73). They are infinite in number: there is an archetype for every typical human experience; and constellated (activated) archetypes can account for such mass behavior as a national neurosis like the Nazi movement in Germany.

The problem for Jungian literary critics is that Jung identifies archetypes not only as images but also as merely the potential for creating images. To resolve this contradiction, it is helpful to understand the archetypes as having the same relationship to images as to ideas. Jung asserts that archetypes are not “inherited *ideas* but . . . inherited *possibilities* of ideas” (CW 9i, 136/66). Similarly, Daryl Sharp’s *C. G. Jung Lexicon* defines archetypes as “primordial, structural elements of the human psyche . . . irrepresentable in themselves[,] but their effects are discernible in archetypal images and motifs.”² Here, in other words, is the difference between an *archetype* and an archetypal *image/idea*: archetype is to the *potential* for representation as archetypal *image/idea* is to actual representation. One is a sort of image- or idea-making *capacity*; the other is an *actual created image or idea* in consciousness, visual art, or a literary text. In short, the collective unconscious sums up “the mental history of mankind” (CW 7, 108/68), and when it is put to artistic purposes (rather than being projected onto a therapist in the transference process), it enables what Jung calls the visionary mode of artistic creation.

A further characteristic of the collective unconscious deserves development—its timeless nature. Jung writes: “Part of our psyche is not in time and not in space. They are only an illusion, time and space, and so in a certain part of our psyche time does not exist at all.” That *part*, of course, is the collective unconscious, which has “a spaceless and timeless quality” (CW 10, 849/450). He explains that time and space are “limiting factors” on “corporeal man” because of his “low frequency”; but we are also “psychic beings . . . not entirely dependent upon space and time,” beings whose “psychic totality reaches beyond the barrier of space and time” (CW 18, 684/287, 753/315, and 1572/695). The dimensions of space and time set boundaries for our physical bodies and presumably for our conscious minds; but for Jung the unconscious mind—the psychic or spiritual part of the psyche—transcends these boundaries. His implication is that psychic functioning is real. Certain that he is right about psi, Jung even chides the skeptics in our midst: “The fact that we are unable to imagine a form of existence without space and time by no means proves that such an

existence is in itself impossible" (CW 8, 814/414). It might be more precise, however, to say not that the collective unconscious is timeless but that it transcends and includes all time—past, present, and future.

Like other things in Jungian psychology, however, his theory of time is not without at least one contradiction. When he writes about future time in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, he argues that "it would be absurd to suppose that a situation which does not yet exist and will only occur in the future could transmit itself as a phenomenon of energy to a receiver in the present" (CW 8, 840/435). But in his essay "On Synchronicity" he states, in connection with J. B. Rhine's experiments with precognition, that future time "can become psychically relative" (CW 8, 978/527), which presumably means that a future event *could* transmit itself to someone in the present. The latter may be Jung's true position because the following remark in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* seems to trump all others: "What happens successively in time is simultaneous in the mind of God" (CW 8, 967/518, n. 17).³

For Jung, time is relative when the mind is in any of the three states that he mentions in "The Concept of the Unconscious": dream, active imagination, and trance. Each of these states can touch the transpersonal and transtemporal material of the collective unconscious. For example, active imagination—"a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration" (CW 9i, 101/49)—enables a kind of trance state in which one can converse with an archetype or dream image. In this way, one can access the collective unconscious and be connected not just to past time, as when Jung notes that his patient sees imagery straight out of ancient Greece, but also to future events. As Shakespeare suggests in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, dream, imagination, and vision enable contact with the collective unconscious; but dream is the only one that hints at the timeless nature of that transpersonal realm, as an analysis of Hermia's experience will reveal.

HERMIA'S DREAM

Hermia's dream—the only actual dream in the entire play—is a logical starting point; and there is little wonder that interpretation has emphasized the sexual implications of its snake image. Just prior to falling asleep, the virgin Hermia asks Lysander to "lie further off yet" (2.2.50). In the first part of the following passage, she is still dreaming:

Help me, Lysander, help me! Do thy best
 To pluck this crawling serpent from my breast!
 Ay me, for pity! What a dream was here!
 Lysander, look how I do quake with fear.
 Methought a serpent ate my heart away,
 And you sat smiling at his cruel prey. (2.2.151–56)

Hermia's dream has received a wide variety of interpretations. The snake, an obvious masculine image (Garber), enacts Hermia's anxiety about Lysander's sexual desire, with the heart standing in for the vagina (P. Holland). In this respect, the dream is "day residue" (N. Holland) or a "'true' dream" (Young), but her anxiety now takes the form of a "shock" dream (Boss), with eating as a substitute for sexual possession (N. Holland). If Lysander's smile suggests the malevolent opposite of his modestly lying "further off," then the dream identifies "the doubleness of lovers and the separation of the two aspects of her own lover" or, in a word, "*duplicity*" (N. Holland; emphasis in the original), an appropriate foreshadowing of the confusion to come. Insofar as Hermia's dream reflects her waking anxieties, it illustrates the idea that "in a dream you are able to see what you are thinking as it occurs" (States).⁴

The differences between Freudian and Jungian dream theory set the stage for a new reading of Hermia's dream. To begin with, whereas Freud would see the snake only as a manifestation of sexual anxiety, Jung would add that the sexual reading just summarized illustrates dreams' compensatory function, which is the psyche's "self-regulation," or its "bringing up everything that is repressed or neglected or unknown" (CW 8, 483/250). In Jung's view, "the vast majority of dreams are compensatory. They always stress the other side in order to maintain the psychic equilibrium. But the compensation of mood is not the only purpose of the dream picture: The dream also provides a *mental corrective*" (CW7, 170/104; Jung's emphasis). Because Hermia rebuffs Lysander's delicate advance, her dream compensates; she represses sexuality while awake, and sexuality in the form of the snake attacks while she sleeps.

Jung and Freud also differ on the importance of latent versus manifest dream content. For Freud, a dream image represents such latent content as a wish that has been repressed into the unconscious; for example, the snake, as phallus, represents Hermia's desire for sex. Jung is not opposed to finding latent content in a dream image, but his dream theory is much more flexible and inclusive: "For instance it

is quite incorrect to assume that a snake, when it appears in dreams, always has a merely phallic meaning; just as incorrect as it is to deny that it may have a phallic meaning in some cases. Every symbol has at least two meanings. The very frequent sexual meaning of dream-symbols is at most one of them" (CW 4, 539/236–37).

What kind of latent content is encoded in a snake image? Besides representing an unfulfilled wish embedded in the personal unconscious, the snake may also emanate from the collective unconscious, the "phylogenetic substratum" or transpersonal "treasure-house of primordial images" (CW 9i, 518/286; 7, 110/70), which Jung considered "archaically wise."⁵ That the snake represents both instinct and wisdom (the qualities of the collective unconscious) is logical given snakes' lidless eyes and preference for dark and concealed places like caves, appropriate geographical emblems of psychological space (CW 13, 448/333, 118/89). The snake also symbolizes danger and the resulting fear of death, and "[i]n youth it denotes fear of life" (CW 17, 219/125; 5, 681/439). Being both *from* and *of* the unconscious, Hermia's snake image, as latent content, directly reflects the possibility of death in Athens and the woods, and it wisely dramatizes the dangers of acting on sexual instinct.

Jung's emphasis on dreams' *manifest* content, however, qualifies the Freudian reading more dramatically. Sometimes a snake is just a snake. Rather than pointing to something else, the dream image itself is significant: "The dream itself wants nothing; it is a self-evident content, a plain natural fact like the sugar in the blood of a diabetic or the fever in a patient with typhus" (CW 7, 162/101). For Freud, dreams conceal; but for Jung, they reveal. The serpent, *as* serpent, is for Jung an image of transformation and regeneration (CW 5, 410/269, 676/436). "The prototype of this renewal is the snake casting its skin every year, a phenomenon round which primitive fantasy has always played" (CW 11, 348/228).⁶ Oberon uses the same detail just before he applies the transforming flower-juice to Titania's eyes: "And there the snake throws her enameled skin, / Weed wide enough to wrap a fairy in" (2.1.254–55). As if to ward off her impending love for Bottom-as-ass, the First Fairy sings,

You spotted snakes with double tongue,
Thorny hedgehogs, be not seen;
Newts and blindworms, do no wrong;
Come not near our Fairy Queen. (2.2.9–12)

In other words, the First Fairy uses the snake image to signify the transformation that awaits her at the hands of Oberon.

Whereas Titania's transformation is from resistance to submission to her husband's will, Hermia's involves the precarious passage that her emotions must endure—the temporary loss of her father's and her suitor's love and the transferal of her main allegiance from her father to her future husband. Although it is appropriate for the snake in her dream to be eating her heart (the symbol of her emotions), the image's suggestion of transformation and renewal is not limited to the dreamer herself, for dreams can "foretell in accurate detail specific future events (beyond the next day) that are of importance to more people than just the dreamer."⁷ Indeed, insofar as Hermia and Titania are not alone in enduring emotional perturbations, the lovers' adventures in the night woods can be considered an extension of the dream: their confusion enacts manifest content, the heart-eating transformation signified by the shedding of the serpent's skin.

Hermia's dream thus heralds not only the play's positive conclusion but also the concrete particulars of her individual ordeal, and its anticipatory function has implications for dreams' relationship to time. Two scenes later, when she believes that Demetrius has killed Lysander, she rebukes him by saying: "Could not a worm, an adder, do so much? / An adder did it; for with doubler tongue / Than thine, thou serpent, never adder stung" (3.2.71–73). If Demetrius is analogous both to the snake that eats her heart and to the cruel Lysander who indifferently watches her agony in the dream, much as he will ignore her in his pursuit of Helena, then Shakespeare suggests that dreams transcend temporal boundaries. It may be that "the unconscious contains timeless contents that have not yet appeared in consciousness,"⁸ and the timeless nature of the collective unconscious accounts for the precognitive nature of Hermia's dream. If Demetrius as a supposed murderer is the snake, then the play illustrates Jung's notion that "dreams can have an anticipatory or prognostic aspect, and [that] their interpreter will be well advised to take this aspect into account" (*CW* 18, 545/237). As Garber rightly says of Shakespearean dreaming in general, a dream can take "the dreamer momentarily out of time . . . leading him toward . . . an accession of knowledge."⁹ Shakespeare's snake imagery in Hermia's dream and in her later experience with Demetrius illustrates this phenomenon.

The snake may emanate from the personal or the collective unconscious, but the precognitive link to Demetrius may also be the

soul's contribution to Hermia's dream. For Jung, it is quite possible that a dream is a whisper from the spirit world, for "[j]ust as, in its lower reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic-material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into a 'spiritual' form about which we know as little as we do about the fundamental basis for instinct" (*CW* 8, 380/183).¹⁰ Although it is not entirely clear what Jung means by "spiritual" in this context, it may be, as Gordon Globus suggests, that "while dreaming, we partake of the power of immanent Spirit, the infinite Godhead that creates the cosmos."¹¹ If that is the case and dreams can transcend the medium of time, then the psyche may be like a series of concentric circles: consciousness is surrounded by the personal and collective unconscious, and the whole is surrounded by spirit. The further out from consciousness one goes, the more timeless one's experience becomes. To the extent that Hermia's dream connects her conscious mind to unconscious or spiritual content, the more timeless her conscious apprehension becomes.

THESEUS ON THE IMAGINATION

Whereas Hermia's dream has been considered an emblem of her insecure sexuality but may actually herald positive transformation and comedic renewal, Theseus's well-known critique of the imagination (5.1.2–22), though sounding Elizabethan and Platonic, may also relate to the realm of the archetypes by suggesting that the poet, by means of the imagination, can access the collective unconscious *without* dreaming. When Hippolyta remarks, "'Tis strange, my Theseus, that these lovers speak of," he replies:

More strange than true. I never may believe
 These antique fables nor these fairy toys.
 Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
 Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
 More than cool reason ever comprehends.
 The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
 Are of imagination all compact.
 One sees more devils than vast hell can hold;
 That is the madman. The lover, all as frantic,
 Sees Helen's beauty in a brow [gypsy] of Egypt.
 The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;

And as imagination bodies forth
 The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
 Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
 A local habitation and a name.
 Such tricks hath strong imagination
 That, if it would but apprehend some joy,
 It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
 Or in the night, imagining some fear,
 How easy is a bush supposed a bear! (5.1.1–22)

Theseus's remark reflects the Elizabethan conception of the psyche's main parts: reason, will, and passion or affectation. Reason rules passion with the help of the will, and common sense helps out with psychic integration. The role of imagination or its synonym fantasy is twofold: to help the five senses report or reflect information, which then becomes part of the memory; and to create images based on remembered information. Trouble arises, though, from the fact that reason resides in the rational soul, whereas imagination is part of the sensible soul. As Ruth Leila Anderson notes in *Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays*, the imagination has a "dualistic relation to reason and the affectations." It "not only evolves ideas and, under normal behavior, recommends to the consideration of reason those that are of sufficient magnitude, but it also communicates with the heart, where the affections reside."¹² Theseus is apparently describing both processes. The imagination affects the lunatic and the lover negatively through the senses and the passions, but it also enables ideas to come to the poet. Theseus is suspicious of all three persons, however, because the imagination can imbalance the psyche by swaying the passions to influence the will; together, passion and will can overthrow reason. Recent Shakespeare critics have supported this view. R. W. Dent observes that imagination is an integral part of the perceptual process because it both reports and invents; and, if all goes well, a healthy psyche results. The trouble, as William Rossky notes, is when "passion and imagination are in league against reason," for the result is misperception and psychic imbalance.¹³ Imagination, says Anderson, "is likely to become a foe to reason; in fact, Elizabethan writers agree in describing this faculty as the general source of all our evils and disorderly passions."¹⁴ Given this prevailing sentiment, the duke's assessment of the imagination is perfectly understandable, though not without the irony that he is a lover who speaks in blank verse.

What has come down to us as a coherent body of “Elizabethan psychology,” however, is really nothing of the sort, as Louise C. Turner Forest points out in her famous article, “A Caveat for Critics against Invoking Elizabethan Psychology.” She argues that what modern critics assume to be “a clear, precise, unified, concrete system” was actually “a hodge-podge of utterly contradictory ‘facts,’ conflicting theories, hopelessly inter-mixed, overlapping terms, and extremely variable and ill-kept distinctions.”¹⁵ Her main concern is the reductive reading of Hamlet’s melancholy that Elizabethan psychology invites, but she is equally critical of the reason-will-passion triad in the following statement by Anderson: “In the light of Elizabethan thinking, they [words from Richard III’s first soliloquy] probably mean the wilful [*sic*] subjection of intellect to a mode of thought and action guided by the desires of the heart.”¹⁶ The triad was certainly an operative principle in Shakespeare’s time (one need look no further than his Sonnets for good examples); but the critic’s objection—much like Jung’s view of the Freudian psychological mode—is that it reduces literary criticism to a diagnostic function.

Given the reductive, if not wholly inaccurate, view of the imagination in Elizabethan psychology, one may turn to a more reliable statement on the imagination—Coleridge’s helpful distinctions in the *Biographia Literaria* among primary imagination, secondary imagination, and fancy—as a step toward a Jungian reading of Theseus’s speech.

The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary [imagination] I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the *kind* of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially *vital*, even as all objects (*as* objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary memory it [fancy] must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.¹⁷

The primary imagination, which is involuntary and usually unconscious, plays a key role in the cognitive process because it mediates “not only between sensation and perception, but also between perception and thought.”¹⁸ Whereas the primary imagination actively perceives objects and frames concepts, the secondary imagination, which is voluntary and conscious, re-forms images and thoughts in a way that makes poetry. Thus far, the artistic process is intrapsychic and therefore akin to Jung’s psychological mode. For Coleridge, as for the Elizabethans, the imagination accounts for both perception and creation, with Coleridge’s term “fancy” being equivalent to the Elizabethan notion of memory. Fancy is a passive and uncreative act that deals in “fixities”; rather than remaking anything, it merely receives the material produced by the primary and secondary imaginations.

What Theseus calls “shaping fantasies” sounds like the synthetic nature of the secondary imagination, which “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create.” In light of Bottom’s transformation into a creature half man and half ass, the fact that *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* illustrates Coleridge’s secondary imagination is unmistakable. As Rossky states, “Elizabethan doctrine pictured imagination as almost literally cutting up its images into parts and then rejoining them into forms that never exist in the external world of nature”—very much like the secondary imagination, “that synthetic and magical power” whose goal is “the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities.”¹⁹ For the Elizabethans, though, there is an extrapsychic factor that brings artistic creation in line with Jung’s visionary mode—what Sir Philip Sidney calls “a divine force, farre above mans wit” and “a divine furie.”²⁰ He places the former remark in the context of Plato’s *Ion*, which states that “a poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him.”²¹ In other words, something in poetic creation transcends reason and even imagination. Thus the question becomes how Theseus’s speech suggests the imagination’s relationship to the psychological, the visionary, and the divine.

Theseus’s main point is that the imagination can be troublesome when passion is active and reason is inactive, and he gives various examples of troubles that arise in the sensation-perception-thought nexus. The lover’s passions (“seething brains”) lead him into a type of thinking that eludes reason. Seeing a beloved person in a way that she is not (inaccurate reflection) is what the duke means by seeing “Helen’s

beauty in a brow of Egypt.” *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* begins with a similar example of how love can distort one’s thinking: Egeus accuses Lysander of having infected Hermia’s fantasy with poetry, song, and gifts (1.1.22–45). Like the lover, the madman may illustrate passion’s corrupting influence on perception, but madness may also embody a less reflective form of creation. Given the Elizabethans’ tendency to mythologize psychological disorder, as when Hamlet wonders if the devil is taking advantage of his melancholy (2.2.599–605), it is not clear whether the madman sees actual devils. If he “sees more devils than vast hell can hold,” meaning more than really exist, then the mind is either seeing real devils but exaggerating their number (perception as inaccurate reflection) or creating devils where none exist, in which case he is a foil to the poet’s positive creation from “airy nothing.” Regardless, it is clear from Theseus’s claim that “lovers and madmen have such seething brains, / Such shaping fantasies” that he is highly critical of their misuse of the imagination. Such inappropriate passion makes them “apprehend / More than cool reason ever comprehends.” Obviously the same principle obtains in Theseus’s concluding remark that fear makes one imagine a bush to be a bear.

Despite the claim that Theseus’s statement on the poet is “far removed from Coleridge’s idea of imagination,”²² interpretation of the duke’s critique has centered on imagination’s role as a reporter or reflector, with reason leading to accurate perception. In this spirit, Rossky states, “Poetic imagination is disciplined imagination.”²³ It may be, however, that Theseus’s poet connects not just with the intrapsychic world of the primary and secondary imagination—Jung’s psychological mode—but also with a realm that transcends the individual psyche altogether. The critical consensus that Theseus is speaking of the realm of Platonic Forms²⁴ admits two critical controversies. First, does the poet genuinely apprehend something transcendent? One view is that “the poet cannot come into direct contact with the unchanging Ideas” (Weiner), but it is also possible that the poet does see the unchanging Forms (Olson), that he “apprehends directly something that most mortals cannot readily apprehend” (Bryant).²⁵ Second, is reason active in the poet’s grasp of the transcendent? Reason may play a role (the poet’s “imaginings [are] apprehensible in more rational terms” [Olsen]), but it is also possible that reason hinders the poet’s apprehension of the transcendent—that one perceives the transcendent

by imagination alone (Zimbardo), the latter being more in the spirit of Plato's *Ion*.²⁶

How does a Jungian reading of Theseus's speech respond to these controversies? To begin with, Jung shares with Elizabethan psychology the sense that the imagination has reflective and creative functions: "Imagination is the reproductive or creative activity of the mind in general. It is not a special faculty, since it can come into play in all the basic forms of psychic activity, whether *thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition*" (CW 6, 722/433; Jung's emphasis). In other words, Jung holds that the imagination plays a more integral role in the psyche than Elizabethan psychology or even Coleridgean literary theory proposes; for it relates not only to the senses, the emotions, and the conscious thought process but also to a part of the mind removed from conscious apprehension. Furthermore, because imagination operates apart from reason, it enables one to gain conscious access to both parts of the Jungian unconscious where art originates. For Jung, the realm that the poet apprehends is not transcendent or divine but immanent and transpersonal; and creativity is not an outward reason-guided flight to a supernatural realm (a hyperbolic glance "from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven") but an imaginative descent into the psyche to the realm of archetypes, the imagistic storehouse that is our connection across time and space to the human condition. Jung makes it clear in "Psychology and Literature" that the collective unconscious is indeed the source of visionary creation: "Here everything is reversed. The experience that furnishes the material for artistic expression is no longer familiar. It is something strange that derives its existence from the hinterland of man's mind, as if it had emerged from the abyss of prehuman ages, or from a superhuman world of contrasting light and darkness. It is a primordial experience which surpasses man's understanding and to which in his weakness he may easily succumb" (CW 15, 141/90).

He also states that "something suprapersonal . . . transcends our understanding to the same degree that the author's consciousness was in abeyance during the process of creation" (CW 15, 116/75). This visionary mode is not altogether different from Sidney's conception of "a divine furie." Jung adds, "The artist is not a person endowed with free will who seeks his own ends, but one who allows art to realize its purpose through him . . . he is a 'collective man,' a vehicle and moulder of the unconscious psychic life of mankind" (CW 15, 157/101). But in the visionary mode, it is the *archetype* that seizes the poet's pen,

whereas in the psychological mode the poet retains some degree of conscious, rational control.

To summarize, we asked whether the poet touches something transcendent and whether reason is active or passive. In the Jungian visionary mode, the poet touches something transpersonal rather than something divinely or Platonically transcendent, and reason is inactive in the process of artistic production. Still, transcendent and transpersonal may be closely analogous, for Platonic Forms and Jungian archetypes may be different ways of saying the same thing. Paul A. Olson refers to “the rulers of fairyland [as] Platonic archetypes.”²⁷ Jung himself blends the languages of psychology and philosophy when he refers to archetypes as forms, pre-existent forms, universal forms, and universal thought forms. Moreover, it is clear from Jung’s complementary definitions that archetypes are a fitting object for an imagination that both reflects and creates. In “The Concept of the Collective Unconscious” Jung writes that an archetype is “literally a pre-existent form” (*CW* 9i, 89/43); but if, as he maintains in 1964, an archetype is merely “a tendency to form . . . representations of a motif,”²⁸ then the emphasis in the creative process falls on the role of human agency. The latter characterizes Theseus’s sense that the “imagination bodies forth / The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen / Turns them to shapes.” On the one hand, the poet’s job is to reflect what exists but is unknown to “cool reason”—airy *something* rather than “airy nothing.”²⁹ On the other, by embodying and shaping this archetypal material into a poem, the poet gives it “a local habitation and a name” and performs a public service that sets him apart from the madman and the lover whose passion-driven imagination distorts their inner lives. The “airy nothing” equates nicely with the subconscious (Garber), and the poet’s relation to archetype makes it what Thomas Berry calls “the means of making the transition from the genetic to the cultural,”³⁰ which echoes Jung’s phrase “the transition from the natural to the cultural phase” (*CW* 7, 114/74). That is, humans create themselves rather than merely following their genetic coding as would a bush or a bear. This cocreative process involves manifesting unconscious content, which is why for Jung the unconscious “is the very source of the creative impulse” (*CW* 8, 339/157). Or as he says elsewhere in a passage that seems to echo Shakespeare’s emphasis on “shaping fantasies,” “The creative process . . . consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the

language of the present” (*CW* 15, 130/82). But “the primordial experience . . . is so dark and amorphous that it requires the related mythological imagery to give it form” (*CW* 15, 151/96), and that is exactly what Shakespeare provides in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* when he explores the unconscious in terms of figures from classical and native British mythology.³¹

By “doubt[ing] that the [poet’s] vision is a genuine primordial experience” and by emphasizing the similarity between the madman, lover, and poet, Theseus plays the rationalist whom Jung has in mind when he says in “Psychology and Literature” that the poet’s visionary experience “has about it a fatal suggestion of vague metaphysics, so that we feel obliged to intervene in the name of well-intentioned reasonableness. . . . Anyone who does not have distinct leanings towards the occult will be inclined to dismiss visionary experiences as ‘lively fantasy’ or ‘poetic licence’ [*sic*]” (*CW* 15, 147/93–94). The duke is undoubtedly critical of the madman and the lover, and the fact that he himself is a lover may ironically signal a residue of the hard-heartedness that leads him to lay out Hermia’s options in act 1. Those who believe that Theseus sets the poet apart from the others evidently overlook the fact that he groups the poet’s activities together with the madman’s and the lover’s under the rubric of “such tricks” in line 18.³² It is not that Theseus praises the imagination or that he exonerates the poet but that the duke’s critique highlights the playwright’s *positive* view of the poetic imagination; and Shakespeare’s position is compatible with Jung’s notion that artists “restore the psychic balance” of a person or an age. Thus “the work of the artist meets the psychic needs of the society in which he lives, and therefore means more than his personal fate, whether he is aware of it or not. Being essentially the instrument of his work, he is subordinate to it, and we have no right to expect him to interpret it for us. He has done his utmost by giving it form, and must leave the interpretation to others and to the future” (*CW* 15, 161/104).

As a man of reason, Theseus, like a Freudian, does not take the lovers’ experience in the night woods (their “dream”) at face value; instead he locates the latent content (a dysfunctional imagination) in the personal unconscious. Like a Jungian, Hippolyta focuses instead on the manifest content and believes the lovers because they all tell the same story of instinct out of rational control. That they all tell the same story highlights the important role that others can play in affirming a dream’s content, particularly the archetypes whose meaning

is transpersonal. Her statement, however, does not continue Shakespeare's praise of the poet; her reply is not, as Andrew D. Weiner claims, "an acknowledgement of the poet's power" to convey Platonic ideas.³³ She and her husband are having a conversation about the lovers' experience in the woods: she calls it strange; he calls it "more strange than true" and explains why he believes that they just imagined it. She replies by noting that it must have actually happened (they did not imagine it) because they all tell the same story. As with the ghost in *Hamlet*, if multiple persons perceive the same thing, a supernatural phenomenon gains a degree of credibility that Theseus, the rational man, refuses to acknowledge. Shared experience, Hippolyta suggests, gives the lovers' experiences the weight of objective reality. What they have experienced is bizarre, and had any of them been alone she or he would have experienced the epistemological quandary in which Bottom, the weaver, finds himself.

BOTTOM'S "MOST RARE VISION"

Bottom's "vision" combines elements of both Hermia's dream and Theseus's critique of the imagination: the vision is rooted in the collective unconscious; and its natural images (Mustardseed et al.)—like Hermia's snake—suggest the psyche's link to instinct and the natural world. The imagination may enable one to access the world of archetypes, and Bottom's vivid imagination certainly enables vivid experience. He wishes to play all the parts in *Pyramus and Thisbe*, and he clearly has a strong imagination (though bad poetics) when he portrays himself, as Hercules, commenting on "the raging rocks and shivering shocks" (1.2.26–27). As Montaigne writes, "*A strong imagination creates the event*," say the scholars.³⁴ On the other hand, although Bottom's imagination may enable his connection to the world of archetypes, the Pauline language following his transformation back into human form suggests that the other role of the collective unconscious is to connect us to spirit. Much like a dream, the imagination provides access to archetypes, but Bottom's description suggests that his experience has pushed beyond the reaches of the collective unconscious.

As an emanation of the personal unconscious, Bottom's vision may be "a parodic fantasy of infantile narcissism and dependency" in connection with Simon Forman's Oedipal dream of Queen Elizabeth,³⁵

but a Jungian reading of Bottom's experience may also illuminate his night with Titania. Like Hermia's dream, which balances and corrects her repressed waking sexuality, Bottom's vision plays a compensatory role. For an unmarried laborer near the bottom of the social hierarchy, nothing can be more pleasingly compensatory than the luxurious sensuality of having the Fairy Queen rub his ears in celebration of his ass-like nature. As Garrett Stewart rightly notes, "In the dream it was Bottom the ass and it was not, for it was [also] Bottom the lothario."³⁶ The film version of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* starring Kevin Kline as Bottom brings the vision's compensatory function into even clearer focus by giving him a shrewish wife as a foil to Michelle Pfeiffer's Titania.³⁷ But whether Bottom is single or married, the vision's emphasis on sensuality does not so much correct as compensate. For James L. Calderwood, however, the wood is "a kind of crazed mirror of the Athenian world," and the key detail is Bottom's *lack* of interest in sexuality.³⁸ If the vision of the Fairy Queen is part of *Theseus's* dream, as Elliott Krieger suggests,³⁹ then Bottom, not as lothario but as courteous celibate, compensates for the duke's impatience for conjugal union: Theseus is lustful and powerful; Bottom is neither lustful nor powerful.

Although Bottom's experience in the night woods may suggest that the personal unconscious, as in a dream, compensates for his waking life, the critical consensus is that the weaver has a visionary glimpse beyond both the physical world and the psychological realm.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the collective unconscious offers a partial explanation for Bottom's vision. It is now possible to clarify Jung's statement in "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1947) that the collective unconscious, in its upper reaches, connects us to spirit. It may be that the vision is spiritual to the extent that it is archetypal: "That is, the archetypes have, when they appear, a distinctly numinous character which can only be described as "spiritual," if "magical" is too strong a word. . . . This aspect deserves the epithet "spiritual" above all else. It not infrequently happens that the archetype appears in the form of a *spirit* in dreams or fantasy-products, or even comports like a ghost" (*CW* 8, 405/205). Elsewhere Jung states, "It is certainly much more difficult to believe that a visionary experience can be real," and "what appears in the vision is the imagery of the collective unconscious" (*CW* 15, 147/93, 152/97).

A connection to the archetypes may also account, in part, for the visionary experiences of Paul, whose language Bottom borrows. After

identifying his “most rare vision” as a “dream,” Bottom notes, “The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what my dream was” (4.1.201–12). In the Geneva version, Paul states, “But as it is written, The things which eye hathe not sene, nether eare hathe heard, nether came into man’s heart, *are*, which God hathe prepared for them that loue him” (1 Cor. 2:9).⁴¹ Shakespeare critics have considered Bottom’s statement to be an absurdly amusing (Noble) and “memorably-distressed Biblical passage regarding the general confines of human perception” (Greenfield), a “travesty analogy” (Battenhouse).⁴² More importantly, Bottom’s twisting of the allusion contrasts with Paul’s comment on perception. Whereas Paul suggests that the transcendent realm that awaits human souls in the afterlife is not accessible to the physical senses, Bottom’s language *enacts* the Jungian point that the collective unconscious is a realm of images, not words. If the vision is of the personal unconscious, then it may be located in Bottom’s “developmental phase” (Hinely); but if it is from the collective unconscious, synesthesia signals not so much an “archetypal sacred moment” (Zimbardo) as a sacred *archetypal* moment.⁴³ In other words, the distinction is between a typical sacred moment involving spiritual transport and an experience of archetypes that seems to have sacred characteristics. Bottom’s adaptation of Pauline language thus illustrates the way in which the spiritual and the transpersonal/archetypal are closely aligned in Jungian thought.

Nonetheless, the breakdown of language indicates that the transport may be not only inward into the unconscious but also outward into the realm of spirits. This distinction is roughly what Robert H. West calls the inner mystery (the human heart) and the outer mystery (“the cosmic mystery, the mystery of transcendence, of ultimate origin” [4]).⁴⁴ Perhaps with such outer mystery in mind, Roy Battenhouse connects Bottom’s allusion to 1 Corinthians to Paul’s experience in 2 Corinthians 12:2–4,⁴⁵ in which he expresses uncertainty about the circumstances of a visionary event: “I know a man in Christ about fourteen yeres agoe, (whether *he were* in the bodie, I can not tel, or out of the bodie, I can not tel: God knoweth) which was taken vp into the thirde heauen. And I knowe suche a man (whether in the bodie, or out of the bodie, I can not tel: God knoweth.) How that he was taken vp into Paradise, & heard wordes which can not be spoken, which are not possible for man to vtter.”⁴⁶ Paul’s statement includes the classic dilemma of the mystic: while not doubting that the experience is real,

one is unsure whether it took place in the body or out of the body and is unable to capture it in words. Language designed to describe the three-dimensional world is at a disadvantage in the multidimensional realm of spirits. Did Paul and Bottom, like Hermia and Theseus's poet, merely delve down into the vast reaches of the collective unconscious, or did they move beyond even the transpersonal into the realm of disembodied spirits? And if they did the latter, was the experience, to use David Ray Griffin's terms, "intrasomatic" (in-the-body) or "extrasomatic" (out-of-body)?⁴⁷ In other words, did Paul merely receive a signal from some spiritual target, or did he travel there astrally?

The view in our own age is that "taken vp" means "being lifted up, at least temporarily, to a supramundane realm"⁴⁸; but on such a point Jung is more cautious than credulous, despite his own profound near-death experience in 1944 and his understanding that, in alchemy, "[t]he soul functions . . . in the body, but has the greater part of its function . . . outside the body" (*CW* 12, 396/769–80).⁴⁹ He says of mystical experience in a chapter called "The Ascent of the Soul" (1946), "As in real death, the soul departs from the body and returns to its heavenly source" (*CW* 16, 475/267), but he notices in his patients "the existence of subjectively experienced levitations in moments of extreme derangement" and calls this experience "a suggestive reminder of the phenomenon called the 'witch's trance,' and also of the parapsychic levitations reported of many saints" such as Augustine's reverie at the end of the *Confessions*, which Jung compares to the poet's ability to transcend everyday experience (*CW* 16, 477/268; 15, 149/95). Here is a slightly different version of the mystic's dilemma: did one genuinely experience something outside the confines of the mind-brain nexus, or is one just crazy? Neither Bottom's highly vivid imagination nor his social and educational background fully accounts for his confusion. Insofar as he is not a madman, his Pauline language strongly suggests that his vision is spiritual in some way that transcends the archetypal; therefore, his synesthesia may relate not only to the archetypes' nonverbal, imagistic nature but also to the spirit world, which is ineffable even for a man of words like Paul. Bottom's vision, of course, is squarely focused on the physical; but if it provides an allegory—or actual instance—of a spiritual event, then his befuddlement betokens the genuineness of such an event because visionary experience scrambles the earthly senses.⁵⁰

Bottom and Paul both report something numinous and ineffable, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* thereby hints, through an allegory

of spiritual experience, at what happens after physical death when our spiritual essence is no longer encapsulated by the body. It is here that Shakespeare and Jung part company. Regarding the afterlife, Jung is more concerned with discovering how spirituality reflects the psyche than with making “a metaphysical statement” (*CW* 8, 585/309, n. 5). At his most pessimistic, he writes in “The Soul and Death” (1934), “Therefore I shall certainly not assert now that one must believe death to be a second birth leading to survival beyond the grave,” though he states that all the great religions think so (*CW* 8, 804/408). If souls are linked to the personal unconscious and spirits to the collective unconscious (*CW* 8, 591/312), spiritual manifestation is simply a projection of unconscious content. Although Jung acknowledges “universal reports of . . . post-mortem phenomena in the form of ghosts and hauntings,” he is convinced that “ghosts and suchlike have to do with *psychic* facts of which our academic wisdom refuses to take cognizance, although they appear clearly enough in our dreams” (*CW* 8, 598/316; my emphasis).

The notion that ghosts are ambulant archetypes has some relevance to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Puck speaks of wandering ghosts that “troop home to churchyards”:

Damnèd spirits all,
That in crossways and floods have burial,
Already to their wormy beds are gone.
For fear lest day should look their shames upon,
They willfully themselves exile from light
And must for aye consort with black-browed night. (3.2.382–87)

Shakespeare is referring to suicides who were buried at crossroads without the usual religious rites, but a Jungian interpretation suggests that spirits are mere projections that lack “direct association with the ego” (*CW* 8, 585/309). If from the personal unconscious, the ghosts, as in Weston A. Gui’s exaggerated Freudian reading, may be “a distorted projection of Bottom’s fear as a self-exile of sexuality into the darkness of night . . . Bottom knows . . . that sexual things go on between the parents at night.”⁵¹ If from the collective unconscious, ghosts, as Puck’s remark implies, may be the archetypal representation of suicidal despair.

Shakespeare, however, would not consider ghosts to be mere projections; for him, as in Jung’s statement on primitive peoples (*CW*

8,577/305), ghosts are the spirits of the dead. The Bible takes immortality as a given, and so does Shakespeare (Burgess); therefore, French critic E. H. A. Sherar incorrectly states that “it is on the boundaries of the invisible world that Shakespeare’s vision fails.”⁵² The playwright gives us, through Puck’s narration, spirits that are not in the heaven of 2 Corinthians, the purgatory mentioned in *Hamlet* (1.5.10–21), or merely a particular character’s unconscious mind. As suicides, the ghosts are rather the *disembodiment* of Pyramus and Thisbe’s suicidal despair, which corresponds to the Athenian lovers’ potential fate if the chaos of the night woods (the unconscious) should totally overcome rational restraint. It is not just that they may end up as dead as Ovid’s characters but also that they may get stuck in a thought pattern—in this world but not of it, unable to move on, and perhaps not even conscious that they are actually dead. Death lies in wait for the lovers, but so does something even worse—a perpetual state between life and the sort of proper afterlife that is implicit in Bottom’s vision and Paul’s experiences.

Pyramus and Thisbe

The mechanicals’ performance of *Pyramus and Thisbe*, like the three main passages already discussed, can also be helpfully interpreted as a commentary on the unconscious mind. We begin with a significant image—moonlight. It would be convenient to say, with Gui, that “the moon *never shines at all* during the whole four-day-and-night period represented by the play” (Gui’s emphasis),⁵³ for then the moonlight in the play-within-the-play would highlight the lovers’ restorative return to Athens. But that interpretation is not possible because characters make various references to the presence of moonlight. In the play’s first speech, Theseus notes that “This old moon . . . lingers my desires” (1.1.4). Quince tells his fellow mechanicals to “Meet me in the palace wood, a mile without the town, by moonlight” (1.2.92–93). Oberon says, “Ill met by moonlight, proud Titania” (2.1.60). Titania refers to “our moonlight revels” (2.1.141). Snout asks, “Doth the moon shine that night we play our play?” This detail is important because Quince hopes “to bring the moonlight into a chamber” because “Pyramus and Thisbe meet by moonlight.” Bottom therefore calls for a calendar or almanac and says, “Find out moonshine, find out moonshine” (3.1.50). Quince replies, “Yes, it doth shine that

night.” Bottom realizes, therefore, that they may simply “leave a casement of the great chamber window where we play open, and the moon may shine in at the casement” (3.1.51–54). After Bottom is transformed, Titania tells her attendants “To fan the moonbeams from his sleeping eyes” (3.1.168). And a bit later she notes that “The moon . . . looks with a watery eye” (3.1.193). With so much evidence for the presence of moonlight, it is incorrect to claim that the moon does not shine at all during the play.

A more likely view relates to Jung’s sense that the moon corresponds to the kind of irrationality that characterizes the events in the night woods. He notes, for example, Pico’s view—that “the sphere of the moon” relates to the appetites, strong passions, “or, in a word, *concupiscentia*” (CW 14, 171/143–44)—which brings to mind Theseus’s statements about the lunatic. So too, in a Jungian reading, the lion represents libido (CW 18, 1078/444). The playlet’s latent content, then, is a world of the unconscious out of control and passion run amuck, as would have been the case if Hermia had slept with (not just beside) Lysander. The lamentable tragedy of Pyramus and Thisbe clearly signifies the lust and death that the Athenian lovers narrowly avoid.

A more positive reading may also be possible in light of the compensatory nature of the playlet’s imagery. The lion, as manifest content, is synecdoche for the dangers of the natural world; and the scene offers two complementary forms of consolation: sexuality (the puns on “hole” and “stones” [5.1.157, 189]) and spirituality (moonlight).⁵⁴ Failing to find each other and achieve sexual union on the horizontal axis, the lovers are consumed by misfortune and bad judgment; moonlight’s vertical axis suggests a complementary spiritual dimension that they ignore. Attention focused entirely on one axis is inappropriate (one thinks here of Yeats’s Crazy Jane and her punning insistence on the need for both soul *and* hole).⁵⁵ R. Chris Hassel, Jr. is right that the playlet signifies “the bondage of the finite mind”;⁵⁶ and it is this limited horizontal dimension, rather than anything spiritual, that brings *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* to a close. Ironically, the wedding celebration—a celebration of passions resisted and the unconscious overcome—features a performance of the exact opposite; and the continuing potential for the unconscious to misbehave shadows forth in Oberon’s reference to Theseus’s progeny, Hippolytus, for whose death the duke will be responsible:

To the best bride-bed will we,
 Which by us shall blessed be;
 And the issue there create [Hippolytus]
 Ever shall be fortunate. (5.1.398–401)

* * *

Given the presence of psychological and spiritual elements, it is possible to suggest that *A Midsummer Night's Dream* provides what Wordsworth on Mount Snowdon—another moonlit scene—calls “the emblem of a mind / That feeds upon infinity” (14:70–71).⁵⁷ Athens represents consciousness, and the moonlit woods represent both aspects of the unconscious mind. The archetypal material of the collective unconscious can be accessed in three compatible ways: through dream, via the imagination, and in visionary experience. Woven into Bottom’s vision, however, are suggestions of a paranormal experience that transcends the mind’s conscious awareness of unconscious content. Through Pauline allusion and Puck’s mention of the “morning lark,” a symbol of the “reasonable soul’s” upward journey “toward God,”⁵⁸ Shakespeare augurs a mystical realm that transcends the psychological. Like Paul, one can access it while still alive with the help of the Holy Spirit,⁵⁹ but imagination may enable something similar. To the extent that the archetypal *is* spiritual, what Jung calls the “active imagination”—a “switching off [of] consciousness, at least to a relative extent,” meaning presumably a switching off of *reason* (CW 11, 875/537)—enables transcendent experience. In other words, reason inhibits spiritual revelation.⁶⁰ Here Shakespeare seems out of step with such orthodox thinking as John Colet’s commentary on 1 Corinthians: “By no human resources, by no faculty of reason even in its highest vigour . . . is man enabled to soar to the designs and acts of God. . . .”⁶¹ One may hear in Colet’s statement an anticipation of Wordsworth’s idea that imagination is “Reason in her most exalted mood,”⁶² but the larger point is that the imagination enables exploration that is both *in here* and *out there*. Although it is true that “Shakespeare does not make the spiritual realm a subject of the drama” and that “there are no spectacular heaven or hell [scenes] in his plays,”⁶³ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, particularly from a Jungian perspective, shows the playwright’s considerable interest in the unconscious mind and in the

infinite realm beyond the psyche where spirits dwell. It is beyond doubt that Shakespeare is depicting the visionary mode in the play; that dream, imagination, and vision are means of accessing the unconscious, whether it is personal or collective; and that vision may reach beyond the psychological realm into the spirit world.

