POST-JUNGIANS TODAY

KEY PAPERS IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

CONTRIBUTORS / EDITED BY ANN CASEMENT

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ROUTLEDGE

Post-Jungians Today

Post-Jungians Today brings together contributions from leading figures in the international Jungian community to explore how the practice of analytical psychology is adapting to the realities of the postmodern world.

In developing the original insights of Jung himself, post-Jungians are committed to an approach that diverges from the total emphasis on psychic reality and takes account of the realities of the outer world. Here authors from very different social, cultural and professional backgrounds explore how Jungian psychology can continue to make a relevant contribution to social and political debates on topics such as gender, ethnicity and sexuality.

A showcase for the diversity of Jungian thought around the globe, *Post-Jungians Today* presents an up-to-date analysis of current clinical and theoretical developments within analytical psychology as it is practised and in the light of how the discipline is viewed by the academy. The book also assesses why Jungian concepts occupy a unique place in the history of ideas and discusses the traditionally problematic relationship between analytical psychology and psychoanalysis.

For anyone interested in the pluralism and influence of Jungian thought in the postmodern world, and in the future of the Jungian enterprise, this is essential reading.

Ann Casement is a training analyst at the Association of Jungian Analysts in London. She is a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute and Chair of the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy.

Contributors: John Beebe; Ann Casement; Roberto Gambini; Donald E. Kalsched; Verena Kast; Hayao Kawai; Renos Papadopoulos; Andrew Samuels; Mara Sidoli; Anne Springer; David Tacey; Polly Young-Eisendrath; Luigi Zoja.

Post-Jungians Today

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Edited by Ann Casement

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To Jane, Alexy, Caroline, Jason

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Contributors

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Preface

Post-Jungians Today: Key papers in contemporary analytical psychology, grew out of the Jungians Today conference held in London in November 1995. The conference offered the opportunity for a celebration and an evaluation of what had been happening over ten years in the Jungian world since the publication of Andrew Samuels' seminal book, *Jung and the Post-Jungians.*

As convener of the conference, I recalled for participants a talk I had had with Andrew ten years before, at the launch of *Jung and the Post-Jungians,* about the possibility of increasing dialogue between the four United Kingdom groups: the Association of Jungian Analysts, the British Association of Psychotherapists, the Independent Group of Analytical Psychologists and the Society of Analytical Psychology. Since that time, the UK Umbrella Group has come into being and the above conference, its second national one, was the biggest event so far for bringing together in the UK the diverse voices of the Jungian family.

The Jungians Today conference covered a variety of topics, some of which feature in the present book, such as gender, ethnicity and individuation. John Beebe, Renos Papadopoulos, Andrew Samuels and I gave papers on the day and another contributor to this book, Anne Springer, attended the event. I would like to thank all of the analysts who were involved in making it such a lively affair, as well as John Clarke, Sonu Shamdasani and Martin Stanton, who are not members of the International Association for Analytical Psychology.

Edwina Welham from Routledge attended the conference, and afterwards she and I had a meeting to discuss the possibility of a future project related to some of the themes dealt with at the time. In the course of our discussions, the idea of this book was born and the focus of the conference was broadened to cover the international Jungian community. As a result, there are represented in the following pages writers from Japan, Australia and Brazil, as well as from the United States, Europe and the United Kingdom.

I would like to thank the twelve contributors to this book. It has been a great pleasure to interact with each of them and to familiarize myself with their work.

I would particularly like to thank Edwina Welham for her support and encouragement, and Andrew Samuels for his friendship and generous advice.

Ann Casement

Introduction

Ann Casement

Post-Jungians Today not only reflects the pluralism and diversity of postmodern analytical psychology but also attempts to explore the place of Jungian concepts in the history of ideas. It brings together thirteen 'post-Jungians' from very different social, cultural and professional backgrounds, each of whom engages the reader in a dialogue about Jungian psychology as it is practised in a 'postmodern' world.

The term 'post-Jungian' is used here not simply to refer to those who have come after Jung, but to differentiate 'post-Jungians' from 'Jungians'. Post-Jungians are committed to developing further the original insights of Jung himself and include those who have moved away from a total emphasis on psychic reality to an approach that also takes into account the reality of the outer world. (Andrew Samuels explores these differences in a provocative chapter which opens the book.)

The title of the book is also deliberately chosen to link the Jungian enterprise to 'postmodernism'. The term stands for both a temporal and an intellectual relationship to a 'modernism' regarded as having its roots in the Renaissance and its initial flowering during the Enlightment. 'Modernism' was seeking ways to overcome a past steeped in superstition and ignorance and held out the hope of a promised land. Reason and logic were judged to be the keys to this utopian future. Postmodernism is sceptical of these claims for mankind's salvation, resting as they do on beliefs in an objective world underwritten by metanarratives such as those of Darwin, Freud, Einstein and Marx. Uncertainty, pluralism, debate, flexibility and changeability are central to postmodern thinking.

The post-Jungian, postmodern world of analytical psychology today is located in thirty different countries. (There are currently over 2,220 members of the International Association of Analytical Psychology, practising in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.) It is located in the academy as well as in clinical practice. An explosion of clinical and cultural interest in Jungian ideas has resulted in university appointments in analytical

psychology being made in countries such as Australia, Brazil, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. This usually involves sharing a department with psychoanalytic studies and the politics between the two disciplines can cause difficulties. In Germany, the UK and the USA, there has been a considerable degree of cross-fertilization between analytical psychology and psychoanalysis, but it has to be said that the initiative in this regard has always come from the analytical psychologists.