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CHAPTER 2



MYTH AND SYZYGY

DISAPPOINTMENT IN *THE MERCHANT OF VENICE*

Myths which day has forgotten continue to be told by night, and powerful figures which consciousness has reduced to banality and ridiculous triviality are recognized again by poets and prophetically revived; therefore they can also be recognized "in changed form" by the thoughtful person.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*¹

Jung makes a statement that nicely bridges the first chapter's treatment of dreams and the present chapter's discussion of myth: "Thus, we know that dreams generally compensate the conscious situation, or supply what is lacking to it. This very important principle of dream-interpretation also applies to myths" (CW 5, 611/390). Much as Hermia's dream of the phallic snake compensates for a denial of sexuality in her waking life or as Bottom's "dream" of Titania compensates for elements of his life as a laborer, Shakespeare's use of myth in *The Merchant of Venice* may in some way qualify or critique characters' conscious situations. Indeed myth plays an important intermediary function in the visionary mode: "Myth is the natural and indispensable intermediate stage between unconscious and conscious cognition."² It is in and through myth that the unconscious speaks in literature because "all mythical figures correspond to inner psychic experiences and originally sprang from them" (CW 9i, 457/256).

As regards the play's mythical elements, John W. Velz perceives a dearth of interpretation: "The problem for critics of *The Merchant of*

Venice in the late twentieth century was that they ignored the mythic dimension. The play asks us to believe things that realism would say are impossible. If we do not accept the mythic/symbolic dimension, the play is a chaotic welter of meaningless contradictions of plausibility.”³ The word “ignored” is clearly an overgeneralization, given such works as Barbara K. Lewalski’s analysis of Shakespeare’s use of religious myth, William C. Carroll’s study of Shakespeare and Ovid, and my own treatment of the relation between classical allusions in the “love duet” that opens act 5 and disappointments earlier in the play.⁴

Prior to the publication of my article, others had indirectly addressed disappointment by identifying an underlying cause. Harvey Birenbaum discusses “the Shylock factor,” a thwarting of ideals “by irrational forces of discontent”; and Carroll speaks of “the Caliban and the Malvolio in us that would rather curse than sing.”⁵ Although Carroll discusses the love duet, neither critic fully applies the idea of human negativity to it; and no previous study, including my own article, explores Shakespeare’s use of myth in *The Merchant of Venice* from a Jungian perspective. My earlier objective was myth criticism plain and simple.

Over a decade ago, Jessica and Lorenzo’s banter at the beginning of act 5 of *The Merchant of Venice* had already been viewed as out of character with the harmony one expects at this point in a comedy, and Carroll’s remark represents the critical consensus: “The final act has begun, moreover, with what I take to be ambivalent allusions to love and metamorphosis, though Lorenzo and Jessica seem unaware of their allusions.”⁶ Although nothing on the conscious level seems amiss, the content of their allusions may signal unconscious apprehension, and failed lovers from classical myth remind the audience of human fallibility. My article, however, was the first to analyze the lovers’ allusions in terms of the possibility of future marital disappointment. It is Gratiano who best expresses the theme of disappointment when he says, “All things that are / Are with more spirit chasèd than enjoyed” (2.6.12–13). The statement directly comments on Lorenzo’s tardiness for his rendezvous with Jessica: he may derive more pleasure from striving for Jessica’s hand than he does from achieving her permanent presence in his life. There is also a sexual subtext in light of Shakespeare’s view of lustful disappointment in Sonnet 129: “Enjoyed no sooner but despisèd straight / . . . A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe.” What may be true for Lorenzo is definitely true, as we shall see, for other characters: since it is more

enjoyable to anticipate than to attain, disappointment is ascendant in the universe of the play.

By blending mythic disappointment with a discussion of myth's psychic origins and mechanics, this chapter seeks what Adrienne Rich calls "re-vision," a new view of previous work from a more informed perspective.⁷ The objective is to show that the classical allusions in the love duet not only reflect disappointing circumstances earlier in the play but also contrast with what, ultimately, does satisfy. For a theory of myth, let us turn now to Jung.

JUNG ON MYTH

A mythological study of *The Merchant of Venice* provides an opportunity to examine the relationship between myth and Jung's thorny definition of "archetype," which we have touched on in the introduction and in chapter 1. His terminology evolved and expanded over a period of about forty-five years; in this paragraph, for example, I cite works dating from 1916 to 1961. A survey that makes linear sense necessarily breaches chronological order. I begin with what appears to be Jung's definitive statement from *Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams* (1961): an archetype is "an inherited *tendency* of the human mind to form representations of mythological motifs—representations that vary a great deal without losing their basic pattern" (CW 18, 523/228; Jung's emphasis). As previously noted, an archetype is *both* the inherited human predisposition (presumably related to the human predisposition for language) to create a "representation" *and* the created representation or image itself. The collective unconscious probably does not create images; it is merely the repository or "the treasure-house of primordial images" (CW 7, 110/70). Instead, the image-making process is a *cultural* phenomenon. Like dreams, myths presumably receive cultural articulation partly through the agency of the personal unconscious, which explains Jung's sense that myths "are dreamlike structures" and the similarity between "dream-motifs" and "those of mythology" (CW 5, 28/24; 8, 474/247). Myth and dream are analogous because they both bear some relation to the personal unconscious, the seat of "unconscious fantasy" (CW 16, 17/14). Moreover, Jung has various names for culturally produced images: "mythological motifs," "mythologems," and—even more awkwardly—"archetypes" (CW 8, 325/152, 554/291). When images are personified as mythical

characters in literature, they are “archetypal figures,” which (notes Jung) Lévy-Bruhl calls “*représentations collectives*” (collective representations) and Hubert and Mauss consider “categories of the imagination” (*CW* 8, 254/122). Image-as-archetype, of course, is what Northrop Frye means when he considers archetypes to be “communicable symbols.”⁸ But the key point is that Jung has two categories in mind: the potential to create an image and the created image itself, with various synonyms and subcategories for the latter.

Given myth’s ultimate origin in the archetype’s potential for representation, mythology is a fertile area of inquiry in our pursuit of Jung’s visionary mode, artistic creation that arises from the collective unconscious. Jung is not wholly consistent, however, on myth’s origin—whether it can originate in both the collective unconscious and the personal unconscious. The ambiguity conveys both a strong bias in favor of the visionary mode and a grudging acknowledgement of Freud’s position on the personal unconscious as the source of art. Speaking in “On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry” (1922) about literature that is worthy of critical attention, Jung at first insists on binary opposition: “I am assuming that the work of art we propose to analyse, as well as being symbolic, has its source not in the *personal unconscious* of the poet, but in the sphere of unconscious mythology whose primordial images are the common heritage of mankind” (*CW* 15, 125/80; Jung’s emphasis). But he admits later in the same passage that literature emanates from the personal unconscious as well, though he dismisses it as irrelevant: “Art receives tributaries from this sphere too, but muddy ones; and their predominance, far from making a work of art a symbol, merely turns it into a symptom. We can leave this kind of art without injury and without regret to the purgative methods employed by Freud” (*CW* 15, 125/80). Mythology evidently has the same dual origin as literature in general. On the one hand, mythology is “collective psyche, and not individual psyche” (*CW* 7, 150/93). On the other, it is possible to “study the collective unconscious in two ways, either in mythology or in the analysis of the individual” (*CW* 8, 325/153). Thus Jung’s own thinking is a bit muddy because he switches back and forth from collective *or* personal to collective *and* personal. Steven F. Walker overlooks the contradictions when he states, “Jung’s theory [is] that the intrapsychic world and the world of mythology share common motifs because they derive from the same source: the world of the archetypes of the collective unconscious.”⁹ But Jung himself suggests in “On the Nature of Dreams”

(1945) a position in harmony with the dual modes proposed in "Psychology and Literature" (1930): mythological images "occur not only at all times and in all places [the collective unconscious/the visionary mode] but also in individual dreams, fantasies, visions, and delusional ideas [the personal unconscious/the psychological mode]" (CW 8, 554/291). This dual approach suggests complementarity: myth may *originate* in the collective unconscious but is *shaped* by the personal unconscious, in and through which it manifests, often as projection. It thus appears that Jung's theory evolved from a rigid denial of value in Freud's position to a holistic recognition that the personal and the collective aspects of the unconscious both play an important role in art.

Regarding the visionary mode, Jung writes: "In fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (CW 8, 325/152).¹⁰ "These images [from the collective unconscious]," he continues, "are mythological and therefore symbolical, for they express the harmony of the experiencing subject with the object experienced" (CW 8, 738/380). The phenomenon described here—explored in greater detail in the *Othello* chapter—is known as *participation mystique* (mystical participation): primitive and modern peoples alike fail to distinguish between psychic content and perceived objects, arrogating causal power to those objects, as Othello does with his myth-bearing handkerchief. This projection process is at work in myth as well. As Jung states, "A myth is essentially a product [that is, projection] of the unconscious archetype and is therefore a symbol which requires psychological interpretation" (CW 10, 625/329). In other words, "a knowledge of mythology is needed in order to grasp the meaning of a content deriving from the deeper levels of the psyche" because myths "seek to translate natural secrets into the language of consciousness and to declare the truth that is the common property of mankind"; myths "reveal the nature of the soul" (CW 8, 309/148; 13, 395/301; and 9i, 7/6).

Although myth may originate in the collective unconscious, an individual person projects neurosis onto it in ways that may enable an understanding of the personal unconscious as well. In a thorny statement, Jung describes how this process may work: "When a man meets a difficult task which he cannot master with the means at his disposal, a retrograde movement of libido automatically sets in, i.e., a regression. The libido draws away from the problem of the moment, becomes introverted, and reactivates in the unconscious a more or less primitive

analogue of the conscious situation” (*CW* 6, 314/186). By “libido” Jung means psychic energy, which may include (but is not limited to) sexual energy; and the passage expresses the idea that we see a present circumstance (a “difficult task” perhaps) in terms of the things that we already know but may not know that we know (the mythical content of the unconscious). Rather than responding directly to a situation as it really is, we may respond to it as myth would have us believe it to be. Often we are actually dealing with a projection of our own psychic content, an “analogue” rather than the situation itself. The word “analogue,” however, may be somewhat imprecise because it implies similarity, whereas compensation, which implies difference, is more in line with Jung’s understanding of myth’s function in the psyche and in society. If myth resembles dream, which compensates for conscious experience, then myth may do the same, providing not an analogy to a life situation but a corrective parallel that Walker calls “the compensatory archetypal image” to promote greater psychic balance.¹¹

Since myth originates in the collective unconscious, is processed through the personal unconscious, manifests as projection, and compensates for conscious experience, a question about myth in *The Merchant of Venice* arises. Are the mythical allusions in the love duet the unconscious mind’s neurotic way of injecting common sense into a joyous occasion, perhaps to herald disappointment, or at least register the fear of it, in Jessica and Lorenzo’s marriage? Before this hypothesis can be tested in act 5, the role of disappointment in the overall play must be established as context, for that theme will animate the love duet more strongly if it is part of a pattern of disappointing experiences.

THE THEME OF DISAPPOINTMENT

“Gratiano speaks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in all Venice. His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff; you shall seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them they are not worth the search” (1.1.114–18). So says Bassanio of his friend’s nonsense language. Yet as regards the theme of disappointment, Gratiano makes the most important statement in the play. Commenting on the tardy Lorenzo, Salerio says, “O, ten times faster Venus’ pigeons fly / To seal love’s bonds new-made than they are wont / To keep obligèd faith unforfeited” (2.6.6-8). Gratiano then expands on this idea:

That ever holds. Who riseth from a feast
 With that keen appetite that he sits down?
 Where is the horse that doth untread again
 His tedious measures with the unbated fire
 That he did pace them first? *All things that are
 Are with more spirit chased than enjoyed.*
 How like a younger or a prodigal
 The scarfèd bark puts from her native bay,
 Hugged and embracèd by the strumpet wind!
 How like the prodigal doth she return,
 With overweathered ribs and ragged sails,
 Lean, rent, and beggared by the strumpet wind! (2.6.9–20; my
 emphasis)

Paul Gaudet accurately identifies “the transitory nature of love, waning appetite, and the delusion of all promise” in Gratiano’s remark but overlooks the fact that Shakespeare is reworking a biblical motif.¹² His speech is a nautical rendering of the prodigal son story but with disappointment as a variation. There is a return, but it is not restorative. To illustrate the sense that all things are more heartily pursued than savored, Gratiano omits the part of the allusion that would qualify his assertion, stressing instead the negative effects of wind and water on the ship, which correspond to the prodigal son’s debasement and destitution. That is, Gratiano stresses the flight from the stormy sea, and by implication from the sty, rather than the safe harbor or the positive life in the father’s house. In reality, the return from sea or sty would presumably transcend expectations and be enjoyed with more spirit than it is pursued. But for Gratiano, if there even is a homecoming for son or ship, it is not the happy occasion that the parable depicts. What makes his allusion problematic is not only the omission of the welcome but also the implication that the homecoming, if it were achieved, would be a disappointment.

The fiscal ventures in the play bear out the prodigal’s experience of pursuing what does not yield the hoped-for enjoyment. Bassanio, like the prodigal son, asks father-figure Antonio for an additional loan—his earlier use of borrowed money has not met his needs or fulfilled his expectations. Shylock pursues his bond with Antonio with great gusto, but his attempt to enforce it results in personal and financial ruin rather than satisfaction—the greatest disappointment suffered by any character in the play. Antonio himself suffers fiscal disappointment: while it is fortunate that three of his ships return, Shylock’s earlier

statement conveys the more significant fact that many more have been lost: “Yet [Antonio’s] means are in supposition. He hath an argosy bound to Tripolis, another to the Indies. I understand, moreover, upon the Rialto, he hath a third at Mexico, a fourth for England, and other ventures he hath squandered abroad” (1.3.17–21). The return by the three ships ironically implies the grim specter of loss—the disappointing truth that most of Antonio’s ships, in fact, have been wrecked or are still missing—much as the prodigal’s return underscores his great financial losses. But Antonio, who denies in act 1 that the anxiety of ownership causes his sadness, also contrasts with the prodigal: the merchant has achieved fiscal success. If Gratiano’s insight holds, the hollowness of ownership causes Antonio’s melancholy. His material wealth at the opening is enjoyed with less delight than presumably it was anticipated; its hollowness, compared with the presumed joys of marriage and family, may cause Antonio’s sadness. Because his prosperity has not lived up to his expectations and does not supply the happiness for which he yearns, disappointment results, with sadness as its symptom.

Human relationships are fertile ground for disappointment as well. Antonio’s sadness stems partly from his awareness that Bassanio’s marriage to Portia diminishes Antonio’s role in his friend’s life. Although Solanio makes it clear how much Antonio loves Bassanio (“I think he only loves the world for him” [2.8.50]),¹³ the second loan qualifies their friendship by subtly heralding distance between the two men. The suitors provide a more dramatic illustration of relational disappointment. Gratiano’s image of a ship setting forth to encounter a natural force personified as a woman parallels their failure: they return home as romantic beggars, not having won Portia’s hand but having sworn never to marry. They have pursued marriage with great spirit but have forfeited married life along with the enjoyment that it might have brought. They have chased; now they must remain chaste. Even apart from marriage, relationships cause disappointment in *The Merchant of Venice*: Shylock is devastated by Jessica’s greed and insensitivity (she takes the ring her mother gave him and trades it for a monkey), and Lancelot Gobbo’s liaison with a black serving girl has resulted in a pregnancy. There is no evidence that this fazes the clown, but the pregnancy is clearly an unwanted inconvenience.

Disappointment in acts 1 through 4 establishes a fitting context for Jessica and Lorenzo’s problematic allusions to tragic lovers from classical mythology, which imply the potential for disappointment in

their married life. Our immediate concern, however, is not only to show disappointment in the allusions but also to identify the (collective) unconscious as their source and the allusions in the love duet as compensation for conscious attitude. The key to showing this nexus of concepts is Jung's idea of syzygy.

SYZYGY

"God unfolds himself," writes Jung, "in the world in the form of syzygies (paired opposites), such as heaven/earth, day/night, male/female, etc."; and in such a "conjunction," "the One is never separated from the Other, its antithesis" (*CW* 9ii, 400/254; 9i, 138/67, 194/106). The most prominent and important of these pairings is the animus/anima syzygy, in which "a masculine element is always paired with a feminine one," as illustrated by Adam and Eve as well as "the divine syzygy . . . Christ and his bride the Church" (*CW* 9i, 142/70, 134/65; 9ii, 400/254, 41/21). James Hillman points out that anima and animus "are exemplifications in psychological experience of the archetypal image of the divine conjoined pair, the syzygy."¹⁴ As suggested in the section above on myth, archetype (the potential for representation) gives rise to the symbolic male/female image, with particular characters like Jessica and Lorenzo as an illustration. Hillman adds two further points about the male/female syzygy. First, it manifests as projection either between a man and a woman or between the male and female parts of a man or a woman. Syzygy thinking is gendered thinking, and it can be either interpersonal or intrapersonal. Second, syzygy's "dynamics . . . are best described by myths. (Psychodynamics is one of the things mythology is all about)."¹⁵

The word "dynamics" properly implies that syzygy relations can be turbulent, as in Jung's connection between syzygy, gender, and myth: "when animus and anima meet, the animus draws his sword of power and the anima ejects her poison of illusion and seduction" (*CW* 9ii, 30/15). Although Jung does not specifically mention Odysseus and Circe here, he must have had them in mind. As with these mythological characters' interpersonal encounter, so with the archetypes that they represent: one activates and defines the other in ways that may be antagonistic. The *Odyssey*, in fact, nicely illustrates the dynamic process by which a man comes to terms with his unconscious mind by projecting his anima onto a series of female figures: Circe, his dead

mother, the Sirens, Calypso, Nausikaa, Arête, and finally Penelope. At the conclusion of the poem, Telemachos, who hangs his mother's faithless serving girls (*Odyssey*, book 22), is evidently beginning the same psychic journey toward integration of the feminine that his father is now completing.

In *The Merchant of Venice*, the antagonistic pair of gendered opposites is the father/daughter syzygy of Shylock and Jessica. The Jew may be leery of losing his daughter to romance because he has already lost his wife, Leah, to death; therefore, he possessively projects the part of his anima that appropriately attaches to a wife onto his daughter, an imbalance in which disappointment festers. Jung writes, "Just as the mother seems to be the first carrier of the projection-making factor for the son, so is the father for the daughter" (*CW* 9ii, 28/14). I am suggesting that projection, in Shylock and Jessica's case, works in the opposite direction as well—the daughter receives the father's projections. But when Jessica leaves with Lorenzo, taking Shylock's money and an important anima-token, the ring that Leah gave him, Shylock is deprived of father/daughter relations and reminded of the missing husband/wife conjunction. As a result, he becomes centered on himself and fixed on revenge. For Hillman, Jung's syzygy theory accounts for such a reaction in the wake of psychological loss: "An animus that loses its soul (anima) connection, that posits itself as independent of the syzygy, is ego . . . [or] what Jung calls the 'monotheism of consciousness.'"¹⁶ In Shylock's case, ego-consciousness manifests as a desire for strict justice.

Syzygy has important implications as well for an analysis of Shakespeare's art. Writing about the frequency of the male/female syzygy in world philosophy, Jung states, "From this fact [syzygy's universality] we may reasonably conclude that man's imagination is bound by this motif, so that he was largely compelled to project it again and again, at all times and in all places" (*CW* 9i, 120/59–60). In *The Merchant of Venice*, for example, Shakespeare's imagination creates numerous male/female pairs: Bassanio and Portia, Gratiano and Nerissa, Lorenzo and Jessica, Lancelot and the black serving girl. Even Shakespeare's *projections* are "compelled to project" male/female pairs, and these troubling allusions in the love duet may echo the author's own potential disappointment in marriage to Anne Hathaway. As Stephen Greenblatt notes, "For most of his married life he lived in London, and Anne and the children apparently remained in Stratford." Greenblatt then makes a strong circumstantial case for the playwright's marital disappointment.

Unlike marriage in the mid-seventeenth century, marriage in the Elizabethan period was not primarily for intimate companionship; like Dante, Petrarch, and Sidney, Shakespeare wrote love poetry for women other than his wife; divorce “did not exist in 1580 in Stratford-upon-Avon, not for anyone in Shakespeare’s class”; and Shakespeare “did in fact register the frustrated longing for spousal intimacy, though he attributed that longing almost exclusively to women.”¹⁷

Apart from the love duet, *The Merchant of Venice* includes two mythological syzygy pairs that both convey the theme of romantic disappointment: Endymion and Diana, Hercules and Hesione. The former syzygy follows the love duet: “The moon sleeps with Endymion / And would not be awaked” (5.1.109–10). After discovering Diana’s love of Endymion, Jupiter gives the youth a choice of punishments: death or eternal sleep. After choosing the latter, he remains forever young while Diana continues to visit him and tend his flock.¹⁸ For Lewalski, the allusion signifies eternity; for Carroll, it is an image of metamorphosis.¹⁹ But in terms of syzygy, the allusion is less positive. The boy’s loss of consciousness puts the feminine in control of the masculine. Sleep negates the dynamics of syzygy because Diana has the kind of control over Endymion that Shylock seeks to gain over his daughter.

The second pair appears earlier as Portia is preparing Bassanio to choose the proper casket. The bridegroom, she says,

. . . goes,
 With no less presence, but with much more love,
 Than young Alcides when he did redeem
 The virgin tribute paid by howling Troy
 To the sea monster. I stand for sacrifice;
 The rest aloof are the Dardanian wives,
 With blearèd visages, come forth to view
 The issue of th’exploit. Go, Hercules! (3.2.53–60)²⁰

As Robert E. Bell explains, after her father, King Laomedon of Troy, refused to pay Poseidon and Apollo for building a wall, Poseidon sent, as punishment, a sea monster to terrorize the Trojans, whose only recourse was to sacrifice their maidens to placate the monster. Reluctantly, Laomedon had Hesione chained to a rock; but Hercules, who happened to be in the region, agreed to save her in exchange for horses that Zeus had given to the king’s grandfather. Once Hesione had been

rescued, Laomedon again refused to pay and backed up his refusal with the threat of military force. Hercules had no choice but to endure his disappointment and move on, having gained neither horse nor female. Later, however, he returned with six ships and killed Laomedon and his sons, sparing only Priam and giving Hesione to his friend Telamon, who took her to Salamis. Priam's attempts to secure her return were failures. As Bell concludes the tale, "This incident was claimed to be one of the causes of the Trojan War, for it was later cited by Priam when an envoy came to Troy demanding the return of Helen."²¹ Jung's general statement on heroism in relation to the feminine bears upon Hercules's rescue of Hesione from the sea monster: "It is precisely the strongest and best among men, the heroes, who give way to their regressive longing and purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the maternal abyss. But if a man is a hero, he is a hero because, in the final reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it, not once but many times" (CW 7, 477/287).

THE LOVE DUET

Mythical syzygy pairs like Odysseus/Circe, Endymion/Diana, and Hercules/Hesione come together in interpersonal relations that enact the heroes' intrapsychic development: a step toward psychological integration for Odysseus and a failure by Endymion and Hercules to achieve relationship. If syzygy pairs thus represent unconscious processes, and if the love duet is full of such dyads, then it is not unreasonable to search the passage for psychological significance.

Lorenzo. The moon shines bright. In such a night as this,
When the sweet wind did gently kiss the trees
And they did make no noise, in such a night
Troilus methinks mounted the Trojan walls
And sighed his soul toward the Grecian tents
Where Cressid lay that night.

Jessica. In such a night
Did Thisbe fearfully o'ertrip the dew,
And saw the lion's shadow ere himself,
And ran dismayed away.

Lorenzo. In such a night
Stood Dido with a willow in her hand

Upon the wild sea banks, and waft her love
To come again to Carthage.

Jessica. In such a night
Medea gathered the enchanted herbs
That did renew old Aeson.²²

Lorenzo. In such a night
Did Jessica steal from the wealthy Jew
And with an unthrift love did run from Venice
As far as Belmont.

Jessica. In such a night
Did young Lorenzo swear he loved her well,
Stealing her soul with many vows of faith,
And ne'er a true one.

Lorenzo. In such a night
Did pretty Jessica, like a little shrew,
Slander her love, and he forgave it her.

Jessica. I would out-night you, did nobody come.
But hark, I hear the footing of a man. (5.1.1–24)

My basic objection is that few critics have adequately recognized the fifth act's dark undertones—the idea that the “past romantic figures . . . connote tragedy and perversion” (Hassel) and that the mythical characters whom Jessica and Lorenzo mention “are none of them examples of self-sacrifice or fidelity” (Auden). Instead, the consensus is that moonlight displaces the “abyss of guilt” (Moody) and that the whole scene treats human illusions kindly. The young lovers' tentative and fearful attitude toward “themselves and their love” gradually yields to assurance; emotion then transfigures them, and they achieve “rapture” later in the scene (Baxter). In the love duet, Jessica and Lorenzo “teasingly set themselves against higher, unattainable ideals” (Leggatt), and “the tragic possibilities of love are made remote in the lyric duet of Jessica and Lorenzo” (Hill). The duet's echo of the Easter liturgy suggests “divine love,” “universal harmony,” the healing of appetites, “goodness and reconciliation” (Gnerro). More realistically, the marriage of Jessica and Lorenzo “charts out a pattern of union between the worlds” of Venice and Belmont; and they, along with Bassanio and Gratiano, function “as extensions of Antonio” (Birenbaum). The duet contains, at worst, “ambivalent allusions to love and metamorphosis” (Carroll); and the retelling of “old love stories,” along with other evidence, suggests that Belmont is “a refuge for eloping lovers” (Belsey).²³

But while Jessica and Lorenzo's banter at the beginning of act 5 is good-natured, their allusions suggest that the passage may augment the disappointment that shadows much of the earlier action. They celebrate their love by allusion to mythical lovers—Troilus and Cressida, Pyramus and Thisbe, Aeneas and Dido, (Jason) and Medea—who come to grief because of misunderstanding or betrayal.²⁴ We are not saying, however, that Jessica and Lorenzo are consciously aware of relational dysfunction or of its potential; they are merely teasing each other, as Alexander Leggatt suggests; and Lorenzo even mentions forgiveness. That said, what may their allusions reveal about the young couple's *unconscious* psychology and about the audience's response?

An obvious first possibility—particularly from the audience's perspective—is that the allusions convey doubts about the stability of their marriage. Perhaps Jessica will betray Lorenzo as she has already betrayed Shylock. Lorenzo's reference to Cressida suggests that he is, on some level, not unaware of the possibility that he may one day be to Jessica as Troilus is to Cressida or as Gratiano's prodigal ship is to the "strumpet wind"—not just a disappointed husband but also a victim of betrayal. For Lorenzo, Gratiano's insight ("All things that are," etc.) may apply—a possibility strengthened by the similar words of Shakespeare's own Cressida:

Women are angels, wooing;
 Things won are done, joy's soul lies in the doing.
 That she beloved knows naught that knows not this:
 Men prize the thing ungained more than it is.
 That she was never yet that ever knew
 Love got so sweet as when desire did sue.
 (*Troilus and Cressida* 1.2.288–93)

For men, as Gratiano would agree, the chase is more enjoyable than the achievement of a romantic goal. Perhaps Lorenzo, without having heard Gratiano's wry comment in act 2, unconsciously fears that he will not enjoy his marriage to Jessica as much as he has anticipated because all things that are, including marriage, are enjoyed more in prospect than in attainment. Jessica playfully implies an awareness of Lorenzo's potential for infidelity in her reference to Medea and Aeson, for the story of Aeson's rejuvenation includes Jason's betrayal of Medea after years of marriage. In their banter, Jessica and Lorenzo

thus hint at each other's potential for betrayal. Despite the loveliness of the setting and the characters' good humor, the potential for marital disappointment—the faint undertone of their love duet—may arise from Jessica's and Lorenzo's *unconscious* misgivings about each other. And although, on the conscious level, the *manner* of their remarks is light-hearted and playful, a kind of inoculation against future infidelity or what Leggatt calls "a comic exorcism of the tragic side of love,"²⁵ the audience (especially those who are woefully married) may perceive the allusions' *content* as a foreshadowing of a much darker future for the married couple.

Invoking unfaithful lovers of both sexes also suggests a criticism of couples in general. In Lorenzo's statements, because the betrayers, Aeneas and Cressida, are a male and a female, the myths distribute blame for pain in relationships to both genders. It is tempting, however, to view Jessica's references in a different light because her allusion to Pyramus and Thisbe evokes tragic misunderstanding rather than betrayal. Moreover, her reference to Aeson's rejuvenation, a kind of rebirth, is appropriate to new life in Belmont. Yet the love duet's allusions to mythical women *and their lovers*, plus the references to the golden fleece by Bassanio and Gratiano, call Jason to mind despite specific reference in act 5 only to his father. Bassanio notes that Portia's "sunny locks / Hang on her temples like a golden fleece, / Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchis' strand, / And many Jasons come in quest of her"; and Gratiano cries, "We are the Jasons; we have won the fleece" (1.1.169–72, 3.2.241). Moreover, Shakespeare knew that, following the rejuvenation of Aeson, Jason abandoned Medea who then used witchcraft to burn his bride and murdered her own children with a knife (*Metamorphoses*, book 7). Whereas Lorenzo refers to Cressida and Aeneas, unfaithful lovers, Jessica invokes Jason and Medea who are hateful to *each other*. The point of the four allusions, then, is not merely that women like Cressida betray men like Troilus, that men like Aeneas desert women like Dido, or that the mutual misunderstanding of a couple like Pyramus and Thisbe can lead to tragedy for both. More importantly, the recollection of Jason and Medea suggests mutual disappointment in marriage. The sad conclusion is that the sexes, in their shared humanity, are potentially hateful to each other and that Jessica and Lorenzo will encounter their share of problems in married life.

Just as the love duet participates in the disappointment motif developed earlier in the play, it also signals potential disappointment

in the future, as further parallelism reveals. Jessica and Lorenzo describe the night in Belmont in terms of nights in classical myth that precede tragedy. Put another way, the situation in each allusion is once removed from tragedy. Troilus mounts the Trojan walls and sighs for Cressida; he later achieves full understanding of her betrayal. Thisbe sees the lion and runs away; later Pyramus's discovery of her bloody veil leads to double suicide. Dido, having loved Aeneas and been deserted, longs for his return; she has not yet killed herself in despair. Medea gathers herbs that renew her husband's father; abandonment and murder happen years in the future. The allusions, therefore, create the sense of *impending* disappointment. For Thisbe and Dido, a present problem (the presumed death of Pyramus, abandonment by Aeneas) leads to future suicide. Troilus and Medea, though they perform positive actions in the present, are betrayed in the future. As a result, the play invites the audience to see Jessica and Lorenzo in a similar way. If their happiness may one day yield to disappointment and discord, their banter is in harmony with the pattern of disappointment established in acts 1 through 4. As Gratiano suggests in his statement on Lorenzo's tardiness, the future is usually idealized in prospect but is rarely as fulfilling as one expects.

The love duet also casts doubt on the future of other marriages in the play. The invocation of Jason and Medea colors Gratiano's earlier statement about the successful trip to Belmont: "We are the Jasons, we have won the fleece." He and Bassanio have achieved their goals, but the recollection of Jason and Medea in act 5 ironically undercuts Gratiano's delight, for he not only celebrates his marriage in terms of a classical figure who is famous for infidelity but also reduces the women to objects. Moreover, whereas Gratiano's own prophecy in act 2 qualifies fiscal and marital success, he is now blind to the violation of expectations and the potential for disappointment in his own marriage and in Bassanio's. He has forgotten that, in the problematic universe of *The Merchant of Venice*, it is simply impossible to attain with the same savor as one anticipates. Marital happiness is no exception.

Although it is unlikely that the love duet conveys any conscious reservation on the young lovers' part, there is a strong suggestion of unconscious forces at work in their banter; and their use of classical allusion illustrates Walker's understanding of the role of myth. He writes, "A myth originates or takes on new life and meaning when an individual mind attempts, sometimes desperately, to respond adequately to pressures from the world and from the collective unconscious." In

this sense, the love banter is an example of “inflation,” the “process of identification with a mythic double or archetypal image.”²⁶ In other words, the syzygy pairs in the love duet—some of them happy now but soon not so happy—personify another syzygy pair, the archetypes of happiness and disappointment. Although Jessica and Lorenzo are blissfully newly wedded, their neuroses activate the potential for representation in the collective unconscious and enable the archetype of disappointment to manifest in mythical terms without their conscious awareness. Insofar as they express truth about marriage in general and about their own marriage in particular, myth compensates by conveying the unconscious content they do not know that they know. There is a high probability that Jessica and Lorenzo will suffer disappointment when romance yields to disillusion and an attempt to change each other in order to recapture the magic of the moonlit night in Belmont. The question is whether they will surmount the inevitable disappointment or, like Jason and Medea, lapse into abandonment and domestic abuse.

The myth of Jason and Medea is particularly relevant to the theme of disappointment because it is all about the fear that one’s husband will be a philanderer, that one’s wife will be a witch, that one will be overcome by female sexuality, and that one has married a Nausikaa who will transform without warning into a Scylla. But at the heart of the apprehension that Jason’s adventures represent is a central element of human psychology, both ancient Greek and Jungian. Richard Hunter points out that “in acquiring the Fleece, Jason also acquires knowledge of the female, a crucial ‘other’ for the construction of Greek heroism and masculinity.”²⁷ Again, Jung notes that heroes must “purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the maternal abyss” (*CW* 7, 477/287). Like Hercules’s rescue of Hesione, Jason’s quest for the fleece involves defeating a monster (a dragon that guards the fleece). One must confront what must be overcome, which means consciously *recognize* what must be *integrated*.

A key question is whether Jung’s own statements about Jason and Medea bear out this point about confrontation/integration or some other point and whether anything he says about these mythical characters is relevant to *The Merchant of Venice*. Jung only mentions the myth three times in the *Collected Works*. The first—“The Golden Fleece is the coveted goal of the argosy, the perilous quest that is one of the numerous synonyms for attaining the unattainable” (*CW* 12, 206/159)—may suggest the inevitability of disappointment and subtly

undercut the play's cheery allusions. Similarly, Jung's identification of Medea with "various motifs: love, trickery, cruelty, motherliness, murder of relatives and children, magic, rejuvenation, and—gold" qualifies the play's allusions by commingling positive and negative elements and by implying the absence of psychic integration (*CW* 14, 16/22).²⁸ Such integration is difficult, as Jung implies in his third reference to the myth, a photograph of an art object with this caption: "The dragon spewing forth Jason, after drinking the potion prepared by Athene.—Attic vase (5th cent. B.C.)" (*CW* 12, page 350, fig. 187). Jason is being disgorged by a dragon on the left; the golden fleece hangs from a tree above the dragon's head; Athena, armed with a spear, breastplate, and helmet and holding an owl, a sacred bird, in her hand, looks on from the right. Because Athena, who sprang fully armed from her father Zeus's head, represents reason, the image suggests that the rational faculty enables a man to keep from being devoured by the monstrous feminine. As I explore in greater detail in chapter 5 on *Hamlet*, however, reason does not enable Jason to integrate the normal human feminine represented by Medea, the other half of the syzygy, and leads to its own type of imbalance.

The myth of Jason and Medea has further significance for *The Merchant of Venice* because her father, King Aeetes, an obstructionist robbed of his daughter by a young man who receives her help, prefigures both Shylock and Portia's dead father. Jessica runs away with Lorenzo as Medea leaves with Jason, and if "Portia is based in part on Medea" (Velz) or is perhaps "a kind of domesticated Medea" (Carroll),²⁹ then there is even more reason to believe not only that she helps Bassanio pick the right casket but also that their own marriage will not be free of the disappointment that shadows the love duet. Moreover, the myth's imagery enables a tight nexus that reinforces this possibility: the golden fleece, Portia's golden hair, Shylock's gold ducats, the gold casket. Perhaps he who wins the lovely blonde Portia will experience something like the disappointment that Jason suffers after winning the fleece, that Shylock feels when his daughter runs off with his ducats, or that Morocco must embrace after choosing the gold casket. The motif may also extend to Antonio's trading abroad because the fleece was "a common image for the great fortunes the Elizabethan merchant-adventurers hoped for."³⁰

THE SOUL AND DISAPPOINTMENT:
 “THIS MUDDY VESTURE OF DECAY”

The theme of disappointment has implications for the material that follows the love duet, and the application of this theme enables a corrective of the rosy portrait that the scholarship paints, particularly of Lorenzo’s remarks.

How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!
 Here will we sit and let the sounds of music
 Creep in our ears. Soft stillness and the night
 Become the touches of sweet harmony.
 Sit, Jessica. [*They sit.*] Look how the floor of heaven
 Is thick inlaid with patens of bright gold.
 There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
 But in his motion like an angel sings,
 Still choring to the young-eyed cherubins.
 Such harmony is in immortal souls,
 But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
 Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it. (5.1.54–65)

A reasonable view holds that sadness abides in “the distance between two imperfect human lovers and the principle of love that orders the universe” (Leggatt). Sunnier readings of the passage do not suffice. One view, based on the premise that “the immaterial ear” can hear the music of the spheres, wrongly concludes that “the material and the spiritual worlds unite in all-embracing harmony” (Baxter).³¹ And Harvey Birenbaum’s statement seems wholly incorrect: “Whatever we conclude about Lorenzo or the play as a romance must accommodate very basically the feelings of rightness that this speech establishes.” This conclusion is based on the author’s fallacy of false dichotomy: “The way of the Rialto is, therefore, the dread nay-saying, the negation of life, and the romance way of Belmont is the yea of basic affirmation.” For Birenbaum, not only is the Rialto to naturalism as Belmont is to idealism, but Venice is to Blake’s state of Experience as Belmont is to his state of Innocence.³² It is more sensible, however, to associate Belmont with the state of Organized Innocence, in which one is aware of the fallen world but not negatively affected by it. In Jungian terms, then, Belmont may stand for individuation, a state of integration in which parts of the psyche operate in harmony and the unconscious

becomes conscious. But the specter of material disappointment qualifies the possibility of psychic integration: if Gratiano is right in thinking that “*All things that are / Are with more spirit chasèd than enjoyed*” (my emphasis), then the lovely night in Belmont and the future that it heralds are prone to disappointment to the degree that the characters eschew inner work in favor of the acquisition of objects (money, success, partners). Although Gratiano’s statement is only one character’s opinion, the profusion of disappointing circumstances in *The Merchant of Venice* suggests that he is making an important statement about a pervasive theme. Birenbaum takes a similar position through the previously mentioned “Shylock factor,” the way in which “our ideals and visions for ourselves are continually being thwarted by irrational forces of discontent [disappointment].”³³ Given the weight of previous disappointments and the ever-present possibility of future disappointment, Lewalski too is overly optimistic to claim that “[i]n Belmont all losses are restored and sorrows end.”³⁴ On the contrary, Lorenzo’s speech reminds us that even life at its most harmonious falls short of expectations; and a Jungian analysis, based on myth’s role in communicating unconscious content through syzygy pairs, drives home the point.

For one thing, marriage functions as synecdoche: as marriage carries the potential for disappointment, so does all of life, as Shakespeare’s treatment of Belmont reveals. For Lewalski, Jessica believes that Belmont “figures forth the heavenly city”³⁵ when she remarks:

It is very meet
The Lord Bassanio live an upright life,
For, having such a blessing in his lady,
He finds the joys of heaven here on earth. (3.5.70–73)

It turns out, however, that Belmont is to the heavenly city as human life is to immortality. One “figures forth” the other in Jessica’s imagination; but conflating the two—burdening an earthly state with expectations of heavenly bliss—can cause disappointment. Lorenzo implies the actual nature of Belmont when he refers to both the music of the spheres and the corresponding music within the human soul: “Such harmony is in immortal souls, / But whilst this muddy vesture of decay / Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.” Although the human soul may be “a fallen spark of the divine substance,”³⁶ the primitive archetypes of the collective unconscious and neuroses from

the personal unconscious mean that individuation—fanning the spark into a flame or achieving the fullness of the Self—is a lifetime's work. Even if psyche achieves an ideal balance, Birenbaum's "Shylock factor" still obtains, dormant perhaps but ready to compromise the human experience. As a result, heavenly music is the object of frustrated longing in this life, and Belmont falls far short of the heavenly city. If full spiritual enjoyment is not possible and Jessica's prediction is unlikely to be realized, then Lorenzo's message is simply that only the afterlife fulfills expectations; nothing earthly can satisfy. The happy banter of Jessica and Lorenzo, itself problematic, is fleeting because marriage, Belmont, and all of life are subject to the same potential for disappointment.