The Jungian academic at La Trobe University in Melbourne, David Tacey, who is a contributor to this book, initiated an international conversation between academics in a recent issue of the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1997). Tacey concentrated his initial article on examining the fanatical loyalty to Jung that he finds amongst undergraduate students and opposed this to the fanatical resistance to teaching Jung on the part of the faculty at his academic establishment.

Three academics in analytical psychology responded to Tacey and, in particular, took up the challenge of trying to undermine resistance to teaching Jung in the academy. Renos Papadopoulos (UK and previously of South Africa) pointed to Jung as a postmodern epistemologist; Roger Brooke (USA and, also, previously of South Africa) discussed presenting Jung as a phenomenologist; and Ann Ulanov (USA) proposed that Jung's perspective be seen as 'only one view' in a multitude of psychodynamic theoretical viewpoints. The overall message was that Jungian studies have to emerge from a ghetto mentality in order to survive.

Tacey's impassioned response is to say that to try to make Jung acceptable to contemporary intellectual taste is to miss the point that it is the religious attitude that Jung takes which sticks in the throat of the secular academy. Both academic resistance and student devotion to Jung must be seen essentially as a religious problem. One way forward would be to relate the post-Jungian discourse to the postmodern interest in the 'Other' which carries the possibility of a mutually fulfilling spiritual exploration.

Another academic initiative to be applauded is the generous donation on the part of the International Association for Analytical Psychology to underwrite a two-year 'Course in Basic Principles of Analytical Psychology' for the East European Institute of Psychoanalysis in St Petersburg. This was the original idea of two UK analysts, Jan Wiener and Catherine Crowther, and will entail a dozen senior UK analytical psychologists spending a weekend each teaching on Jungian topics in Russia. The three UK contributors to this book are amongst those who will be embarking on this enterprise in 1998, which will also involve follow-ups, continuity and reciprocal visiting rather than just 'experts' flying in to post-perestroika Russia to deliver lectures before flying out again.

As there are diversities within the analytical psychology world itself it would be useful to orientate the reader to the background of each of the book's contributors. Beebe, Kast, Kawai and Zoja have clearly emerged from a classical Jungian tradition but personal and cultural differences between them have lent each a unique style of working and writing. Their chapters provide fascinating

insights into grounding the classical approach in an American (Beebe), European (Kast and Zoja), and Japanese (Kawai) setting. Casement is a broadly based Jungian and an anthropologist, which is reflected in the sociocultural motifs that run through much of her work.

The work of Gambini and of Kalsched shares a mythopoetic archetypal quality. Kalsched's original combination of archetypal and psychoanalytical theory relates back to the dialogue that was happening between Freud and Jung in relation to the psyche's mysteries before their split in 1913. Gambini, on the other hand, is a soulful writer who demonstrates how anthropology combined with analytical psychology can be used to understand Third World problems from an archetypal perspective.

Samuels, Sidoli and Young-Eisendrath have emerged from what has been called by Samuels (1985) a developmental background in which psychoanalysis played a central role. Samuels, for his part, has become increasingly pluralistic over the years, while Sidoli's chapter presents a concise and authoritative exegesis of the work of the English analyst Michael Fordham. Young-Eisendrath has incorporated many other disciplines into her approach and, along with another of the contributors, Papadopoulos, gives an insight into postmodern Jungian identity, opening a door upon what it is to be a Jungian analyst in today's world. Papadopoulos comes from a varied background starting as a psychoanalyst and behavioural therapist before finally becoming a Jungian analyst and systemic family therapist.

Springer's approach exemplifies the Berlin tradition that emerged after the Second World War and resulted in neo-Freudian psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists interacting and working together under the same roof. Lastly, Tacey is doing inspiring work as an academic in the field of analytical psychology.

Part I of the book incorporates two 'think pieces' each quite different from the other. The first, Andrew Samuels' provocatively titled 'Will the post-Jungians survive?', sets out initially to define the difference between 'Jungians' (those who seek to retain a personal affiliation to Jung and his 'teachings') and 'post-Jungians' (those who wish to be other than only Jungian). As the term 'post-Jungian' was coined by him, Samuels is in the best position to define it and he does so as follows: 'a connection to and at the same time a critical distance from Jung'.

The alarmist tone of his chapter is a genuine expression of what he perceives to be a necessary response to the criticisms aimed at analytical psychologists in general, namely that they are non-clinical, have sexual relationships with their patients and are the cultist followers of a leader with Nazi sympathies and pretensions to being a demi-god.

However, the picture is by no means totally negative and Samuels points to a certain acceptance of post-Jungians in clinical, cultural and academic circles. An important reason for this is the changing view of the nature of knowledge in the postmodern world. Samuels also reiterates the point he made in *Jung and the*

Post-Jungians (1985) that Jung might be seen as the pioneer in numerous advances in psychoanalysis since the Second World War. His tripartite classification of the Jungian movement in that book is now in general usage. The three schools cited are the classical school, consciously working in Jung's tradition; the developmental school, emphasizing the importance of infancy in the evolution of the adult personality and also the clinical importance of a transference-countertransference-based approach to analytic work; and the archetypal school which concentrates on the exploration of images in therapy.

In Chapter 1, Samuels modifies his classification. He considers the archetypal school to have ceased to exist and adds two new schools to those of the classical and developmental models. The first is what he terms the 'Fundamentalists', who are devoted to following 'a' or 'the' Jungian way. Like all fundamentalists they have iconicized their 'leader', conferring on him and his sayings divine status, and they tend to be cruel and stigmatizing in their misuse of Jungian concepts in an unproductive and oracular way. For instance, in the way that typology is travestied by this particular view, 'extroverts' and 'intellectuals' are beyond the pale, although Jung himself was a 'thinking' type.

The polar opposite to the fundamentalists is a further school of post-Jungians who advocate a merger with psychoanalysis (hence 'psychoanalytic school'), often because of their disaffection with and denigration of their personal experience in the classical or developmental schools. This is frequently accompanied by an idealization of psychoanalysis as being clinically—some even claim scientifically—superior to analytical psychology.

Samuels attributes this split in the Jungian movement to the fact that Jung has not been properly mourned and as a result the movement is in a depression. Mourning Jung would mean getting beyond an idealization-denigration split in relation to him.

Samuels rounds off his consciously polemical piece with a ten-point Jungian charter, which includes the plea that Jungians should develop a relationship to outer-world issues such as politics and social and multicultural problems in recognizing that the spiritual and social are two sides of the same coin.

Further, post-Jungians need to join in the celebration of the postmodern approach to a knowledge base which involves a shift away from metanarratives, so that they can join in the cultural movement that is happening at universities and in society generally. A really vital contribution that Jungian psychology can make is its perception of the reality of evil. Another is the clinical excellence of post-Jungians in combining rigorous use of boundaries and transference-countertransference with vision and a search for meaning. The charter ends with a plea for lack of defensiveness and openness in the face of criticism from academe, the media, and so on.

Luigi Zoja's chapter, 'Analysis and tragedy', follows on from his book *Growth and Guilt* (1995), in researching tragedy for the roots of problems presented in analysis. He links the specialized form of narrative that happens in

analysis to that of tragic narrative in saying: 'The tale and its telling are the one true religion to which all of its personages, without exception, pay obeisance.'

Tragedy is not a stable form such as poetry and the novel but flourishes in some civilizations at the height of their splendour: Ancient Greece, Elizabethan England, German Romanticism and the Christian West. Discontent has accompanied the latter since its inception and Zoja's explanation is that it has committed treason against its cultural roots in Greek myth, mystery and tragedy and turned instead towards philosophy and rationalism. Added to this, Christianity betrayed its religious roots in adopting the new faith so that: 'Treason has thus remained in the genes of the Christian West, and in its tormented mind, no less than in its blood.'

Christian monotheism, biased as it is in favour of unilateral goodness, lacks the profundity of Hebraic monotheism and this gives rise to the twin persecutors of envy and guilt. Christian guilt is different to the *inevitability* of guilt in the Ancient Greek psyche which was a question of destiny and not of individual responsibility. Instead, Christian guilt gives rise to self-torture and psychological guilt. This lack of tolerance of opposites in both the Christian and Cartesian approaches is compensated in Jung's perception of an opposition between the two peoples, Christians and Jews. Paradoxically this view in its turn appears as one of his major errors.

Zoja links the way in which the tragic spirit views human beings as an inseparable mixture of good and evil that finds expression in ambivalence which is inherent in psychic functioning. It was in response to this inner need that analysis came into being and it is the modern age's means of providing a cure for unilateral modes of expression. Tragedy teaches that the human being is only a tiny instrument in the hands of destiny, just as analysis teaches that the human ego is in the same position with regard to unconscious forces. In this way, analysis presents itself as one of the few antidotes to modern hybris, which Zoja describes as the search for ever greater power *to do*. The analytic approach points instead to the need *to be,* in the course of which intentions but not emotions are suspended on the part of both patient and analyst, which can result in a kind of pure or tragic emotion.

Part II of the book is devoted to Jung's central concept of individuation or selfrealization with the two chapters in this section posing very different models of this process. John Beebe's chapter Toward a Jungian analysis of character', holds as its central thesis that the development of integrity which an analysis can facilitate is enough to help contain the continuing limitations of character that belong to the human condition. He first sets out to define 'character' as the notion of good or bad character and this is evaluated in terms of its moral impact. Beebe has explored 'moral process' in his 1992 book *Integrity in Depth,* and his chapter is part of his continuing work in this area. Moral philosophy, which was dealt a near-death blow after the twin horrors of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, is being revived in recent times as an interdisciplinary enterprise but has so far received little attention from analytical psychologists. He ponders the

relationship that this may have to the fact that the Jungian approach is held to be soft on character issues and that its limitations are nowhere more evident than in dealing with patients with character defects. For such patients: 'the narcissistic, loving, Jungian brand of empathy is judged to be very poor medicine indeed.'

One of the hazards about Jungian analysis is that the moral balance is biased towards the self rather than to others. In this way, an analyst's empathy may often be more directed to the patient's self and intrapsychic others than to the outer world of spouses, parents, colleagues, and so on.

However, the most fundamental danger in working with character disorder in the Jungian approach is the idea of *individuation*. The central theme of alchemy linked to the individuation process in Jung's work went beyond the idea of transformation of character in seeking to eliminate the problem of character altogether. In any case, character is a given and not susceptible to change and this can lead to its being left out of the analytic work altogether. 'However, what can individuate out of a person's character is integrity.'