Surprisingly, Lancelot Gobbo expresses the proper qualification in his statement to Bassanio, though neither character may realize it. "The old proverb is very well parted between my master Shylock and you, sir: you have the grace of God, sir, and he hath enough" (2.2.141–43). Whatever jokes Lancelot may be making, the important point is what the original proverb conveys: "He that has the grace of God has enough."³⁷ Disappointment results from an earthly outcome's ultimate insufficiency, its inability to live up to expectations. Even rejuvenation like Aeson's cannot change the inner man, alter the inevitability of death, or ensure eternal life.³⁸ Everything earthly is doomed to death, which is why Morocco finds a skull in the golden casket. God's grace, however, is sufficient in itself and does not disappoint us: "They called vpon thee, and were deliuered: they trusted in thee, and were not confounded" (Psalm 22:5). Ultimately, the play points toward the need for the salvation to which Portia alludes—"mercy . . . above this sceptered sway" (4.1.191). Despite Jessica's conversion, the problem with the love duet, then, is that the allusions are based not on Christian mercy (unlike the dish of doves at 2.2.127) but on thinking that predates the old law: revenge is justifiable (Medea), and suicide is an adequate response to loss (Pyramus, Thisbe, Dido, and perhaps Troilus). However humorous Jessica and Lorenzo's love banter may be and however hopeful their future may seem, they operate in a universe of disappointment and indirectly imply the need for grace and charity.

Instead of offering marriage as an end in itself, the playwright uses mythical material to imply that no ending, however comedic, can be totally unproblematic because harmony in this life and on the earth forever falls short of celestial harmony. It is true that the lovers have avoided tragedy, though they voice subtle reminders of its ever-present

possibility. Individuation helps, but no one can enjoy the goal with as much spirit as one pursues it—because full enjoyment abides in the next life and in the realization of divine love. The play thus reminds us that psychic integration is never free of myth's primitive antecedents. The contrast to Jungian thought could not be more pronounced. For Jung, “[a]ll the major tenets of Christianity were interpreted as instances of archetypes in the collective unconscious.”³⁹ It may also be that religious dogma and restriction provide coping mechanisms that function to rein in the archetypes, which have the tendency to manifest, as they did in Jung's own psychological crisis. But a careful analysis of act 5 suggests that Shakespeare is as far beyond Jung as Jung is beyond Freud.⁴⁰ Whereas Jung reads religion through the lens of psychology, Shakespeare ultimately suggests in *The Merchant of Venice* that unless genuine spirituality connects us to something beyond the psychological, disappointment is the burden of mortality.

CHAPTER 3



THE TRICKSTER'S INFLATION DIVES AND LAZARUS IN *THE HENRIAD*

Anyone who belongs to a sphere of culture that seeks the perfect state somewhere in the past must feel very queerly indeed when confronted by the figure of the trickster. He is a forerunner of the saviour, and, like him, God, man, and animal at once.

Jung, "On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure"
(CW9i,472/263)

We have observed so far that Jung's "visionary mode" involves the conveyance of unconscious content through dream, imagination, vision, and myth; but myth is clearly not limited to classical material such as Jessica and Lorenzo's love duet. Biblical myth functions the same way, and it is to Falstaff's allusions to a particular Bible passage that we now turn in connection with two key concepts. Whereas, in chapter 2, a brief mention of Jungian inflation arises from an analysis of classical myth in *The Merchant of Venice*, the present chapter examines in detail Jung's statements on inflation, along with those on the trickster, in order to illuminate Falstaff's frequent allusions in *The Henriad* to the story of Dives and Lazarus. The assumption here—that Falstaff himself is a trickster—is argued by Edith Kern in "Falstaff—A Trickster Figure":

Falstaff, rather than merely serving as the scapegoat upon whose back are loaded the sins of Prince Hal, acquires instead the ambivalence of the American-Indian Trickster, redeeming and redeemed, martyred and ultimately ascending into the heavens. The subtle biblical allusions [that Roy] Battenhouse discovered and uncovered within the play fit

with such ease the trickster pattern in all its ramifications that it would be wrong to ignore its theatrical and carnivalesque tradition that was known to Shakespeare as well. We should not see Falstaff exclusively, therefore, in the noble light that Battenhouse sheds upon him.¹

Although Kern devotes her article more to “a theatrical trickster tradition”²—particularly in Molière—than to Shakespeare, her rich and fundamentally correct statement outlines a number of points that will receive attention in this chapter: the trickster’s “ambivalence” (or “ambiguity,” as Kern also calls it)³ makes Falstaff more than a mere scapegoat; Falstaff, as trickster, bears some relationship to Prince Hal; the trickster’s positive and negative duality dovetails with Falstaff’s biblical allusions (though Kern does not state what they are); Falstaff’s death may lead to a felicitous afterlife; and Roy Battenhouse’s claim regarding Falstaff’s nobility needs qualification. That his nobility is a somewhat invalid reader response anticipates my own critique of Battenhouse and Harold Bloom, who both revere the character, though for different reasons.

Battenhouse and Bloom emphasize Falstaff’s positive qualities in *The Henriad* and overlook the crimes that he commits. Battenhouse considers him a “holy fool” and “comic oracle” who slyly comments on the ills of Henry’s realm. Bloom takes the praise a step further. Falstaff represents consciousness, imaginative freedom, vital intellect, the principle of play, and life itself.⁴ He is an “outrageous version of Socrates” and “the veritable monarch of language.” In an *ad hominem* attack, Bloom holds that those who subscribe to “the social morality that is the permanent curse of Shakespearean scholarship”—who, in other words, deal Falstaff any blows—are “joyless scholars.” Such statements contrast markedly with the opinion of Robert Hapgood who states: “There is no blinking Falstaff’s criminality. . . . His criminal record is in fact an index to his degeneration.” Ralph Berry expresses a sensible mean between these positive and negative extremes: “Behind the attractive rogue is a real rogue, and the play’s [*I Henry IV*’s] business is to keep these alternating images before us.” It is indeed as problematic to overlook the criminal reality of Falstaff’s life as it would be to ignore his role as parodist and as champion of the imagination; positive and negative, far from being mutually exclusive, are both essential to a fair assessment of the character. Falstaff’s two sides must both be considered.⁵

Battenhouse and Bloom are also alike in asserting that Shakespeare's multiple allusions to Jesus's parable of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16:19–31 helpfully illuminate Falstaff's role. "By repeated references to the parable," writes Battenhouse, ". . . Falstaff has figured his times as those of the rich fool Dives, and himself as the age's Lazarus, fated to enjoy only crumbs from the table of its rulers, but with an inner faith in the table of Psalm xxiii." Bloom similarly asserts, "Since Falstaff is perpetually in want of money, neither he nor we associate the fat knight with Dives. . . . Sir John must end like Lazarus," though the assertion comes a page after Bloom tacitly links Falstaff and Dives by pointing out that "Falstaff himself is another glutton."⁶

By stressing Falstaff's use of the parable to satirize the political situation and to soften his misdeeds, both critics overlook a more objective evaluation of the character, which the story of Dives and Lazarus enables. Without denying "the love and loyalty, the wit and imagination, and the comic genius" that Falstaff clearly manifests,⁷ this chapter considers the possibility that, although he is Lazarus-like in death, he corresponds in life not only to Dives and his five surviving brothers but also to Jesus's Pharisaic audience. Shakespeare's multiple allusions to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, I will argue, constitute the trickster's inflation, which may ultimately signal some degree of individuation on Falstaff's part.

THE TRICKSTER AND INFLATION

The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology, Paul Radin's 1956 collection of and commentary on trickster myths, includes Jung's essay, "On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure," as well as Karl Kerényi's "The Trickster in Relation to Greek Mythology."⁸ Jung's piece, later included in the *Collected Works*, includes one statement that sounds remarkably like Falstaff: the trickster "is in many respects stupider than the animals, and gets into one ridiculous scrape after another. Although he is not really evil, he does the most atrocious things from sheer unconsciousness and unrelatedness" (*CW* 9i, 473/264). Kerényi's summary statement also seems directly relevant to Shakespeare's character: the trickster is "a figure who is the exponent and personification of the life of the body: never wholly subdued, ruled by lust and hunger, for ever [*sic*] running into

pain and injury, cunning and stupid in action.” Radin himself amplifies Kerényi’s statement by stating that “lust is his [the trickster’s] primary characteristic” and makes the trickster sound like Falstaff: “Laughter, humour and irony permeate everything Trickster does.”⁹ These statements support Kern’s assumption that Falstaff is a trickster figure, but the concept still requires definition and application. Let us build on her insight by matching the primary material with the reality of Falstaff’s life.

As Jung, Kerényi, and Radin imply, the trickster corresponds “to a psyche that has hardly left the animal level” and reflects “an earlier, rudimentary stage of consciousness” (*CW* 9i, 465/260, 467/261). Incipient consciousness, or what Jung calls the trickster’s “unconsciousness,” accounts for the figure’s appetites and laughter—lack of awareness and self-indulgence go hand-in-hand. Nonetheless, he experiences “self-imposed sufferings”; even “his two hands fight each other” (*CW* 9i, 458/256, 472/263). The image suggests that the trickster’s actions rebound in self-destructive ways, much as Falstaff’s self-interested actions recoil against him: the Gadshill robbery leads to his exposure as a coward; sexual adventuring brings venereal disease; overeating causes obesity, ill health, and penury; and cozying up to Hal ultimately results in banishment. Radin’s corresponding statement that the trickster is “creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and who is always duped himself” illuminates Hapgood’s observation that Falstaff illustrates “the pattern of the robber robbed.”¹⁰ Being a thief who is stolen from is an aspect of Falstaff’s tricksterism because self-defeating behavior manifests undeveloped consciousness.

The trickster sheds light not only on Falstaff but also on the way in which he figures forth the trickster and the shadow within Hal’s personality. Sitansu Maitra states that “Falstaff is at bottom an externalization or projection of the trickster in Hal himself which is why it is so difficult for Hal to cast him off.”¹¹ But trickster and shadow are closely related, as Jung’s definition of the latter suggests: “The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting itself upon him directly or indirectly—for instance, inferior traits of character and other incompatible tendencies” (*CW* 9i, 513/284–85). Thus Alex Aronson rightly comments on “the relationship between the persona and its shadow, as symbolized in the case of Hal and Falstaff,” who represents “part of the hero’s personal unconscious.”¹² The trickster-shadow nexus, however, is beyond the

scope of Aronson's analysis. Jung states that "the trickster is represented by counter-tendencies in the unconscious, and in certain cases by a sort of second personality, of puerile and inferior character"; that is why the trickster is in a "compensatory relation to the 'saint'" (CW 9i, 469/262, 458/256). If the immature elements of one's personality represent the trickster, then the trickster in turn is likely to represent those elements, which means that the trickster is an aspect of the shadow, as Jung affirms more directly in the following passage: "The so-called civilized man has forgotten the trickster. . . . He never suspects that his own hidden and apparently harmless shadow has qualities whose dangerousness exceeds his wildest dreams" (CW 9i, 478/267). Daryl Sharp's definition further affirms the link between trickster and shadow: the trickster is, "[p]sychologically, descriptive of unconscious shadow tendencies of an ambivalent, mercurial nature."¹³ Friendship with Falstaff, then, provides a way for Hal to explore his inner life. In the tavern, he learns not only to "drink with any tinker in his own language" but also to dialogue with his own shadow in the form of Falstaff, especially when the prince plays King Henry addressing Falstaff playing Hal (*I Henry IV* 2.4.18–19). "That villainous abominable misleader of youth, Falstaff, that old white-bearded Satan" is not only a shadow father figure but also an aspect of Hal himself (2.4.457–58). H. R. Coursen provides the logical extension of this point: "In [ultimately] rejecting Falstaff, Henry insures that he will have to develop his own *alter ego*, or that his psyche will create one for him; that is, if Jung is correct in his thesis about the self-compensating psyche."¹⁴

Besides being a projection of Hal's individual shadow, Falstaff, as trickster, is also "a *collective* shadow figure, a summation of all the inferior traits of character in individuals"; and "the [collective] trickster [is seen] as a *parallel* of the individual shadow" (CW 9i, 484–85/270; my emphasis). Jung makes the point more clearly as follows: "A collective personification like the trickster is the product of an *aggregate* of individuals and *is welcomed by each individual as something known to him*, which would not be the case if it were just an individual outgrowth" (CW 9i, 468/262; my emphasis). These quotations account for Falstaff's powerful appeal despite his criminality. Because various shadow elements—appetites, irresponsibility, criminality, and others—contribute to the making of Falstaff and because everyone can locate part of his own shadow in Sir John, the character has universal appeal rather than the repulsiveness of an individual messed-up old man. As a result, tricksterism enables a fine tuning of Berry's point that Falstaff

is both a criminal and a “parodist and . . . champion of the imagination.”¹⁵ His positive and negative characteristics are not a simple opposition because embodying *collective* or *aggregate* shadow characteristics makes even Falstaff’s criminal side somewhat attractive. We feel good about Falstaff because he manifests our own repressed qualities in a humorous fashion.

One of Jung’s statements in “On the Psychology of the Trickster” summarizes much of what I have just observed: “He [trickster] is a forerunner of the saviour, and, like him, God, man, and animal at once. He is both subhuman and superhuman, a bestial and divine being, whose chief and most alarming characteristic is his unconsciousness.” The quotation expresses not only the trickster’s animality and unconsciousness but also, as Jung states in the next paragraph, his “*divine-animal* nature” (*CW* 9i, 472–73/263–64; Jung’s emphasis). But because no Shakespearean character is a divine being, a Berry-esque homology accurately expresses the paradox of Falstaff: the subhuman is to animality as the superhuman is to imagination. The quotation also suggests that one who is a trickster is dynamic rather than static. Earlier in the trickster essay, Jung contradicts himself by styling the trickster not as “a *forerunner* of the saviour” but as a figure who can experience a “gradual *development into* a saviour and his simultaneous humanization” (*CW* 9i, 458/256; my emphasis). He continues: “If, at the end of the trickster myth, the saviour is hinted at, this comforting premonition or hope means that some calamity or other has happened and been consciously understood. . . . The individual shadow contains within the seeds of an *enantiodromia*, of a conversion into its opposite” (*CW* 9i, 487/271, 488/272). The trickster’s manifestation of collective shadow qualifies his negatives, and so does his dual and dynamic nature. A trickster-character like Falstaff can change because when a dire event—banishment, illness, death—jars him, as it were, more widely awake, the unconscious may become conscious. The result is some degree of individuation whose “aim is not to overcome one’s personal psychology, to become perfect, but to become familiar with it” (Sharp). Or as Radin suggests, the trickster may evolve “from a being psychically undeveloped and a prey to his instincts, to an individual who is at least conscious of what he does and who attempts to become socialized.”¹⁶ In Falstaff’s case, *enantiodromia* works, at least partly, by allusion to Dives and Lazarus in the following ways.¹⁷ On the one hand, Falstaff can be seen as either character, depending on the situation and the direction of his self-interest. On the other, from

his first appearance in the tavern with Hal to Mistress Quickly's report of his off-stage death, he undergoes a transformation from being more like Dives to being totally humanized like Lazarus, especially in his sad admission that he owes Justice Shallow one thousand pounds (2 *Henry IV* 5.5.73–74). Whereas he begins *The Henriad* as a confidence man and as a paragon of language and the imagination, he makes his unseen exit as Everyman; and Quickly's kind words, as we shall see, suggest what Kern calls his ascension into the heavens.

While tricksterism clarifies much about Falstaff in relation to previous criticism, one further concept, inflation, is necessary in order to understand, from a Jungian standpoint, the full significance of his manipulation of biblical myth. Jung defines inflation as "exaggeration, a puffed-up attitude" and as "an extension of the personality beyond individual limits. . . . In such a state a man fills a space which normally he cannot fill," meaning that the archetype compels the psyche "to transgress the bounds of humanity" (*CW* 7, 110/71, 227/143, and 110/70–71). This puffing up directly echoes Paul's language in 1 Corinthians 8:1—"Knowledge puffeth up," Paul writes," says Jung (*CW* 7, 243/156 n.); and elsewhere he quotes I Corinthians 5:2—"And you are puffed up" (*CW* 9ii, 44/23, n. 3). A more substantial passage takes the definition a few steps further:

An inflated consciousness is always egocentric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of drawing right conclusions about the future. It is hypnotized by itself and therefore cannot be argued with. It inevitably dooms itself to calamities that must strike it dead. Paradoxically enough, inflation is a regression of consciousness into unconsciousness. This always happens when consciousness takes too many unconscious contents upon itself and loses the faculty of discrimination, the *sine qua non* of all consciousness. (*CW* 12, 563/480–81)

First, what puffs one up is the ego, a connection that appears even more direct when Jung mentions "an inflating effect on the individual. His ego fancies itself magnified and exalted, whereas in reality it is thrust into the background" (*CW* 10, 721/380). Elsewhere Jung refers to the "inflated ego-consciousness" (*CW* 10, 500/253). Second, inflation makes one unaware and prone to error because, when the ego asserts itself, one becomes prey to unconscious forces. Insofar as inflation

elevates the ego above all else, it promotes a kind of unconsciousness. More precisely, the ego's tendency to fancy itself to be the whole of the psyche, to confuse the ego with the Self (*CW* 11, 438/287), makes one unaware of his own unconscious functioning, which "magnifies the blind spot in the eye," as Jung puts it (*CW*9ii, 44/24). That is how, paradoxically, "inflation is a regression of consciousness into unconsciousness" and becomes all the more dangerous to the degree that it is stealthy. So whereas tricksterism involves consciousness that is only rudimentary, inflation is the regression of consciousness into unconsciousness because of the ego's limited perspective.

Paul also provides the key to inflation's dual nature. Jung writes of "St. Paul and his split consciousness: on one side he felt he was the apostle directly called and enlightened by God, and, on the other side, a sinful man who could not pluck out the 'thorn in the flesh' and rid himself of the Satanic angel who plagued him" (*CW* 11, 758/470). Jung is getting at what he calls positive versus negative inflation: "Positive inflation comes very near to a more or less conscious megalomania; negative inflation is felt as an annihilation of the ego. The two conditions may alternate" (*CW* 16, 472/263-64). In other words, "conscious megalomania is balanced by unconscious compensatory inferiority and conscious inferiority by unconscious megalomania (you never get one without the other)" (*CW*9i, 304/180). Whereas positive inflation involves "a conviction that one is something extraordinary," negative inflation involves "one's own inferiority" as "the heroic sufferer" (*CW* 9i, 304/180). Regarding the former type, Jung implies that Faust and Mephistopheles, like Nietzsche and Zarathustra, are examples of inflation; and he makes the point more directly when he mentions "Faust's superhuman powers" (*CW* 9i.254/146; 12, 559/479). The demon is Faust's inflation, his ego projection; inflation and "the projection-making factor" are close cousins (*CW*9ii, 44/24). The Faust-Mephistopheles relationship is particularly important because it suggests that one character in a literary work can be the carrier or projection of another's inflated ego. And as Faust is to Mephistopheles, so Falstaff is to both Dives (positive inflation/self-importance) and Lazarus (negative inflation/inferiority). Like the classical allusions discussed in the previous chapter, Sir John's biblical allusions are *symptoms* of qualities and attitudes that are not fully conscious.¹⁸

Just as positive and negative inflation are in opposition, the inflation process itself is the opposite of individuation. According to Sharp,

“Inflation, whether positive or negative, is a symptom of psychological possession, indicating the need to assimilate unconscious complexes or disidentify from the self.”¹⁹ Assimilating unconscious material is in accord with Sharp’s definition of individuation quoted above, and the awkward term “disidentify” apparently means realizing that the whole (Self) is more than one of its parts (complexes, the ego). Jung himself is explicit about the relation between inflation and individuation in the following statement: “Once the reef of the second identification [inferiority] has been successfully circumnavigated, conscious processes can be cleanly separated from the unconscious, and the latter observed objectively. This [process] leads to the possibility of an accommodation with the unconscious, and thus to a possible synthesis of the conscious and unconscious elements of knowledge and action. This in turn leads to a shifting of the centre of personality from the ego to the self” (*CW* 9i, 304/180–81). Here is the distinction: whereas tricksterism may *include* some kind of elevation or humanization that involves individuation (being a trickster is a dynamic process), inflation is a cycle of positive and negative that may be *escaped* in a way that brings about individuation. If Falstaff’s allusions to Dives and Lazarus are a reflection of the trickster’s inflation, then analyzing the allusions provides a key to understanding his path to some kind of individuation.²⁰ The rest of this chapter will examine those allusions in detail in order to chart the knight’s psychological journey.

FALSTAFF’S POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INFLATION

Let us begin with the parable of the rich man and Lazarus:

There was a certeine riche man, which was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared wel and delicately euerie day. Also there was a certeine begger named Lazarus, which was laied at his gate ful of sores, And desired to be refreshed with the crommes that fell from the riche mans table: yea, and the dogs came and licked his sores, and it was so that the begger dyed, and was caryed by the Angels into Abrahams bosome. The riche man also dyed and was buryed. And being in hel in torments, he lift vp his eyes, and sawe Abraham a farre of, & Lazarus in his bosome. Then he cryed, and said, Father Abraham, haue mercie on me, and send Lazarus that he may dippe the typ of his finger in water, and coole my tongue: for I am tormented in this flame. But Abraham said, Sonne, remember that thou in thy life time receiuedst thy pleasures,

and likewise Lazarus paines: now therefore is he comforted, and thou art tormented. Besides all this, between you and vs there is a great gulfe set, so that they which wolde go from hence to you, can not, nether can they come from thence to vs. Then he said, I pray thee therefore father, that thou woldest send him to my fathers house, (For I haue fiue brethren) that he may testifie vnto them, lest they also come into this place of torment. Abraham said vnto him, They haue Moses & the Prophetes: let them heare them. And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one came vnto them from the dead, they wil amend their liues. Then he said vnto him, If they heare not Moses and the Prophetes, nether wil thei be persuaded, thogh one rise from the dead againe. (Luke 16:19–31)²¹

In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Jesus makes two points. First, whatever one's station in life may be, death brings about a reversal of fortune in the spirit of the Beatitudes: "Blessed are ye that hunger now: for ye shal be satisfied. . . . But wo be to you that are riche: for ye haue receiued your consolation" (Luke 6:21, 24). Second, even a miracle will not cause persons to reform if they are so hard of heart as to ignore the Law and the Prophets. Leon Morris sums up the parable's message this way: "If a man (says Jesus) cannot be humane with the Old Testament in his hand and Lazarus on his doorstep, nothing—neither a visitant from the other world nor a revelation of the horrors of Hell—will teach him otherwise."²²

Falstaff's two allusions to the parable of Dives and Lazarus in *I Henry IV* deconstruct Jesus's dual message and illustrate the positive inflation or megalomania of which Jung speaks: Falstaff empties the story of its warning by reversing the order of the narrative and by dissolving the causal connection between hardness of heart and damnation. Falstaff's first allusion associates Bardolph's face with Dives's torment: "I never see thy face but I think upon hellfire and Dives that lived in purple; for there he is in his robes, burning, burning" (3.3.31–33). Only later does Falstaff say that his recruits are "as ragged as Lazarus" (4.2.25). For Jesus, Dives is damned as a result of his lack of compassion toward Lazarus. In Falstaff's parodic use of the parable, there is damnation, and there is mistreatment of the poor; however, the causal element in the parable—hardness of heart toward Lazarus—comes second without any link to damnation, which is merely used to characterize Bardolph's face. Parabolic language, the verbal building block of Falstaff's insult, no longer conveys a warning to the rich of dire consequences in the afterlife. Or as the Lord Chief Justice puts it

in another context, Falstaff is guilty of “wrenching the true cause the false way” (2 *Henry IV* 2.1.108–9), of emptying the parable of its warning and displacing its language onto a barroom joke. Whereas the humor affirms Falstaff as a trickster, its content suggests positive inflation: Dives and Falstaff, in their ego-centeredness, think themselves in fine shape, immune to the damnation to which hardness of heart leads.

This trickster-like emphasis on the ego and the attendant positive inflation suggest a need to qualify Battenhouse’s claims that biblical allusion signals “a Christian intelligence in Falstaff” and that he covertly has “a Christian spirit as wise as serpents and as harmless as doves.”²³ But having a Christian intelligence—Battenhouse means being aware of the parable and being able to manipulate its language—does not mean that Falstaff possesses a Christian spirit, the charitable disposition that Jesus hopes to inculcate in the Pharisees. The joke linking Bardolph’s disfigured face and Dives’s torment in hell and the later reference to recruits as ragged Lazaruses illustrate the presence in Falstaff of a Christian *intelligence* but the absence of a Christian *spirit*.

The notion that positive inflation “magnifies the blind spot in the eye,” as Jung puts it, suggests that Falstaff himself may be a Dives-figure without realizing it. As Hal projects his shadow onto Falstaff, Falstaff projects his own shadow onto others. Harry Morris points out that “the fat knight usually attributes his own worst faults to others,”²⁴ which is why he calls his victims at Gadshill “bacon-fed knaves” (1 *Henry IV* 2.2.84) and why, in his next allusion to the parable, he says of his tailor: “Let him be damned, like the glutton. Pray God his tongue be hotter!” (2 *Henry IV* 1.2.34–35). Like Dives in his expensive purple garment, Falstaff wants Master Dommelton to send him “two-and-twenty yards of satin” (43), but the tailor demurs because he knows that bill-paying is anathema to Falstaff—hence the condemnation. If Morris is right that Falstaff projects his own gluttony onto others, it is also possible that his reference to Bardolph’s face as recalling “hellfire and Dives,” like his later claim that “his face is Lucifer’s privy kitchen” (2 *Henry IV* 2.4.332), reveals in Falstaff a trickster-like unconsciousness that his gluttonous self may end up in hell with the rich man. This example would not be the first time that a joke revealed a person’s true disposition. Whether or not Falstaff is worried about his soul, his ego forges ahead by displacing any sense of impending doom onto a joke at Bardolph’s expense. Falstaff’s assumption that he

will not be subject to damnation clearly illustrates the megalomania of positive inflation.

Falstaff's trickster ego, ignorance of his unconscious, and puffed-up blindness make him analogous not only to Dives but also to the rich man's five wicked brothers who survive him. To the rich man's request that Lazarus be sent to warn them, Abraham replies, "They haue Moses & the Prophetes: let them heare them" (Luke 16:29), an echo of Moses's words in Deuteronomy 30:11–14.²⁵

For this commandement which I commande thee this day, is not hid from thee, nether is it farre off. It is not in heauen, that thou shuldest say, who shal go vp for vs to heauen, and bring it vs, and cause vs to heare it, that we may do it? Nether is it beyonde the sea, that thou shuldest say, Who shal go ouer the sea for vs, & bring it vs, and cause vs to heare it, that we may do it? But the worde is verie nere vnto thee: euen in thy mouth & in thine heart, for to do it.

Moses reminds the Israelites of the Law, much as Jesus reminds the Pharisees of Moses's writings in the Old Testament. Reforming does not require a special message from heaven or from across the sea; it rather involves paying attention—as Dives fears his five brothers do not—to what has already been revealed. There is no need of a miracle like Lazarus's return to the brothers to warn them. The rich man's request no doubt anticipates Jesus's own resurrection and the Jews' refusal to believe in him. That in turn brings us again to Falstaff. The knight has the kind of evidence that Dives wishes his brothers to have. Like the hard-hearted brothers who have Moses and the Prophets, Falstaff ignores the significance of the resurrection and continues to sin egregiously, even joking about his tricksterish misdeeds just prior to his reference to Dives in hell: "I was as virtuously given as a gentleman need to be, virtuous enough: swore little, diced not above seven times—a week, went to a bawdy house not above once in a quarter—of an hour, paid money that I borrowed—three or four times, lived well and in good compass; and now I live out of all order, out of all compass" (*1 Henry IV* 3.3.14–20). Here Falstaff is aware enough to be self-justifying but sufficiently oblivious to make light of his misdeeds. Humor notwithstanding, the passage makes various things clear about Falstaff: he takes his ethics from society, not from the Church or the Bible; his culpability is beyond doubt; and his summation of his own animalistic lack of self-awareness and egocentric disregard of others'

well-being perfectly characterizes the trickster. He swears, gambles, fornicates, does not pay back his loans, and eats too much. In addition, he is a petty thief, exploits the poor, does not pay his bar bill, and is trying to manipulate Hal into supporting him once he becomes king. Falstaff's sins make him a good example of what theologian Shirley C. Guthrie calls the kingdom "between the times" (between the resurrection and the end of history) when human beings, though aware of the promise expressed in the gospels, still continue to sin.²⁶ As before, consciousness of the Christian faith and ability to manipulate Jesus's words signal a keen Christian intelligence; but Falstaff's allusions signal the heart of a trickster rather than any sign of a Christian spirit. His language indicates that he has heard the good news; but like Dives's five surviving brothers who have Moses and the Prophets, he does not modify his misbehavior. With the ego large and in charge and language that conveys a megalomaniacal sense that sins and crimes are worthy of celebration, the trickster's positive inflation is in full swing.

The root of Falstaff's errant ways—his gluttonous appetite—also links him to the trickster and strengthens his connection to Dives and his brothers. Luke writes that the "riche man . . . fared wel and delicately euerie day" (16:19). As New Testament scholar Joel B. Green points out, "Jesus has it that this was *daily* fare for this wealthy man . . . in an economy where even the rich could afford to kill a calf only occasionally." The rich man's extravagances make him "an impious reveler" (Jeremias) and highlight his lack of charity not just to Lazarus but also to his community. Famine, one of the four horsemen in Revelation, is pictured by Albrecht Dürer as much the same sort of figure as Dives—"not a famished specter but a fat German banker, clutching his money scales and clad in opulent contemporary dress, the cause of starvation in others, himself the picture of heedless prosperity" (Duffy).²⁷

Although it would be inaccurate to say that Falstaff intentionally causes anyone to starve, his financial well-being does depend on his ability to take advantage of others in ways whose genuine harm does not register in his conscious awareness. He runs up such a large bar bill at Mistress Quickly's establishment—again, the trickster is appetitive—that she is nearly ruined (*1 Henry IV* 3.3); he participates in the Gadshill robbery on top of a lifetime as a petty thief and confidence man; at the end of *2 Henry IV* he is one thousand pounds in debt to Shallow (5.5.12), a phenomenal amount of money at a time when "an artisan earned around £5 a year";²⁸ and in *Henry V* Bardolph says that he received nothing for his service to Falstaff (2.3.42–43).

Moreover, Hal's specific mention of Falstaff's "unbuttoning . . . after supper" and going to "leaping houses" (*1 Henry IV* 1.2.3, 9) not only illustrates the trickster's emphasis on food and sex but also suggests that the indulgence of one's appetite for food leads to indulgence in lust and other deadly sins. As Chaucer's Parson puts it, "He that is usaunt to this synne of glotonye, he ne may no synne withstonde" (lines 820–21).²⁹ For Falstaff, wealth, sin, and poverty perpetuate each other. Gluttony drives him to run up a large bill, he steals to acquire the funds to pay it off, but he squanders his money on more loose living and eventually has to steal or borrow again. "Everything he is," writes Berry, "all that he owns or can borrow, serves his gigantic appetite for continuing life and continuing pleasure."³⁰ Although Battenhouse suggests that "the sleeping Falstaff, with pockets full of testimony to wastrel living, symbolizes foxily the state of the household [Henry's kingdom],"³¹ the bar bill in *1 Henry IV* also confirms that Falstaff rivals Dives for gluttony. Or more precisely, as the Lord Chief Justice tells him, "Your means are very slender, and your waste [like his waist] is great" (*2 Henry IV* 1.2.139–40). Falstaff's gluttony makes him both a fat Lazarus and a poor Dives, but the cycle has not yet switched from positive to negative inflation.

What is needed at this point is not a further application of Jungian terms but a brief digression into biblical analysis. In the parable, Jesus's point about money is not that merely having it leads to damnation (indeed Abraham was a wealthy man); one is damned for having an inappropriate attitude toward it, acquiring it unjustly, and not using it charitably.³² Dan De Quille, in his novel *Dives and Lazarus: Their Wanderings and Adventures in the Infernal Regions*, has the following moral imperative inscribed over the door to "the cavern of Plutus, god of riches": "*Seek not Proud Riches, but Such as thou mayest get Justly, Use Soberly, Distribute Cheerfully, and leave Contentedly.*"³³ Attitude is key. Luke uses the phrase "the riches of iniquitie" (16:9)—or in more modern translations like the Revised Standard Version, "unrighteous mammon"—to characterize ill-gotten wealth.³⁴

The characters' names in the parable reinforce the contrast between unrighteous mammon and a life of poverty. The name "Dives" (Latin, *rich*) was added by commentators and is not part of the original parable. K. Grobel suggests that the rich man's name also relates to the word *nineve*, which means nobody; and Grobel makes the obligatory mention of Odysseus's encounter with the Cyclops.³⁵

Nineve, which may be “an allusion to the rich city of Nineveh and God’s judgment upon it,” would be “a derisory word to describe the status of the rich man in the underworld” (Marshall). If Dives is really Nobody, then he can also be Anybody, and “perhaps this is Jesus’s way of inviting his money-loving listeners to provide their own [names]” (Green). Lazarus, on the other hand, is the only named character in any of the parables, both to emphasize his virtuous spirit and to recall Lazarus, the brother of Mary and Martha, whose resurrection from the dead in John 11 does not cause people to repent. “And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one came vnto them from the dead, they wil amend their liues. Then he said vnto him, If they heare not Moses and the Prophetes, nether wil thei be persuaded, thogh one rise from the dead again.” Be that as it may, the poor man’s name appropriately means “God helps” (Collins); certainly nobody else will. He is a diseased cripple, but it is not likely that he is a leper (if he were, the rich man and his guests would not abide his presence for fear of contamination). Only the dogs—unclean animals—attend to his condition; and they may ironically compound his misery by licking his sores. He sits near the gate of Dives’s property, hoping to eat scraps of food as well as the loaves of bread used as napkins and then thrown on the ground (Green).³⁶

In death, however, each man experiences a reversal of fortune. Dives is damned not for being rich but for acquiring his wealth unrighteously and for hard-heartedly focusing on sensual pleasures rather than putting his means to what Edmund Spenser’s Guyon calls “right vsaunce” in *The Faerie Queene* (II.vii.7).³⁷ Lazarus is saved not because he has been actively good but because his poverty has prevented him from indulging in the sins to which money leads.³⁸ His blessed afterlife compensates for his life of misery and deprivation. As Abraham tells Dives in verse 25, “Sonne, remember that thou in thy life time receuedst thy pleasures, and likewise Lazarus paines: now therefore is he comforted, and thou art tormented.”

By alluding to a number of details just summarized, Shakespeare suggests that Falstaff’s profit from the king’s press, like his stolen and borrowed money, qualifies as unrighteous mammon. This is trickster behavior, and Falstaff’s megalomaniacal attitude continues the positive inflation. He admits to Bardolph that he “misused the King’s press damnably,” making over three hundred pounds by allowing wealthy men to bribe their way out of military service. He then conscripted “ancients, corporals, lieutenants, gentlemen of companies—slaves as

ragged as Lazarus in the painted cloth, where the glutton's dogs licked his sores, and such as indeed were never soldiers . . . a hundred and fifty tattered prodigals . . . most of them out of prison" (*1 Henry IV* 4.2.12–41). On the one hand, he conscripts men down on their luck who cannot offer him a bribe to avoid service. On the other, he appoints many of these unworthy men to be junior officers, whose higher pay he can pocket after they fall in battle. As he tells Hal, his men are "food for powder"; and Westmorland affirms that they are indeed "exceedingly poor and bare, too beggarly" (64–68). Later he remarks to himself, "I led my ragamuffins where they are peppered. There's not three of my hundred and fifty left alive, and they are for the town's end, to beg during life" (5.3.35–38). Leading his ragged recruits into the thick of the battle at Shrewsbury results in the death of all but a couple of his troops, the implication being that he will keep the fallen men's wages. The survivors evidently do not get paid and have to beg for sustenance ever after. In light of such facts, Bloom's claim that "Falstaff betrays and harms no one"³⁹ is simply inaccurate: profit based on the suffering of others is surely unrighteous mammon. As E. Pearlman writes, "Falstaff presents the underside of war . . . the administrative and moral abuses, the poverty and insult of which soldiering has been eternally composed," the very abuses that the Act for Taking Musters of 1557 was created to stop (Fortescue, Wilson).⁴⁰ Although Falstaff's intelligence registers the depth of his wrongdoing, his egocentrism does not register any signs of guilt; he rather seems matter-of-fact about his misdeeds, perhaps even smug.

Battenhouse's reading of the conscription passage in *1 Henry IV* emphasizes Falstaff's deft transformation of his Lazaruses into prodigals, which enables him to cast himself not as Dives but as the good father. Falstaff, Battenhouse argues, implies that King Henry is a Dives-figure who ignores his people's poverty.⁴¹ Two distinctions are lacking here. First, although King Henry may to some degree shirk his responsibility for tending the kingdom's economic condition, Falstaff is still guilty of exploiting it. The fact that he may subtly indict the king does not absolve him of his own crimes. Second, Falstaff's use of biblical allusion to describe his actions may once again signal a Christian intelligence but does not mean that the audience should also credit him with a Christian spirit. Instead, we must evaluate his crimes in the parabolic terms that Shakespeare provides. In the pursuit of unrighteous mammon, Dives, Falstaff, and Shallow actively exploit their countrymen. The irony, therefore, is that Falstaff simultaneously gloats about treating disadvantaged men so poorly and does not see

that the fate of Dives, his analogue in the parable, portends his own possible damnation. The trickster is still operating in a state that Jung would characterize as unconsciousness and positive inflation: Falstaff is unaware of his faults' implications and still considers himself superior.

In *2 Henry IV*, however, Shakespeare provides a hint of the negative inflation that is to come. Falstaff is in the conscription business again, this time in league with Justice Shallow, and the parabolic language continues.

[*A table and chairs are set out.*]

Shallow. Nay, you shall see my orchard, where, in an arbor, we will eat a last year's pippin of mine own grafting, with a dish of caraways, and so forth. . . .

Falstaff. 'Fore God, you have here a goodly dwelling and a rich.

Shallow. Barren, barren, barren. Beggars all, beggars all, Sir John. Marry, good air. Spread, Davy. . . .

Falstaff. This Davy serves you for good uses. He is your servingman and your husband.

Shallow. A good varlet, a good varlet, a very good varlet, Sir John. By the Mass, I have drunk too much sack at supper. (5.3.1–15)

Although Battenhouse quotes part of this passage,⁴² he overlooks the direct echoes of the parable: “*table*,” “*rich*,” “*beggars*,” and *gluttony*. Like Dives, Falstaff and Justice Shallow relax at the latter's goodly, rich estate, indulging in a fine meal and excess drink. Although Shallow's “*beggars all*” may signal momentary guilt about the men whom they have pressed into military service, it is more likely that he ignores the underprivileged and sees himself and others like him, including Falstaff, as beggars. Despite his access to unrighteous mammon, he styles himself as a Lazarus; for when hardness of heart leads to self-delusion, self-pity displaces guilt. Nonetheless, the exchange between Falstaff and Justice Shallow—especially Falstaff's exclamation, “‘Fore God”—conveys a faint foreshadowing of the move from positive to negative inflation. For both characters, the unconscious is not breaking through in a way that leads to the humanization and apotheosis of the trickster, nor do they experience the shift from ego to the Self that leads out of the cycle of megalomania and inferiority to some type of individuation. They are both still enjoying the fruits of their bad behavior, though at least one of them feels a bit sorry for himself.

FALSTAFF'S INDIVIDUATION

Falstaff's banishment and death, however, may be enough to jar the trickster to negative inflation and thence to awareness of his unconscious, as well as of his conscience. *The Henriad's* final allusion to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is the loving recollection of Falstaff's death by the Hostess (the former Mistress Quickly): "Nay, sure he's not in hell. He's in Arthur's bosom, if ever man went to Arthur's bosom" (*Henry V* 2.3.9–10). The critical disagreement about Falstaff's salvation or damnation, which I consider below, arises to some degree from the ambiguity of her statement. If he is in a mythological place, is it Arthurian or biblical? Frederick Turner suggests that Falstaff is in "Arthur's bosom, not that of Abraham or Jehovah or even Christ" and that it is "a third place, neither heaven nor hell"—in other words, Avalon.⁴³ But given all of the allusions to a parable in which Abraham's bosom figures prominently, my reading is that "Arthur's bosom" is Quickly's malapropism for "Abraham's bosom," meaning "the abode of the blessed dead."⁴⁴ In the parable, to be in Abraham's bosom means that a soul resides in the favorable part of the Greek Hades or the Hebrew Sheol and enjoys "close fellowship with the patriarch."⁴⁵ Lazarus resides in the pleasant part of Hades, whereas Dives dwells in an unpleasant area akin (but probably not identical) to Gehenna, the place of eternal torment. The technical definition of Abraham's bosom—the place where righteous souls await the resurrection—need not concern us because the resurrection upgrades such references as Quickly's to the Christian heaven. The key point is that Lazarus's presence there signifies his "position of intimacy and honor at the heavenly banquet" (Green). The beggar who ate scraps from the rich man's table is now at table in paradise with the patriarch. Moreover, since Lazarus's full name, Eleazar, identifies him with the Gentile who served as Abraham's servant in Genesis 15:2 (Goulder), Jesus's point may be that the Pharisees, if they are not careful, "will see the gentiles finding mercy instead of themselves" (Marshall).⁴⁶

The problem, then, is how to reconcile Quickly's "not unbiased judgment" that Falstaff, like Lazarus, is saved⁴⁷ with the fact that, as a Dives-figure or worse, he deserves damnation. A possible answer resides in the details of Falstaff's deathbed experience. Despite the distance between *Henry V* 2.3 and the scene that the characters

describe, we can be reasonably certain that Falstaff said and did certain things on his deathbed, all of which suggest the trickster's humanization. He fumbled with the sheets; he probably attempted to recite Psalm 23 (as the reference to "green fields" suggests); he cried, "'God, God, God!'" three or four times; he asked for more blankets; like Socrates he went cold from the feet up;⁴⁸ he railed against sack and women and talked of the Whore of Babylon; and he "saw a flea stick upon Bardolph's nose, and 'a said it was a black soul burning in hell" (*Henry V* 2.3.38–40). But that is where the facts end and the speculation begins. For all of Quickly's certainty, the passage does not tell us whether Falstaff is damned or saved, but one should note the movement to negative inflation. In the earlier statements about damnation in connection with Bardolph's fiery nose and Master Dommelton, Falstaff betrays no awareness that he himself may be a damned soul. On his deathbed, however, perhaps he fears that he may soon be to hell as the flea is to Bardolph's nose—a damned soul condemned to the eternal fires; and if this is the case, then positive inflation at last yields to its negative counterpart. Falstaff is not becoming a savior, but it may be that his humanization partially paves the way to his own salvation—he is now far from his earlier megalomania and will never return to it. His final moments on earth are dynamic: the trickster is evolving. Falstaff is aware that his earlier culpability has consequences in the afterlife because the ego—now damaged by illness—recedes, allowing the unconscious to become conscious. Of course, it is doubtful that the dying knight achieves full individuation at the end of such a dissolute life, but he evidently makes some progress in the direction of self-awareness.

The remaining question—whether Falstaff is saved—bridges the gap between the psychological and the theological. Critics hold opposing views. Kathrine Koller notes that Falstaff's death does not match the criteria for a holy death in the *ars moriendi* tradition (that is, the tradition dealing with the art of dying well). "There were no long prayers though he called on God; no confession though he talked of sins. The vision of burning souls may have been the devil's temptation to despair. There was no making of a will. There was no deathbed repentance. . . . Whether Falstaff burns in hell or rests in Abraham's bosom remains an unsolved problem in spite of the Hostess."⁴⁹ On the other hand, Christopher Baker takes the opposite view. "His final end, resting in 'Arthur's bosom,' is the return of a comic prodigal to the father he sought to escape. . . . in death he

suggests an Anglican Everyman, 'moved to earnest and true repentance.' . . . The death scene reveals Falstaff as the archetypal fallen Christian, saved from Dives' fate by his gracious conversion."⁵⁰

Both views are somewhat problematic. Koller notes omissions that do not necessarily signal a lack of salvation, and Baker depends too heavily on Quickly's opinion. Ambiguity abides, for example, when Falstaff cries out to God. Cubeta asks whether the dying knight conveys fear, contrition, or the despair of abandonment.⁵¹ I prefer the possibility that "God, God, God!" becomes a cry of wonderment because Falstaff, his mortal body failing but his spiritual eyes alight, is seeing a little way into the afterlife, much as King Lear moments before his death cries, "Look there, look there!" (*King Lear* 5.3.317). And if I am right, Falstaff's death represents the kind of apotheosis that Kern advocates—not because Quickly tells us so but because his reaction to the fly on Bardolph's nose reflects a change in the inner man.

Eschatology encompasses both the psychological and the theological. Although the retrospective narration makes it impossible to know *how* Falstaff speaks on his deathbed, a possible conclusion on his afterlife may be based on the parable. Falstaff has gone from crimes and assorted sins that make him worse than Dives, his brothers, and the Pharisees to a genuine recognition of his faults—the consciousness that marks the final part of the trickster's journey and the end of the cycle of inflation. Like Lazarus, he is rejected by King Henry V, who earlier, like Dives, is clad in his purple "garment all of blood" but now wears his "new and gorgeous garment, majesty" (*1 Henry IV* 3.2.135; *2 Henry IV* 5.2.44). Falstaff has become Lazarus at the rich man's gate. Given his frequent allusions to the parable, it is reasonable to view his afterlife in similar terms. From an Old Testament point of view, salvation or damnation depends on living according to the Law and the Prophets versus living in a way that ignores them. Lazarus's ratio of good and evil deeds is favorable; the rich man's is not. Similarly, such commendable qualities as the imagination outweigh, even if they do not cancel, Falstaff's vices. His life is not flat like that of Dives; it is instead composed "of a mingled yarn, good and ill together" (*All's Well That Ends Well* 4.3.70–71), and the good outweighs the ill. Although he cannot claim the innocence of Lazarus, he avoids the hardened heart of Dives and is due for a positive reversal of fortune in the afterlife. Salvation seems reasonable.

The problem with this view is that it presupposes that our merit provides sufficient basis for our salvation. The more important factor

is grace, as Falstaff himself understands: "O, if men were to be saved by merit, what hole in hell were hot enough for him?" (*1 Henry IV* 1.2.105–6). If good works alone lead to salvation, then great misdeeds must surely lead to damnation; only grace, made active by faith, ensures salvation. At that moment in the first tavern scene, he justifies "purse taking" by claiming that it is his "vocation" (101–2) and then immediately attributes villainy to Gadshill, much as he attributes gluttony to others later on. Still, the operation of grace may be what Battenhouse means by Falstaff's "inner faith in the table of Psalm xxiii."⁵² Unlike his quips in the tavern scene, however, Falstaff's deathbed statements indicate a painful awareness of, and contrition for, his faults—awareness that is a clear exception to Bloom's sense that the knight represents "freedom from censoriousness, from the superego, from guilt."⁵³

To the objection that Falstaff is merely pretending to play the role of the *moriens*, we may invoke the simplest but most frequently overlooked piece of evidence in the scene that Quickly recounts. If *she* can love and forgive "plump Jack" (*1 Henry IV* 2.4.474) after he has cheated her, promised to marry her, and then asked her to bring Doll Tearsheet to him, then surely God will forgive him as well. An apt analogy appears in Hosea 3:1, where "the love of YHWH for Israel is substantiated and exemplified in Hosea's own relationship with his [harlotrous] wife."⁵⁴ So despite the sentimentality of Quickly's statement, her sense that Falstaff is now in a good place is a reasonable assumption.

There is some truth, then, to Bloom's claim "that Sir John must end like Lazarus, rejected by the newly crowned king in order to win admission to 'Arthur's bosom.'"⁵⁵ If Falstaff is saved, however, it is not *because* the young king rejects him (the relationship between events is merely chronological, not causal) but instead because the banishment brings about a softer heart through greater conscious awareness of what has been unconscious, which in turn enables him to accept the grace to which he alludes in *1 Henry IV*. Acceptance of grace does undercut Bloom's sense that "Falstaff's implicit interpretation of the text [the parable] is nihilistic: one must either be damned with Dives, or else be saved with Lazarus, an antithesis that loses one either the world to come or this world."⁵⁶ The statement is a false dichotomy based on an Old Testament ethic. Although the reference to "Arthur's bosom" calls the parable to mind, one who sins can return to the fold like the prodigal son of Falstaff's allusion (*1 Henry*

IV 4.2.34). The cycle of positive and negative inflation—association with Dives and Lazarus, respectively—gives way when the trickster’s humanization leads to individuation; and a more integrated psyche in turn makes Falstaff receptive to divine grace.

It is insufficient to say that Falstaff is only a Lazarus-figure or even a parody of Henry IV’s troubled realm, for Falstaff’s criminal life is an object lesson to Henry V of the gross mismanagement that he must avoid and of the corruption that he must quell in order to be a successful ruler. The knight’s life is thus a “negative witness”⁵⁷ to the moral life that the young king must affirm and achieve. Shakespeare’s biblical allusions in *The Henriad* convey a strong ethical imperative and social consciousness, and Falstaff emerges as an even more complicated and fascinating character against the full spectrum of parabolic language. As an extended analogy and an example of the trickster’s inflation, Shakespeare’s allusions to Luke’s parable provide the means to understand the true depth of the knight’s depravity and to chart his spiritual progress; therefore, his portrait is both more somber than Battenhouse and Bloom propose and more hopeful. Falstaff is the key figure in a lifelong psychomachia modeled on the parable: he is not only a round character in both senses of the term but also a dynamic one who plays the negative role of Dives, his brothers, and the Pharisaic audience. But his marginalization by Henry V and his eventual contrition imply that, like Lazarus, he enjoys felicity in the afterlife.

If this truly is the shape of Falstaff’s psychomachia, then he more than fulfills Radin’s sense that the trickster becomes “at least conscious of what he does and . . . attempts to become socialized.”⁵⁸ And the movement toward greater consciousness critiques Falstaff’s statement in the tavern: “There is nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man” (*1 Henry IV* 2.4.122–23). That he is a villain and a trickster should now be obvious, but the fact that roguery is not the extent of his psyche should be equally obvious. While his allusions to Dives and Lazarus are the trickster’s inflation (both positive and negative), Falstaff’s final identification with Lazarus ultimately suggests the trickster’s humanization and a way out of the cycle of inflation.

CHAPTER 4



THE PRIMITIVE IN *OTHELLO*

A POST-JUNGIAN READING

Outwardly people are more or less civilized, but inwardly they are still primitives.

Jung, “On the Psychology of the Trickster-Figure”
(*CW* 9i, 482/269)

If the collective unconscious connects human beings to instinct (chapter 1), and if the trickster is part animal (chapter 3), it follows that the collective unconscious also bears some relation to the primitive, a concept to which we now turn. Previous psychological critics—both Jungian and non-Jungian—have glanced at the primitive in connection with Shakespeare’s *Othello*, but most consider it an obvious premise not worthy of deeper consideration. Only Jungian critic Barbara Rogers-Gardner, whose comments on the primitive deal mainly with Othello’s concept of time, begins to unfold the notion of the primitive, though she does not apply Jung’s theory.¹ There is no sustained reading of the primitive in *Othello* from a Jungian perspective despite various references that suggest its relevance: Othello’s travels in strange lands, his attitude toward the handkerchief, and his final speech about the “base Indian” and “turbaned Turk” (5.2.357, 363). On the one hand, the omission of such a reading is strange because the primitive lies at the heart of Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious. He notes that “it was the discovery of the collective unconscious, that is to say, of impersonal psychic processes, that aroused my interest in primitive and Oriental psychology” (*CW* 18, 1286/553). The collective

unconscious, which transcends time and place, connects human beings with archaic elements in humans' psychic history; and these elements, for Jung, were more evident in tribal cultures than in Western civilizations, though his articulation of these ideas sometimes includes troubling statements about race. To use the idea of the archaic to advance an understanding of the play requires that Jung's statements about race be sheared away—a critical process that I undertake here in the spirit of postcolonialism.² Once Jung's theory of the primitive has received a post-Jungian corrective, however, the remaining concepts enable a deepened understanding of Othello's so-called primitive mentality—his *participation mystique* (mystical participation), a state of being that is psychologically archaic but not tied to race or culture—that ultimately thwarts his individuation, though the resulting portrait is subject to cultural critique as well.

Previous Jungian criticism has analyzed Othello's problems using an archetypal approach, which focuses on projection. Rogers-Gardner quotes the relevant passage: "A man who is unconscious of himself acts in a blind, instinctive way and is in addition fooled by all the illusions that arise when he sees everything that he is not conscious of in himself coming to meet him from outside as projections upon his neighbour" (*CW* 13, 391/297). Maud Bodkin, the first Jungian critic to examine *Othello*, holds that Othello projects his anima onto Desdemona and his shadow onto Iago, while Desdemona projects her animus, her inner warrior, onto Othello. Non-Jungian critic Robert Rogers calls the conflict within the main character "endopsychic" or "intrapsychic": the key conflict is within Othello, whose psychic forces are projected onto others. For Alex Aronson, Othello is a "victim of the archetype" when he relies on the handkerchief as "ocular proof" (3.3.376), allowing anima and shadow (the "devil-figure" Iago) to overcome his ego. Perhaps this is why non-Jungian critic Catherine Bates sees "a profound archetypal significance" in Othello as "a Mars disarmed." In any case, it is no surprise when Rogers-Gardner states that "Othello is caught between his anima and shadow"; and her analysis—the most sustained Jungian reading of the play to date—adds the helpful idea that whereas Desdemona and Othello's mother "represent witchcraft, anti-reason, and romantic love," Iago "represents wit or tough, reductionist realism." Kenneth Tucker develops the idea that Othello is to feeling as Iago is to thinking, and he too argues that Othello projects his anima onto Desdemona. Terrell L. Tebbetts takes a more comprehensive approach to archetypes and projection: Othello-as-general

represents male ego, while his blackness reflects the shadow; Othello and Desdemona are animus/anima projections; Iago's sexual suspicions manifest shadow and negative anima; and the trial scene at the Senate enacts a "balanced or individuated psyche" inasmuch as all parties are heard from. Later in the play, of course, Othello, Desdemona, and Iago deviate from the ideal of the individuated Self that the Senate represents. Gregg Andrew Hurwitz memorably adds, "Rather than integrating his shadow and wedding his anima, Othello weds his shadow and neglects his anima." Hurwitz also suggests that the handkerchief represents Othello's attempt "to transfer his anima libido from mother to mate."³ To one degree or another the preceding Jungian approaches to *Othello* all relate to this homology: Desdemona is to anima as Othello is to ego as Iago is to shadow (or what Othello himself calls "some monster in thy thought" [3.3.119]). The characters' interaction, then, is a stage psychomachia, with Othello attempting, but ultimately failing, to integrate competing alternatives. Nonintegration of the shadow dooms his attempt to embrace the anima, but previous criticism does not examine how this failure to achieve individuation relates to the primitive.

Although a number of studies do touch on the primitive in *Othello*, they neither use the concept precisely nor avoid perpetuating the negative connotations that trouble Jung's rhetoric. Arguing against the idea that Othello is a primitive, G. K. Hunter asserts that *Othello* does not use "any simple primitivist terms" or depict "the exploitation of a noble savage by a corrupt European." Whereas Montaigne critiques European society in "Of Cannibals," the play is "anti-primitivist" because Othello is not a "credulous and passionate savage." Other critics have focused on the way in which the play enacts the disintegration of a primitive psyche in a civilized setting. Abraham Bronson Feldman does not use the term "primitive," but he does imply that primitivism is a factor in Othello's geographical origin: "Othello's Moorish fatherland is linked in the unconscious not only with sex-terror but also with vision of an id-paradise. . . . a wonderland of libido," which stands in opposition to Venice where reason rules. Although Jung would not be comfortable with Feldman's claim about the id, he would support a link between the unconscious and primitive geography, particularly the lands through which the young Othello has traveled. Moreover, if K. W. Evans is right to consider Cyprus "midway" between the two settings, it follows, in the Freudian vein, that Africa is to the id as Venice is to the superego and that on Cyprus Othello's

ego attempts to mediate between these competing psychological imperatives. As Jyotsna Singh argues regarding this traditional geographical reading of *Othello*, “a ‘symbolic geography’ . . . continues to perpetuate racial divisions within today’s postcolonial world.”⁴ Readings of *Othello* based on geography thus perpetuate the troubling sense in Jung that the primitive is the Other, whereas in this chapter I am more interested in examining his idea that the primitive, as the archaic substrata of the collective unconscious, is common to us all.

Othello’s journeys through primitive landscapes prior to the opening of the play also suggest that he bears some resemblance to the hero archetype. David Kaula notes that Othello has achieved, “like the standard mythical hero, an upward progress from slavery, dangerous exploits, and exposure to monsters and wild landscapes, to an honored place in Brabantio’s drawing room and finally to the love of Desdemona.” The point is a valuable one, for (in my view) the stages of the hero’s journey not only characterize Othello’s past and present but also correspond to elements of the dramatic situation. Cassio’s drunken misbehavior may parallel Othello’s “boyish days” (1.3.34). Young manhood corresponds to the realms that he describes to Desdemona (“antres [caverns] vast and deserts idle” where cannibals “each other eat,” and men have heads that “grow beneath their shoulders” [1.3.142–47]). The young hero becomes a more integrated psyche as a result of battling his shadow projection in a primitive setting, which may be why Robert B. Heilman associates primitivism with “unresting destructiveness.” Mature manhood finds Othello commanding the Venetian army, and victory over the Turks ought to herald a time of contentment-in-marriage that would usher him into old age. The ideal progression is understood to be toward the civilized, but Othello fails to perform one of the hero’s duties. A hero must “protect beautiful women from terrible danger” (Henderson), not subject them to it as Othello does when he murders his wife. Because he has not integrated his shadow in his earlier travels, he cannot properly embrace his anima and is instead at its mercy. James Hillman states, “The more a man identifies with his biological and social role as man (persona), the more will the anima dominate inwardly,” and he quotes the following passage from Jung: “Take, for example, the ‘spotless’ man of honour and public benefactor, whose tantrums and explosive moodiness terrify his wife and children. What is the anima doing here?” (*CW* 7, 319/199). As Feldman puts it, Othello is “spiritually chained to his mother.” Anima addiction (as opposed to

anima integration) derails a hero's journey from the primitive landscape—where psychic content is projected and dealt with—to the civilized world where the integration of shadow and anima should enable him to become man-in-relationship-to-woman.⁵

By reflecting the hero's journey in *Othello*, geography implies the role of the primitive and develops the “intrapsychic” approach; but one must turn to Rogers-Gardner for a more direct reading of the primitive. She first goes the archetypal critics one better by cleverly invoking Shakespeare's angel and devil in Sonnet 144—his two loves “of comfort and despair.” Contrary to Feldman, she holds that Othello is a “primitive, innocent man [who falls] into civilized deceit” by allowing Iago, the “angel of despair,” to win him over. Like the geographical critics, she then describes the realm of Othello's travels as “the warrior's world of the primitive past.” Because Othello's worldview is “traditional-tribal,” he has a “primitive sense of time” and lives “in the wide open spaces of myth” rather than by the clock—a deficiency that renders him vulnerable to Iago's machinations. Rogers-Gardner's strongest contribution to the discourse on the primitive is this statement: “Jung reminds us continually that only primitives like Othello have access to those deep areas of the unconscious which must be integrated for full maturation, for individuation, and for art.”⁶ Presumably analysis enables everyone to access the deep unconscious, and one may also quibble that a successful general cannot really be innocent or lack a linear sense of time. But it is certainly true that Jung considers primitive peoples in general to have greater access to the collective unconscious than those who are civilized.

JUNG'S THEORY OF THE PRIMITIVE

In this review of Jungian criticism, those who invoke “the primitive” assume that it means the opposite of civilization, the presence of warfare, or what Shakespeare calls in *The Tempest* “the dark backward and abysm of time” (1.2.50). No one actually defines it explicitly, and not even Rogers-Gardner considers Jung's extensive statements on the concept. I believe that Jung's primary intention in using the term “primitive” is to convey the *psychologically archaic*, that is, areas of the psyche that are less conscious and less differentiated. Unfortunately, he occasionally makes statements that conflate such an archaic/primitive psychological state with the skin color of tribal peoples, in whom

he thinks such a state predominates. My goal here is to acknowledge and criticize this conflation and then to focus on *the primitive as psychologically archaic* to analyze *Othello*.

Jung's essay "On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry" (1922) provides an appropriate starting point for an inquiry into his theory of the primitive:

The fact that artistic, scientific, and religious propensities still slumber peacefully together in the small child, or that with primitives the beginnings of art, science, and religion coalesce in the undifferentiated chaos of the magical mentality, or that no trace of "mind" can be found in the natural instincts of animals—all this does nothing to prove the existence of a unifying principle which alone would justify reduction of the one to the other. For if we go so far back into the history of the mind that the distinctions between its various fields of activity become altogether invisible, we do not reach an underlying principle of their unity, but merely an earlier, undifferentiated state in which no separate activities yet exist. (CW 15, 99/66)

Art, science, and religion are evidently of a magical mentality all compact in the mind's distant history. An "undifferentiated state" is not a "principle of their unity," meaning a unity of art, science, and religion, because such distinct fields simply did not exist in human prehistory. Although this conclusion is reasonable, Jung reaches it through the association of primitives with children and animals: even as he provides the helpful concept of the undifferentiated magical mentality, the implied disparagement of native peoples echoes colonial discourse. As Andrew Samuels puts it in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, Jung's "attitudes to women, blacks, so-called 'primitive' cultures, and so forth are now outmoded and unacceptable. He converted prejudice into theory, and translated his perception of what was current into something supposed to be eternally valid." Samuels is describing the principle of "fixity," which Homi K. Bhabha defines "as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism." As Ania Loomba and Martin Orkin point out, "'the African mind' was slotted into a permanent and fixed difference from the European [mind]."7

Since such fixity is, in a word, racist, it will be helpful to examine two contrasting perspectives that relate Jung's racism to Darwinian thought. In the first view, Petteri Pietikainen makes a strong case that

Jungian psychology has little in common with evolutionary theory: Jung's racism is not so much biological as cultural, and it would be inappropriate to put a neo-Darwinian spin on it. On the one hand, Pietikainen concedes that both Jungians and neo-Darwinians assert "a universal structure of the mind that has its own evolutionary history" and that evolution may provide an analogy for an individual person's development from childhood to adulthood. But on the other, the application of biological science to Jungian thought is fraught with difficulties: metaphysics and philosophy are more relevant to Jungian psychology than is hard science; Jung's own assumptions about biology are largely erroneous; he did not read Darwin or understand Darwinian principles; and the biological theories that he did embrace were later proven false. A second perspective, one more firmly grounded in Jung's own writings, is offered by Farhad Dalal who holds that Jung's lack of scientific method is precisely the point: his position purports to be evolutionary science but is not. Jung is particularly guilty of projecting his own racist fears on the Other (especially African blacks) and of then defusing that fear by considering them to be the evolutionary equivalent of European children. As with children, so with animals: Dalal writes that for Jung "the races are seen to be on a spectrum of evolution. But there is a sharp discontinuity at two places on the continuum: between the animal world and the human, and between the European and the non-European." Jung thus "creates a hierarchy of races and uses Darwinism as a justification for it. The bushman is less evolved than the European and therefore closer to the animal world." Difference, then, is both psychological *and* biological: "The European brain being 'more evolved' has access to the history of the 'primitive' by plumbing its own depths, but the brain of the 'primitive' being less developed has no such access. . . . The collective unconscious is the realm of concretism, participation mystique, non differentiation, collectivity. The European has evolved and grown out of this stage, and has repressed it. The other races have not moved too far from this stage. Thus the unconscious of the European is equivalent to the conscious of the non-European."⁸ I find value in each author's perspective, and my own inquiry into Jung's concept of the primitive is consistent with elements of both. Pietikainen correctly holds that Jung's take on the primitive is not Darwinian in execution (it is instead bad science or nonscience); and evolution is indeed an analogy for individuation. And Dalal rightly identifies the racism in Jung's Darwinist intentions—Jung's perception of difference obscures a

sense of cultural and biological hegemony. I will argue, however, that Jung's theory of the primitive is less Darwinian than Eurocentric. As a white European, Jung looked down on primitive peoples as *lesser* even as he admired what he presumed to be their close connection to the archetypes.

Perhaps the best definition of the "primitive" appears in "Archaic Man" (1931), where "archaic" and "primitive" are synonyms. Jung specifically states that "man" does not imply skin color but refers instead to "his psychic world, his state of consciousness, and his mode of life." He further maintains that "primitive mentality" is not the exclusive province of one race in particular or even of uncivilized man in general (*CW* 10, 105/50–51). If the primitive relates not to skin color but to the collective unconscious, to which all persons are linked, then everyone has a primitive element inside. He states that "these primitive vestiges still exist in us" and that "certain contents of the collective unconscious are very closely connected with primitive psychology. . . . deep down in our psyche there is a thick layer of primitive processes . . . closely related to processes that can still be found on the surface of the primitive's daily life" (*CW* 18, 1288–89/554–56). He is expressing what Edward Said calls the "contrapuntal," a "simultaneous awareness" of "metropolitan history" and "other histories" or what Emily C. Bartels calls "cross-cultural dialogism, recovered traces of the Other in the self, the self in the Other."⁹ Although Jung sometimes talks about race in binary terms that seem to have universal application, his theory of the psyche and therefore of the primitive does include its own subaltern voice, which conveys the sense that the boundaries embedded in colonialist discourse, though they may still obtain, are beginning to blur.

In light of Jung's basic position—the primitive is the psychologically archaic—we can properly contextualize passages in the *Collected Works* that sound offensively Eurocentric. Such rhetoric is unfortunate because he is making an important point about the primitive as a trans-racial phenomenon. He mentions "lower races, more particularly the Negroes" and asserts that "the Negro" and "the Red Indian" are present in the American white person (*CW* 18, 1284/551, 94/47). Here, then, is the problem: although a sympathetic reading might assert that Jung is speaking metaphorically and that he *means* to suggest the presence of the psychologically archaic even in the most "civilized" citizens of the West, he has conflated the psychologically primitive with darker skin color, leaving him open to valid concern regarding

his position on race. The same conflation is present when Jung writes, “Just as the coloured man lives in your cities and even within your houses, so also he lives under your skin, subconsciously. Naturally it works both ways. Just as every Jew has a Christ complex, so every Negro has a white complex and every [white] American a Negro complex. As a rule the coloured man would give anything to change his skin, and the white man hates to admit that he has been touched by the black” (*CW* 10, 963/508).

Again, a sympathetic reader might consider Jung’s final statement that the “white man hates to admit that he has been touched by the black” to mean that human beings have great difficulty facing their inner shadow. Similarly, by “the coloured man would give anything to change his skin,” Jung may mean that the impulse of individuation arising from the Self impels all persons to desire transformation from their archaic psychological states to those of increased consciousness and differentiation. But such readings belie what Jung says, and what he says poisons the well with rhetoric that is sometimes akin to the Duke’s statement to Brabantio: “If virtue no delighted beauty lack, / Your son-in-law is far more fair than black” (1.3.292–93). The Duke’s praise of Othello, as Phillipa Kelly notes, invokes categories that reflect the racist sense of difference and otherness that leads to the indictment of Othello in the first place.¹⁰ The same criticism may be leveled at Jung. Even if his rhetoric and examples are more at issue than the theories themselves, a rereading of his stance on race and the primitive is definitely in order.

If Jung’s point is that all persons, whether civilized or not, share a layer of primitive psychology, then what is that primitive layer, and how does it manifest, particularly in a civilized setting? Here as well, Jung’s discourse perpetuates the sense of racial difference because he considers tribal peoples, all of whom possess darker skin color, to be psychologically “inferior.” For instance, they lack intellectual capacity, are like “herd animals” in terms of instinct and “well-developed social sense,” and like children are both strongly imitative and strongly influenced by the unconscious (*CW* 4, 403/179, 641/278; 6, 422/249; 8, 516/270; and 9i, 276/163). “Primitive people, especially,” he writes, “are very much bound to their infantility” (*CW* 4, 564/246). Their emotions rule their egos,¹¹ and they are suspicious of neighboring tribes (*CW* 10, 45/27). Although naturally expressing their sexuality, primitives have strict moral codes, especially as regards sexual matters (*CW* 10, 214/103; 6, 356/212; and 8, 465/244). In

Jung's way of thinking, people characterized predominantly by primitive or archaic psychological elements are also unintelligent, animal-like, infantile, suspicious, openly sexual, and rigidly moral. Of course, some of these characteristics relate to Othello; and behind Shakespeare's Moor, as Ruth Cowhig points out, lie the stereotypes of Africans popularized by Leo Africanus's *The Geographical History of Africa* (1550; published in England in 1600): "courage, pride, guilelessness, credulity and easily aroused passions."¹²

Jung's own expeditions to "primitive" cultures reinforce the sense of cultural difference and contrast markedly with Othello's presence in Venice. Othello, a black man who has traveled through primitive lands, finds himself in Venice where his psychic limitations prove to be stronger than Europe's civilizing influence. Jung himself journeyed in the opposite direction, visiting Africa twice in 1920 and 1925 and New Mexico in 1924–25 to study the Pueblo tribe of Native Americans.¹³ Whereas Shakespeare wants to dramatize Othello's reactions to civilization, Jung wanted to see how he, as a civilized man, would react to Africa—to study his own psyche as much as the "primitive psychology" of the natives whom he visited. He writes, "In traveling to Africa to find a psychic observation post outside the sphere of the European, I unconsciously wanted to find that part of my personality which had become invisible under the influence and pressure of being European."¹⁴ For both Othello and Jung, then, the fundamental issue is how a man's reaction to a foreign culture whose mentality differs from his own relates to his individuation. If Jung had not expected to find a different mentality among "primitive" peoples than among Europeans, he would not have traveled to far-flung parts of the world.

If we understand the primitive to mean the psychologically archaic and separate it (as Jung often failed to do) from a context based on race, Jung has a point when he considers all persons to have a degree of the primitive inside. In the same spirit, William Heinrich Roscher and James Hillman assert that people can be "Western, modern, secular, civilized and sane—but also primitive, archaic, mythical and mad."¹⁵ A "civilized" person's primitive side manifests, for example, in Jung's own positive return to nature when he built his rural retreat at Küsnacht or in Iago's negative Turk-like machinations. It is vastly more difficult for Othello, the supposedly primitive man, to operate within a highly sophisticated civilization. Yet, according to Jung, the "primitive" man longs for "civilization" because the psyche's basic goal is growth, and civilization fosters a social and individual state of

further consciousness and differentiation. Jung's work also frequently acknowledges that civilization is itself problematic in a multiplicity of ways, including civilized man's vestigial primitivism, whose most obvious manifestation is war. In "The Fight with the Shadow" (1946) he attributes world war to unconscious influence because "we simply accuse our enemy of our own unadmitted faults" (*CW* 10, 444/218; 8, 516/270).¹⁶ If we project our shadow on the enemy, then fighting that enemy equals denying our own shadow and blocking the individuation process. Jung predicts grave consequences: "The dammed-up instinctual forces in civilized man are immensely destructive and far more dangerous than the instincts of the primitive, who in a modest degree is constantly living out his negative instinct"; and he considers world war a manifestation of the primitive within and among civilized nations (*CW* 6, 230/140). So although, on the surface, the Venetians are fighting the Turks, Jung's concept of projection suggests a different reading. Whereas, from the Venetian point of view (and presumably from Shakespeare's), the Turks represent a primitive, bellicose challenge to civilization, the Turks (in a Jungian reading) merely objectify the Venetians' own inferior function, which "is practically identical with the dark side of the human personality" (*CW* 9i, 222/123).

Civilized persons' vestigial primitivism also illuminates Desdemona's attraction to Othello. Jung writes that "the sight of a child or a primitive will arouse certain longings in adult, civilized persons—longings which relate to the unfulfilled desires and needs of those parts of the personality which have been blotted out of the total picture in favor of the adapted persona."¹⁷ It is not merely, as the archetypal critics argue, that Desdemona projects her animus onto Othello but also that their interaction makes her aware of her own "dammed-up instinctual forces." Jung notes a similar phenomenon in a comment about American girls: "We often discover with Americans that they are tremendously unconscious of themselves. Sometimes they suddenly grow aware of themselves, and then you get these interesting stories of decent young girls eloping with Chinamen or with Negroes, because in the American that primitive layer, which with us is a bit difficult, with them is decidedly disagreeable, as it is much lower down. It is the same phenomenon as 'going black' or 'going native' in Africa" (*CW* 18, 341/148). The statement's racism and Eurocentrism are so pronounced that it is necessary to state at once what I am not saying. I am not saying that there is anything wrong with interracial marriage or that Jung is right about Americans or women. That said,

does Jung's quotation contain anything beyond obvious flaws; and, if so, what valid insights illuminate *Othello*? The passage suggests that while all persons have a primitive element by virtue of the collective unconscious, the primitive in Americans is layered over with greater repression than in Europeans who, though they struggle with unconscious forces too, have somehow managed to become more individuated (that is, they have achieved greater conscious awareness of their own unconscious forces). When a white American girl becomes somewhat aware of her unconscious, primitive nature, however, she affirms it by projecting it onto a black man whom she then marries: the stronger the repression of the unconscious, the more force it will have when it is released. The passage repeats the unacceptable linkage of dark skin and primitivism, but the point for Desdemona is that Othello's stories activate her animus and make her aware of her own primitive nature, which she embraces through projection and marriage to the Moor. There is not only animus/anima projection in the union of the Venetian belle and the African general but also a connection in terms of the primitive: Desdemona may subtly desire it, while Othello appreciates the pity she feels for his endurance of it (1.3.163). Jung's analysis of American girls and my application of it to Desdemona thus reinforce what was once a popular stereotype: "Given the enormous popularity of travel books among white women (the Earl of Shaftesbury in 1710 was to lament the fact that 'a thousand Desdemonas' were so obsessed with stories of African men that they would readily abandon husbands, families and country itself, to 'follow the fortunes of the black tribe'), can we not say that Desdemona was an early travel book 'fanatic'?"¹⁸ Although Shakespeare, Shaftesbury, and Jung may, to an extent, reflect white European males' insecurity about female sexuality and fidelity, the dependability of their evidence seems dubious. So far, Jung's valid principle of universal primitivism, defined as the archaic, undifferentiated, and less conscious elements of the psyche, is sometimes obscured by racist rhetoric that centers on binary opposition and creates a sense of alterity; however, his insights—perhaps because of their flaws—are not without some application to *Othello*.

A more positive aspect of Jungian primitivism—and what motivated Jung to visit African and Native American villages—is the aforementioned "magical mentality" and the primitive's connection to the collective unconscious. The primitive, as Steven F. Walker writes, "is wise in the ways of psychology, capable of establishing a relationship with the archetypal world."¹⁹ He does this primarily through projection,

as Jung points out: “We find this phenomenon beautifully developed in primitive man,” who “is somewhat more given to projection than we [are]” (CW 10, 44/26, 132/65). In “Archaic Man,” Jung takes the point a step further: “Projection is one of the commonest psychic phenomena. It is the same as *participation mystique*, which Lévy-Bruhl, to his great credit, emphasized as being an essentially characteristic feature of primitive man” (CW 10, 131/65). It is this projection, or nondifferentiation between subject and object or between the perceiving mind and the perceived object, that characterizes a primitive mind as opposed to a civilized mind, for the latter type distinguishes between “qualities which, formerly, were naïvely attributed to the object [but] are in reality subjective contents” (CW 7, 329/206; 8, 516/270–71). “To him [the primitive] the world is a more or less fluid phenomenon within the stream of his own fantasy, where subject and object are undifferentiated and in a state of mutual interpenetration” (CW 9i, 187/101).

According to Jung’s line of reasoning, because primitives do not realize that projection is taking place, they assume that there is no difference between psychic content and external objects. Dire consequences result when civilized persons make the same mistake. The most obvious is war, which is not merely a manifestation of primitive instincts but also an example of projection. A second consequence is fetishism, the belief that objects have power and significance in themselves. In a passage that could nicely illuminate the 1980 film *The Gods Must Be Crazy*,²⁰ Jung writes: “For primitive man any object, for instance an old tin [or Coke bottle] that has been thrown away, can suddenly assume the importance of a fetish. This effect is obviously not inherent in the tin, but is a psychic product” (CW 10, 625/329). Elsewhere he speaks of “the primordial relation of the primitive to the object. His objects have a dynamic animation, they are charged with soul-stuff or soul-force (and not always possessed of souls, as the animist theory supposes), so that they have a direct psychic effect upon him, producing what is practically a dynamic identification with the object. . . . Its [the object’s] strong libido investment comes from its *participation mystique* with the subject’s own unconscious” (CW 6, 495/294–95). A third consequence of projection is superstition; the primitive assumes the existence of magical “supra-personal ‘powers’”: “Primitive man has a minimum of self-awareness combined with a maximum of attachment to the object; hence the object can exercise a direct magical compulsion upon him” (CW 8, 95/50, 516/270). As

Jung points out in “Archaic Man,” for example, primitives assume that occurrences may be ascribed to supernatural causes and that what “we call pure chance is for [them] wilful [*sic*] intention” (*CW* 10, 107/52, 117/56). There is no doubt that *participation mystique* underscores cultural difference (all humans are prone to projection, but primitives’ “magical mentality” makes them most prone of all). Let us now see where Jung’s line of thinking leads in our understanding of *Othello*.

THE PRIMITIVE AND DESDEMONA’S HANDKERCHIEF

War, fetishism, and the supernatural—unlike the minor characteristics of the primitive—have a major bearing upon an interpretation of *Othello*. Projection in each case springs from and defines a primitive mentality and illustrates an inability to distinguish between subject and object. The war against the Turks shadows forth the Venetians’ own inner negativity, while the primitive in fetishism and the supernatural relates to the matter of interpretation that has most engaged the play’s critics—Desdemona’s ill-fated handkerchief.

That handkerchief
 Did an Egyptian to my mother give.
 She was a charmer, and could almost read
 The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it
 ’Twould make her amiable and subdue my father
 Entirely to her love, but if she lost it
 Or made a gift of it, my father’s eye
 Should hold her loathèd and his spirits should hunt
 After new fancies. She, dying, gave it me,
 And bid me, when my fate would have me wived,
 To give it her. I did so; and take heed on ’t;
 Make it a darling like your precious eye.
 To lose ’t or giv ’t away were such perdition
 As nothing else could match. . . .
 ’Tis true. There’s magic in the web of it.
 A sibyl, that had numbered in the world
 The sun to course two hundred compasses,
 In her prophetic fury sewed the work;
 The worms were hallowed that did breed the silk
 And it was dyed in mummy which the skillful
 Conserved of maidens’ hearts. (3.4.57–77)

The handkerchief definitely qualifies as a symbol because there is no “pat definition of its significance” (Adams). To begin with, its origin is ambiguous—Othello’s mother got it from an Egyptian charmer in one passage (3.4.57–58) and from Othello’s father in another (5.2.223–24). Othello may truly impute magical power to the handkerchief and mention his father only when it suits the dramatic situation (Andrews); but if the father story represents his “real feelings” (Reid), then the mythological story may be a fabrication (Evans, Jones). The handkerchief is an emblem of death (Kaula), responsibility for marital happiness (Reid), “purity or honesty” (Stockholder), Desdemona’s reputation (Hodgson), “women’s civilizing power” (Neely), the “primal scene”—parents’ lovemaking—and “the mysteries of female sexuality” (Rudnytsky), the capacity for love and pity (Rogers-Gardner), sexual power and chastity (Berger), and both purity and baseness (Fisher). The handkerchief’s strawberry pattern symbolizes nipples (Wangh), breasts (Faber), the penis (Jofen), breast and penis interchangeably (Smith), the clitoris (Newman), or virgin blood on the wedding sheets (Jofen, Boose). In the context of emblem books and Shakespeare’s other plays, strawberries represent both Desdemona’s true goodness and Othello’s warped perception of that goodness (Ross). The worms that produced the silk for the handkerchief suggest the sensuous and primal nature of Othello’s love (Elliott); they are a phallic image (Boose) as well as an “emblem of self-entanglement” (Bates) and “of death, sexuality, and procreation” (Neely). Others consider the handkerchief an echo of St. Veronica’s handkerchief (Doloff), a “bridge” between states of mind and a “surrogate” for ocular proof (Mudford), a “floating signifier” (Rudnytsky, Rogers-Gardner), a “snowballing signifier” (Newman), and a fetish (Stockholder, Rudnytsky).²¹

A question untouched in this profusion of critical opinion, however, is how Jung’s notion of the primitive illuminates specific elements of the handkerchief’s main description. There is no doubt, as Katherine S. Stockholder points out, that Othello “confuse[s] the handkerchief . . . with the human love it represents,”²² but a Jungian interpretation of the handkerchief locates this problem of projection in a specifically primitive mentality. Writing about “primitive and archaic psychology,” Jung states, “The unconscious identity, in turn, is caused by the projection of unconscious contents into an object, so that these contents then become accessible to consciousness as qualities apparently belonging to the object” (CW 13, 122/91). The seriousness of the blurring of subject and object becomes clearer when Jung discusses

the notion of “bush-soul”: “Many primitives assume that, as well as his own, a man has a ‘bush-soul,’ incarnate in a wild animal or a tree, with which he is connected by a kind of psychic identity. This is what Lévy-Bruhl called *participation mystique*. . . . Injury to the bush-soul means an equal injury to the man” (*CW* 18, 440/194). In Shakespearean terms, as it is done to the handkerchief (object), so it is also done to Othello (subject) and to his marriage. The subject-object connection is what Lynda E. Boose means when she rightly notes “the triviality of this object which the primitive invests with disproportionate significance.”²³ Jung’s theory of primitives’ projection, then, undergirds Othello’s caveat that losing or giving away the handkerchief would signify that Desdemona is no longer “amiable” and that the marriage has come to “perdition” (3.4.61, 69).

Even the inherited nature of the handkerchief relates to the primitive. As Jung notes, “The lively imitativeness which we find in primitives as well as in children can give rise, in particularly sensitive children, to a peculiar inner identification with the parents, to a mental attitude so similar to theirs that effects in real life are sometimes produced which, even in detail, resemble the personal experiences of the parents” (*CW* 4, 308/135). When Jung also notes the importance of ceremony, one thinks of the ritual transfer of the handkerchief from mother to son to wife. With primitives, Jung writes, “you find that all important events of life are connected with elaborate ceremonies whose purpose is to detach man from the preceding stage of existence and to help him to transfer his psychic energy into the next phase” (*CW* 18, 365/159). Thus the handkerchief has such a grip on Othello’s psyche for three reasons: he has the primitive’s tendency to project psychic content onto objects, he has learned the story from his mother (a particularly primitive thinker), and the object’s ceremonial transfer from mother to son to wife signifies a corresponding transition within Othello himself.

For the same reasons, the loss of the handkerchief—the “ocular proof” (3.3.376) of Desdemona’s supposed infidelity—is particularly potent for Othello. Jung writes: “Here you see the chief difference between primitive and civilized psychology: with us a word is enough to release an accumulation of forces, but with primitives an elaborate pantomime is needed, with all manner of embellishments which are calculated to put the man into the right mood for acting” (*CW* 18, 1289/556). What is Iago’s manipulation of the handkerchief if not “an elaborate pantomime”? Finally, since *participation mystique* surely characterizes Othello’s attitude toward the handkerchief, then, as

Michael C. Andrews maintains, Othello “does indeed impute magical properties to the handkerchief.”²⁴ The handkerchief story is consistent with Jung’s portrait of the primitive mindset: Othello really believes what he tells his wife about its supernatural qualities, despite his later statement that his father gave it to his mother.