Casement's chapter in this section is centred on an exploration of the dark side of the self. From this vantage point, she draws attention to the affinity between Kierkegaard and Jung as deeply religious philosophical thinkers and links the former's 'qualitative leap of faith' to Jung's process of individuation.

The emphasis in this chapter is on existential anxiety as the precursor of new life which Casement links to the archetypal trickster father. All fathers have ambivalent feelings for their offspring and it is the unconscious tricksterish side that is so often at work in propelling the child into life. She cites both Beebe's interpretation of the biblical story of Joseph and the coat of many colours and Kierkegaard's of Yahweh and Adam as examples of the subversive influence of the father. Both of these are linked to the problematic relationship that Kierkegaard and Jung had to their own fathers. The Freud/Jung rupture is also revisited from this perspective. The chapter ends with two vignettes (one personal) which illustrate how the work of individuation entails humanizing the archetypal aspect of the trickster father.

Part III is devoted to clinical issues and incorporates two chapters. The first, 'Archetypal affect, anxiety and defence in patients who have suffered early trauma', is by Donald E. Kalsched. He has pioneered a New York approach to synthesizing archetypal and object relations theory. In his introduction, Kalsched links archetypal anxiety with the 'unspeakable horror' of early trauma and the lasting anxiety it evokes in the personality, as described by various psychoanalytic theorists such as Winnicott's 'primitive agonies'. This threatens the core self with disintegration and leads to the creation of a false life which is trying to defend against a breakdown that has already been experienced but cannot be remembered.

In his attempt to reconcile archetypal theory with that of object relations and self-psychology, Kalsched casts a Jungian perspective on what psychoanalysis terms primitive defences. As he movingly expresses it, the archetypal meaning

of these is to act as life-savers for a person whose heart has been broken by trauma.

Kalsched is in agreement with Jung's assertion that dreams often portray traumatic anxiety and he illustrates this with nightmares from certain patients. Primitive anxiety is personified in these dreams in the form of daimonic images and motifs and these give insight into the 'unthinkable' affects of infancy where the environment was incapable of 'holding' the infant. These dreams often involve a confrontation between a dyad with one side personifying a tyrannical personality threatening the more vunerable, innocent one. This latter Kalsched sees as the personification of Winnicott's 'true self'. The struggle may be centred around issues of embodiment as patients in the grip of primitive anxiety often somatize their terror and may, for instance, experience difficulty in breathing.

The dream tormentor could be pointing to an actual abuser from the patient's past but Kalsched also images this persecutory figure as the dark side of the ambivalent godhead or self which has at its disposal all of the archetypal aggression that in other circumstances would have been directed to adaptation to the environment. In primitive anxiety, this aggression is directed against the self and the individual's immune system turns persecutory against any sign of new life instead of acting as a helpful defence against attack. Kalsched's chapter points to the creative use of play in the transference as a way of reconnecting such an individual to a transitional space that could not happen in infancy.

Mara Sidoli's chapter is the second clinical piece in Part III and is called 'Archetypal patterns, mental representations, and replicative processes in infancy'. This sets out to explore the connection between archetypes as organizers of experience, Michael Fordham's developmental model, and mental representation described by infant researchers such as Daniel Stern.

Sidoli starts with a brief summary of Jungian metapsychology and she makes it clear that she is using the term 'self' in the same way that Fordham uses 'primal self'. Both represent *in potentia* the totality of psyche and soma of the organism. This 'primal self' is intensely active in infancy when it is articulated through the deintegration-reintegration processes. Fordham adapted this usage of the term 'self' from Jung's concept of the 'Self' which also includes something of the divine hence the use of the capitalized 'S'. Jung saw archetypal activity, that is, the underlying organizing principle of experience, as located within the Self.

Sidoli discusses the bipolar functioning of the archetype in relation to the infant and says that the instinctual end is readily available at this stage, while the spiritual pole is there potentially but has yet to become available through the development of the capacity for symbolization. Replication is important in the emotional life of the infant in the way that it continuously experiences mother/breast as being present or absent. Within this matrix the baby can begin to acquire a sense of time and space and to develop emotionally. Where negative replication predominates then only negative aspects of the mother archetype become constellated leading to dysfunctional adaption on the part of the infant.

Part IV has two chapters, based on fairy tales, by Verena Kast and Hayao Kawai. Both of these analysts work in the classical style contained in the transferencecountertransference and it is fascinating to see this applied in the work of individuals from such diverse cultural backgrounds as Switzerland and Japan.

Kast's chapter, 'Can you change your fate? The clinical use of a specific fairy tale as the turning point in analysis', describes how she was drawn to the fantasy world of fairy stories in childhood and how they still play an important part in her work. She particularly values the way in which they speak in symbols and images and she defines symbols as a mix of experiences, psychic contents and emotions that cannot be represented in any other form. Each fairy tale has an archetypal motif which can shed light on individual problems and conflicts and, like Zoja above, Kast points to the narrative process as affording the possibility of a creative solution to conflict.

Kast also draws interesting parallels between fairy-tale motifs and transferencecountertransference reactions and illustrates this with an in-depth account of her analysis of a 37-year-old professional woman. The chapter winds down with her description of the fairy tale as a transitional object and of all stories as a transitional space acting as a reservoir of collective creativity through time and space.