Besides amplifying the role of projection in the confusion between subject and object, a Jungian approach provides terms for the handkerchief’s function within the symbolic process. Jung mentions the “detachment of libido from the real object, its concentration on the symbol and canalization into a symbolic function” (*CW* 6, 402/238). Libido for Jung is psychic energy in general (*CW* 4, 566–67/247), but in Othello’s case the Freudian sexual libido is the right concept. Othello (as subject) detaches his sexual desire (“libido”) from Desdemona (“the real object”) and attaches it (channels or “canalizes” it) to the handkerchief (“symbol”) so that, in his own mind at least, it restrains male lust (“symbolic function”). In the same paragraph, Jung adds something a bit different: “The detachment of libido from the [real] object transfers it into the subject, when it activates the images lying dormant in the unconscious. These images are archaic forms of expression which become symbols, and these appear in their turn as equivalents of the devalued objects” (*CW* 6, 402/238). As Sherry Salman states, “Symbolic images are genuine transformers of psychic energy because *a symbolic image evokes the totality of the archetype it reflects*” (Salman’s emphasis).²⁵ By detaching his sexual desire from Desdemona, Othello internalizes it, activating male sexual restraint (the archetype), which he then projects onto the handkerchief (archetypal image). If “the archetype cannot be named until it is represented by a symbol,”²⁶ then a symbol *represents* the archetype. Othello’s problem, however, is that he considers them one and the same thing: rather than merely seeing the handkerchief as a symbol of male sexual restraint, he believes that the handkerchief actually regulates sexuality—that the symbol *is* the archetype that it represents. That is, Othello mistakes a symbol, which “depicts a reality that cannot be fully explained,” for a sign, which “is immediately understood.”²⁷ Jung ascribes such an error in judgment to a specifically primitive propensity: “For primitive man . . . the psychic and the objective coalesce in the external world” (*CW* 10, 128/63).

Because one of the defining qualities of the Jungian primitive, along with *participation mystique*, is its relation to man’s ancient origins, the sibyl is relevant to this discussion.²⁸ Though not addressing the primitive, Boose forges the relevant link: “Because the ritual origins of

marital blood pledge stretch back into man's ancient consciousness, 'A sibyl, that had number'd in the world / The sun to make two hundred compasses, / In her prophetic fury sew'd the work' (III.iv. 68–70)."²⁹ There is more afoot here than Stockholder's simple association of the sibyl and wisdom.³⁰ Although the sibyl in *Othello* is only two hundred years old, the sibyl, as an ancient figure, participates in the primitive; and a look at what Jung says about her illuminates an understanding of Othello's primitive consciousness.

The sibyl, of course, is best known for her role as guide to Aeneas during his journey through the underworld in the *Aeneid*, book 6, a journey signifying the hero's exploration of his own unconscious mind.³¹ Although Jung does not mention the sibyl and Aeneas together, what he does say about her is Virgilian in spirit. She is "a feminine psychopomp" (one who delivers the souls of the dead), "the sibylline anima," "the guide of souls," and "the anima-sibyl" or a guide to the essential feminine quality within a man (*CW* 9i, 60/29; 14, 300/226, 282/214, 287/217, and 313/233). As what James Hillman calls a "girl guide,"³² the sibyl is part of an anima pattern in the handkerchief's description that calls to mind Jung's "four stages of eroticism," which coincidentally happen to be anima-figures: Eve, Helen of Troy, the Virgin Mary, and Sophia (*CW* 16, 361/174). The handkerchief is handed down from the sibyl to the Egyptian sorceress, Othello's mother, and finally Desdemona. Merging the two patterns yields an exact correspondence:

- Sibyl/Sophia: anima that provides wisdom and guidance
- Sorceress/Helen: anima that bewitches and misguides
- Othello's mother/Mary: maternal anima that nurtures but can also smother
- Desdemona/Eve: wifely anima and proper partnership³³

This series suggests a number of things: first, a maturation process whose goal is to affirm the wisdom that marks its origin; second, types of anima (mother, whore, witch) that must be confronted and integrated into consciousness; and third, if the hero makes it this far, psychic integration in union with a wife, who may yet betray him. The handkerchief's transmission from one female figure to the next over a period of generations (with Othello as an intermediary in one transmission) is thus an outline for Othello's, or any man's, individuation within his own lifetime. As the correspondence between the female

characters in Othello's speech and Jung's stages of eroticism suggests, the handkerchief represents stages of psychological development that Othello must work through, but has not, in order to be successfully married.

The sibyl is significant not only for promoting a man's individuation but also for guiding him from the primitive to the civilized. Jung writes, "The sibyl, the guide of souls, shows the hero the way to Mercurius, who in this case is Hermes Trismegistus" (CW 14, 300/226)—an opaque statement that deserves unpacking. Hermes, like the Sibyl, is a psychopomp. Mercurius is Mercury/Hermes, and Hermes Trismegistus (literally "thrice great Hermes") is a god who conflates Hermes and Thoth, both of whom are gods of writing. So a reference to Hermes Trismegistus carries the same weight as the following explanation of Thoth: "he came to be regarded as the lord of knowledge, language and all science—even as Understanding or Reason personified."³⁴ Thus the sibyl, for Jung, guides the psyche away from the primitive's inability to distinguish between subject and object, toward civilized man's ability to differentiate between signifier and signified. With Hermes Trismegistus in the background, the handkerchief's history is ironic, for its genealogy implies an antidote to the projection that it invites as a fetish object. The sibyl is actually not responsible for the projection-inviting myth of the handkerchief. Although she wove it in ways that seem magical to Othello, it was the Egyptian charmer (a Helen-figure) who touched off the *participation mystique* by promulgating the myth that the handkerchief will make a woman "amiable" and "subdue" her husband's libido "to her love." Far from being to blame for Othello's projection problem, the sibyl actually guides men toward a civilized use of signification in which external objects do not govern psychological processes.³⁵

The sibyl's civilizing influence relates to yet another passage in Jung's writings: the "Erythraean Sibyl . . . was alleged to have foretold the coming of Christ" (CW 14, 277/211).³⁶ The sibyl is primitive only in the sense that she is ancient. For Jung, she is a civilizing force in the course of human events, for she helps men with the individuation process, relates to a properly functioning symbol system, and prophesies the coming of Christ.³⁷ As the sibyl wisely foretells the coming of Christ, so the sibylline handkerchief prefigures Othello's baptism. There is no causal relationship on either side of the homology—the existence of the handkerchief does not directly bring about the baptism. In each case, however, psychological well-being precedes and prepares

the way for spiritual wisdom, and baptism signals the birth of “spiritual man,” as Jung mentions: “I mean that the idea of baptism lifts man out of his archaic identification with the world and transforms him into a being who stands above it. The fact that mankind has risen to the level of this idea is baptism in the deepest sense, for it means the birth of spiritual man who transcends nature” (*CW* 10, 136/67). But Othello is no more able to affirm the Christian message of loving-kindness and its Pauline extrapolation—that husbands and wives should be subject to each other—than to achieve psychic integration by embracing his shadow and his anima. On the contrary, as Kaula states, by regarding the handkerchief as magic, “Othello is in a sense renouncing his baptism.”³⁸ Far from becoming spiritual man or even psychological man, Othello remains primitive man, unable to distinguish between his own psychic forces and the object onto which he projects them. This inability to perceive and overcome binary opposition is part of his tragedy.

Because *participation mystique* governs Othello’s psyche, he puts all his stock in the strawberry handkerchief and none in the signifying thing that it *truly* represents—bloody wedding sheets. For critics, whether the marriage is consummated remains mysterious,³⁹ but Jung’s insights into the sexual libido illuminate the issue. “Non-employment of the libido makes it ungovernable.” “When, therefore, unconscious contents accumulate as a result of being consistently ignored, they are bound to exert an influence that is pathological. There are just as many neurotics among primitives as among civilized Europeans” (*CW* 4, 474/209; 10, 26/19). Jung’s comments on repression sound distinctly Freudian: the monster is the thing that is repressed. Othello has been directing all of his libido, sexual and otherwise, into prosecuting a war against the Turks; and now that the victory has been achieved, the “young affects” in him are “defunct” (1.3.266–67), which may mean that he is unable to consummate his marriage. He is repressed, first, because his martial duties do not allow otherwise; and later his impotence makes him unable to perform his marital duties at his leisure. On the one hand, Othello’s “impotence” is transformed into a defensive accusation—his guilt becomes the blame that he projects onto Desdemona. On the other, it could be that his sex-libido becomes ungovernable. When Desdemona declines from what Jung calls a *femme inspiratrix* (an inspirational woman or muse) by interrupting Othello to go do housework and by arguing for Cassio’s reinstatement, Othello’s sex drive, which should have been

relieved in consummation, is “canalized” into spousal abuse. Jung writes that the *femme inspiratrix*, “if falsely cultivated, can turn into the worst kind of dogmatist and high-handed pedagogue—a regular ‘animus hound,’ as one of my women patients aptly expressed it” (*CW* 7, 336/209). This is essentially the perception of Desdemona that Iago instigates in Othello’s psyche.⁴⁰

THE PRIMITIVE AND OTHELLO’S FINAL SPEECH

As the great victor over the Turks ironically adopts their brutality in his domestic life, we come to the final evidence of Othello’s primitive mentality. His last speech has been negatively viewed as schizophrenia (Burton); an undermining of his identity (Singh); and an expression of “universal human weakness,” an escape from reality, and a self-dramatizing aesthetic attitude (Eliot). In a more positive reading, the speech is a subaltern’s self-reclamation, self-appropriation, and reversal of “colonial encryption” (Habib).⁴¹ My Jungian position is that Othello’s comments in his final speech express a frank confrontation among his intrapsychic forces. He affirms reality and asserts such strength-in-identity as he still possesses (not weakness or schizophrenia); however, far from constituting a postcolonial voice, the speech shows the extent of Othello’s submission to the dominant discourse. His final utterance is what ethnographers call “transculturation,” that is, “processes whereby members of subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted by a dominant or metropolitan culture.”⁴²

By using third person in his last speech, Othello puts psychic distance between his civilized self and the part of him that killed his wife.

Soft you; a word or two before you go.
 I have done the state some service, and they know’t.
 No more of that. I pray you, in your letters,
 When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
 Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate,
 Nor set down aught in malice. Then must you speak
 Of one that loved not wisely but too well;
 Of one not easily jealous but, being wrought,
 Perplexed in the extreme; of one whose hand,
 Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away
 Richer than all his tribe; of one whose subdued eyes,

Albeit unused to the melting mood,
 Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees
 Their medicinable gum. Set you down this;
 And say besides that in Aleppo once,
 Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk
 Beat a Venetian and traduced [slandered] the state,
 I took by th' throat the circumcisèd dog
 And smote him, thus. (5.2.348–66)

The two analogies correspond to his former lack of self-awareness (Indian) and his present self-realization (Turk). His primitive mentality is on greater display in his first analogy: killing his wife makes him like “the base Indian, [who] threw a pearl away / Richer than all his tribe” (5.2.357–58).⁴³ An “Indian” in Shakespeare’s time is not only a denizen of India but also a Native American.⁴⁴ As Leslie A. Fiedler states, “By the time *Othello* was written, the first English explorations of the New World had already occurred, and the audiences had learned to associate the word ‘tribe’ not only with Jews but with those red men whose contempt for gold and precious stones had already become proverbial.”⁴⁵ Reflecting on his trip to New Mexico, Jung considers Native Americans to be at “a still lower cultural level” than he had found in the Sahara and notes that they think with the heart rather than the head.⁴⁶ Although he admires their closeness to the archetypes, he believes that Native Americans may participate in the lack of self-awareness that he attributes to African tribesmen. After asking what state would characterize children who grew up without formal schooling, he writes: “It would be a primitive state, and when such children came of age they would, despite their native intelligence, still remain primitive—savages, in fact, rather like a tribe of intelligent Negroes or Bushmen. They would not necessarily be stupid, but merely intelligent by instinct. They would be ignorant, and therefore unconscious of themselves and the world” (*CW* 17, 104/52–53). Far from being one of Jung’s ignorant bushmen, Othello inhabits the liminal space between savagery and civilization—his murderous nature has been put to the service of the Venetian state. But he shares with the bushman—and presumably with Jung’s version of the Native American—a lack of self-awareness, the predominance of heart over head, and, again, the inability to distinguish outer objects and events from his own psychological processes.

Whereas act 5 shocks Othello into the painful awareness that leads to his self-comparison to “the base Indian,” his ultimate reference to the “turbaned Turk” not only amplifies his self-realization but also explains his suicide. In Othello’s view, the Turks, in their treachery and bellicosity, are to the primitive as the Venetians, with their elaborate judicial system, are to civilization. Styling himself as the opponent of the one and the avenger of the other, Othello projects his psychic situation onto a remembered conflict. On the surface, Othello is saying that, in Aleppo (in present-day Syria), he killed a Turk who had beaten a Venetian citizen and spoken maliciously of the state (presumably but not necessarily Venice). As Othello dispensed justice to the Turk on that earlier occasion, so he now, as Harold C. Goddard points out, punishes the Turk-like part of himself by committing suicide.⁴⁷ As a Moor, he too is a “circumcised dog” who beats, traduces, and murders a Venetian (his wife); but like his former self he now exacts strict justice with a blade. In Freudian terms, the superego (Othello) snuffs out the id (Turk) that had been assailing the ego (Venetian). In Jungian terms, Othello’s final analogy declares victory over the shadow, probably by the persona rather than the Self, for he speaks his last words not as Whole Othello but as General Othello, dispenser of swift justice and broken man. He has achieved a Pyrrhic victory: the shadow, once wedded, is now divorced and beaten but not integrated—all at the cost of his own life. His suicide indeed marks the disintegration of his psyche rather than individuation, the psyche’s government by the Self, the latter being Jung’s term for “the wholeness of our psyche.”⁴⁸

Achieving individuation enables one to overcome the crux of the primitive mentality: “If the transposition [from ego to self] is successful, it does away with the *participation mystique*” (CW 13, 67/45). The goal of individuation is “to detach consciousness from the object so that the individual no longer places the guarantee of his happiness, or of his life even, in factors outside himself, whether they be persons, ideas or circumstances [or handkerchiefs], but comes to realize that everything depends on whether he holds the treasure or not. If the possession of that gold is realized, then the centre of gravity is in the individual and no longer in an object on which he depends” (CW 18, 377/166). In short, Othello’s fetishism—his inappropriate attitude toward an object, which arises from his primitive mentality—is the main barrier to his individuation, the shift from ego to the greater wholeness of the Self. Shakespeare provides a fitting image for this

lack of transition. After killing Desdemona, Othello says, “Methinks it should be now a huge eclipse / Of sun and moon, and that th’ affrighted globe / Should yawn at alternation” (5.2.102–4). This is pretty clearly the “chaos” that he prophesies at 3.3.99–100. The murder causes the whole earth to shudder (and no doubt proved especially shocking for those who had just witnessed it at the Globe Theater), but the image takes on a further meaning in a Jungian context. As Marie-Louise von Franz points out, “In art it [the Self] is often depicted as the globe of the world, which clearly shows its meaning, for the child and the sphere are widespread symbols of wholeness.”⁴⁹ The shadow-driven murder of Desdemona affrights the Self, which seeks to draw Othello from the primitive tendency for *participation mystique* toward a greater psychic integration through a more sophisticated understanding of signification. Ultimately, however, his death is tragic not because he never realizes the error of his primitive thinking but because the realization comes too late for him to conceive of any outcome other than self-murder.

Othello’s adoption of the dominant culture’s discourse (“base Indian” and “turbaned Turk”) illustrates the position held by Patricia Parker and Stephen Greenblatt that his psychological deterioration parallels colonization.⁵⁰ The dominant culture is to the subordinate culture as Iago is to Othello, Venice is to Cyprus, and England is to Africa. Part of his fall is his *participation mystique* (he is guilty of projection), but as a fictional character and a product of the playwright’s own projection, the Moor reflects the Elizabethans’ ambivalence about “the alien other” (Habib), otherness that is “at once an object of desire and derision” (Bhabha). Regarding the Elizabethans, Cowhig elaborates a plethora of mixed emotions such as fascination, prejudice, fear, distrust, and hostility. Ania Loomba adds, “Outsiders provoked more debates, anxiety, and representations than the population statistics might warrant.”⁵¹

Jung’s theory of the primitive provides an appropriate starting point for examining Shakespeare’s depiction of the Moor precisely because both theory and play are rife with the same flaws that come into focus under the lens of postcolonial critique. Both Shakespeare and Jung convey a sense that the European is distinct from the Other, and this relationship implies hierarchy based on value judgment—a privileging of the civilized over the primitive. Thus the ambivalence felt within the Elizabethan psyche is at least partly a projection of psychic content onto a so-called “primitive” Other and a handy method of

sidestepping individuation. The terminology and examples of Jung's formulation of the primitive are often problematic, but there is value in using a post-Jungian conceptualization of the "primitive" (defined as those elements of the psyche that remain archaic, undifferentiated, and less conscious) and in recognizing that there is a strong tendency to project such elements outward to other individuals, groups, and societies. The exploration of this post-Jungian conceptualization of the primitive in *Othello* illustrates the power of literature to portray and convey essential human truths: Othello's *hamartia* (error, mistake) is seen less as jealousy than as his inability to confront and overcome his own archaic psychological states, of which jealousy is one symptom. The play demonstrates that psychologically primitive powers lurking in each person's psyche can cause devastating damage, but Jung reminds us that within each psyche reside the potential and desire for individuation, growth, balance, and increased wholeness. If we wish to avoid literal or symbolic destruction in our lives, these primitive elements must be brought to consciousness through the individuation process, and their power must not be repressed but rather be channeled and integrated into individual and social growth. In this way we can avoid our own unique version of Othello's fate.

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CHAPTER 5



SHADOW AND ANIMA IN *HAMLET*

MERMAID ALLUSION AND THE STAGES OF EROTICISM

As a matter of fact, day after day we live far beyond the bounds of our consciousness; without our knowledge, the life of the unconscious is also going on within us. The more the critical reason dominates, the more impoverished life becomes; but the more of the unconscious, and the more of myth we are capable of making conscious, the more of life we integrate. Overvalued reason has this in common with political absolutism: under its dominion the individual is pauperized.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*¹

One may better understand the potency of Othello's soldier persona in light of the following statements:

The more masculine his [a man's] outer attitude is, the more his feminine traits are obliterated: instead, they appear in his unconscious. This explains why it is just those very virile men who are most subject to characteristic weaknesses; their attitude to the unconscious has a womanish weakness and impressionability. (CW 6, 804/469)

Outwardly an effective and powerful role is played, while inwardly an effeminate weakness develops in face of [*sic*] every influence coming from the unconscious. Moods, vagaries, timidity, even a limp sexuality (culminating in impotence) gradually gain the upper hand. (CW 7, 308/194)

Jung emphasizes this compensatory relationship between persona and anima by stressing that a man's identification with a masculine "mask" determines the degree to which "he is delivered over to influences

from within,” specifically “feminine weakness . . . for it is the anima that reacts to the persona.” Furthermore: “Everything that should normally be in the outer attitude, but is conspicuously absent, will invariably be found in the inner attitude. This is the fundamental rule” (*CW* 7, 308–9/194–95; 6, 806/469). The phenomenon occurs whether the mask is martial as in Othello’s case or intellectual as in Hamlet’s.

Moreover, as discussed in chapter 4, the four female figures that Jung identifies—Sophia, Mary, Eve, and Helen—bear upon Othello’s psychology, particularly in his lengthy statement to Desdemona about the handkerchief. Jung offers a different version of these stages in the following statement: “the anima is bipolar and can therefore appear positive one moment and negative the next; now young, now old; now mother, now maiden; now a good fairy, now a witch; now a saint, now a whore” (*CW* 9i, 356/199). The two lists of female figures yield close correspondences: Sophia/good fairy; Mary/mother, maiden, saint; Helen/witch, whore; and Eve/good wife. The linkage between Helen and whoredom is particularly strong because Jung specifies it in a passage about the anima: “the anima-type is presented in the most succinct and pregnant form in the Gnostic legend of Simon Magus . . . [who] was always accompanied on his travels by a girl, whose name was Helen. He had found her in a brothel in Tyre; she was a reincarnation of Helen of Troy” (*CW* 10, 75/40). It is the prostitute (negative anima) who figures most powerfully in the compensatory relationship with the male persona. Othello, the warrior, marries a saint but easily believes that she is a whore; and Hamlet, the intellectual, sees whoredom everywhere but particularly in the play’s female characters—in Ophelia because he presumably fornicates with her (either offstage or before the play begins) and in Gertrude because she incestuously weds Claudius.

An additional link between Othello and Hamlet is the shadow’s role in the psyche: one must integrate the shadow in order to embrace the anima. As Jung puts it, “If the encounter with the shadow is the ‘apprentice-piece’ in the individual’s development, then that with the anima is the ‘master-piece’” (*CW* 9i, 61/29). And elsewhere: “the integration of the shadow, or the realization of the personal unconscious, marks the first stage in the analytic process, and . . . without it a recognition of anima and animus is impossible” (*CW* 9ii, 42/22). Unable to recognize and assimilate his shadow into his conscious personality, Othello does not achieve a happy marriage to anima-figure

Desdemona; he instead believes that his shadow projection, Iago, speaks the truth about her; Othello ignores his own negativity by projecting it onto his wife and then murders her for it. Like King Lear, “he hath ever but slenderly known himself” (*King Lear* 1.1.296–97).

A good deal has been said about *Hamlet*, shadow, and anima over the last three decades. To begin with, H. R. Coursen argues that Hamlet is to introversion and thinking as Gertrude is to extraversion and feeling, citing (but misquoting) Hamlet’s phrase, “About, my brains!” (2.2.588), as evidence. Hamlet so emphasizes the intellect that Coursen calls him “the perennial graduate student,” which alienates him from his anima, deprives him of “effective [that is, conscious and positive] contact with the woman-in-him,” and leads to the rise of the negative anima or inner prostitute: “Hamlet’s ‘whore’ (V.ii.64) or Claudius’s ‘harlot’s cheek’ (III.i.52).”² Anima alienation has two results, the first of which is binary thinking: “The anima-alienated man can see women only as saints—in which case they do not exist as women—or as whores—in which case they also do not exist as women. A woman exists for a man only insofar as he can elevate the feminine principle from the depths of his psyche into consciousness.” Coursen does not mention “Get thee to a nunnery” in this context, but the phrase’s dual implication of convent and brothel nicely illustrates the saint/whore dichotomy. The second result is projection of the “unconscious anima” onto Ophelia. Hamlet’s “castigation of women in his outer world argues his hatred of the feminine within.” Rejection or repression of the feminine means that the negative anima has Hamlet in her grip, the shadow darkens, and Hamlet is powerless to claim his “masculine power.”³

Like Coursen, Barbara Rogers-Gardner stresses the opposition between thinking and feeling, but for her Hamlet’s psychomachia is between reason (Horatio) and passion (the ghost), with movement from the former to the latter.⁴ There is a further conflict between “the repressed mother/anima and the growing idea of the warrior father” or between “emotion ‘that would trouble the heart of a woman’ (V,ii,215) and tough, fatalistic cool. ‘The readiness is all . . . let be.’” Rogers-Gardner nicely expresses the compensatory effect of Hamlet’s growing masculinity: “So paradoxically the tougher and more manly Hamlet’s persona gets, the more anima-ridden, manic, and unreasonable his unconscious becomes.” Hamlet “buries his feminine nature alive, and . . . therefore . . . cannot integrate intuition and action.”

The effects are a range of anima-related dysfunction: a view of the mother as “ego-death,” projection of whorishness onto Ophelia (“a mere stand-in for Gertrude” and “the signifier of impossible desire”), and reference to Claudius in act 4, scene 3 as his mother.⁵ Although Rogers-Gardner’s main point is compelling (Hamlet switches from mother love to the world of men but never properly integrates the two), her take on the anima per se is somewhat imprecise. Hamlet responds to the fall of Troy, enacted by the players, with “tears for the *dead* feminine within himself”; but “the last of Hamlet’s humanity *dies* with [Ophelia]” in a later scene (my emphases). If anima is already dead in act 2, how can it die in act 5? Notwithstanding this contradiction, Rogers-Gardner’s point is that Hamlet’s psychomachia culminates in masculinity’s ascendancy over the feminine.⁶

Unlike Coursen and Rogers-Gardner, who emphasize the compensatory relationships within Hamlet’s psyche, the next two critics explore a wider spectrum of archetypal interpretation. Sally F. Porterfield identifies Hamlet, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and the grave diggers with the trickster archetype; Ophelia is the rejected anima; Laertes is Hamlet’s shadow, Claudius the shadow of Hamlet Senior, and Polonius another shadow father-figure; Fortinbras and Horatio are agents of the Self; the ghost represents the father complex; and Hamlet’s sea voyage signifies psychic integration. Porterfield rightly notes the close connection between trickster and shadow when she asserts that Hamlet is “possessed by trickster/shadow” and that he integrates the trickster on the sea voyage (an integration marked by the death of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern). Regarding the shadow, however, her interpretation contains a contradiction because she asserts that “his impulsive engagement with Laertes” in the graveyard signals shadow integration but that Hamlet’s death at Laertes’s hand in the climactic scene signals *unintegrated* shadow qualities. It is not clear how both can be the case. Regarding the anima, Porterfield’s analysis is more sure-footed: “Hamlet’s anguished and rejected anima sinks back into the unconscious as Ophelia drowns in her flowery stream, not coincidentally at the time that he embarks upon his voyage into the unconscious once more”; but “[b]y publicly declaring his love [in the graveyard scene] he claims once more the rejected anima.” A temporary *rejection* of the anima seems more accurate than Rogers-Gardner’s claim of the anima’s *death*, my only quibble being that Hamlet does not so much reject as get rejected by the anima: Ophelia dumps *him* on the advice of her father (2.1.110–12), not the

other way around. In this respect, Porterfield's archetypal criticism does not precisely match the dynamics of the characters' relationship.⁷

Elizabeth Oakes pairs characters and archetypes in a different way than Porterfield's study does. Hamlet is both hero and scapegoat; Gertrude, the terrible mother; Ophelia, the anima; Claudius, the shadow; Hamlet Senior, the "tribal father," whom Jung calls "the representative of the spirit, whose function is to oppose pure instinctuality"; and Polonius, wise old man, fool, and scapegoat, in that order. Regarding the anima, Oakes notes that Gertrude, ocean, and earth all represent the mother archetype; and the critic's comment on Ophelia's drowning is that water is "the element most associated with the anima figure." Fortunately, Oakes does not assert that Ophelia's death in the feminine stream signals the death of Hamlet's anima, and she adds helpfully to the discourse on the graveyard scene: "Hamlet can leap into Ophelia's grave and emerge, an action that not only graphically illustrates his rebirth but also foreshadows his spirit's victory over death at the end of the play."⁸

The only trouble here is that not all editions contain the same stage direction. In the Bevington edition, for example, it is Ophelia's brother Laertes, rather than erstwhile suitor Hamlet, who leaps into Ophelia's grave.⁹ Hamlet comes forward a few lines later, and they grapple; however, it is not clear whether Laertes leaps out of the grave or whether Hamlet leaps in. Bevington's note on the grappling (5.1.259) is instructive. He states, "The testimony of the First Quarto [1603] that '*Hamlet leaps in after Laertes*' and the '*Elegy on Burbage*' ('Oft have I seen him leap into the grave') seem to indicate one way in which this fight was staged; however, the difficulty of fitting two contenders and Ophelia's body into a confined space (probably the trapdoor) suggests to many editors the alternative, that Laertes jumps out of the grave to attack Hamlet." Yet the first folio (1623) leaves the staging of the scene up to the director: the only stage direction has Laertes leap into the grave; it is not clear how he gets his hands on Hamlet's neck.¹⁰ Although directorial license permits Hamlet to join Laertes in Ophelia's grave and the text does not explicitly convey Shakespeare's intention one way or the other, subtle clues do suggest that Hamlet never stands in the grave. Since Hamlet tells Laertes to "take thy fingers from my throat" (5.1.61), Laertes appears to be the aggressor, which implies that he leaves the grave to attack Hamlet. And Hamlet's further statement—that Laertes attempts "to outface me with leaping in her grave" (5.1.280)—implies that he himself does

not do so. As a result, a statement about Hamlet's grave-leaping in connection with symbolic rebirth is not definitive.

A further problem among *Hamlet's* Jungian critics is that they ostensibly wrote their studies in isolation from each other. Rogers-Gardner overlooks Coursen; Porterfield overlooks both previous studies; Oakes cites Maud Bodkin,¹¹ but among the more recent critics only Coursen merits a note; and the most recent (not to mention the most pessimistic) Jungian critic of *Hamlet*, Kenneth Tucker, cites none of the above yet employs the same reason/passion duality that Coursen and Rogers-Gardner discuss. Tucker writes, "Hamlet is never able in this world to achieve psychological equipoise" because there is no reconciliation between "thinking and intuition," on the one hand, and "feeling and sensation," on the other. In short, "individuation . . . may well be impossible." Regarding anima, Tucker is not specific; but he asserts—incorrectly, I believe—that Hamlet and Ophelia have not had sex before the play opens; and he notes that Hamlet "well-nigh accuses Ophelia of being a prostitute."¹²

Although Hamlet's Jungian critics have acknowledged the role of the anima and have even noted that "the shadow must first be integrated before we can truly integrate our contra-sexual archetype,"¹³ no one has sufficiently analyzed the play in terms of the anima, the shadow-anima dynamic, or the anima-mermaid-*meretrix* (prostitute) nexus. Jungian theorist James Hillman discouragingly claims that "[m]anifestations of the anima show that she [the anima] has no answers: the images of her . . . as slippery mermaid say that she is incomprehensible."¹⁴ I believe, however, that the "slippery mermaid" holds the key to understanding Hamlet's psychological situation. By exploring the anima in *Hamlet*—particularly its relationship to shadow integration—this chapter locates the roots of Hamlet's tragedy in depersonalization (detachment from the positive anima) and in the repression that stems from "overvalued reason" and leads to possession by the negative anima whose symbol is the mermaid. More specifically, what is the relationship between Ophelia's death and Hamlet's anima? Does Hamlet's anima die, is it merely repressed, or is some other interpretation more probable? What more can be said about anima and prostitution, especially in Shakespeare plays that contain actual prostitution? What does Jung himself have to say about anima images like the mermaid and about the prostitute/*meretrix*, and how do Shakespeare's references to these categories relate to Jung's ideas? Does Hamlet integrate his shadow? What is the role of his encounter

with the pirates in this possible integration? And how might the anima inform scenes not considered by other critics?

ANIMA AND SHADOW

Looking at Hamlet's psyche in terms of the anima requires an adequate definition of a concept that, for Jung, is wide-ranging and highly variegated. At its most general, "the anima is the *archetype of life itself*" (Jung's emphasis), a transgender phenomenon that "satisfactorily sums up all the statements of the unconscious, of the primitive mind, of the history of language and religion" (*CW* 9i, 66/32). Anima, meaning the "soul," often personifies the unconscious for all persons, particularly the collective unconscious (*CW* 9i, 57/27, 55/26; 11, 107/63; and 14, 128/106). As H. R. Coursen points out, Hamlet too "describes the male soul as feminine" when he comments that the player "could force his soul so to his own conceit / That from *her* working all his visage wanned" (2.2.553–54; my emphasis).¹⁵ The anima not only represents the whole of the unconscious but also links the conscious and unconscious parts of the psyche: "I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious in general, and have taken it as a bridge to the unconscious, in other words, as a function of relationship to the unconscious"; anima and animus (the masculine principle in women) thus "represent *functions* which filter the contents of the collective unconscious through to the conscious mind" (*CW* 13, 62/42; 9ii, 40/20; Jung's emphasis). Unless the collective unconscious is divine, these statements appear to correct Coursen's claim that the anima "mediate[s] . . . between the soul of man and God."¹⁶ The anima is a conduit but also a storehouse: "The anima can be defined as the image or archetype or deposit of all the experiences of man with woman" (*CW* 13, 58/40). Moreover, the anima functions in "a compensatory relationship" with the persona, as suggested above: as the persona is to the world, so the anima is to the collective unconscious (*CW* 7, 304/192, 521/304). Calling one the "outer attitude" and the other the "inner attitude," Jung maintains that "the character of the anima can be deduced from that of the persona. Everything that should normally be in the outer attitude, but is conspicuously absent, will invariably be found in the inner attitude" (*CW* 6, 803/467, 806/469). The implication is that anima can be either a positive bridge to the collective unconscious and psychological

wholeness or a major impediment to individuation, the latter occurring when one represses the anima into the personal unconscious and then projects it onto a female. Hamlet does so when he says to Ophelia, “Get thee to a nunnery,” an order that nicely sums up the saint/whore dichotomy within his own psyche (3.1.122). Jung’s theory of the anima includes a wide range of manifestations: the whole of the unconscious, the soul, a conduit between the unconscious and conscious awareness, a repository of the feminine in men (for example, the stages of eroticism), and a balance for the persona.

As men age, their relationship to the anima changes in interesting ways. Jung says that men attempt to get in touch with their masculinity during the first half of life and with their femininity during life’s second phase, but his metaphor of “use” seems incorrect: “We might compare masculinity and femininity and their psychic components to a definite store of substances of which, in the first half of life, unequal use is made. A man consumes his large supply of masculine substance and has left over only the smaller amount of feminine substance, which he must now put to use” (CW 8, 782/398). Instead, if a man’s masculinity matures and mellows to a point where femininity provides a natural complement, making way for exploration of his feminine half does not mean that a man’s masculinity is gone or depleted. He simply dwells more in his masculinity in the first half of life and leavens that with femininity in life’s second half. Moreover, in each segment of his life, the anima takes a different form: “the young boy” and the “infantile man” like Hamlet have a maternal anima; an “adult man” prefers “the figure of a younger woman”; and a “senile man finds compensation in a very young girl, or even a child” (CW 9i, 357/200). On the other hand, anima’s influence on the psyche can wane as a man ages, resulting in “premature rigidity, crustiness, stereotypy, fanatical one-sidedness, obstinacy, pedantry, or else resignation, weariness, sloppiness, irresponsibility, and finally a childish *ramollissement* [softening] with a tendency to alcohol” (CW 9i, 147/71). A good example of an older man whose anima projection is a young woman and who nonetheless becomes prematurely rigid is King Lear, who says of Cordelia, “I loved her most, and thought to set my rest / On her kind nursery” (1.1.123–24). Another old man who seems to prefer young women—and succumbs to irresponsibility and alcohol to boot—is Falstaff, who reminisces with Justice Shallow about cavorting with Jane Nightwork at a brothel called the Windmill in their younger days, 55 years before (2 *Henry IV* 3.2.193–215). Falstaff’s statement,

“We have heard the chimes at midnight,” anticipates Lucio’s remark in *Measure for Measure* that “women are light at midnight” (5.1.288), meaning “[w]anton, unchaste.”¹⁷ In a Jungian reading, however, Lucio’s remark carries an unintended double meaning, that “women” (the anima) are the key to illuminating the “midnight” of a man’s psyche (the unconscious). Jung’s theory of anima projection also explains why in *2 Henry IV* Falstaff prefers the prostitute Doll Tearsheet (negative anima) to Mistress Quickly (positive anima)—he is projecting an aspect of the anima that Jung calls “the glamorous, possessive, moody, and sentimental *seductress* in a man” (*CW*9ii, 422/266; my emphasis)—and why, in his old age, he evidently savors the memory of a young Jane more than the reality of an old Doll.

The problem that Lear, Falstaff, and—as we shall see—Hamlet face in approaching the anima is that they have not adequately integrated the shadow, which we first encountered in chapter 3. As noted there, Jung defines the concept as follows: “The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting itself upon him directly or indirectly—for instance, inferior traits of character and other incompatible tendencies” (*CW* 9i, 513/284–85). While the shadow is clearly a manifestation of the personal unconscious, another definition suggests that it reflects the collective unconscious as well: “SHADOW, that hidden, repressed, for the most part inferior and guilt-laden personality whose ultimate ramifications reach back into the realm of our animal ancestors and so comprise the whole historical aspect of the unconscious” (*CW* 9ii, 422/266). Together, the two definitions correctly suggest that the shadow is both personal and transpersonal or archetypal. Like the anima, the shadow is in a compensatory relationship with the persona, as Daryl Sharp notes: “To the degree that we identify with a bright persona, the shadow is correspondingly dark.” When assimilating the shadow by awakening awareness of one’s dark side—an act that Sharp calls “diplomacy or statesmanship”¹⁸—one can engage the shadow’s positive characteristics. While it does contain personal negatives and primitive tendencies, the shadow, Jung says, is “not wholly bad,” for its “childish or primitive qualities . . . would in a way vitalize and embellish human existence, but—convention forbids!” (*CW*11, 134/78). So the shadow, though at first the persona’s adversary, will check its negatives and release its positives if ego properly acknowledges it.

The shadow’s personal dimension bears more significantly upon a man’s relationship to the anima. Conscious recognition of the shadow

matters because acknowledging the shadow/personal unconscious opens a conduit to the anima/collective unconscious. Jung states, “The shadow coincides with the ‘personal’ unconscious (which corresponds to Freud’s conception of the unconscious),” but the anima and animus “evidently live and function in the deeper layers of the unconscious, especially in that phylogenetic substratum which I have called the collective unconscious” (*CW* 9i, 513/284, 518/286). In order for a man to integrate his anima he must first integrate the shadow: conscious awareness must incorporate the personal in order to reach and integrate the collective; this is the sense in which integration of the one is the “apprentice-piece” and of the other the “master-piece.” Thus “to the degree in which the shadow is recognized and integrated, the problem of the anima, i.e., of relationship, is constellated [that is, activated]” (*CW* 9i, 485/270, n. 18). The integrative process, says Jung, involves relationship—with a same-sex “partner” for the shadow and with someone of the opposite sex for the anima—because projection must take place for conscious awareness to be achieved (*CW* 9ii, 42/22). For example, Hamlet must first come to terms with his shadow—acknowledge its socially unacceptable nature and embrace its vitality—before he can achieve a decent relationship with Ophelia. Without the one, the other is impossible. Even in an ideal state of individuation, only the *content* of the anima is integrated because the anima itself is a disembodied idea, which, as Sharp points out, is “irrepresentable”¹⁹ except insofar as its “effects are discernible in . . . images and motifs” (*CW* 9ii, 40/20).

OPHELIA, HAMLET, AND THE ANIMA

As we have already noted, Rogers-Gardner’s claim that Hamlet’s anima dies is unlikely because no man can murder the feminine archetype, which is, by definition, an eternal and transpersonal idea. It is more accurate to argue, as Porterfield does, that an individual man may reject the *content* of that archetype, which leads to unwanted consequences because psychic content will manifest negatively if not integrated positively. Kay Stanton suggests—even more sensibly—that “in death, Ophelia switches from potential whore to worshipped Madonna.”²⁰ Rather than signaling the death of Hamlet’s inner feminine, her physical demise transmutes his orientation toward the

inner feminine from negative to positive—from despicable Helen to revered Mary, from one stage of eroticism to another.

Let us first consider Ophelia, who is a main bearer of Hamlet's anima projection. Jung states, "The 'maiden' corresponds to the anima of the man. . . . But as long as a woman is content to be a *femme à homme* [a woman who derives her identity from (sexual) relations with men], she has no feminine individuality. She is empty and merely glitters—a welcome vessel for masculine projections" (*CW* 9i, 355/198–99). Hillman illuminates the relationship between Ophelia and Hamlet, in saying that

this "anima-type" presents us with an archetypal condition of soul that is drowsily nymphic, neither asleep nor awake, neither self-sustainingly virginal nor faithfully conjoined, lost and empty, a *tabula rasa*. . . .

To derive it [a woman's emptiness] from a father-complex again puts the origin onto man, leaving the woman only a daughter, only an object created by projection, an Eve born out of Adam's sleep, without independent soul, fate, and individuality.

Rather this emptiness would be considered an authentic archetypal manifestation of the anima in one of her classical forms, maiden, nymph, Kore, which Jung so well describes, and where he also states that "she often appears in woman."²¹

The two passages from Hillman are highly relevant to Ophelia's nature and situation because both stress the female's function as recipient of male projection, particularly the father's. Polonius and Laertes project onto her the role of obedient daughter and virginal sister, even as Hamlet sees her as a reflection of his inner whore. As Tucker rightly states, "Ophelia is a restrained, repressed, fledgling woman, dominated by her brother and father."²² Applied to Ophelia, the phrase "*tabula rasa*" implies that she may be an object, an open receptacle, an "O"; and the reference to Eve suggests an aspect of the first woman not mentioned previously. Hillman implies a diminution of this stage of eroticism—wifely anima—from the potential for positive relationship and a hidden potential for bewitchment to complete dependency on a male, without whom a woman is a nothing. Ophelia is simultaneously the "maiden, nymph, Kore"²³ whom Hillman describes, as we know from Hamlet's statement under his breath: "Nymph, in thy orisons / Be all my sins remembered" (3.1.90–91). And she illustrates the male-dependent role described by Jung and

Hillman because she literally ceases to exist with her father dead and her brother and lover abroad. Whereas one ordinarily supposes that these factors are the context or occasion of her demise, Jungian theory suggests that they are both the psychological cause and the true meaning of her death. The conclusion is a typically unrecognized point about Jung's anima theory: "Anima, released from this containing definition [contrasexuality], bears upon the psyche of women too."²⁴

Jung's statements about the anima also clarify Hamlet's psychological dysfunction and provide a helpful complement to the more traditional reading of the character's melancholy.²⁵ Jung writes, "When the anima is strongly constellated, she softens the man's character and makes him touchy, irritable, moody, jealous, vain, and unadjusted. He is then in a state of 'discontent' and spreads discontent around him," with "anima possession" being "a condition of uncontrolled emotion" (*CW* 9i, 144/70-71; 10, 76/40). Regarding a specific anima figure, the nixie or water spirit, Jung states, "She is a mischievous being who crosses our path in numerous transformations and disguises, playing all kinds of tricks on us, causing happy and unhappy delusions, depressions and ecstasies, outbursts of affect, etc." (*CW* 9i, 54/26). Softness of character, irritability, moodiness, maladjustment, depression, and "outbursts of affect" sound remarkably like Hamlet, particularly in his interaction with Ophelia and Gertrude. Coursen notes the dysfunctional role of the anima in Hamlet's experience by stating, "The 'moods' of men, even depression and deep melancholy, can be attributed to their divorce from the feminine-in-them, the principle that fertilizes the male ego"; "the man alienated from his own feminine principle can only react from his stereotypic version of woman."²⁶ But what we have here are two complementary but subtly distinct phenomena: whereas Jung is writing about negative anima, Coursen is getting at detachment from the positive anima; and each orientation evinces a botched relationship with the stages of eroticism.

By giving a name—depersonalization—to the phenomenon that Coursen merely describes and by attributing it to "young men [like Hamlet] scarcely turned twenty, compulsive neurotics and introverted worriers who are also highly intelligent and can portray fascinating descriptions of their depersonalization experiences," Hillman helps deepen the role of anima in Hamlet's dysfunction.²⁷ He adds:

The condition can be distinguished from depression since depersonalization is less the inhibition of vital functions and the narrowing of

focus than it is *a loss of personal involvement with and attachment to self and world*. There seems another archetype at work than in depression. . . . There is *a curious ability to observe one's condition coupled with morbid introspection by the ego in search of the soul*. We each may have experienced depersonalization and derealization in less extreme degree. I refer to those states of *apathy, monotony, dryness, and weary resignation, the sense of not caring and of not believing in one's value, that nothing is important or all is voided, outside and inside*. Jung attributes states such as these to the anima archetype. We might see this now less as a "negative" anima state than as a mild depersonalization, a loss of soul, or what Jung calls . . . "permanent loss of the anima."

Loss of anima is familiar at the end of a love-affair. There is a loss of vitality and reality, not only about the other person, the affair, and love but also in regard to oneself and the very world itself. "Nothing seems real anymore." "I feel dead, empty, mechanical like a robot." It happens in men and women. (my emphases)²⁸

Hamlet's loss of Ophelia certainly fits the general formula that a problematic relationship with the anima leads to depersonalization, and Hillman's details invite striking parallels to Shakespeare's text. Hamlet feels a weary detachment from himself and from the world: "How weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable / Seem to me all the uses of this world!" (1.2.133–34). The "morbid introspection" continues as he stresses a sense of dryness, a lack of caring, and a "loss of vitality" in the following famous statement, whose shift to prose underscores his misery and fatigue: "I have of late—but wherefore I know not—lost all my mirth, forgone all custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a *sterile* promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted congregation of vapors" (2.2.296–304; my emphasis). And Hamlet is nothing if not an "ego in search of the soul" when he wishes "that the Everlasting had not fixed / His canon 'gainst self-slaughter" or when he considers "what dreams may come, / When we have shuffled off this mortal coil" (1.2.131–32, 3.1.67–68). In light of Hillman's definition and these several examples from the play, Hamlet suffers Jung's so-called "permanent loss of the anima," which means that Hamlet suffers not from the wrong sort of anima, as Coursen holds, but from anima *detachment*, a disconnection from the life force, the utter absence of the anima's positive *or* negative influence on his psyche. Although this sounds a good deal like what Rogers-Gardner calls the

anima's death, detachment from the anima does not imply its total elimination; and there is no reason why reconnection, reactivation, and reintegration should be impossible, Jung's use of the word "permanent" notwithstanding. As we shall see, Hamlet's anima, far from being dead or irretrievably lost, manifests negatively early in the action and has a resurgence once he returns from his sea voyage.

THE ANIMA AND PROSTITUTION

A male also proves to be dysfunctional when repression leads to the above-mentioned "bipolar"—saint vs. whore—attitude toward the feminine and to the manifestation of negative anima as Helen, the prostitute or *meretrix*, a term that Jung borrows from alchemy (*CW* 9i, 356/199; 14, 415/302). Indeed, he specifically identifies "the courtesan" as the anima's "unfavourable aspect" and maintains that men's fixation on "the maternal significance of woman" signifies the anima's "infantile, primitive level of the prostitute" (*CW* 10, 75/39, 76/40). But her male patron is both victimizer and victim: he obviously takes advantage of her "social circumstances," and Jung is aware of the plight of "the syphilitic, tubercular, adolescent prostitute"; but in victimizing such a person, a man becomes "no less a victim of impulses from the unconscious" (*CW* 6, 805/469; 15, 210/138). Availing himself of her services reflects and enacts a man's own lack of psychic integration.

Before considering the language of prostitution in *Hamlet*, we should first illustrate Jung's theory of bipolar thinking and psychic self-victimization in two plays that feature actual prostitution—*Measure for Measure* and *Pericles*. The former nicely echoes "Get thee to a nunnery" by containing both a convent and a brothel, and Angelo relates to Hamlet's statement by trying to treat a novice nun like a prostitute. Repression is at the root of Angelo's sexual problem. Marie-Louise von Franz argues that rejection of the shadow means that "a part of our own personality remains on the opposing side. The result is that we shall constantly (although involuntarily) do things behind our backs that support this other side, and thus we shall unwittingly help our enemy."²⁹ Jung himself writes, "A man who is possessed by his shadow is always standing in his own light and falling into his own traps" (*CW* 9i, 222/123). Angelo's repression is not just of the shadow but also of the anima; and without recognition of the

one, there is no integration of the other but instead an undesirable compensation: “The repression of feminine traits and inclinations naturally causes these contrasexual demands to accumulate in the unconscious,” and “the anima continually thwarts the good intentions of the conscious mind, by contriving a private life that stands in sorry contrast to the dazzling persona” (*CW* 7, 297/189, 318/198). The anima, then, becomes “the serpent in the paradise of the harmless man with good resolutions and still better intentions” (*CW* 9i, 59/28). Furthermore, “If the soul-image is not projected, a thoroughly morbid relation to the unconscious gradually develops. The subject is increasingly overwhelmed by unconscious contents, which his inadequate relation to the object makes him powerless to assimilate or put to any kind of use, so that the whole subject-object relation only deteriorates further” (*CW* 6, 811/472). The “subject-object relation” is an apt term to describe Angelo’s attitude toward Isabella. He represses his sexual libido, which manifests as an inappropriate attraction to the young virgin, whose denial personifies and deepens his inner repression, which in turn leads him to project even greater sexual desire onto her.

Given such a vicious circle, two descriptions of Angelo—by the Duke and by Lucio—ironically sum up only his persona. The Duke intends to see if power gives Angelo’s inner life an opportunity to erupt.³⁰

. . . Lord Angelo is precise,
 Stands at a guard with envy, scarce confesses
 That his blood flows or that his appetite
 Is more to bread than stone. Hence shall we see,
 If power change purpose, what our seemers be. (1.3.50–54)

Unlike the Duke, Lucio appears to be completely credulous of Angelo’s persona: “Some report a sea maid spawned him; some, that he was begot between two stockfishes. But it is certain that when he makes water his urine is congealed ice; that I know to be true. And he is a motion ungenerative; that’s infallible” (3.2.105–9). With persona and anima in a compensatory relationship, the quality that the public man denies is what most bedevils his private thoughts. As Edward F. Edinger emphasizes, “*The neglected opposite ambushes Angelo from the unconscious.*”³¹ If the persona denies the anima in whatever way, the latter gathers steam in the unconscious and manifests negatively and inappropriately, as when the state’s paragon of virtue tries to seduce a

nun; as, in *Venus and Adonis*, the sexuality that Adonis denies returns in the form of the boar's phallic tusk; or as, in Hamlet's case, inappropriate jokes supersede appropriate relationship. In light of repression's consequences, Edinger's statement—"Gradually Angelo falls under the spell of this earnest, attractive young woman"³²—is incorrect because such bewitchment as there may be is the consequence of repression, which is an intrapsychic phenomenon.

Edinger's thesis is that the characters swing back and forth in a *coniunctio* (conjunction) between law and "blackmailed rape" (Angelo) and between mercy and fury (Isabella).³³ Her most interesting speech is the apotheosis of her anger. After trying to reason with Angelo, Isabella finally loses her temper:

Could great men thunder
 As Jove himself does, Jove would never be quiet,
 For every pelting, petty officer
 Would use his heaven for thunder,
 Nothing but thunder! Merciful Heaven,
 Thou rather with thy sharp and sulfurous bolt
 Splits the unwedgeable and gnarlèd oak
 Than the soft myrtle; but man, proud man,
 Dressed in a little brief authority,
 Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
 His glassy essence, like an angry ape
 Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
 As makes the angels weep; who, with our spleens,
 Would all themselves laugh mortal. (2.2.115–28)

Since she has just pledged herself to a life of devotion to Christ and the church, the presence of classical allusion in this passage not only indicates her fury and frustration but also reflects the unchristian nature of Angelo's proposition. If men had Jove's power, she says, they would use it noisily to call attention to the fact that they have it. Then she apostrophizes the "Merciful Heaven" (Jove), pointing out that whereas Jove uses his "sulfurous bolt" to attack the hard of heart, "proud man" (Angelo, Doctor Faustus), ignorant of his immortal soul ("what he's most assured / His glassy essence"), uses his earthly authority to play tricks on others. Read in this way, the passage conveys Isabella's sense that Angelo is risking perdition. The phrase "but man, proud man" clearly indicates this contrast between Jove and man; however, prior to reaching it, the audience/reader may interpret lines 119–22 not as an apostrophe to Jove but as an exclamation ("Merciful

Heaven”) followed by a direct address to a petty Jove (“Thou” Angelo). In this reader response, “Thou rather with thy sharp and sulfurous bolt / Splits the unwedgeable and gnarlèd oak / Than the soft myrtle” seems to imply that Angelo would rather act sexually upon an unwilling nun (the sturdy oak) than on a willing partner such as Mariana (the “soft myrtle”)—a “blackmailed rape” indeed.³⁴ When the phrase “but man, proud man” steers the reader toward the correct contrast (Jove versus a man like Angelo), the sexual suggestion disappears. It is now clear that Isabella is apostrophizing heaven rather than addressing Angelo, but the apostrophe’s construction initially allows a secondary reading.

The truth of Angelo’s moral failure is that repression leads to inappropriate behavior. Although Isabella is not a whore, Angelo treats her like one, offering as “hire and salary” (*Hamlet* 3.3.79) the life of her brother, Claudio. The literal prostitution in *Measure for Measure* illustrates the same caveat about repression; for, as Edinger points out, “the whorehouse psychology of Mistress Overdone and her pimp Pompey had likewise separated the body from the head,”³⁵ in much the same way as Hamlet, the intellectual, neglects his physicality and succumbs to melancholy. A story recounted by Gwen Benwell and Arthur Waugh reinforces the dynamic that becomes active in *Measure for Measure*’s brothel: “Another very old story links Alexander with a sea-woman, this time an undoubted mermaid. She is variously described as his mother, sister, lady-love, whom he hurled into the sea because she had been before him in drinking the Water of Immortality. Therefore, she became a dangerous mermaid.”³⁶ This simple story strongly reflects a dysfunctional relationship between a male and his anima. The mermaid herself, with her fish tail and human torso, personifies the basic division that Edinger notes between body and head; and the eternal mermaid also manifests a variety of anima types: “mother, sister, lady-love.” In other words, she represents both the archetypal idea of the feminine—transpersonal, eternal—and its specific content projected onto individual women. It is the rejection/repression of the mermaid/anima that makes her the sort of dangerous “sea maid” that Lucio mentions, one with ice water in her veins, whose human counterpart, the prostitute, preys on men. As Jung’s theory of repression suggests, it is quite impossible for the persona to quell the anima without negative consequences; and Shakespeare was well aware of this psychological principle, as the bawdy characters make clear. Pompey asks, “Does your worship mean to geld and splay [*sic*] all the youth of the city?” (2.1.229–30). And Lucio remarks, “But it

is impossible to extirp it [lechery] quite, Friar, till eating and drinking be put down" (3.2.100–1). As Catharine F. Siegel argues, "By portraying the stew-dwellers in the best possible light, Shakespeare is suggesting to [King] James that he not listen too attentively to the sermonizing of the Puritan divines as they clamored for hard-line administrators to enforce the existing laws against prostitution." Similarly, Wallace Shugg echoes Aquinas and Augustine in calling brothel-going "a necessary evil . . . a 'venereal safety valve' to prevent attacks upon virtuous wives and daughters." In other words, prostitution's purpose in society is to prevent exactly the kind of attack that Angelo attempts to make on Isabella.³⁷ Or in Jungian terms, if the law (persona, consciousness) represses sexual desire, a man's orientation to the feminine (anima, unconscious) is skewed, resulting in a bipolar view of actual women: some are saints, others whores.

Shakespeare shows in *Pericles*, however, that the venting of repressed lust is not the only psychological experience enacted in a brothel. Whereas Isabella is drawn from the convent into temptation by Angelo and later into forced marriage by the Duke, the equally virginal Marina finds herself in a brothel where her virtue protects her until fortune restores her not to a convent but to her family. The two women are alike in having their virtue assailed by men who would use them sexually; but whereas Isabella's resistance fuels Angelo's lust, Marina's protestations have the opposite effect on Lysimachus. To begin with, the bawd counsels her to be a manipulatrix by *pretending* to be the sort of wretched prostitute whom Jung mentions: "Pray you, come hither awhile. You have fortunes coming upon you. Mark me: you must seem to do that fearfully which you commit willingly, despise profit where you have most gain. *To weep that you live as ye do makes pity in your lovers*; seldom but that pity begets you a good opinion, and that opinion a mere profit" (4.2.113–19; my emphasis).

This is excellent psychology. The bawd lays out a comprehensive strategy: be coy, despise money, and appear sorrowful—all in order to make the most money for the least service by playing on the clients' ambivalent emotions. If they are aware that they do her injury, they will imagine money to be some compensation for the violation. Reluctance is the thing, says the bawd; but she incorrectly supposes that Marina will participate in such a ruse. Her actual reaction to the prospect of being a working girl is quite the opposite, as the bawd points out: "Fie, fie upon her! She's able to freeze the god Priapus and undo a whole generation. We must either get her ravished or be rid of

her. When she should do for clients her fitment [have sex] and do me the kindness of our profession [pay her], she has me her quirks, her reasons, her master reasons, her prayers, her knees, that she would make a puritan of the devil if he should cheapen a kiss of her" (4.6.3–10).

Enter Lysimachus, who hopes to take his pleasure with her but ends up being shamed by her and giving her gold, twice, in honor of her virtue and in compensation for his own error and shame. He denies that he "brought hither a corrupted mind," saying:

For me, be you thoughten
 That I came with no ill intent, for to me
 The very doors and windows savor vilely.
 Fare thee well. Thou art a piece of virtue, and
 I doubt not but thy training hath been noble.
 Hold, here's more gold for thee.
 A curse upon him, die he like a thief,
 That robs thee of thy goodness! If thou dost
 Hear from me, it shall be for thy good. (4.6.105, 110–18)

Lysimachus—who initially intends, as he tells the bawd, to bed a healthy prostitute, particularly a virgin, in order to avoid syphilis—gets more than he bargains for in his confrontation with Marina. Rather than encountering the feigned reluctance that the bawd prescribes for her charges, he encounters a virgin who is genuinely unwilling to engage in anything beyond a conversation. He attempts to buy his way out of the resulting guilt, and his statement about virtue is major back-pedaling.

The resolution of their encounter brings us back to Jung, who comments on women who would save men and men who would save women: "For an idealistic woman, a depraved man is often the bearer of the soul-image; hence the 'savior fantasy' so frequent in such cases. The same thing happens with men, when the prostitute is surrounded with the halo of a soul crying for succour" (*CW* 6, 811/472). The question that arises, though, is why Lysimachus, in attempting to project his inner whore onto an Isabella, ends up projecting his inner saint instead and proves himself, though a brothel goer, not to be an Angelo. If Angelo and Lysimachus are parallel figures, why does the one try to whore a nun while the other honors virginity in a brothel? It is not only that Marina out-projects him, her virtue proving

stronger than his concupiscence, but also that a man who frequents brothels, though he is not ideally aligned with his anima, is not fully repressing it either.³⁸ As a result, a virgin's denial brings compassion rather than deepening lustful determination. Despite parallel intentions, Angelo and Lysimachus behave quite differently because they stand on opposite sides of virginity—one of them totally chaste, the other certainly not—and a lesser degree of repression opens Lysimachus's anima to stages of eroticism other than the whore.

PROSTITUTION IN *HAMLET*

Prior to the play's opening, Hamlet may well have done to Ophelia the thing that Angelo wishes to do to Isabella but does instead to Mariana,³⁹ and Hamlet lacks any of the compensatory conscience-driven recognition of female virtue that Lysimachus achieves as a result of his dialogue with Marina. Yet, although there are no actual women for hire in *Hamlet*, the language of prostitution abounds, largely as a function of repressed anima. As Jung puts it, "Intellect and feeling . . . conflict with one another by definition. Whoever identifies with an intellectual standpoint will occasionally find his feeling confronting him like an enemy in the guise of the anima" (*CW* 9ii, 58/31). Jung amplifies the role of intellect when he claims, in another statement that is remarkably reminiscent of Hamlet, that the "man who identifies himself absolutely with his reason and his spirituality . . . is in danger of becoming dissociated from his anima and thus losing touch altogether with the compensating powers of the unconscious. In a case like this the unconscious usually responds with violent emotions, irritability, lack of control, arrogance, feelings of inferiority, moods, depressions, outbursts of rage, etc., coupled with lack of self-criticism and the misjudgments, mistakes, and delusions which this entails" (*CW* 13, 454/335). This quotation, when read in combination with *CW* 9i, 144/70–71 (quoted above), provides a more complete picture of the dynamics of Hamlet's psychological problem. When a man "identifies himself absolutely with his reason" and becomes "dissociated from his anima," the anima becomes "constellated" or activated, leading to dysfunctional behavior. Compensation for the persona will take place whether one is in touch with the unconscious or not; evidently the compensatory process is positive when a man is in harmony with the anima and negative when he is not. As an intellectual

who overemphasizes reason, Hamlet is “dissociated from his anima” and experiences negative compensation as a result. And since the opposite of male scholarship is female whoredom, negative anima manifests in his consciousness in a profusion of references to prostitution.

What, then, are the play’s references to prostitution?⁴⁰ Characters mention whoring (2.2.586, 5.2.64), a brothel (2.1.63), “the harlot” (4.5.122), a “harlot’s cheek” (3.1.52), bawds and bawdry (1.3.131, 2.2.500, and 3.1.113), a “drab” (2.2.587), and a nunnery (3.1.122). Hamlet compares Polonius to a fishmonger or pimp (2.2.174), Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to whores (5.2.57), and fortune to a strumpet (2.2.235–36). Hamlet’s mother is “stewed in corruption” (3.4.94). And the larger context for “Aeneas’ tale to Dido,” which the players enact, is that he treats her like a whore; Aeneas is to Dido as Hamlet is evidently to Ophelia (2.2.446). Previous critics provide interesting glosses on some of these prostitution references. For example, when Hamlet mentions how he “must like a whore unpack my heart with words / And fall a-cursing, like a very drab, / A scullion” (2.2.586–87), he may actually be punning. As Stanton points out, “The third comparison in the ‘Good Quarto’ is not to a ‘scullion’, but to a ‘stallyon’—Elizabethan slang for a male prostitute”; and “prostitution serves its turn for male projections of guilt.” Actually, the *OED* notes that “stallyon” can refer not only to “a woman’s hired paramour” but also to a courtesan, and Shakespeare’s line is quoted in support of the latter definition. So Hamlet “compensates for his perceived failure with torrents of self-accusation in which his own frailty must be equated to . . . female prostitution” (Coursen). Regarding fortune as a strumpet, “While Fortune is a goddess no doubt fickle and inconsistent, Hamlet’s projections of whorishness upon her signals his view of women, not necessarily Fortune’s view of men. But Hamlet predicts what *his* fortune will be if he clings to his vision of woman—and of the woman-in-him—as strumpet” (Coursen; emphasis in the original). As for the word “fishmonger,” fish symbolize the unconscious; and Polonius, rather than “helping Hamlet achieve psychological and spiritual insight . . . *uses* these unconscious elements to secure his position in court. Instead of ‘fishing’ for them, he ‘peddles’ them; thus he is a fishmonger instead of a fisherman” (Oakes; emphasis in the original). Finally, Rogers-Gardner incorrectly states that Claudius claims in his soliloquy that “it hurts him to look at the murder of his brother and compares himself to a whore.”⁴¹ Claudius does compare

himself to Cain (3.3.37), but there is no reference to prostitution anywhere in the soliloquy.

It should be clear that Hamlet is a young man with prostitution on his mind, both because of the negative anima that results from repression and because he witnesses his mother's incestuous marriage and may well have whored Ophelia. Nonetheless, Alex Aronson and Tucker both doubt that there have been sexual relations between the young couple. Aronson believes that Ophelia's "own loss of virginity might have been 'imaginary,'" and Tucker states that "the play presents no evidence that before the drama's opening lines Hamlet and Ophelia copulated." Stanton takes the opposite view when she speculates that "he may indeed have raped her in the offstage closet interlude."⁴² Whether before or during the play's chronological span, and whether forced or consensual, sexual intercourse *is* likely because, as Robert Painter and Brian Parker point out in their helpful note, "several of Ophelia's key flowers were . . . well known to the Elizabethans as contraceptives, abortifacients, and emmenagogues (i.e., agents to induce menstruation)."⁴³ The implication of her flower-gathering is that she may be attempting to terminate a pregnancy because Hamlet has whored her out of wedlock.

In Shakespeare, there is an interesting link between prostitution and mermaid imagery, and the mermaid's form conveys a psychological truth about human beings. Benwell and Waugh quote Bartholomaeus's statement that mermaids "were strong whores, that drew men that passed by them to poverty and to mischief." And during the Elizabethan period, the mermaid was part of the coat of arms for the "Fishmongers' Company of the City of London" (Berman), which strengthens the fishmonger-mermaid-prostitution nexus in *Hamlet*. Indeed, according to the *OED*, the word "mermaid" then "applied to a prostitute," and the cited illustration from *The Comedy of Errors* (1590)—"O, train me not, sweet mermaid, with thy note, / To drown me in thy sister's flood of tears! / Sing, siren, for thyself, and I will dote" (3.2.45–47)—suggests that Shakespeare was well acquainted with the word's slang usage.⁴⁴

Besides her association with prostitution, the mermaid's form—half human and half fish—embodies a truth about human nature, that we are part rational and part bestial, much as Hamlet maintains: "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the

world, the paragon of animals!” (2.2.304–8). On the Great Chain of Being man is between the angels and the animals, participating in the intellectual faculties of the former and the physicality of the latter—a “paragon” to be sure but an animal nonetheless. Like this duality, the mermaid image conveys the psychomachia between our rational and physical/sensual elements (competing alternatives that Horatio and Ophelia represent for Hamlet), and the reason/sensuality dichotomy is a predictable association given the mermaid’s mythological background, which we will now survey in order to drive home the connection to sensuality, to suggest a Jungian connection, and to set the stage for a reading of Gertrude’s speech announcing Ophelia’s death.

THE LITERARY HISTORY OF MERMAIDS

Mermaid legend begins with the classical sirens who tempt Odysseus with these honey-tongued words:

“Come this way, honored Odysseus, great glory of the Achaians, and stay your ship, so that you can listen here to our singing; for no one else has ever sailed past this place in his black ship until he has listened to the honey-sweet voice that issues from our lips; then goes on, well pleased, knowing more than ever he did; for we know everything that the Argives and Trojans did and suffered in wide Troy through the gods’ despite. Over all the generous earth we know everything that happens.” (12:184–91)⁴⁵

Odysseus’s temptation to knowledge, somewhat ironic because he already knows “everything that the Argives and Trojans / did and suffered in wide Troy,” anticipates key motifs associated with mermaids in English folk tradition: duplicity, false sympathy, abandonment of duty, and narcissistic self-indulgence. Although Homer describes only the sirens’ voices, visual art makes it clear that they were bird-women. With “the head and bust of a woman and the body and claws of a bird,” they were similar in appearance to the classical harpies.⁴⁶ In later allegories, the significance of the sirens’ wings and talons was clear: “love flies and wounds.”⁴⁷ Around 300 B.C. the sirens began to lose their bird form, gradually metamorphosing into the fish-women we know as mermaids. This shift continued in the early Christian era

and into the Middle Ages, reinforced by medieval church art and bestiaries. Particularly in the Romance languages, the word “‘siren,’ in its various cognate forms, became simply the word for ‘mermaid.’”⁴⁸ The *OED*’s entry on “mermaid” gives examples of this conflation: “So swete a sownde that it semed to be the mermaydes of the see” (1533); “Did sense perswade Ulysses not to hear The Mermaids songs” (1592). And a 1586 emblem illustrating Ulysses’s encounter with the sirens portrays them as having fishtails.⁴⁹ Consequently, Shakespeare’s use of water creatures in *Hamlet*—Ophelia as a nymph and her clothing as “mermaidlike” (3.1.90, 4.7.177)—evokes a whole tradition from Homer’s sirens to mermaid references in Shakespeare’s own time, for sirens and mermaids are alike in the threat that their beautiful voices present to mariners.

By linking both images to the temptations of the flesh, the Christian Church played a crucial role in the evolution of the classical bird-women into the mermaids of the sixteenth century. To begin with, the Homeric story was moralized. In *Exhortation to the Heathen* Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–c. 215) offers this especially interesting allegory: “Let not a woman with a flowing train cheat you of your senses . . . sail past the song; it works death; exert your will, and you have overcome ruin; bound to the wood of the Cross, you shall be freed from destruction. The Word of God will be your pilot, and the Holy Spirit will bring you to anchor in the haven of Heaven.”⁵⁰ Benwell and Waugh note, “The twelfth-century abbess [Herrade of Landsburg, author of *Hortus Deliciarum*] saw the ship of Ulysses as the image of the Church upon the seas of the world, and Ulysses as the figure of Christian people ‘exposed to a thousand seductions.’”⁵¹ As listening to the sirens’ song leads to physical death in Homer, so in Christian tradition the song of siren or mermaid signals a temptation to moral death through sexual impropriety, as in Bartholomaeus’s previously quoted statement about mermaids as “‘strong whores.’” Considered deadly to men’s souls, mermaids were sometimes pictured holding a fish in one hand, the image of a human soul at their mercy. As images of the temptations of the flesh, they also reflect the ambivalence and misogyny of medieval clerics—men’s desireful hatred of women. In short, the mermaid represents “‘doomed passion’” and “‘sensual temptation.’”⁵²

Aside from the allegorization of mermaids in Christian writing, mermaid lore was available to Elizabethans in a variety of forms: natural history, literary works, and travel literature.⁵³ *Physiologus*, Pliny’s *Natural History* (translated into English by Philemon Holland in

1601), and medieval bestiaries such as Philippe de Thaun's *Livre des Créatures* (mermaids are allegorized here as the riches of the world) are the main works of natural history responsible for perpetuating the belief in mermaids' actual existence. Mermaids appear as well in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, book 5; and in the Book of Enoch 19:2 female angels leading men astray are possibly turned into sirens. In Dante's *Purgatorio* (19:7–33) the sirens represent sensual pleasures that turn Ulysses from his course.⁵⁴ Mermaids or sirens are mentioned in Geoffrey of Monmouth's *The History of the Kings of Britain* (c. 1136), Chaucer's translation of *The Romaunt of the Rose* (lines 680–84) and *The Nun's Priest's Tale* (4459–62), John Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, Francis Bacon's "Fable of the Syrens," Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* (II.162–64), and Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*. To reinforce the idea that sirens represent the temptations of the flesh, Spenser expands the number of sirens ("Mermaidys") from three to five, underscoring the susceptibility of all five human senses (II.xii.30–31). Popular ballads were also a source of mermaid lore, especially "Clerk Colvill," "The Mermaid," and "Sir Patrick Spens."⁵⁵

Elizabethans gave credence to mermaids' existence especially because the theory that every creature on land had its counterpart in the sea was supported by actual mermaid sightings, many of which occurred less than fifty years prior to the writing of *Hamlet* (1600–01). Jane Hutchins reports the earliest of these sightings. In 1531 a mermaid captured alive in the Baltic Sea was sent as a present to King Sigismund of Poland but survived only three days in captivity. In 1560 a Jesuit Father named Henriques and Bosquez, physician to the Viceroy of Goa, witnessed the capture of seven mermen and mermaids in a net near the Isle of Mandor off the west coast of Ceylon. "After the death of these unfortunate specimens Bosquez dissected them, and reported that their bodies were as those of human beings."⁵⁶ Samuel Purchas's *Purchas his Pilgrimes* reports that travellers saw a mermaid's skin in 1565. Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles* (published in a revised second edition in 1587) reports a mermaid sighting. The Stationers' Register notes a "ballad of a strange and monstrous fishe scene in the sea on friday the 17 of february 1603."⁵⁷ In 1608 tritons were sighted in Africa, and on June 15 of that year Henry Hudson's log book reports a mermaid sighting. *The Discoverie of the Large Rich and Beautiful Empyre of Guiana, performed in the year 1595 by Sir W. Raleigh* does not mention mermaids, but it does mention men with heads beneath their shoulders. Benwell and Waugh speculate that if the widely

respected Raleigh argued for the existence of such unlikely creatures, then mermaids, which were easier to accept and already deeply ingrained in the contemporary imagination, must have continued to merit belief.⁵⁸

Actual existence aside, the mermaid was an image of special significance for the Elizabethan age. As Ruth Berman puts it, "Mermaids were an apt symbol for a nation winning riches from sea-voyages."⁵⁹ Moreover, Queen Mary of England had been represented in a contemporary cartoon as a mermaid, and Shakespeare alludes to the Queen of Scots in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Oberon says to Puck:

Thou rememb'rest
 Since once I sat upon a promontory,
 And heard a mermaid on a dolphin's back
 Uttering such dulcet and harmonious breath
 That the rude sea grew civil at her song,
 And certain stars shot madly from their spheres
 To hear the sea-maid's music? (2.1.148-54)⁶⁰

During Elizabeth's reign the mermaid, alluring but dangerous, may also have represented the relationship between the queen and her male subjects. Writing about Shakespeare's Venus, whose voice Adonis compares to "the wanton mermaids' song" (line 777), Wayne A. Rebhorn mentions the "deep-seated male fear of emasculation through infantilization at the hands of a woman," and "the dangers that culture sensed were inherent in a sexual relationship where the female played the dominant role."⁶¹ (In a similar way, the name of the Mermaid Tavern suggests the dangerous pleasures of alcohol, in which a man seeks compensation for his inadequacy but ends up further wounding his self-esteem.) Many of the following details would also have been present in Elizabethans' minds. The mermaid embodies the mystery of the ocean. She is eternally youthful and beautiful, her song is alluring, and she sometimes appears in an attitude of mourning or may pluck a lyre. Her long hair may be green, golden, blond, black, or brown. She wears a cap and sometimes a belt, and she will marry the mortal who steals her cap. A mermaid's traditional accoutrements, a comb and mirror (signifying vanity), are "the attributes of Venus-Luxuria."⁶² Siren-like mermaids "lived on an island between Circe's isle and Scylla, where they sat in a flowery bed surrounded by the rotting bodies of the shipwrecked men."⁶³ The flowers may represent what Berman calls

“the desire to be free of human cares in a world of vegetative and animal beauty.”⁶⁴ The mermaid dwells not only in the high seas but also in lakes, ponds, and rivers. According to Thomas of Cantimpré’s *De Naturis Rerum*, rivers signify “the flowing or looseness of lust.”⁶⁵

Given the conflation of sirens and mermaids, the Church’s use of the mermaid as an emblem of temptation to moral depravity, a long-standing tradition of mermaids in natural history and literature, supposed sightings in Shakespeare’s own day, and a variety of well-known characteristics, an Elizabethan audience would have been likely to assign more significance than perhaps we do today to Gertrude’s statement about Ophelia’s clothing as “mermaidlike” at the moment just prior to her death—and especially to the connection between mermaids and sensuality, which leads us back to the *Collected Works*. Jung connects sirens/mermaids and sensual temptation when he notes that sirens and lamias “infatuate the lonely wanderer and lead him astray,” and such figures represent the feminine nature of the unconscious (*CW* 12, 61/52). A homology makes perfect sense in this context: the mermaid is to the ocean as the anima is to the unconscious. More specifically, Jung’s term is “melusina,” the French “water-fay,” whose etymology includes Paracelsus’s *melosinae*, or “fish-tailed mermaid.”⁶⁶ Jung specifically links the mermaid and the anima (*CW* 9i, 452/251, n. 66), and he stresses that “Melusina . . . must become what she was from the beginning: a part of his [a man’s] wholeness. As such she must be ‘conceived in the mind.’ This leads to a union of conscious and unconscious that was always present unconsciously but was always denied by the one-sidedness of the conscious attitude” (*CW* 13, 223/180). Like a mermaid whom a man entices to become his bride, the anima must be made conscious in order for individuation to occur.

A much longer statement about melusina in the *Collected Works* traces her much further back in time than Homer’s sirens and helps explain her potency for modern man:

The nixie is an even more instinctive version of a magical feminine being whom I call the anima. She can also be a siren, melusina (mermaid), wood-nymph, Grace, or Erlking’s daughter, or a lamia or succubus, who infatuates young men and sucks the life out of them. Moralizing critics will say that these figures are projections of soulful emotional states and are nothing but worthless fantasies. One must admit that there is a certain amount of truth in this. But is it the whole truth? Is the nixie really

nothing but a product of moral laxity? Were there not such beings long ago, in an age when dawning human consciousness was still wholly bound to nature? Surely there were spirits of forest, field, and stream long before the questions of moral conscience ever existed. What is more, these beings were as much dreaded as adored, so that their rather peculiar erotic charms were only one of their characteristics. Man's consciousness was then far simpler, and his possession of it absurdly small. An unlimited amount of what we now feel to be an integral part of our psychic being disports itself merrily for the primitive in projections ranging far and wide. (CW 9i, 53/25)

For Jung, the mermaid's link to sensual temptation ("moral laxity," "erotic charms") is a relatively recent development, and he traces her existence back to nature spirits whom early human beings directly perceived—and projected onto—presumably because their conscious faculties were less developed than they are in recorded history. Insofar as these spirits were the object of projection, the passage hints at the *participation mystique* that makes it difficult for Othello to negotiate the wiles of a Machiavellian thinker like Iago. But the advancement of consciousness relegated nature spirits to the realm of mythology so that their psychological significance for modern persons is divorced from nature and becomes solely intrapsychic. To the extent that humans are more conscious and less attuned to nature, spirits that objectify the anima lose their independent existence and take on moral freight. But since mermaids' ontological status was taken for granted during the Elizabethan age—they are not the purely mythological beings of the present day—it may be that Shakespeare's mermaid allusion combines some of the immediacy that Jung attributes to primitive man's faith in super-nature with a latter-day sense of inappropriate sensuality. That said, how do the themes and principles discussed in this section illuminate the queen's mermaid allusion?

GERTRUDE'S MERMAID ALLUSION

The queen's mermaid simile at first appears to have little in common with the mermaid of literary tradition or the water beings of Jung's writings, so let us begin with the literal parallels.⁶⁷

There is a willow grows askant the brook,
That shows his hoar leaves in the glassy stream;

Therewith fantastic garlands did she make
 Of crowflowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples,
 That liberal shepherds give a grosser name,
 But our cold maids do dead men's fingers call them.
 There on the pendent boughs her crownet weeds
 Clamb'ring to hang, an envious sliver broke,
 When down her weedy trophies and herself
 Fell in the weeping brook. Her clothes spread wide,
 And mermaidlike awhile they bore her up,
 Which time she chanted snatches of old lauds,
 As one incapable of her own distress,
 Or like a creature native and endued
 Unto that element. But long it could not be
 Till that her garments, heavy with their drink,
 Pulled the poor wretch from her melodious lay
 To muddy death. (4.7.167–83)

The key lines—“Her clothes spread wide, / And mermaidlike awhile they bore her up”—suggest either that Ophelia’s air-filled clothes are like mermaids in bearing her up or that she herself resembles a mermaid while the clothes bear her up. In addition, she is compared in subsequent lines to a mermaid in various respects: her “snatches of old lauds” and “her melodious lay”—mermaids are musical creatures—and her being “like a creature native and endued / Unto that element.” Moreover, although the queen’s description does not contain a direct analogy to the mermaid’s comb, Ophelia is putting flowers in her hair; and the passage opens with a kind of mirror—the water itself. “There is a willow grows askant the brook, / That shows his hoar leaves in the *glassy* stream” (my emphasis). The image resonates with similar images elsewhere in the play: both Ophelia and Hamlet use the word “glass” to mean mirror (3.1.156, 3.4.20), and the word “mirror” appears twice as well (3.2.22, 5.2.118). The “glassy stream” and the mermaid’s mirror are alike in suggesting female vanity, a foible that may even contribute to Ophelia’s drowning: a young woman who weaves “fantastic garlands” for her hair, which call to mind the sirens’ flowery bed, would be likely to want to see her own reflection in the brook; so she leans over the water and falls in when the branch she holds onto breaks off. Painter and Parker have a darker suggestion—that Shakespeare uses the mirror imagery to call attention to the fact that Ophelia, as previously noted, is gathering abortifacients just before she drowns, as though the suggestion in her Valentine’s Day

song that Hamlet may have “tumbled” and abandoned her (4.5.63) is a literal truth.⁶⁸

The occasional drowning of a mermaid in classical mythology further suggests that Ophelia, who is “mermaidlike” in death, may commit suicide as a result of mistreatment by Hamlet. Before the fifth century B.C.E. there was a “legend that the siren Parthenope cast herself into the sea, through frustration, when her wiles failed in their effect upon Odysseus.”⁶⁹ A post-Homeric legend holds that after Odysseus escaped them, all three sirens threw themselves into the sea and were drowned. In addition, when Orpheus sang more beautifully than the sirens, Jason managed to sail past their rocks with the loss of only one man. Thus classical myth makes either Odysseus or Orpheus responsible for the sirens’ death by drowning and their transformation into sunken rocks.⁷⁰ As with the sirens, so with the “mermaidlike” Ophelia: perhaps the thwarting of desire motivates self-destruction. This point needs qualification, however, because Ophelia’s death, rather than being an actual suicide, may be a simple accident followed by a refusal or inability to keep herself from drowning. Erik Rosenkrantz Bruun speculates that self-rescue was possible because the water was shallow but that she might have been disabled by the previously mentioned abortifacients: “It is not likely that a grown up girl would be able to drown herself in a brook where the water level must be very low, unless of course she was intoxicated by some potent drug, or maybe had internal bleeding.”⁷¹ Still, if Ophelia shares mournfulness with the sirens, then the possibility that her “muddy death” results from rejection by Hamlet cannot be ruled out.

Let us now turn the focus from Ophelia and literary tradition to Hamlet and Jungian psychology, with assistance from the sort of “old laud” that Gertrude mentions. Although there is no story of a mermaid drowning herself in siren-like fashion, the apparent drowning of a mermaid is part of the folklore of the British Isles, as the following summary of the Scottish rhyme “The Laird of Lorntie” (n.d.) illustrates.

The young Laird of Lorntie in Angus (Forfarshire) was returning home from hunting with one man behind him, when he passed near a lonely lake about three miles from his house. He suddenly heard screams as of a woman drowning, and bursting through the wood he saw a beautiful woman struggling in the water. He plunged in, and was just snatching at her hair, when his man dragged him roughly back. “Bide, Lorntie! bide a blink!” he cried. “That wauling madam was none other, God sauf us, than the mermaid.” Lorntie believed him, and mounted his horse, and as he

rode away, the mermaid rose up from the water, and called after him:
 “Lorntie, Lorntie, / Were it na your man, / I had gart your heart’s bluid /
 Skirl in my pan.”⁷²

To begin with, there are some clear differences between Lorntie’s mermaid and the “mermaidlike” Ophelia. Whereas the mermaid’s temptation fails, it appears likely that Hamlet, far from resisting Ophelia’s charms, has experienced her sexually. Moreover, the Laird’s mermaid—no drugged-up girl, singing as she slowly drowns—uses apparent distress to trick Lorntie into a near-fatal error. In a practical sense, it is unimaginable, despite the classical analogue, that the mermaid Lorntie encounters would ever drown herself.⁷³ More significantly, whereas the sirens’ drowning results from frustration or grief, the mermaid’s feigned drowning in “The Laird of Lorntie” reflects male insecurity about the siren-like sensuality and the feminine allure (“a beautiful woman”) that an unindividuated man can neither resist nor withstand; a man’s natural motivation to save a helpless prostitute figure (“madam”);⁷⁴ the illusion of safety in male solidarity, work, geographical distance, and consciousness (“his man,” “hunting,” and “home”); and the dark depths of the unconscious (“the water”) from which the negative anima (“mermaid”) cries out to remind him of the continuing threat that the inner feminine may yet ignite his passions (“your heart’s bluid / Skirl in my pan”). By allegorizing an ongoing lack of male individuation, Lorntie’s encounter with the mermaid illustrates the temptation to sensuality and moral depravity that is ever-present in men’s nonrationality, the part of the psyche hidden below conscious awareness (beyond “the wood”). As Lorntie’s confrontation with the mermaid implies, a man must confront the feminine principle in order to integrate her into the wholeness of the Self; but his flight signifies an aborted attempt at unification, misogyny in action, and female-as-enemy.

In a similar way, the playwright’s male voice seems present in Gertrude’s mermaid simile. Mentioning Ophelia’s singing voice right after a figure well known for her use of false appearance to lure men to destruction contributes to a native folk tradition of male insecurity. Through Gertrude’s mermaid simile, the misogynistic male voice becomes more pronounced in light of the slang meaning of the term. Since prostitutes were called mermaids, it is ironic that the whore Gertrude, who perhaps unintentionally puns on the “hoar leaves,” uses a term, “mermaidlike,” that calls prostitution to mind when she describes the death of the whore Ophelia. The queen’s speech, then,

may well be an example not only of Jungian projection on her part but also of bipolar thinking about women on the part of males, with credence lent by having a compromised woman as mouthpiece.