Kawai, in his chapter, 'Splitting: resolved or reserved?', is uniquely placed to address this subject as a Japanese who has adopted many aspects of Western culture. He extrapolates the growing phenomenon of splitting and multiple personality disorder (MPD) from this kind of cultural identity problem which is greatly on the increase in the postmodern age. He warns against treating MPD by trying to integrate the different personalities as this can lead to renewed splitting on the part of the patient. As a result, he is against constellating the hero archetype in order to subjugate all of the other parts of the personality and he looks to fairy tales to provide material for alternatives to the modern concept of the ego.

The psychological mechanism of splitting leads to experiencing life as a half person and Kawai describes the motif of half persons in fairy stories from Japan and Italy. In explicating the latter he touches on similar ground to Casement with his idea of an individual being led into temptation through the voice of prohibition by a supraordinate power. He concludes that the world is full of half people, that is, people living with a split consciousness, and goes on to say that splitting not only brings about crises but can also help in negotiating them. In the therapeutic setting he warns that if the therapist seeks to *resolve* the split he may set up a split between himself and the patient with the two becoming polarized as the good therapist/bad patient. Kawai suggests instead that it is more helpful for the therapist to *reserve* or act as a container of the split. This can eventually lead to its transformation in the process of self-realization.

Part V has two chapters devoted to the theme of ethnicity, the first by Roberto Gambini from Brazil and the second by Renos Papadopoulos from the United

Kingdom. Gambini's 'The Challenge of Backwardness' is a profoundly moving but also disturbing chapter on the traumatic history of a country belonging to what is called the Third World. He uses the twin lenses of Jungian psychology and the social sciences to analyse the imbalance in his country's psyche.

Gambini's chapter encapsulates so much that gives the Jungian approach its depth and meaning, including the archetypal, the alchemical and the astrological. He turns to the latter in Jung's *Aion* to point to the convergence of the Renaissance and the Discovery (Invasion) of Brazil by the Portuguese in the year 1500. The whole 'discovery' of the New World represents an archetypal encounter of two contrasting parts of mankind which culminated in the climax of its achievement for one culture and the loss of the ancestral soul for the other.

The alchemical synthesis that could have happened between European and Amerindian ways of being was replaced instead by the domination of one polarity over the other. Brazil has no myth of origin and the myths that belong to the indigenous people, to do with incest, hunger, danger, and meaning in life, have been completely subjugated to the dominant European ethos. It is now for the analysts to do the soul work of rehabilitating the mythology of their native land. This is part of the individuating process where the quest is for the Other and, in the case of Brazil, the Other is the Indian—literally and symbolically.

There is reference to Lévi-Strauss's work with Amerindian myths and a plea to restore the repressed and denied Indian part of the Brazilian psyche to consciousness. In this way, the ancestral soul/anima may be revived and from the rich genetic pool or prima materia that makes up Brazil's population the alchemical quintessence may be extracted.

Renos Papadopoulos' chapter, 'Jungian perspectives in new contexts', extends the application of analytical psychology to work outside the consulting room and mainly to his work with Bosnian ex-camp prisoners and other victims of violence. He found that Jung's flexibility in understanding human suffering as not necessarily a pathological category as well as Jung's awareness of the fact that our psychotherapeutic approaches are essentially Eurocentric could provide a most suitable framework for this work.

Papadopoulos seems to have been able to apply creatively most elements of analytical work (e.g. focus on the unconscious communications and the symbolic meaning of the material, optimal therapeutic distance and stability of setting, transference-countertransference considerations, acknowledgement and containment of destructiveness) to his work in these contexts. He found that Jungian ideas such as archetypal possession and polarization, confrontation with the shadow and the concept of evil (not as an abstraction) were most useful in working with such victims. Above all, it is important for Papadopoulos to delineate as well as interrelate the psychological and political discourses which underlie these painful and complex situations, to avoid the violence of the one discourse over the other. One tragic consequence of such violation is what he calls 'psychologization of evil' which occurs when mental health professionals attempt to explain away atrocities by using clever psychosocial theorizing.

Two important points that emerge from Papadopoulos' chapter are that in applying the Jungian approach outside the consulting room there is a way to move beyond traditional one-to-one formal therapeutic practice whilst retaining the basic principles of analytical work. The other point he makes provocatively is that it could be more profitable for Jungians to let go of the 'Freud-Jung saga', which by and large has been the source of sterile bitterness and bigotry, and to find more appropriate comparative contexts with which they could grow in parallel. He mentions how the systemic approach, especially as it is applied to family therapy, could provide Jungians with such an alternative to Freud.

Part VI is about gender and comprises two chapters, Anne Springer's 'Reflections on female homosexuality', and Polly Young-Eisendrath's 'Contrasexuality and the dialectic of desire'.

Springer looks at the particular issues that arise in the transferencecountertransference when working with lesbian patients. One is that female Jungian analysts are often seen as more tolerant of homosexuality than their Freudian counterparts. Springer spells out the accumulated fantasies around this assumption, including the central one about Jungians being less preoccupied with the 'primacy of the phallus'. This kind of idealization can result in a split between a positive mother-daughter relationship versus a fantasized negative father-son one 'out there'.

However, Jung's depiction of female homosexuality was brief and only negative, seeing it as the result of a disturbed relationship to the mother or as an expression of animus obsession. Describing a negative mother-daughter relationship which led to the latter's forming a homosexual transference on to a female teacher, Jung writes: 'If tender feelings are thrown out of the door, then sex in violent form comes in through the window.'