If Gertrude knows on an unconscious level that she herself is a whore, then the word “mermaidlike” may be a projection of her self-realization onto Ophelia. But the connection between mermaid and whore is more significant to Hamlet’s psychology, for “mermaidlike” participates in two image patterns that illuminate his dilemma. The first includes an additional type of water creature, the nymph that Hamlet mentions in connection with his “orisons.” Michele Personali notes that “the anima, according to Jung, is a magical feminine being who has the power to suck the life out of men. . . . Hamlet sees in Ophelia the anima which he must either incorporate into his own psyche, or be forever possessed by.”⁷⁵ This reading is consistent with the sense that the mermaid represents “the darker, night aspect of love as a potentially destructive force.”⁷⁶ Joseph Campbell offers a more directly Freudian view of water spirits: “The regions of the unknown (desert, jungle, deep sea, alien land, etc.) are free fields for the projection of unconscious content. Incestuous *libido* and patricidal *destrudo* are thence reflected back against the individual and his society in forms suggesting threats of violence and fancied dangerous delight—not only as ogres but also as sirens of mysteriously seductive, nostalgic beauty.”⁷⁷ The implication is not necessarily that the “mermaidlike” Ophelia has been a whore or any kind of threat in her own right but that Hamlet projects onto her and Gertrude—for example, in his comment on “incestuous sheets” (1.2.157)—his own self-destructive disunity, which he must confront and befriend, not behold in stunned horror or, like Lorntie, flee.

The mermaid also participates in a second pattern of images that are half human and half bestial, which illustrates Jung’s concept of bipolarity between saint and whore or between consciousness and the unconscious. Her physiology—half fish and half woman—links her to Hamlet’s statement about Claudius: “So excellent a king, that was to this / Hyperion to a satyr” (1.2.139–40).⁷⁸ Half goat and half man, the satyr anticipates Claudius’s own allusion to the centaur:

I have seen myself, and served against, the French,
 And they can well on horseback, but this gallant
 Had witchcraft in ‘t; he grew unto his seat,
 And to such wondrous doing brought his horse

As had he been incorpsed and demi-natured
With the brave beast. (4.7.84–89)

Here the centaur image attends martial achievement but, in the king's mouth, is subtly ironic because the centaurs are best known in classical mythology for trying to rape the bride at the wedding of Pirithous and Hippodamia. And King Lear uses the centaur image to comment on his evil daughters in a bitter speech that devolves into prose:

Down from the waist they're centaurs,
Though women all above.
But to the girdle do the gods inherit;
Beneath is all the fiends'.
There's hell, there's darkness, there is the sulfurous pit, burning,
scalding, stench, consumption. (*King Lear* 4.6.124–29)

Siren, mermaid, satyr, and centaur are alike in suggesting the dichotomy within each person between the base desires that humans share with the beasts and the rational potential that situates us at a higher level. But in Lear's view of female sexuality, a woman is part human and part monster. Three other passages relate to the same dichotomy. Hamlet states that even "a beast, that wants discourse of reason" would have mourned longer than Gertrude (1.2.150), and he distinguishes between "godlike reason" and "bestial oblivion" (4.4.39, 41). In the next scene, Claudius makes a similar comment about "poor Ophelia / Divided from herself and her fair judgment, / Without the which we are pictures or mere beasts" (4.5.85–87). On the one hand, the mermaid and other associated mythological images and bestial references embody the base sexuality that we share with animals. As the sirens are to Odysseus, or as Venus is to Shakespeare's Adonis, the "mermaid-like" Ophelia represents for Hamlet, the would-be epic hero, a life of luxury and a regression to childhood, unconsciousness, and lack of psychic integration. On the other hand, the mermaid's human part corresponds to his rational element and calls to mind Hamlet's quest for an integrated psyche and full manhood in an epic world where it is possible to act on the ghost's directive and to be in a proper relationship with a woman. What emerges is an archetypal formulation that differs from other critics' views: the mermaid's dual form, half human and half bestial, suggests not only the danger of feminine

seductiveness, sensuality, and prostitution (Ophelia, Gertrude) but also the rational call (Horatio) to epic duty (the ghost).

Hamlet is not yet capable of integrating these disparate parts in the Self. Psychomachia is a matter of mutually exclusive extremes, and it is so for Ophelia as well. The flower imagery that precedes Gertrude's description of Ophelia's drowning is consistent with this duality and sums up her dysfunction: the queen mentions "long purples," and notes that "liberal shepherds" give the phallic flower a "grosser name," while "cold maids" have a different term for them. Peter J. Seng notes that long purples were known as Priestespyn till, Cockow-pintell, Cockowpynt, and Wake-robyn. He cites Harry Morris's argument that the last of these synonyms relates to Ophelia's song at 4.5.190: "For bonny sweet Robin is all my joy." Aronson notes that the *Variorum* identifies "one of the grosser names Gertrude had a particular reason to avoid—the rampant widow." Elaine Showalter rightly states, "The 'weedy trophies' and phallic 'long purples' which she wears to her death intimate an improper and discordant sexuality that Gertrude's lovely elegy cannot quite obscure. The *Variorum* interprets the flower imagery more specifically, as an indication that Ophelia died chaste: "A fair maid stung to the quick, her virgin bloom under the cold hand of death."⁷⁹ Whatever one's view of her "virgin crants" and "maiden strewments" may be (5.1.232), the sexual undertones in the flower imagery underscore the great divide between male duty and female sexuality. There will be no merging of these extremes for Hamlet and Ophelia—a life of marriage, family, and children in which martial duty and female sexuality coalesce and cooperate.

Ophelia's death by water is the final stage in the transformation of her voice: from poetry, to prose, to her mad-song parody of mermaids' song, and finally—like Cordelia and Desdemona—to the silence of death. It is incorrect, however, to say that "though Ophelia's final posture is 'mermaid-like,' she leads Hamlet to revelation rather than destruction."⁸⁰ A mermaid would curse a sailor who rejects her, resulting in his future destruction. Ophelia never does so, but the demise of their relationship does contribute to her death, which in turn strengthens Laertes's desire to achieve Hamlet's destruction. Moreover, Hamlet's revelation happens while he is away from Denmark, not because of his earlier interaction with Ophelia; the geography of their relationship does not support the critic's view of causality. Though Hamlet may come to share some of her resignation, it is through a sea change apart from Ophelia that he makes psychological progress.

HAMLET'S SEA CHANGE AND SHADOW INTEGRATION

There is little agreement among the play's Jungian critics regarding Hamlet's interrupted voyage to England, on which he dispatches Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and encounters the pirates. Speaking of Brutus, Macbeth, and Hamlet, Aronson maintains, "None of these three protagonists ever integrates the shadow he projects." Porterfield disagrees: in the "To be or not to be" soliloquy, Hamlet begins shadow integration by "owning . . . the parts of his personality that are not convenient"; as previously noted, the sea voyage is a "voyage into the unconscious," which implies individuation and presumably the integration of the shadow. Rogers-Gardner holds that "the Danish prince takes off across the sea, away from his mother, to test himself in a man's world," that the encounter with the pirates sets in motion "the conjunction of opposites . . . necessary to maturation," and that he "almost" loses "his capacity for feeling in the process." Oakes echoes the maternal point, arguing that it is "the [sea] journey that generates his extrication from the terrible mother in his rebirth from water" and that the experience moves him "beyond the personal to the communal."⁸¹

My own analysis of the sea voyage rests on several fundamental Jungian premises. Jung argues that a male must separate from maternal anima by means of "rites designed to organize this separation," as in primitive societies (*CW* 7, 314/197). The sea voyage clearly accomplishes this separation by immersing Hamlet in the world of mariners and pirates; and if Hamlet is thirty years old, as Coursen asserts,⁸² it is high time that this separation took place. Regarding Jung's assertion that the first half of a man's life focuses on the masculine and the second half on the feminine (*CW* 8, 782/398), if the sea voyage caps off his experience of the masculine and culminates his "apprentice-piece" with the shadow in the encounter with the pirates, it may potentially be a hinge between masculine and feminine emphases. Jung further maintains that any kind of "projection ceases the moment it becomes conscious, that is to say when it is seen as belonging to the subject" (*CW* 9i, 121/60); and this is what happens—the unconscious is made conscious—in Hamlet's encounter with the pirates, as he implies in his letter to Horatio:

Ere we were two days old at sea, a pirate of very warlike appointment gave us chase. Finding ourselves too slow of sail, we put on a compelled

valor, and in the grapple *I boarded them*. On the instant they got clear of our ship, so *I alone became their prisoner*. They have dealt with me like thieves of mercy, but *they knew what they did: I am to do a good turn for them*. Let the King have the letters I have sent, and repair thou to me with as much speed as thou wouldst fly death. (4.6.15–24; my emphasis)

The literal implication of “I boarded them” and of “I alone became their prisoner” is not only that Hamlet assumes a martial role in the conflict but also that he is at the vanguard of the resistance to the pirates; otherwise, he would not be the only person on board the pirates’ ship when the vessels separate. His remark’s symbolic implication is that confronting the shadow is something a man must take the conscious initiative to do on his own. Bold action confirms Rogers-Gardner’s notion that Hamlet “embraces the archetype of the warrior,”⁸³ but what happens next is crucially important. Although the pirates are thieves, they treat him mercifully, presumably *because* “they knew what they did.” Either they recognize Hamlet, or he tells them his identity; and in exchange for helping him reach his destination, he is “to do a good turn for them.” That is, he is *supposed* to do a boon for the pirates; whether he genuinely intends to remains to be seen. Although the letters to Claudius mentioned in the next sentence probably do not include something favorable to the pirates, the juxtaposition of “good turn” and “the letters” hardly rules out the possibility. In any case, Hamlet’s encounter with the pirates suggests that he manages to integrate his shadow into his conscious awareness: the pirates are shadow projections with whom he effectively negotiates during his sea voyage. It may be, then, that his later claim—“The readiness is all” (5.2.220)—suggests that he has made friends with the shadow, which not only stands ready to assist him in his action against Claudius but also no longer impedes his work on his “master-piece” with the anima. The shadow must be integrated in order for a man to avoid negative anima with a Helen or a mermaid and to affirm positive anima in relationship with a Sophia, Mary, or Eve. Of course, Hamlet grapples with shadow-figure Laertes in the graveyard and has a sword fight with him in the final scene. But even if these conflicts suggest the need for further integration of the shadow, Hamlet’s success with the pirates still signifies some major inner work and marks an important step toward individuation.

Hamlet's tragedy is not that he never confronts or overcomes the shadow (he apparently does both on his sea voyage) but that he encounters the anima and the shadow in the wrong order, attempting a relationship with Ophelia before he has properly integrated his shadow. He attempts the "master-piece" before the "apprentice-piece." The readiness—in revenge or in relationship—really is all; and with Ophelia dead—part of the fallout from Hamlet's *unreadiness* earlier in the play—it is too late for him to build a relationship with her now that shadow integration has laid a more or less appropriate foundation. That Hamlet affirms the anima is clear in the graveyard scene. In the course of the play, he journeys from telling her, "I did love you once. . . . I loved you not. . . . Get thee to a nunnery" (3.1.116–22) to affirming in the graveyard, "I loved Ophelia. Forty thousand brothers / Could not with all their quantity of love / Make up my sum" (5.1.272–74). Affirmation of love for Ophelia/anima suggests not only that shadow integration has taken place but also that Hamlet's anima is still alive; for apart from either of these preconditions, he would be incapable of such words. Shadow integration has led Hamlet *too late* to some kind of anima-affirmation as he peers into Ophelia's grave.

Like Hamlet's comment at graveside, his journey from anima-alienation to a more positive attitude toward his feminine side underscores how far he has come with respect to the anima, especially if we consider the state of his psyche in earlier episodes. Other details reinforce Hamlet's journey from anima-alienation to a more positive attitude toward his feminine side. He states early in the play in a blighted conversation with Claudius and Gertrude, "I am too much in the sun" (1.2.67). Rogers-Gardner's claim that the sun represents "masculine consciousness and reason"⁸⁴ has a solid basis in Jung: "Anima and sun," he writes, "are thus distinct, which points to the fact that the sun represents a different principle from that of the anima." Hamlet may be operating too much in the first half of life, which involves coming to terms with masculinity and reason; he may thus be out of touch with his feminine side. But then Jung adds: "The latter is a personification of the unconscious, while the sun is a symbol of the source of life and the ultimate wholeness of man . . ." (CW12, 112/84). Hamlet may be too much the *son*, but he is far from the individuation that the *sun* signifies in Jungian thought.

When he cries later in the same scene that "frailty, thy name is woman!" (1.2.146), he illustrates another element of dysfunctional

anima. Jung writes: “The anima also stands for the ‘inferior’ [or lesser] function and for that reason frequently has a shady character; in fact she sometimes stands for evil itself” (*CW* 12, 192/150–51). Hamlet’s primary function is his reason; therefore, his inferior function is his emotion. In other words, he is projecting onto women in general and Gertrude in particular “the dark side of the human personality” (*CW* 9i, 222/123).

The closet scene in act 3, scene 4 provides a further sense that Hamlet projects his inferior function onto his mother, and several other points are possible. The closet scene was shocking to an Elizabethan audience because Hamlet violates the principle of family hierarchy—father, mother, children, in that order (Tucker). It is also possible that “Hamlet is [in some sense] killing the woman in himself” (Rogers-Gardner), perhaps because he is “possessed by trickster/shadow” (Porterfield).⁸⁵ But accusing his mother of being a party to his father’s murder is a further projection of the inferior function, and stating that she is “stewed in corruption, honeying and making love / Over the nasty sty!” (3.4.95–96) reflects a number of anima-related problems: the allusion to the stews suggests the prostitute, Helen, an inappropriate stage of eroticism; there is negative anima here aplenty, perhaps even anima possession, which manifests as uncontrolled emotion; and Hamlet’s objection to his mother’s incestuous sexuality may point to the presence of incestuous feelings within himself. So while he is not killing off his anima in the closet scene, his behavior does evince a lack of anima integration.

If Hamlet can speak lovingly of Ophelia as he stands in the graveyard, he has done a good bit of shadow work, and this point emerges more powerfully against his anima-related dysfunction in these several earlier scenes. But he does not make it to the stage where “the anima will gradually cease to act as an autonomous personality and will become a function of relationship between conscious and unconscious” (*CW* 16, 504/295), which is what Gertrude’s statement to the dead Ophelia implies: “I hoped thou shouldst have been my Hamlet’s wife” (5.1.244). Of course, even if the young woman had survived, she would have been unlikely to marry her father’s murderer; and besides, Hamlet must pay for his crime—first-degree murder—with his own death. There are various obstacles in the way of their union; but by the end of the play, having integrated his shadow, Hamlet is ironically now ready for the kind of relationship that would be possible

if Ophelia were not in the grave. Although he is a more integrated personality than he was at the play's opening, problems with shadow and anima prevent the couple from relating properly; and by the time Hamlet returns from his sea voyage, it is too late to do anything but wait for sufficient evidence of the king's guilt and for an opportunity to take action against him without harming the queen.

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EPILOGUE

“If you bring forth what is within you, what you bring forth will save you. If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth will destroy you.”

Jesus, *The Gospel of Thomas*¹

In Jungian thought, the key to individuation is to make the unconscious conscious; and the resulting wholeness of the Self has been a major unifying principle of *A Jungian Study of Shakespeare: The Visionary Mode*. Chapter 1, on *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, discusses three ways in which the process can happen (dream, imagination, and vision), as well as how a spiritual experience can bring a new perspective on consciousness. Chapter 2, on *The Merchant of Venice*, builds on this foundation by suggesting the role of myth in communicating with the unconscious and by analyzing the play’s classical allusions, particularly the “love duet” that opens act 5. Chapter 3, on *The Henriad*, argues for a further connection to the unconscious by discussing Falstaff as a trickster figure whose multiple allusions to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus in the Gospel of Luke suggest the cycle of positive and negative inflation, a cycle that Falstaff ultimately escapes in order to achieve some degree of individuation. The main theme in chapter 4, on *Othello*, is the title character’s link to the “primitive” thinking or *participation mystique*, which must be assimilated if individuation is to be achieved. Chapter 5, on *Hamlet*, addresses the most powerful of the avenues to the unconscious and its implications—the anima and the shadow-anima dynamic—in order to show that the title character’s main problems stem from the repression of his anima. The acknowledgement and integration of the shadow are prerequisites for forging a relationship with an anima figure. Ultimately, then, all the manifestations of the collective unconscious discussed in this book come to rest in the concept of individuation.

As I stated in the introduction, my goal was not to attempt an exhaustive reading of selected works by Shakespeare, and it is worth mentioning the sort of angles that could still be pursued. One might well discuss, for example, Bottom's experiences in the woods as an encounter with the anima or the primitive; or the role of classical figures such as Aeneas, Dido, and Diana in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in connection with Jung's theory of myth.² What, for example, does Shakespeare imply by having Hermia swear "by that fire which burned the Carthage queen / When the false Trojan under sail was seen" (1.1.173–74) that she will meet Lysander in the night woods—perhaps something like the disappointment discussed in chapter 2? And does Shakespeare's use of other mythical material—Diana and the moon—convey unconsidered truths to the Jungian reader? In *The Merchant of Venice*, it might be possible to discuss a male version of the stages of eroticism in connection with the play's masculine types: Antonio, Bassanio, Shylock, Gratiano, Lorenzo, Lancelot, and Old Gobbo. In *The Henriad*, Hal's playing the father in the tavern scene in act 2, scene 4 is what Jung calls "active imagination," which means using the imagination to personify the archetypes with which one wishes to communicate.³ In Hal's case, playing the father activates the father archetype within him—a good way to reclaim that lost part of himself and to prepare for the roles of responsible son and eventual king that he must affirm. Something similar happens when Hamlet enacts the fall of Troy with the players in act 2, scene 2. The enactment is pretty clearly a Freudian act of compromise, which substitutes and compensates "the instinct for what has been prohibited" and moves one a step closer to the prohibited act (namely, patricide).⁴ Instead of killing King Claudius, Hamlet enacts a fictional version of Pyrrhus's revenge slaying of another father figure, King Priam. The wish is Freudian and Oedipal, but the technique is the Jungian active imagination, which puts Hamlet in closer touch with his inner father-killer.

It is worth asking a final question related to a matter that we have merely touched on: does the unconscious *think*? Let us consider an example from the *Collected Works*. Jung tells of an accountant, struggling "to clear up a fraudulent bankruptcy," who arose at 3:00 A.M. and made notes in his study. In the morning he did not remember doing so (his wife had to fill him in), but the notes he found on his desk, written in his own hand, "straightened out the whole tangle finally and completely" (*CW* 8, 299/144).⁵ It is fairly obvious from

this example that the unconscious can think; and everyone has experienced something similar while driving—the conscious mind suddenly realizes that the unconscious has been steering for the last few miles. Consider also the way in which we academics have ideas come to us, seemingly from out of the blue. In these examples, Jung would locate the ability to think and to do constructive work in the *personal* unconscious rather than the collective. The influence of the *collective* unconscious is more relevant to Shakespeare's works, but instinct and archetypes probably do not *think* in the same way the personal unconscious can solve an accounting problem, drive a car, or write a paper. Still, the collective unconscious *exerts influence*, the more so when the archetypes remain unintegrated into the wholeness of the Self. Shakespeare's works are all about the ways in which universal psychic content drives and goads characters to do things not fully grounded in conscious control, as the poet of the Sonnets engages in lustful behavior, though it is "past reason hated" (Sonnet 129). Like their playwright creator, characters do the things that they do not want to do because of a failure to acknowledge and integrate the transpersonal forces of the deep unconscious. In the words of Jesus, "If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth [that is, acknowledge and integrate] will destroy you." The sort of "thinking" that this welling up of archetypes manifests, then, is probably not linear or rational, though it *is* possible to have a normal, logical conversation with an archetype through active imagination. But the influence that archetypes exert certainly makes the collective unconscious more than a "treasure-house of primordial images" (*CW* 7, 110/70), a mere repository of inert pictures. The plays and poems discussed in this book—the results of Shakespeare's visionary mode of artistic production—are a living testament to the power, importance, and potential of these unconscious forces.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Although Jung reportedly stated, “Shakespeare had a dream—and we are it,” I believe the remark to be falsely attributed to him. Barbara Rogers-Gardner quotes this statement as an epigraph in *Jung and Shakespeare: Hamlet, Othello, and The Tempest* (Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 1992), 1. Similarly, Irwin R. Sternlicht, quotes the same line but punctuates it differently in “Shakespeare and the Feminine,” in *A Well of Living Waters: A Festschrift for Hilde Kirsch*, ed. Rhoda Head et al. (Los Angeles: C. G. Jung Institute of Los Angeles, 1977), 196. Neither critic provides attribution, and the quotation does not appear in *CW*, *MDR*, or the *Letters*. I suspect that the statement attributed to Jung may be an extrapolation from his dream about a yogi: “When I looked at him more closely, I realized that he had my face. I started in profound fright, and awoke with the thought: ‘Aha, so he is the one who is meditating me. He has a dream, and I am it.’ I knew that when he awakened, I would no longer be” (*MDR*, 323).
2. Maud Bodkin, *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of Imagination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 217–30, 280–81.
3. For previous discussion of Jung’s work on literature, see James P. Driscoll, *Identity in Shakespearean Drama* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1983), 10–14; Sitansu Maitra, *Psychological Realism and Archetypes: The Trickster in Shakespeare* (Calcutta: Bookland Private, 1967), 64–105; Morris Philipson, *Outline of a Jungian Aesthetics* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Susan Rowland, *Jung as a Writer* (London: Routledge, 2005), 1–23; and Richard P. Sugg, ed., *Jungian Literary Criticism* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1992).
4. Jung stresses the structural—rather than imagistic—role of archetypes in *MDR*. He calls them “forms of instinct” (138). He also writes: “The archetypes, which are pre-existent to consciousness and condition it, appear in the part they actually play in reality: as a priori structural forms of the stuff of consciousness. They do not in any sense represent things as they are in themselves, but rather the forms in which things can be perceived and conceived” (347).
5. Steven Mullaney, *The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 24.

6. Adrienne Rich, "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision," in *Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers*, ed. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002), 635.
7. The survey that follows emphasizes selected criticism written since 1980. For earlier work, see Jos Van Meurs and John Kidd, *Jungian Literary Criticism, 1920–1980: An Annotated, Critical Bibliography of Works in English (with a Selection of Titles after 1980)* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1988).
8. Bodkin, *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry*.
9. Alex Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 96. See also CW9i, 20/44.
10. Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol*, 104, 101.
11. H. R. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche: A Jungian Approach to Shakespeare* (New York: University Press of America, 1986); and Johannes Fabricius, *Shakespeare's Hidden World: A Study of His Unconscious* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1989).
12. Fabricius, *Shakespeare's Hidden World*, 141.
13. Ibid., 146–48; and Weston A. Gui, "Bottom's Dream," *American Imago* 3–4 (1952–53), 276.
14. Sally F. Porterfield, *Jung's Advice to the Players: A Jungian Reading of Shakespeare's Problem Plays* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1994). For Rogers-Gardner, see above, note 1.
15. Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol*, 127, 129.
16. Edward F. Edinger, *The Psyche on Stage: Individuation Motifs in Shakespeare and Sophocles* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 2001).
17. Porterfield, *Jung's Advice to the Players*, 10; and Edinger, *The Psyche on Stage*, 23. The definitions are from Daryl Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 50, 42.
18. Kenneth Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology: A Reading of the Plays* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003); and Ryder Jordan-Finnegan, *Individuation and the Power of Evil on the Nature of the Human Psyche: Studies in C. G. Jung, Arthur Miller, and William Shakespeare* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006).
19. Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology*, 132.
20. Jordan-Finnegan, *Individuation and the Power of Evil*, 5.
21. Steven F. Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth: An Introduction* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1995), 102.
22. Edith Kern, "Falstaff—A Trickster Figure," *Upstart Crow* 5 (1984): 135–42; Roy Battenhouse, "Falstaff As Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool," *PMLA* 90 (1975): 32–52; and Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1988), 270–314.
23. Paul Radin, *The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). "On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure" is reprinted in CW9i, 456–88/255–72.

24. James Hillman, *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1985), 105–7. The term “*femme à homme*” comes from CW9i, 355/199 and seems to be the opposite of “*homme à femme*” (ladies man).

CHAPTER 1

1. A solid archetypal reading of the play appears in Franz Riklin, “Shakespeare’s ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream’: A Contribution to the Process of Individuation,” in *The Reality of the Psyche: The Proceedings of the Third International Congress for Analytical Psychology*, ed. Joseph B. Wheelwright (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968), 278–91. For Freudian readings of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* see Weston A. Gui, “Bottom’s Dream,” *American Imago* 3–4 (1952–53): 251–305; Jan Lawson Hinely, “Expounding the Dream: Shaping Fantasies in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” in *Psychoanalytic Approaches to Literature and Film*, ed. Maurice Charney and Joseph Reppen (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1987), 120–38; Norman N. Holland, “Hermia’s Dream,” in *Representing Shakespeare: New Psychoanalytic Essays*, ed. Murray M. Schwartz and Coppélia Kahn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 1–20; and Louis Adrian Montrose, “‘Shaping Fantasies’: Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture,” *Representations* 1 (1983): 61–94. For a non-Freudian reading see Thelma N. Greenfield, “Our Nightly Madness: Shakespeare’s *Dream* without *The Interpretation of Dreams*,” in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Critical Essays*, ed. Dorothea Kehler (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 331–44. The most comprehensive studies of dreams in Shakespeare’s plays are John Arthos, *Shakespeare’s Use of Dream and Vision* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978); and Marjorie B. Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare: From Metaphor to Metamorphosis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974). For psychological studies of Bottom’s experience see James L. Calderwood, “*A Midsummer Night’s Dream*: Anamorphism and Theseus’ Dream,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 42 (1991): 409–30; Garrett Stewart, “Shakespearean Dreamplay,” *English Literary Renaissance* 11 (1981): 44–69; and David P. Young, *Something of Great Constancy: The Art of “A Midsummer Night’s Dream”* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 111–66. A contemporary theoretical reading of Bottom’s experience appears in John J. Joughin, “Bottom’s Secret,” in *Spiritual Shakespeares*, ed. Ewan Fernie (New York: Routledge, 2005), 130–56. A comprehensive bibliography of works on the play appears in Kehler, *Critical Essays*, 62–76.
2. Daryl Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 27.

3. See also Augustine, *St. Augustine's Confessions*, trans. William Watts, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 2:235, 237: "Nor dost thou in time precede times: else thou shouldest not precede all times. But thou predest all times past, by high advantage of *an ever present eternity*: and thou goest beyond all times to come, even because they are to come, and when they shall come, they shall be past: whereas thou art still the same, and thy years shall not fail" (book 11, chapter 13; my emphasis). Augustine's reference is Psalm 102:27: "But thou art the same, and thy yeres shal not faile."
4. Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare*, 72; Peter Holland, introduction to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, by William Shakespeare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 13–14; N. Holland, "Hermia's Dream," 4, 8, and 12; David P. Young, *Something of Great Constancy*, 120; Medard Boss, *The Analysis of Dreams*, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), 125; and Bert O. States, *Dreaming and Storytelling* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13.
5. Gordon G. Globus, *Dream Life, Wake Life: The Human Condition Through Dreams* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 178.
6. For a helpful Jungian commentary on the snake, see Joseph L. Henderson and Maud Oakes, *The Wisdom of the Serpent: The Myths of Death, Rebirth, and Resurrection* (New York: George Braziller, 1963), esp. 34–44.
7. Mary Ann Mattoon, *Applied Dream Analysis* (Washington, DC: V. H. Winston & Sons, 1978), 143–44.
8. *Ibid.*, 34.
9. Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare*, 4.
10. Joseph Henderson, writing about *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, puts the point slightly differently in "Symbolism of the Unconscious in Two Plays of Shakespeare," in *The Well-Tended Tree: Essays into the Spirit of Our Time*, ed. Hilde Kirsch (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), 285: "Today we realize the unconscious is not only below us but also above us. It is a super- as well as a subconscious."
11. Globus, *Dream Life*, 62.
12. Ruth Leila Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays* (1927; repr., New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), 134.
13. R. W. Dent, "Imagination in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 15 (1964): 115–16; and William Rossky, "Imagination in the English Renaissance: Psychology and Poetic," *Studies in the Renaissance* 5 (1958): 63. For a further discussion of this point see R. A. Foakes, introduction to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, by William Shakespeare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 37–38; Theodore Spencer, *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1949), 12; and Young, *Something of Great Constancy*, 126–37.
14. Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology*, 133–34.
15. Louise C. Turner Forest, "A Caveat for Critics against Invoking Elizabethan Psychology," *PMLA* 61 (1946): 652, 656.

16. *Ibid.*, 651. See Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology*, 147.
17. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria: Or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions* (1817), in *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 16 vols., Bollingen Series 75 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971–2001), 7.1:304–5.
18. R. L. Brett, *Fancy & Imagination* (London: Methuen & Company, 1969), 45.
19. Rossky, “Imagination,” 59; and Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 7.2:16.
20. Philip Sidney, *The Defence of Poesie*, in *The Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 34, 45.
21. Plato, *Ion*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 220 (534b).
22. Howard Nemerov, “The Marriage of Theseus and Hippolyta,” *The Kenyon Review* 18 (1956): 635.
23. Rossky, “Imagination,” 73.
24. John Vyvyan holds that *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* is a “parable . . . based on Platonist ideas” (*Shakespeare and Platonic Beauty* [New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961], 9). A Platonic reading of Theseus’s speech also appears in Andrew D. Weiner’s “‘Multiformitie Uniforme’: *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” *English Literary History* 38 (1971): 331. Nemerov cites *Phaedrus*, 245a and *Ion*, 533d. Weiner cites *Ion*, 533c and *Sophist*, 235–36.
25. Weiner, “‘Multiformitie Uniforme,’” 331; Paul A. Olson, “*A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and the Meaning of Court Marriage,” *English Literary History* 24 (1957): 95–119; and J. A. Bryant, Jr., *Hippolyta’s View: Some Christian Aspects of Shakespeare’s Plays* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1961), 3.
26. Olson, “Court Marriage,” 97; R. A. Zimbardo, “Regeneration and Reconciliation in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” *Shakespeare Studies* 6 (1970): 36; and Plato, *Ion* 534b.
27. Olson, “Court Marriage,” 112.
28. Jung, “Approaching the Unconscious,” in *MHS*, 67.
29. For an interesting comparison, see the following statement by Judith Orloff, M.D., who seems to echo Theseus’s speech: “I believe that all forms of creative and psychic expression originate from an infinitely fertile spiritual source. In the same way that artists create, visionaries peer into the invisible. The painter Paul Klee recognized this when he said, ‘Art does not reproduce the visible. It makes visible.’ To me, the shared challenge of both psychics and artists is to translate the intangible into material form. This can take the shape of a novel, a painting, a song, or may come through as a prediction about the future. The kind of information we pick up depends on our intention. Any creative endeavor can provide a medium to help the psychic grow” (*Second Sight* [New York: Warner Books, 1996], 297).

30. Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare*, 86; and Thomas Berry, "The Relevance of C. G. Jung to Today's Historical/Ecological Situation" (lecture, meeting of the Charlotte Friends of Jung, Myers Park Baptist Church, Charlotte, NC, March 22, 2003).
31. Shakespeare's use of the Theseus myth has received the most commentary. See Douglas Freake, "A *Midsummer Night's Dream* as a Comic Version of the Theseus Myth," in Kehler, *Critical Essays*, 259–74; Peter Holland, "Theseus' Shadows in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*," *Shakespeare Survey* 47 (1994): 139–51; R. L. Horn, "A Note on Duke Theseus," *Studia Neophilologica* 58 (1986): 67–69; M. E. Lamb, "A *Midsummer Night's Dream*: The Myth of Theseus and the Minotaur," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 21 (1979): 478–91; and D'Orsay W. Pearson, "'Unkinde' Theseus: A Study in Renaissance Mythography," *English Literary Renaissance* 4 (1974): 276–98.
32. See Dent, "Imagination," 129; Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare*, 86; R. Chris Hassel, Jr., *Faith and Folly in Shakespeare's Romantic Comedies* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 76; and Young, *Something of Great Constancy*, 137, n. 34.
33. Weiner, "Multiformitie Uniforme," 333.
34. Michel de Montaigne, "Of the Power of the Imagination," in *The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), 68.
35. Montrose, "Shaping Fantasies," 65.
36. Stewart, "Shakespearean Dreamplay," 48.
37. Kevin Kline et al., *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, VHS, directed by Michael Hoffman (Century City, CA: 20th Century Fox, 2000).
38. James L. Calderwood, "Anamorphism," 410, 424.
39. Elliot Krieger, *A Marxist Study of Shakespeare's Comedies* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1979), 56.
40. See Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology*, 35; Thelma N. Greenfield, "A *Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Praise of Folly*," *Comparative Literature* 20 (1968): 243; Hassel, *Faith and Folly*, 54–56; P. Holland, introduction, 21, 84; Ronald F. Miller, "A *Midsummer Night's Dream*: The Fairies, Bottom, and the Mystery of Things," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 26 (1975): 263, 266–67; and Young, *Something of Great Constancy*, 124.
41. Paul refers to Isaiah 64:4 and 65:17. Hans Conzelmann also cites Psalm 31:20 and *The Gospel According to Thomas*, in which Jesus says, "I will give you what eye has not seen and what ear has not heard and what hand has not touched and (what) has not arisen in the heart of man" (*1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, ed. George W. MacRae, trans. James W. Leitch [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975], 64, n. 77). For commentary on Bottom's use of 1 Corinthians, see Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare*, 79; and Hassel's chapter, "Bottom and St. Paul," in *Faith and Folly*, 53–58.

42. Richmond Noble, *Shakespeare's Biblical Knowledge and Use of the Book of Common Prayer as Exemplified in the Plays of the First Folio* (New York: Macmillan, 1935; New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 22; Greenfield, "Our Nightly Madness," 333; and Roy Battenhouse, introduction to *Shakespeare's Christian Dimension: An Anthology of Commentary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 12.
43. Hinely, "Expounding the Dream," 136; and Zimbardo, "Regeneration and Reconciliation," 36.
44. Robert H. West, *Shakespeare & the Outer Mystery* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), 4.
45. Battenhouse, introduction, 12.
46. The note in the margin of the Geneva Bible glosses "thirde heauen" as "the highest heauen." For commentary on Paul's vision in 2 Corinthians see A. T. Lincoln, "'Paul the Visionary': The Setting and Significance of the Rapture to Paradise in II Corinthians XII.1–10," *New Testament Studies* 25 (1979): 204–20; and Peter Schäfer, "New Testament and Hekhalot Literature: The Journey into Heaven in Paul and in Merkavah Mysticism," *The Journal of Jewish Studies* 35 (1984): 19–35.
47. David Ray Griffin, *Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 230.
48. Victor Paul Furnish, trans. and comp., II Corinthians, *The Anchor Bible*, vol. 32A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1984), 525.
49. See Ronald Hayman, "What Happens after Death," in *A Life of Jung* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 379.
50. For a modern example of mystical synesthesia see the phrase "Blue—uncertain stumbling Buzz—" in Emily Dickinson's "I heard a Fly buzz—when I died," in *The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Including Variant Readings Critically Compared with All Known Manuscripts*, ed. Thomas H. Johnson, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1955), 1:358–59. The synesthesia in a line from Shakespeare's Sonnet 23—"To hear with eyes belongs to love's fine wit"—suggests that Bottom's tortured remark may convey simple infatuation as well as mystical experience. He has a crush on Titania.
51. Gui, "Bottom's Dream," 276.
52. William Burgess, *The Bible in Shakespeare: A Study of the Relation of the Works of William Shakespeare to the Bible* (New York: F. H. Revell, 1903), 104. Sherar is quoted on the same page.
53. Gui, "Bottom's Dream," 267. Regarding Bottom's performance, Joseph A. Longo suggests that "Bottom appears as the comic perversion of Orpheus, of one who, in Jung's words, is «running contrariwise» (*enantiodromia*). . . . As one who runs «contrariwise» Bottom is a parody of Orpheus whose dual functions as singer and deep questor have led him to become accepted as a symbol of the creative artist" ("Myth in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*," *Cahiers élizabéthains* 18 [1980]: 21).
54. My reading clearly diverges from Riklin, "Shakespeare's 'A Midsummer Night's Dream,'" 291: ". . . the self-opinionated ego destroys all life that

- is under lunar influence: a good image, which accords with the negative, lunatic state of mind.”
55. William Butler Yeats, “Crazy Jane Talks to the Bishop” in *Selected Poems and Two Plays of William Butler Yeats*, ed. M. L. Rosenthal (New York: Collier Publishing, 1962), 142–43.
 56. Hassel, *Faith and Folly*, 75.
 57. William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, in *Selected Poems and Prefaces*, ed. Jack Stillingr (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 385.
 58. Olson, “Court Marriage,” 115.
 59. *The New Interpreter’s Bible: A Commentary in Twelve Volumes*, ed. Robert W. Wall et al., vol. 10 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2002), 823.
 60. Jung would agree with the view that “reason impoverishes the imagination” (Foakes, introduction, 37). He does not assert the kind of complementary relationship between reason and imagination that some critics have seen in the play (Foakes, 37, n. 2) but instead predicts dire consequences of imbalance between reason/spirituality and a man’s anima (*CW* 13, 454/335), which this book explores in chapter 5. Elsewhere he considers reason incapable “of putting a lid on the volcano” of human irrationality (*CW* 11, 83/47; 16, 178/78). In “Approaching the Unconscious,” Jung states that “‘rationalism’ . . . has put him [man] at the mercy of the psychic ‘underworld’” and that “the goddess Reason . . . is our greatest and most tragic illusion” (94, 101). Nonetheless, he also asserts that “the interpretation of dreams and symbols demands *intelligence*. . . One can explain and know only if one has reduced intuitions to an exact knowledge of facts and their logical connections” (in *MHS*, 92; my emphasis).
 61. Quoted in Hassel, *Faith and Folly*, 72.
 62. Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, book 14, line 92.
 63. Burgess, *The Bible in Shakespeare*, 104.

CHAPTER 2

1. C. G. Jung, *MDR*, 282
2. *Ibid.*, 311.
3. John W. Velz, “Portia and the Ovidian Grotesque,” in *The Merchant of Venice: New Critical Essays*, ed. John W. Mahon and Ellen MacLeod Mahon (New York: Routledge, 2002), 184.
4. Barbara K. Lewalski, “Biblical Allusions and Allegory in *The Merchant of Venice*,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 13 (1962): 327–43; William C. Carroll, *The Metamorphoses of Shakespearean Comedy* (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1985); and Matthew A. Fike, “Disappointment in *The Merchant of Venice*,” *ANQ* N.S. 7.1 (1994): 13–18.

5. Harvey Birenbaum, "A View from the Rialto: Two Psychologies in *The Merchant of Venice*," *San José Studies* 9 (1983): 73; and Carroll, *Metamorphoses*, 123–26.
6. Carroll, *Metamorphoses*, 123.
7. Adrienne Rich, "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision," in *Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers*, ed. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002), 629.
8. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 118.
9. Steven F. Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth: An Introduction* (New York: Garland Publishing), 92. Many of Jung's statements on myth are anthologized in Robert A. Segal, ed., *Jung on Mythology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Segal's introduction presents a helpful, concise summary of Jung on myth.
10. See also *CW* 10, 43/26.
11. Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth*, 20.
12. Paul Gaudet, "Lorenzo's 'Infidel': The Staging of Difference in *The Merchant of Venice*," in *The Merchant of Venice: Critical Essays*, ed. Thomas Wheeler (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991), 358.
13. My students are fond of writing about the possibility that Antonio, who may be homosexual, is sad because he knows that his friend Bassanio will soon marry. The merchant's sexual orientation, however, can be argued either way. His relationship with Bassanio may illustrate what Montaigne and Bacon consider a typical Renaissance male friendship. Antonio is thus to Bassanio as Shakespeare is to the young man in Sonnet 20: "Mine be thy love and thy love's use their treasure." An older man enjoys a Platonic friendship with a younger man, but women enjoy the young man sexually. See Francis Bacon, "Of Friendship," in *The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral of Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Albans*, ed. Samuel Harvey Reynolds (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1890), 183–99; and Michel de Montaigne, "Of Friendship," in *The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*, trans. Donald Murdoch Frame (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), 135–44. For a contrasting view, see Alan Sinfield's essay, "How to Read *The Merchant of Venice* without Being Heterosexist," in *New Casebooks: The Merchant of Venice*, ed. Martin Coyle (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 161–80. Birenbaum's suggestion—that Antonio is sad because he has to be in the same play as Shylock ("A View from the Rialto," 78)—does not seem likely. For a more recent view, see Tom MacFaul, *Male Friendship in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 160–64.
14. James Hillman, *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* (Dallas, TX: Spring Publications, 1985), 169.
15. *Ibid.*, 175, 179.
16. *Ibid.*, 179. See also *CW* 13, 51/36.