Springer's own approach is to critique traditional Jungian concepts of masculine/ feminine in the light of the interdisciplinary discussion about the concept of gender identity that has developed since the mid-1960s. The current state of that discussion may be summarized by looking at four factors which interact with each other: core gender identity; gender role identity; sexual identity; and sexual object choice. The legitimate objective of analysis can be to help a female analysand to lead a successful life as a homosexual by working on disturbances in any or all four of these areas.

Further, Springer states that it is especially important with female homosexual patients to work in the transference through the aggressive-sadistic fantasies that are directed on to their own body. In confronting this kind of negative transference, the analyst can enable a lesbian woman to become emancipated from her own sado-masochistic impulses.

Polly Young-Eisendrath's chapter begins by relating Lacan's term 'alterity' to the Jungian concept of the archetype of the Other (capitalized to distinguish this use of the term from the interpersonal other). This sense of otherness precedes the notion of sexual otherness. It is the consequences of sex differences that are

addressed in this chapter—primarily concentrating on heterosexual desire but also touching on homosexual desire.

Young-Eisendrath makes the telling point that although her approach is broadly based—Jungian, object relations, neo-Piagetian, feminism, Buddhism, gender studies and clinical work are her sources of reference—there still remains for her a mystery about Otherness. She also urges further methodological research within the analytic field and increased interaction with other human sciences such as psychology and anthropology.

Jung's theory of opposites and, in particular, his description of anima/animus as biological consequences of the archetypal Feminine/Masculine or nature/culture has led to difficulties related to sexual stereotyping based on social prejudices. Young-Eisendrath has moved away from this way of thinking to a nonessentialist contrasexual approach in the clinical domain. She prefers not to apply preconceived categories of female/male to contrasexuality but to discover instead the meaning that individuals themselves bring to psychotherapy.

She points to the deadening impact of chronic envy on intimacy and sexual desire between a couple in her clinical account of just such a dead marriage. In this way, she illustrates her synthesis of object relations and Jungian archetypal theory in utilizing Kleinian concepts of envy, jealousy and idealization linked to Jung's transcendent function. The latter points the way to the possibility of opening up the psychic space between a couple that can allow for a reawakening of desire and intimacy.

This book opened appropriately enough with Andrew Samuels' chapter on postJungians as they are today and it seems fitting that it should close with a chapter dedicated to the work of James Hillman. Part VII is entirely taken up by 'Twisting and turning with James Hillman: from anima to world soul, from academia to pop', by David Tacey, Head of Psychoanalytic Studies at La Trobe University in Melbourne, who has been closely associated with Hillman.

Tacey suggests that Hillman has experienced at least four separate intellectual incarnations: as a Jungian analyst; as the leading exponent of 'archetypal psychology'; as a Neo-Platonist concerned with the 'soul of the world'; and as a popular writer with connections to the men's movement and the New Age. These incarnations are fuelled by two archetypal energies: that of Hermes which insists on openness, fluidity and complexity, combined with an anima emotionality which accounts for Hillman's extremism and dramatic reversals.

Tacey's own writing style is a match for the poetic brilliance of his subject as he follows Hillman through the twists and turns of the latter's fruitful career. The Jungian community appears to have largely ignored Hillman, with the exception of a few writers such as Andrew Samuels, and this is reciprocated on his part by the criticism that Jungians are not interested in ideas. In his latest book, *The Soul's Code* (1996), Hillman launches a diatribe against the postmodern and constructivist world and writes instead in praise of destiny, fate, providence, truth, vision, genius, daimon, claiming that these big nouns need rehabilitation. Doubtless he will be less than charmed to be included in a postmodern book!

Tacey's intention is not to condemn Hillman. He attempts instead to produce a balanced analysis of the work and the shift from a purist interiority to its opposite of 'social conscience'. As Tacey asks: 'Has the anima as shy, elusive, withdrawing Diana or Daphne been replaced by the anima as Athena, Goddess of the *polis*?' As a self-proclaimed puer, Hillman appears to personify the saying of that other archpuer, Oscar Wilde: 'Yet each man kills the thing he loves.'

In conclusion, while reflecting the pluralism and diversity of the post-Jungian world, the common thread which runs throughout this book is a concern with numinous experiences and the Jungian theorization of them. But such experiences are by no means other worldly or cut off from the lived world. Contrary to any supposedly exaggerated inner-orientation, the book demonstrates how postJungians today find themselves preoccupied with this-worldly issues such as atrocities, multiculturalism and gender issues. In this way, 'inner world savants' emerge as invaluable cultural critics.

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Part I

Think pieces

Chapter 1
Will the post-Jungians survive?

Andrew Samuels

Introduction

When people first heard or read the title of this chapter, they tended to wonder what would happen if the answer to the question 'Will the post-Jungians survive?' were to be 'no'. Would it merely mean that the 'Jungians' would survive? Or, if everyone nowadays is a post-Jungian, would it mean that no one at all connected to analytical psychology would survive? If the answer to the question were to be 'yes', would there still be Jungians surviving alongside the post-Jungians? Or would the survival of the post-Jungians mean the end for Jungians?

The ambiguity and nuanced tension of the relationship between Jungian and post-Jungian analytical psychology is not one I care to resolve simplistically either by bemoaning the fact that, unlike psychoanalysis, analytical psychology suffers from bearing the name of its founder—or, conversely, by regarding this as a special strength or feature of analytical psychology. Those who are proud to be Jungian often end by denigrating whatever is meant by post-Jungian, and vice versa. I share the frustration of those who want to be other than Jungian but can empathize with the conviction of those who seek to retain a kind of personal affiliation to Jung the man and what are sometimes referred to as his 'teachings'.

I do not know how seriously the actual question of survival should be taken. I want to sound an alarmist note because that is what I both feel and perceive to be necessary. Perhaps the title exaggerates the sense of being at a crossroads but, as Adorno once said of psychoanalysis, the important bits of the chapter may lie in the exaggerations.

At the outset, let me say something about the spirit in which I have written this chapter. Then I will move on to try to construct a sort of balance sheet for Jungian psychology worldwide, in terms of credits and debits. The third section will be a description of what has come to be called the 'post-Jungian decade', meaning the ten or more years since I published *Jung and the Post-Jungians* in 1985. From there, I will move on to try to say something about the convoluted, diverse, conflict-ridden, post-Jungian scene today. After that, I will discuss the

thorny problem of mourning Jung the man, which will be a basis for a discussion of whether we can make Jungian theory and practice truly 'good enough'. Next comes a section on Jung in the university. Finally, I will present, for debate and discussion, as much as any sort of blueprint for survival, a 'Jungian charter', and conclude by showing how I personally try to 'package' Jung.

As far as the spirit of the chapter is concerned, I need to apologize in advance for the number of generalizations it contains. Inevitably, I will do violence to precious and sincerely held individual differences. However, I believe that one can preserve individual differences via the use of *judicious* generalization. What I have to say is based on personal experience: my extensive travel to lecture in many countries, my friendships with Jungian analysts and candidates in many countries, connections with psychoanalysts in several of these countries, what I have learned from talking to academics in various disciplines.

I want to present in a public way, as frankly as possible, the kinds of issues that analysts usually discuss in private. The point is not whether I am right or wrong about these things, but whether readers have a sense of what I am getting at. Robert Musil once said: 'I am convinced not only that what I say is wrong, but that what will be said against it will be wrong as well.' So the spirit of the chapter involves error, all round. How *do* I feel about being Jungian? At the 1995 international congress of analytical psychology, I gave a presentation jointly with Polly Young-Eisendrath entitled 'Why is it difficult to be a Jungian analyst in today's world?' It is difficult, for reasons that I will explain. But I did not say that it was impossible. Being a Jungian analyst in clinical practice has provided me with an extraordinarily useful, flexible and rich basis for work in related fields—politics, social action and the like. And for that I am extremely grateful.

A balance sheet for post-Jungian analytical psychology

Let me move on to talk about the balance sheet. On the credit side, we would find the great cultural penetration of Jungian psychology in some countries, to the extent that it is scarcely possible to talk about women, men, marriage, soul, politics, without having some idea in mind that stems from the Jungian or post-Jung-ian corpus or tradition. This is an extraordinary success which has brought its own particular problems. Also on the credit side, I think we can discern a certain acceptance that has hitherto been denied to 'Jungians' in clinical, cultural and academic circles. It is not an open-armed welcome, but there is an open-mindedness, stimulated not only by the cogent arguments and improved behaviour of the Jungians but also by shifts in cultural process, and in how we understand both clinical work and the nature of knowledge itself in contemporary culture.

Another credit stems from the fact that analytical psychology operates internationally. I cannot stress too strongly how important it has been for Jungian psychology that there has been an international free trade in ideas and practices. In particular what are ironically called the 'frontier areas' for analytical

psychology are proving to be sources of all kinds of good ideas and creative energy. In the former communist countries, the Far East, Latin America and Australasia, postJungian analysts and scholars are doing and saying things which are valuable in direct proportion to their tendency to shock the old-timers in Europe and North America.

On the debit side, Jungian analysts cannot get round the 'Jung cult' argument started off by Richard Noll (1994) simply by attacking its author. The arguments of this book were rather flawed: Jungian analysis is not a pyramid selling system and clinical work does not depend in a tight way on one particular version of the theory of the collective unconscious. But there is sometimes excessive deference shown in Jungian groups to analysts in general, and to senior analysts in particular, a deference which it is quite often hard to justify in terms of the productivity and output of those individuals. I should perhaps observe that I myself have been the recipient, even the short-term beneficiary, of quite unwarranted positive and idealistic transferences, and I have to confess that sometimes I have not been sufficiently self-critical or assiduous in asking myself: am I riding a cultic wave here? There is also a gerontocratic problem, which definitely needs to be addressed. This means that something has got attached to seniority, chronological seniority, as much as professional seniority, which urgently needs critique.

Also on the debit side is the seeming inability of our particular branch of the psychotherapy profession to convince the wider public that Jungian analysts do not commit sexual misconduct any more than members of any other school of psychotherapy commit sexual misconduct. Twenty-five years ago, sexual misconduct was a definite problem in Jungian analysis. But we have put our house in order. Nevertheless, partly because of the legacy of Sabina Spielrein, Toni Wolff and Christiana Morgan—all analysands with whom Jung is thought to have had sexual relations—it has been hard to convince others that we are no worse than other schools of psychotherapy.