17. Stephen Greenblatt, *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 125, 128–30.
18. Charles Mills Gayley, *The Classic Myths in English Literature and in Art* (New York: Ginn and Company, 1939), 124–25; and Edith Hamilton, *Mythology* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942), 154. Although Jung does not mention the Diana-Endymion myth, he does note that her responsibility in the death of Actaeon shows “that she is also a goddess of destruction and death” (*CW* 14, 188/159). Death by dismemberment by his own dogs (Actaeon) and eternal stasis in sleep (Endymion) illustrate the goddess’s destructive and controlling sides, respectively.
19. Lewalski, “Biblical Allusion,” 343; and Carroll, *Metamorphoses*, 123.
20. Lewalski comments: “The word ‘stand’ is ambiguous, suggesting at once that she occupies the position of a sacrificial victim whose life must be saved by another, but also that she ‘represents’ sacrifice—the very core of Christian love. The exact counterpart [that is, the direct opposite] of Portia’s remark, both in form and ambiguity of meaning, is Shylock’s later comment, ‘I stand for judgment. . . . I stand here for law’ (IV.i.103, 142)” (337–38).
21. Robert E. Bell, *Women of Classical Mythology: A Biographical Dictionary* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1991), 238. Carroll nicely points out two parallels between Portia and Hercules: both are cross-dressers, and “Portia herself will play Hercules” by “defeating the judicial equivalent of the sea monster” (*Metamorphoses*, 120).
22. Jessica conflates the moonlit night when Medea prays to Night and the nine days and nights during which she gathers her ingredients. Medea rejuvenates Aeson during the day. See book 7 in Ovid, *The Metamorphoses*.
23. R. Chris Hassel, Jr., “Antonio and the Ironic Festivity of *The Merchant of Venice*,” *Shakespeare Studies* 6 (1970): 69; W. H. Auden, “Belmont and Venice,” in *Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Merchant of Venice*, ed. Sylvan Barnet (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 115; A. D. Moody, “An Ironic Comedy,” in *Twentieth Century Interpretations*, 107; John S. Baxter, “Present Mirth: Shakespeare’s Romantic Comedies,” *Queens Quarterly* 72 (1965): 75; Alexander Leggatt, *Shakespeare’s Comedy of Love* (London: Methuen, 1974), 143; R. F. Hill, “*The Merchant of Venice* and the Pattern of Romantic Comedy,” *Shakespeare Survey* 28 (1975): 85; Mark L. Gnerro, “Easter Liturgy and the Love Duet in *MVV*, I,” *ANQ* 18 (1979): 19–21; Birenbaum, “A View from the Rialto,” 79; Carroll, *Metamorphoses*, 123–24; and Catherine Belsey, “Love in Venice,” in *New Casebooks*, 139. For a more extended treatment of the love duet in terms of Easter liturgy, see Mark F. Cosgrove’s University of Florida dissertation, *Biblical, Liturgical, and Classical Allusions in The Merchant of Venice* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1970), 57ff.
24. Jessica refers, of course, not to Jason but to his father, Aeson. The reference to Aeson and the argument for invoking Jason are examined below.
25. Leggatt, *Shakespeare’s Comedy of Love*, 143.

26. Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth*, 95, 102. Jung calls inflation “a regression of consciousness into unconsciousness” (CW 12, 563/481). Chapter 3 looks more closely at inflation in connection with Falstaff’s use of biblical allusion.
27. Richard Hunter, introduction to *Jason and the Golden Fleece*, by Apollonius (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), xxi.
28. In *As You Like It*, Rosalind tells Orlando, “Believe then, if you please, that I can do strange things. I have, since I was three years old, conversed with a magician, most profound in his art and yet not damnable. . . . I say I am a magician” (5.2.57–69). This remark directly follows Orlando’s matter-of-fact statement of libido: “I can live no longer by thinking” (49). If Rosalind makes a veiled allusion to Medea, the magical maiden whom Jason (the Orlando figure) seeks to wed, then magic may be women’s answer to masculine lust, just as reason is men’s defense against feminine seduction.
29. Velz, “Portia and the Ovidian Grotesque,” 181; and Carroll, *Metamorphoses*, 118.
30. Moody, “An Ironic Comedy,” 102.
31. Baxter’s full statement reads as follows: “The material ear, closed in the muddy vesture of decay, hears only the sweet sounds of viol and recorder; but the immaterial ear listens to the unheard sounds of the stars in their courses. And the music of the spheres, the pure unchanging hymn of love sung by materiality to its God, is itself the distant descant to the heavenly song of love sung eternally by the young-eyed cherubins before God’s throne. Thus the material and the spiritual worlds unite in all-embracing harmony” (“Present Mirth,” 76). While the immaterial ear can perceive the music of the spheres, this cosmic harmony does not reach the conscious awareness of corporeal man: there is no unity of the material and spiritual worlds in Lorenzo’s remark.
32. Leggatt, *Shakespeare’s Comedy of Love*, 144–45; Baxter, “Present Mirth,” 76; and Birenbaum, “A View from the Rialto,” 70–73. Jung mentions the music of the spheres only once—in CW 5, 235/164.
33. Birenbaum, “A View from the Rialto,” 73.
34. Lewalski, “Biblical Allusion,” 343.
35. *Ibid.*, 343.
36. Ronald Hayman, *A Life of Jung* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 120.
37. See F. P. Wilson, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1970), 330: “The grace of God is (gear) enough.” Wilson cites several other uses of this proverb, the most relevant being Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, I.x.38: “The grace of God he layd vp in store, / Which as a stocke he left vnto his seede; / He had enough, what need him care for more?” See *The Works of Edmund Spenser: A Variorum Edition*, ed. Edwin Greenlaw et al., 11 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1932), 1:133. Morris Palmer Tilley notes the proverb’s source in 2 Corinthians 12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee” (*A Dictionary*

- of the Proverbs in England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Collection of the Proverbs Found in English Literature and the Dictionaries of the Period* [Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1950], 272).
38. Compare the presence of Aesculapius in *The Faerie Queene*, I.v.36 (1:36). The physical medicine that he represents is insufficient to heal the Redcrosse knight's spiritual wounds.
 39. Peter Homans, *Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 184.
 40. For an interesting discussion of the limitations of Freud and Jung, see C. S. Lewis, "Psycho-Analysis and Literary Criticism," *Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association* 27 (1941): 7–21. Lewis points out "that Jung's discussion of 'primordial images' itself awakes a primordial image of the first water; that Miss Bodkin's *Archetypal Patterns* itself exhibits an archetypal pattern of extreme potency . . . it might be called the Recovery Pattern, or the Veiled Isis, or the Locked Door, or the Lost-and-Found." Lewis also proposes that Jung may have "worked us into a state of mind in which almost anything, provided it was dim, remote, long buried, and mysterious, would seem (for the moment) an adequate explanation of the 'leap in our blood' which responds to great myth." But the critic finally admits that "it is not the idea of following our remote ancestors which produces the response but the mere fact of doing so, whether we are conscious of this fact or no" (19–21).

CHAPTER 3

1. Edith Kern, "Falstaff—A Trickster Figure," *Upstart Crow* 5 (1984): 137. For Battenhouse, see below, note 5.
2. *Ibid.*, 141.
3. *Ibid.*, 135–37.
4. For a similar statement, see James P. Driscoll, *Identity in Shakespearean Drama* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1983), 36: "Falstaff embodies freedom, spontaneity, and the life force in all its insuppressible reality."
5. Roy Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool," *PMLA* 90 (1975): 32, 40; Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998), 278–318, esp. 281 and 306; Robert Hapgood, "Falstaff's Vocation," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 16 (1965): 94; and Ralph Berry, *Shakespeare and Social Class* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988), 82.
6. Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist," 47; and Bloom, *Shakespeare*, 311–12.
7. Paul M. Cubeta, "Falstaff and the Art of Dying," *Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 27 (1987): 204.

8. Paul Radin, *The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). Jung's essay appears on 195–211, Kerényi's on 173–91.
9. Karl Karényi, "The Trickster in Relation to Greek Mythology," 185; and Radin, *The Trickster*, 136 and x.
10. Radin, *The Trickster*, ix; and Hapgood, "Falstaff's Vocation," 91.
11. Sitansu Maitra, *Psychological Realism and Archetypes: The Trickster in Shakespeare* (Calcutta: Bookland Private, 1967), 122. I like very much Maitra's statement that "the trickster is the *shadow* of the collective unconscious" (95).
12. Alex Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 104–5.
13. Daryl Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 139.
14. H. R. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche: A Jungian Approach to Shakespeare* (New York: University Press of America, 1986), 55.
15. Berry, *Shakespeare and Social Class*, 82.
16. Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon*, 68; and Radin, *The Trickster*, 136.
17. *Enantiodromia* is Jung's term for "the emergence of the unconscious opposite in the course of time" (Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon*, 50).
18. A correction seems in order at this point. Peter Homans states, "Extravagant attitudes are also produced in the self: either self-deification, which Jung referred to as inflation or godliness, or else inferiority and what he called moral laceration" (*Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979], 96–97). Although Homans correctly identifies the duality, he considers inflation to mean only self-importance and misses Jung's idea that inflation can be both positive and negative.
19. Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon*, 73.
20. Direct allusions to the parable appear in *1 Henry IV* 3.3.31–33 and 4.2.25; *2 Henry IV* 1.2.34–35 and 5.3.1–15 (previous critics have not connected this passage to the parable); and *Henry V* 2.3.9–10.
21. I have omitted emphasis and spelled out words that are abbreviated in the original.
22. Leon Morris, *The Gospel According to St. Luke: An Introduction and Commentary* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 254–55.
23. Roy Battenhouse, *Shakespeare's Christian Dimension: An Anthology of Commentary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 299; and "Falstaff as Parodist," 33.
24. Harry Morris, *Last Things in Shakespeare* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1985), 283–85.
25. For the linkage to this passage, I am indebted to Rudolph Bultman, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John Marsh (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 203; and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, ed., *The Gospel According to Luke* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1985), 1128.

26. Shirley Guthrie, *Christian Doctrine*, rev. ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster/Knox Press, 1994), 284.
27. Joel B. Green, *The Gospel of Luke* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 605–6; Joachim Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, rev. 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 183; and Eamon Duffy, "On the Brink of Oblivion," *The New York Review of Books* 49.9 (2002): 42–43.
28. Berry, *Shakespeare and Social Class*, 82.
29. Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Parson's Tale," in *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 254–55.
30. Berry, *Shakespeare and Social Class*, 80–81.
31. Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist," 41.
32. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 185. See also Philip Francis Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke–Acts: The Social and Political Motivations of Lucan Theology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 198; and J. Duncan M. Derrett, "Fresh Light on St Luke XVI," *New Testament Studies* 7 (1961): 373. For a contrasting view see David L. Mealand, *Poverty and Expectation in the Gospels* (London: SPCK, 1980), 48.
33. Dan De Quille, *Dives and Lazarus: Their Wanderings and Adventures in the Infernal Regions*, ed. Lawrence I. Berkove (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishing, 1988), 77. Berkove's introduction suggests that De Quille worked on the novel between 1890 and 1893 (37). De Quille places Falstaff in hell along with Gulliver, Sinbad, and the Ancient Mariner (98). The implication is that Falstaff is here because he lied about killing Hotspur.
34. See, for example, *Harper Study Bible*, ed. Harold Lindsell (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Bible Publishers, 1946–1971). Despite the parable's emphasis on Lazarus's poverty, he is associated throughout the Middle Ages and in Shakespeare's time with leprosy. See the *OED*, s.v. "Lazar," A.1: "A poor and diseased person, usually one afflicted with a loathsome disease; *esp.* a leper."
35. K. Grobel, ". . . Whose Name Was Neves," *New Testament Studies* 10 (1964): 381. Grobel's point is that the Egyptian word *nineve* combines *nine* (nothing) and *ove* (one or someone), hence Nobody.
36. Howard I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Exeter, UK: Paternoster Press, 1978), 634–35; Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 606; and Raymond F. Collins, "Lazarus," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, ed. David Noel Freedman et al., 6 vols. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1992), 4:265.
37. See *The Works of Edmund Spenser: A Variorum Edition*, ed. Edwin Greenlaw et al., 11 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 2:79.
38. Collins, "Lazarus," 267.
39. Bloom, *Shakespeare*, 285.
40. E. Pearlman, *William Shakespeare: The History Plays* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 113; J. W. Fortescue, "The Soldier," in *Shakespeare's England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Age* (1916), 2 vols. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1962), 1:112; and J. Dover Wilson, *The Fortunes of Falstaff* (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1943), 84–85.

41. Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist," 43.
42. *Ibid.*, 45.
43. Frederick Turner, *Shakespeare's Twenty-first-century Economics: The Morality of Love and Money* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 112. The possibility that Falstaff is in Avalon connects with the line from "Sir Launcelot du Lac" and the subsequent reference to the "Nine Worthies," one of whom is Arthur (*2 Henry IV* 2.4.33, 218). In addition, John Shawcross suggests that "though Dame Quickly's version of Abraham's bosom is dismissed by critics as a part of her confusions, Shakespeare the artist knew what he was doing: Falstaff has gone where he always has been, to the medieval world, to Arthur, the epitome of the medieval vertical socio-political structure" ("Concepts of Medievalism: The Case of Falstaff," *CEA Critic* 47.1-2 [1984]: 37).
44. *OED*, s.v. "Bosom," I.1.b. The phrase "Abraham's bosom" also appears in *Richard II* as the likely destination of the late Norfolk (4.1.104-5) and in *Richard III* of "The sons of Edward" (4.3.38).
45. John Martin Creed, *The Gospel According to St. Luke: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Indices* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1930), 212.
46. Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 607; Michael D. Goulder, *Luke: A New Paradigm*, 2 vols. (Worcester, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 2:638; and Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 633.
47. Cubeta, "Falstaff and the Art of Dying," 200.
48. For an exploration of Shakespeare's use of Plato, see Alice Goodman, "Falstaff and Socrates," *English* 34 (1985): 97-112.
49. Kathrine Koller, "Falstaff and the Art of Dying," *Modern Language Notes* 60 (1945): 385-86.
50. Christopher Baker, "The Christian Context of Falstaff's 'Finer End,'" *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 12 (1986): 70-71, 81, and 83.
51. Cubeta, "Falstaff and the Art of Dying," 207.
52. Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist," 47.
53. Bloom, *Shakespeare*, 288.
54. C. L. Seow, "Hosea, Book of," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, 3:297. Hosea 3:1 reads, "Then said the Lord to me, Go yet, and loue a woman (beloued of her housband, and was an harlot) according to the loue of the Lord toward the children of Israel: yet they looked to other gods, & loued the wine bottles."
55. Bloom, *Shakespeare*, 312.
56. *Ibid.*, 312.
57. Francis G. Fike, "Visible Voids: Reading and the Art of Negative Witness," *Reformed Review* 47 (1993): 39, n. 6.
58. Radin, *The Trickster*, 136.

CHAPTER 4

1. Barbara Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare: Hamlet, Othello, and The Tempest* (Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 1992), 39–75.
2. Despite the unfortunate nature of Jung's rhetoric, at the end of his life he could see colonialism from both sides, as he makes clear in the following passage from his autobiography: "What we from our point of view call colonization, missions to the heathen, spread of civilization, etc., has another face—the face of a bird of prey seeking with cruel intentness for distant quarry—a face worthy of a race of pirates and highwaymen. All the eagles and other predatory creatures that adorn our coats of arms seem to me apt psychological representatives of our true nature" (*MDR*, 248–49).
3. Maud Bodkin, *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of Imagination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 219; Robert Rogers, "Endopsychic Drama in *Othello*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 20 (1969): 206, 209; Alex Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 27, 110; Catherine Bates, "Weaving and Writing in *Othello*," *Shakespeare Survey* 46 (1993): 53; Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 66, 45; Kenneth Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology: A Reading of the Plays* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 82–93; Terrell L. Tebbetts, "Pageants for False Gaze: Jungian Perfectibility in *Othello*," *Publications of the Arkansas Philological Association* 23 (1997): 93, 95; and Gregg Andrew Hurwitz, "'The Fountain, from which my current runs': A Jungian Interpretation of *Othello*," *Upstart Crow* 20 (2000): 80, 82.
4. G. K. Hunter, "Othello and Colour Prejudice," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 53 (1967): 157–60; Abraham Bronson Feldman, "Othello's Obsessions," *American Imago* 9 (1952): 160; K. W. Evans, "The Racial Factor in *Othello*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 5 (1969): 132; and Jyotsna Singh, "Othello's Identity, Postcolonial Theory, and Contemporary African Rewritings of *Othello*," in *Women, "Race," and Writing in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker (New York: Routledge, 1994), 289.
5. David Kaula, "Othello Possessed: Notes on Shakespeare's Use of Magic and Witchcraft," *Shakespeare Studies* 2 (1966): 116; Robert B. Heilman, *Magic in the Web: Action & Language in Othello* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1956), 127; Joseph L. Henderson, "Ancient Myths and Modern Man," *MHS*, 123; James Hillman, *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* (Dallas, TX: Spring Publications, 1985), 11; and Feldman, "Othello's Obsessions," 162.
6. Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 39, 47, 50, 41, 61, and 43. Asim Kumar Mukherjee mentions the primitive in the following remark: "Othello's 'egocentre', his personality, has its seat in a primitive, aboriginal self-love" ("The 'Blissfully Unconscious' and the 'Careful Observer' [A Jungian

- interpretation of *Othello*],” *The Literary Criterion* 13 [1978]: 13). Mukherjee’s thesis is that “*Othello*’s tragedy is the tragedy of extreme ego-consciousness” (2).
7. Andrew Samuels, “Introduction: Jung and the Post-Jungians,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, ed. Polly Young-Eisendrath and Terence Dawson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2; Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 66; and Ania Loomba and Martin Orkin, “Introduction: Shakespeare and the Post-colonial Question,” in *Post-Colonial Shakespeares*, ed. Ania Loomba and Martin Orkin (London: Routledge, 1998), 11.
 8. Petteri Pietikainen, “Soul Man Meets the Blind Watchmaker: C. G. Jung and Neo-Darwinism,” *Psychoanalysis and History* 5.2 (2003): 195–212; and Farhad Dalal, “Jung: A Racist,” *British Journal of Psychotherapy* 4.3 (1988): 265–66, 271, and 277–78.
 9. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 51; and Emily C. Bartels, “*Othello* and Africa: Postcolonialism Reconsidered,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 54 (1997): 46.
 10. Phillipa Kelly, “‘The Cannibals That Each Other Eat’: *Othello* and Post-colonial Appropriation,” *Span* 36 (1993): 116.
 11. Jung, *MDR*, 242.
 12. Ruth Cowhig, “Blacks in English Renaissance Drama and the Role of Shakespeare’s *Othello*,” in *The Black Presence in English Literature*, ed. David Dabydeen (Dover, NH: Manchester University Press, 1985), 1.
 13. Jung, *MDR*, 242–73.
 14. *Ibid.*, 244.
 15. Quoted in Claire Douglas, “The Historical Context of Analytical Psychology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, 21.
 16. For a similar point, see Johannes Fabricius, *Shakespeare’s Hidden World: A Study of His Unconscious* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1989). Fabricius associates war in *Richard III* with something akin to the Jungian shadow (18).
 17. Jung, *MDR*, 244.
 18. Cowhig, “Blacks in English Renaissance Drama,” 13.
 19. Steven F. Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth: An Introduction* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 142.
 20. *The Gods Must Be Crazy*, VHS, dir. Jamie Uys (Hollywood, CA: Columbia Tristar, 1980).
 21. Michael Vannoy Adams, “The Archetypal School,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, 315; Michael C. Andrews, “Honest *Othello*: The Handkerchief Once More,” *Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 13 (1973): 273; Stephen Reid, “*Othello*’s Jealousy,” *American Imago* 25 (1968): 291; Evans, “The Racial Factor,” 134; Eldred Jones, *Othello’s Countrymen: The African in English Renaissance Drama* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 102–3; Kaula, “*Othello* Possessed,” 126; Katherine S. Stockholder, “Egregiously an Ass: Chance and Accident in *Othello*,”

- Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 13 (1973): 268, 266; John A. Hodgson, “Desdemona’s Handkerchief as an Emblem of Her Reputation,” *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 19 (1977): 313–22; Carol Thomas Neely, “Woman and Men in *Othello*: ‘What should such a fool / Do with so good a woman?’” in *The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare*, ed. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz et al. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 228–29; Peter L. Rudnytsky, “The Purloined Handkerchief in *Othello*,” in *The Psychoanalytic Study of Literature*, ed. Joseph Reppen and Maurice Charney (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985), 185, 171; Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 69, 65; Harry Berger, Jr., “Impertinent Trifling: Desdemona’s Handkerchief,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 47 (1996): 239; Will Fisher, “Handkerchiefs and Early Modern Ideologies of Gender,” *Shakespeare Studies* 28 (2000): 205; Martin Wagh, “*Othello*: The Tragedy of Iago,” *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 19 (1950): 212; M. D. Faber, “*Othello*: The Justice of It Pleases,” *American Imago* 28 (1971): 242; Jean Jofen, “The Case of the Strawberry Handkerchief,” *Shakespeare Newsletter* 21 (1971): 14; Gordon Ross Smith, “Iago the Paranoiac,” *American Imago* 16 (1959): 160; Karen Newman, “‘And wash the Ethiop white’: Femininity and the Monstrous in *Othello*,” in *Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology*, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor (New York: Methuen, 1987), 156; Lynda E. Boose, “Othello’s Handkerchief: ‘The Recognizance and Pledge of Love,’” *English Literary Renaissance* 5 (1975): 362, 367; Lawrence J. Ross, “The Meaning of Strawberries in Shakespeare,” *Studies in the Renaissance* 7 (1960): 227, 239; G. R. Elliott, *Flaming Minister: A Study of Othello as Tragedy of Love and Hate* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1953), 151–52; Bates, “Weaving and Writing in *Othello*,” 58; Steven Doloff, “Shakespeare’s *Othello*,” *The Explicator* 56 (1977): 13; and Peter G. Mudford, “Othello and the ‘Tragedy of Situation,’” *English* 20 (1971): 5. Finally, those who seek a Lacanian psychoanalytic reading will find much of interest in Elizabeth J. Bellamy, “Othello’s Lost Handkerchief: Where Psychoanalysis Finds Itself,” in *Lacan, Politics, Aesthetics*, ed. Willy Apollon and Richard Feldstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 151–79.
22. Stockholder, “Egregiously an Ass,” 265.
 23. Boose, “Othello’s Handkerchief,” 360.
 24. Andrews, “Honest Othello,” 273.
 25. Sherry Salman, “The Creative Psyche: Jung’s Major Contributions,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, 65.
 26. James Baird, “Jungian Psychology in Criticism: Theoretical Problems,” *Literary Criticism and Psychology*, ed. Joseph P. Strelka, *Yearbook of Comparative Criticism*, vol. 17 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), 9.
 27. David L. Hart, “The Classical Jungian School,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, 95.

28. There are only four other references to the sibyl in Shakespeare's works: *I Henry VI* 1.2.56, *The Taming of the Shrew* 1.2.69, *Titus Andronicus* 4.1.107, and *The Merchant of Venice* 1.2.104.
29. Boose, "Othello's Handkerchief," 367.
30. Stockholder, "Egregiously an Ass," 266.
31. Edwyn Bevan, *Sibyls and Seers: A Survey of Some Ancient Theories of Revelation and Inspiration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), 140.
32. Hillman, *Anima*, 133.
33. This interpretation of the "stages of eroticism" differs from Daryl Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 20–21. For Sharp, Eve is "the personal mother" and Mary "religious feelings and a capacity for lasting relationships." One thinks first, however, of Eve as Adam's wife and Mary as Jesus's mother.
34. Garth Fowden, *The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 22. See also Françoise Dunand and Christiane Zivie-Coche, *Gods and Men in Egypt: 3000 BCE to 395 CE*, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 275; and Brian P. Copenhaver, introduction to *Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction*, ed. Brian P. Copenhaver (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), xiii–lxi.
35. It is possible, however, to be sibyl-like in a negative way as well. Writing about international criticism of the Germans, Jung states, "It is blasphemy to them, for Hitler is the Sybil [*sic*], the Delphic Oracle" (quoted in Ronald Hayman, *A Life of Jung* [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999], 343). Hayman's source is William McGuire and R. F. C. Hull, eds., *C. G. Jung Speaking* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1977), 92–92. Jung's statement about Hitler suggests the following homology: Hitler is to the swastika (negative) as the Sibyl is to the handkerchief (positive).
36. See also *CW* 9ii, 127/72, n. 2.
37. An irony immediately surfaces: although the sibyl teaches ancient peoples how to use symbols in a way that properly disconnects subject and object, she foretells the coming of the person who says that bread and wine are his body and blood. Transubstantiation bears considerable similarity to the *participation mystique* that bedevils Othello as he contemplates the handkerchief.
38. Kaula, "Othello Possessed," 125.
39. For an affirmative view, see Boose, "Othello's Handkerchief," 363; André A. Glaz, "Iago or Moral Sadism," *American Imago* 19 (1962): 336; Martin Orkin, "Othello and the 'plain face' of Racism," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 38 (1987): 186, n. 44; and Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 61. For an opposing view, see T. G. A. Nelson and Charles Haines, "Othello's Unconsummated Marriage," *Essays in Criticism* 33 (1983): 1–18. Rudnytsky claims

- that the matter is uncertain, but he inclines toward lack of consummation (“The Purloined Handkerchief,” 181–82).
40. See also *CW* 11, 240/161; 17, 340/199.
 41. Jonathan Burton, “‘A most wily bird’: Leo Africanus, *Othello* and the Trafficking in Difference,” in *Post-Colonial Shakespeares*, 58; Singh, “Othello’s Identity,” 287; T. S. Eliot, “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” in *Selected Essays*, new ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950), 110–11; and Imtiaz Habib, *Shakespeare and Race: Postcolonial Praxis in the Early Modern Period* (New York: University Press of America, 2000), 145.
 42. Mary Louise Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” in *Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers*, ed. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002), 612.
 43. Eldred Jones, *Othello’s Countrymen*, 108; and Hunter, “Othello and Colour Prejudice,” 160.
 44. *OED*, s.v. “Indian,” B.2.a. Shakespeare’s other references to Indians appear in *All’s Well That Ends Well* 1.3.201; *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* 2.1.22, 124, and 3.2.375; *The Merchant of Venice* 3.2.99; *3 Henry VI* 3.1.63; *Henry VIII* 5.4.33; and *The Tempest* 2.2.33.
 45. Leslie A. Fiedler, *The Stranger in Shakespeare* (New York: Stein and Day Publishing, 1972), 196.
 46. Jung, *MDR*, 247.
 47. Harold C. Goddard, *The Meaning of Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 467.
 48. Marie-Louise von Franz, *Archetypal Dimensions of the Psyche* (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997), 293.
 49. *Ibid.*, 346.
 50. Patricia Parker, “Fantasies of ‘Race’ and ‘Gender’: Africa, *Othello* and Bringing to Light,” in *Women, “Race,” and Writing in the Early Modern Period*, 99; and Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 233.
 51. Habib, *Shakespeare and Race*, 139; Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 67; Cowhig, “Blacks in English Renaissance Drama,” 1; and Loomba, “Outsiders in Shakespeare’s England,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare*, ed. Margreta de Grazia and Stanley Wells (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 148.

CHAPTER 5

1. Jung, *MDR*, 302.
2. In Bevington’s edition 5.2.64 reads, “He that hath killed my king and whored my mother” (my emphasis).

3. H. R. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche: A Jungian Approach to Shakespeare* (New York: University Press of America, 1986), 80–81, 88, 83, 96, 93, 97, 72–73, and 76.
4. James Kirsch deals with the ghost through the lens of analytical psychology in *Shakespeare's Royal Self* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), 10–57.
5. Hamlet says of Claudius, "My mother. Father and mother is man and wife, man and wife is one flesh, and so, my mother" (4.3.55–57).
6. Barbara Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare: Hamlet, Othello, and The Tempest* (Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 1992), 19, 18, 35, 27–28, 33, 26, and 14.
7. Sally F. Porterfield, *Jung's Advice to the Players: A Jungian Reading of Shakespeare's Problem Plays* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 93–95.
8. Elizabeth Oakes, "Polonius, the Man behind the Arras: A Jungian Study," in *New Essays on Hamlet*, ed. Mark Thornton Burnett and John Manning (New York: AMS Press, 1994), 103–12. Oakes uses the phrase "racial father." Jung's phrase is "tribal father." She quotes *CW*5, 396/261 (107–8).
9. Regarding this detail, there is some difference of opinion among the play's Jungian critics. Rogers-Gardner also claims that Hamlet jumps into Ophelia's grave (*Jung and Shakespeare*, 14), and Porterfield has Hamlet leap into it with Laertes (*Jung's Advice to the Players*, 94).
10. Charlton Hinman, *The Norton Facsimile: The First Folio of Shakespeare* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968), 786.
11. Maud Bodkin, *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of Imagination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934).
12. Kenneth Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology: A Reading of the Plays* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 132, 111, 129, and 116.
13. Porterfield, *Jung's Advice to the Players*, 76.
14. James Hillman, *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* (Dallas, TX: Spring Publications, 1985), 139.
15. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche*, 91. For Jung, whereas the soul of a male is feminine, the soul of a female is masculine (*CW* 16, 522/304).
16. *Ibid.*, 97.
17. *OED*, s.v., "Light," 14b.
18. Daryl Sharp, *C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms & Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 124.
19. *Ibid.*, 27.
20. Kay Stanton, "Hamlet's Whores," in *New Essays on Hamlet*, 179.
21. Hillman, *Anima*, 57, 63. Hillman is quoting *CW*9i, 311/184: "As a matter of practical observation, the Kore often appears in woman as an *unknown young girl*, not infrequently as Gretchen or the unmarried mother" (Jung's emphasis). The reference to "the unmarried mother" connects nicely to Ophelia's probable pregnancy, which I discuss below.
22. Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology*, 113.

23. Sharp defines Kore as follows: "In Greek mythology, a term for the personification of feminine innocence (for example, Persephone); psychologically, in man or woman, it refers to an archetypal image of potential renewal" (C. G. Jung *Lexicon*, 79).
24. Hillman, *Anima*, 55.
25. See Lawrence Babb, *The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580–1642* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State College Press, 1951), 106–10; Ernest Jones, *Hamlet and Oedipus* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1954), 23–50; Theodore Lidz, *Hamlet's Enemy: Madness and Myth in Hamlet* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 195–205; and W. I. D. Scott, *Shakespeare's Melancholics* (London: Mills & Boon, 1962), 73–107.
26. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche*, 86, 85.
27. Hillman, *Anima*, 103. Hamlet's age, however, is an open question. Coursen asserts that the young Dane is thirty (*The Compensatory Psyche*, 66), and I base my argument later in the chapter on this assumption. But a younger age is also an attractive possibility. In either case, the audience may develop a subtle Oedipal suspicion that Claudius is Hamlet's biological father.
28. Hillman, *Anima*, 105–6. The phrase "permanent loss of the anima" is from CW9i, 147/71.
29. Marie-Louise von Franz, "The Process of Individuation," in *MHS*, 173. The point is in the spirit of James P. Driscoll's observations about Angelo's "sensualist shadow" (*Identity in Shakespearean Drama* [Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1983], 111).
30. Irwin R. Sternlicht holds that the Duke's role makes him an example of "the healer archetype." See "Shakespeare and the Feminine," in *A Well of Living Waters: A Festschrift for Hilde Kirsch*, ed. Rhoda Head et al. (Los Angeles: C. G. Jung Institute of Los Angeles, 1977), 191–92.
31. Edward F. Edinger, *The Psyche on Stage: Individuation Motifs in Shakespeare and Sophocles* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 2001), 25.
32. *Ibid.*, 23.
33. *Ibid.*, 25–27.
34. There is support for the oak as a feminine image in CW14, 75/70.
35. Edinger, *The Psyche on Stage*, 37.
36. Gwen Benwell and Arthur Waugh, *Sea Enchantress: The Tale of the Mermaid and Her Kin* (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 55.
37. Catharine F. Siegel, "Hands Off the Hothouses: Shakespeare's Advice to the King," *Journal of Popular Culture* 20 (1986): 84–85; and Wallace Shugg, "Prostitution in Shakespeare's London," *Shakespeare Studies* 10 (1977): 292. See also Ronald B. Bond, "'Dark Deeds Darkly Answered': Thomas Becon's Homily Against Whoredom and Adultery, Its Contexts, and Its Affiliations with Three Shakespearean Plays," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16 (1985): 191–205.
38. This point suggests an analogy to Rogers-Gardner's statement about Claudius: "Unlike Hamlet, Claudius, on however low a level, has effected

- a Jungian integration of masculine and feminine" (*Jung and Shakespeare*, 21).
39. The case for Ophelia's pregnancy is a circumstantial one based on Hamlet's bawdy remarks, her Valentine's Day song, her flower imagery, and her possible suicide. The most convincing case for pregnancy is provided by Painter and Parker (below, note 43).
 40. See Stanton's "Hamlet's Whores" for a discussion of many of the following references.
 41. *Ibid.*, 172, 174; Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche*, 72, 98; Oakes, "Polonius," 105; and Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 23. See also *OED*, s.v., "stallyon," 2b and 3a.
 42. Alex Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 179; Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology*, 112; and Stanton, "Hamlet's Whores," 168.
 43. Robert Painter and Brian Parker, "Ophelia's Flowers Again," *Notes and Queries* N.S. 41 (1994): 42.
 44. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 71; Ruth Berman, "Mermaids," in *Mythical and Fabulous Creatures: A Source Book & Research Guide*, ed. Malcolm Smith (New York: Bedrick, 1988), 139; and *OED*, s.v. "Mermaid," 3a. Benwell and Waugh critique the mermaid-prostitute linkage: "The Elizabethans sometimes gave a courtesan the name of 'mermaid'—an unwarrantable slur on one who, though her favours might cost a man his life, never yet bartered her charms for gain" (239).
 45. Homer, *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1967), 190.
 46. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 41.
 47. John Block Friedman, "The Nun's Priest's Tale: The Preacher and the Mermaid's Song," *The Chaucer Review* 7 (1973): 264. Robert E. Bell notes that the sirens "received [wings] at their own request, in order to be able to search for Persephone . . . or as a punishment from Demeter for not having assisted Persephone or from Aphrodite because they wished to remain virgins. . . . Once, however, they allowed themselves to be prevailed upon by Hera to enter into a contest with the Muses, and, being defeated, they were deprived of their wings . . ." (*Dictionary of Classical Mythology: Symbols, Attributes & Associations* [Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1982], 278).
 48. Berman, "Mermaids," 149.
 49. Peter M. Daly, ed., *The English Emblem Tradition*, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 1:99.
 50. Quoted in Beatrice Phillpotts, *Mermaids* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 35.
 51. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 73.
 52. Phillpotts, *Mermaids*, 68; and Berman, "Sirens," in *Mythical and Fabulous Creatures*, 148.
 53. For much of the summary in the next several paragraphs, I am indebted to Benwell and Waugh, Berman, Phillpotts, and Jane Hutchins (*Discovering*

- Mermaids and Sea Monsters* [Gubblecote Cross, UK: Shire Publications, 1968).
54. Dorothy L. Sayers's comments on the sirens in her translation of *Purgatory* are in the spirit of my discussion: "She [the siren] is, therefore, the projection upon the outer world of something in the mind: the soul, falling in love with itself, perceives other people and things, not as they are, but as wish-fulfilments [*sic*] of its own: i.e., its love for them is not love for a 'true other' . . . but a devouring egotistical fantasy, by absorption in which the personality rots away into illusion" (*The Comedy of Dante Alighieri, the Florentine*, trans. Dorothy L. Sayers, 3 vols. [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1949–1962], 2:220).
 55. For versions of the ballad now known as "Sir Patrick Spens," see Francis James Child, ed., *The English and Scottish Popular Ballad*, 8 vols. (New York: Dover Publishing, 1965), 5:148–52.
 56. Hutchins, *Discovering Mermaids and Sea Monsters*, 11.
 57. Hyder E. Rollins, *An Analytical Index to the Ballad-Entries (1557–1709) in the Registers of Stationers of London* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1924), 219, no. 2533.
 58. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 94.
 59. Berman, "Mermaids," 139.
 60. Benwell and Waugh write: "The *dolphin* refers to the Dauphin of France, Mary's first husband, and the *rude sea* to her Scottish subjects, whom the young queen found uncouth after the polished manners of the French courtiers. The *certain stars* who *shot madly from their spheres* are the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland and the Duke of Norfolk, who paid with their lives for their attempts to rescue Mary when she was a prisoner in the hands of Elizabeth" (*Sea Enchantress*, 89–91). Most of Shakespeare's other references not cited in the text of this chapter mention their beautiful and enticing song (*The Rape of Lucrece* 1411, *Venus and Adonis* 429, *The Comedy of Errors* 3.2.163, and *Titus Andronicus* 2.1.23). The drowning of sailors is mentioned in *3 Henry VI* 3.2.186; Cleopatra is attended by sea nymphs (*Antony and Cleopatra* 2.2.216–19); and Sirens' tears are mentioned in *Sonnet* 119.
 61. Wayne A. Rebhorn, "Mother Venus: Temptation in Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*," *Shakespeare Survey* 11 (1978): 8.
 62. Friedman, "*The Nun's Priest's Tale*," 264.
 63. Anthony S. Mercantante, *The Facts on File Encyclopedia of World Mythology and Legend* (New York: Facts on File, 1988), 592.
 64. Berman, "Mermaids," 140.
 65. Quoted in Friedman, "*The Nun's Priest's Tale*," 264. A few other details do not relate directly to *Hamlet*. Mermaids exhibit a number of recurring characteristics: the desire for a soul; the power to prophesy, grant wishes, raise storms, and wreak vengeance if they are thwarted; a love of dancing; and the ability to imprison the souls of drowned men at the bottom of the sea.

66. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 78, 85.
67. Whereas I consider Gertrude's speech to be a mythological moment, Stephen Ratcliffe takes a very different approach in his detailed explication, "What Doesn't Happen in *Hamlet*: The Queen's Speech" (*Exemplaria* 1 [1998]: 123–44). Ratcliffe bases his claim that Ophelia's death was "rape and/or murder" and that "Gertrude had a hand in Ophelia's death" (143, 141) not on the presence of positive evidence but on the absence of contrary information. The article only superficially mentions the queen's use of the term "mermaidlike": "what clothes was she wearing? have they turned, or turned her, into a fish?" (140).
68. Painter and Parker, "Ophelia's Flowers Again," 43. I strongly agree with Kirsch's statement about Ophelia's drowning: "Symbolically, the contents of her unconscious which have already broken her mind have pulled her completely into the unconscious" (*Shakespeare's Royal Self*, 158).
69. Benwell and Waugh, *Sea Enchantress*, 43.
70. Mercantante, *The Facts on File Encyclopedia*, 592.
71. Erik Rosenkrantz Bruun, "'As your daughter may conceive': A Note on the Fair Ophelia," *Hamlet Studies* 15.1–2 (1993): 99.
72. Quoted in Katharine M. Briggs, *A Dictionary of British Folk-Tales in the English Language Incorporating the F. J. Norton Collection*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 1:229. Briggs's source is Robert Chambers, *The Popular Rhymes of Scotland* (1870; Detroit: Singing Tree Press, 1969), which offers a nearly identical summary but gives no original source. There is no reference to "Lorntie" in Donald Goddard Wing, et al., *Short-Title Catalog of Books Printed in England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and British American, and of English Books Printed in Other Countries, 1641–1700*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1972–1998); various poetry indexes; the Stationers' Register; Child's *The English and Scottish Popular Ballad*; or *The Roxburghe Ballads, Illustrating the Last Years of the Stuarts*, ed. William Chappell et al., 9 vols. (Hertford, UK: Publications of the Ballad Society, 1873–1897). Whether it is a poem or ballad is uncertain. But even if written after *Hamlet*, which is likely, "Lorntie" sums up a type of mermaid encounter that would not have surprised Elizabethans, who took mermaids' existence for granted.
73. Perhaps the contradiction between mermaid and drowning partly accounts for Laertes's confused reaction immediately following the queen's announcement: "Alas, then she is drowned?" (4.7.185).
74. *OED*, s.v., "Madam," 3c.d: "A brothel-keeper." However, none of the examples predates 1911. The link between "The Laird of Lorntie" and prostitution is my interpretation.
75. Michele Pessoni, "'Let in the Maid, That out a Maid Never Departed More': The Initiation of Ophelia: Hamlet's Kore Figure," *Hamlet Studies* 14.1–2 (1992): 35.
76. Phillpotts, *Mermaids*, 10.

77. Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 79.
78. The line should be read as follows: “So excellent a king [Hamlet Senior], that was to this [king: Claudius] / [as] Hyperion [is] to a satyr” (1.2.139–40). In short, Hamlet Senior is to Hyperion as Claudius is to a satyr.
79. Peter J. Seng, “Ophelia’s Songs in *Hamlet*,” *Durham University Journal* N.S. 25 (1964): 83; Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol in Shakespeare*, 180; and Elaine Showalter, “Representing Ophelia: Women, Madness, and the Responsibilities of Feminist Criticism,” in *Shakespeare and the Question of Theory*, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Methuen, 1985), 81; and *A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare*, ed. Horace Howard Furness, 27 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1871–1955), 3:371.
80. Zachary A. Burks, “‘My Soul’s Idol’: Hamlet’s Love for Ophelia,” *Hamlet Studies* 13.1–2 (1991): 70.
81. Aronson, *Psyche & Symbol*, 101; Porterfield, *Jung’s Advice to the Players*, 87, 93; Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 34, 29, and 36; and Oakes, “Polonius,” 109, 111.
82. Coursen, *The Compensatory Psyche*, 66.
83. Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 29.
84. *Ibid.*, 16.
85. Tucker, *Shakespeare and Jungian Typology*, 113–14; Rogers-Gardner, *Jung and Shakespeare*, 33; and Porterfield, *Jung’s Advice to the Players*, 92.

EPILOGUE

1. The Gospel of Thomas, trans. Thomas O. Lambdin et al., *Early Christian Writings*, ed. Peter Kirby (2001–2006), <http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/thomas.htm> (accessed April 6, 2008). This translation differs significantly from other translations. One example appears in John S. Kloppenborg et al., eds., *Q-Thomas Reader* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1990), 146: “Jesus said, ‘If you bring forth what is within you, what you have will save you. If you do not have that within you, what you do not have within you [will] kill you’ (70:1–2). In my view, Jesus is getting at what the translation in the epigraph expresses more clearly: the danger of repression and lack of conscious communication with the unconscious.
2. The play’s mythic inheritance has received some previous attention. For example, Joseph A. Longo deals with the play’s Apollonian, Dionysian, and Orphic elements in “Myth in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” *Cahiers élizabéthains* 18 (1980): 17–27.
3. See Barbara Hannah, *Encounters with the Soul: Active Imagination as Developed by C. G. Jung* (Santa Monica, CA: Sigo Press, 1981).

4. Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74), 13:30–31.
5. For a fuller discussion see Matthew A. Fike, "The Role of the Unconscious in the Writing Process," *Peer English: The Journal of New Critical Thinking* 1 (2006): 46.

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