A further aspect of the debit side concerns what I see as the continuing inability of Jungian analysts to deal with the psychoanalytic 'dirty tricks' that are used against them. There is a history to this of course: Freud's secret 'committee', set up right at the beginnings of psychoanalysis to ensure that defectors were not regarded as serious contributors to the psychoanalytic endeavour. The legacy of that committee is the often remarked upon tendency for psychoanalysts utterly to ignore Jung's pioneering contributions (of which more in detail in due course) and what the post-Jungians have contributed as well. For example, a recent, absolutely excellent panoptic book by Steven Mitchell and Margaret Black called *Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought* (1995) contains but two references to Jung. They are, as it happens, quite positive references. For example, Mitchell and Black point out that it was Jung who anticipated spirituality as a serious psychoanalytic concern. But surely there were many more things in which Jung could be regarded as a pioneer? In *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (1985), I listed seventeen specific

advances in psychoanalysis since the Second World War in which Jung might be referred to as the prescient pioneering figure. My purpose in raising this again is not to complain but to suggest that this state of affairs deserves an entry in the debit columns of the balance sheet.

There is even some evidence that the situation is getting worse. In a recent review of a book by a Jungian analyst in the *International Journal of PsychoAnalysis,* written by a psychoanalyst in London who was previously a Jungian analyst, the reviewer objected to the whingeing, complaining tone in this book, and in other Jungian books, that said: 'Look at us. We thought about it first.'

Some Jungian analysts consider that this does not matter. But I do not have that degree of detachment and 'maturity'.

Similarly, in 1988, at the International Psychoanalytic Association Congress, the then President, Robert Wallerstein, gave a talk entitled 'One psychoanalysis or many?' (Wallerstein 1988). He concluded that they would really have to refer to 'many psychoanalyses'. So everybody was in: Klein, Kohut, British object relations, interpersonal, interactional, relational, feminist. But Jungians were not, because, Wallerstein argued, Jungians deny 'the facts of transference and resistance'. How does Robert Wallerstein know? Because he had read, and quoted extensively from, William Goodheart's article (1984) about Jung's behaviour in relation to his young cousin when he was doing the research work for his doctoral dissertation on occult psychology. Jung was 21 at the time. He had never heard of Freud, let alone become a psychoanalyst. This material was manipulated by Wallerstein into being a clear statement, or support for the statement, that Jungians reject the ideas of transference and resistance. What is particularly sad about this problem is that, instead of getting alongside our psychoanalytic colleagues, and defending depth psychology against the onslaught of the managed care revolution—and other antipsychotherapeutic moves in several countries—we are at each other's throats instead of standing shoulder to shoulder.

The public image of Jungian analysis is not good. In a way, this is strange. Books sell in the millions. But when one asks university students to play a simple associative game to the word Jung (and I have asked over 300), the overwhelming responses to the stimulus word 'Jung' are either 'Freud' or something referring to anti-Semitism, Nazism, Germany, Hitler. Archetypes come third, and mysticism, meant pejoratively, comes fourth. These answers suggest that we have an identity problem. Are we a profession? Are we a community? Are we a movement? Do we even have a settled history on which we all agree? The Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani has published a number of papers (e.g. 1990, 1995) which in effect make it no longer possible for the Jungians to agree on the facts of their history. Miss Miller, the pseudonym that Jung uses in Volume 5 of the *Collected Works* (1956), was not a pseudonym. There really was a Miss Miller who was not at all ignorant of the mythological and cultural material that at that time constituted Jung's version of the collective unconscious. Miss Miller

was a performing artiste whose speciality was dressing up as a member of an exotic ethnic group and reciting poetry germane to that particular cultural grouping. You could say that she knew all about the idea of the collective unconscious long before she had heard of Jung. Shamdasani has also shown that Jung's autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* is a drastically incomplete text, most of which was not written by Jung and which had chapters to do with Toni Wolff omitted at the Jung family's insistence. A major chapter on Jung's debt to William James was also omitted, which skews the perspective of intellectual history totally.

The post-Jungian decade

What does the tag 'post-Jungian' mean? I did not coin this term in the wake of 'postmodern'. In fact, it was a take-off of a well-known Penguin book called *Freud and the Post-Freudians* (Brown 1961). Maybe this was just my bit of the Jungian inferiority complex. (Or maybe it takes about twenty years since the death of the pioneer for such books to be written—twenty-one years for Freud, twenty-four for Jung (Casement 1985). However, I can now see that understandings of post-Jungian based on understandings of postmodernism do make sense because, just as one cannot possibly have postmodernism without modernity, one cannot have post-Jungian psychology and analysis without Jungian psychology and analysis. I meant *a connection to and at the same time a critical distance from Jung*. The key word is 'critical', and if I were to write my book again, and had completely free rein as regards title, I should like to call it *Critical Analytical Psychology*.

I needed to find a way of describing the field because what existed before as classification was so problematic. People used to talk about 'London' and 'Zürich'. But even in the 1980s and certainly in the 1990s there are what we used to call 'London' analysts in Chicago and in San Francisco, and there are 'Zürich' analysts all over the world who have never been anywhere near Zürich. Moreover, as there are four Jungian societies in good standing in the city of London, to refer to what goes on in all of them as 'London' is now semantically, and indeed in terms of politeness, quite impossible.

Another belief that I grew up on before I began working out the post-Jungian modes was that there was really a divide between the clinical and symbolical approaches to analytical psychology. I think Louis Zinkin got it right when he said that this division was a set-up, because no self-respecting Jungian is going to say that he or she is not 'symbolic' but rather 'clinical' (personal communication, 1983). And which practitioners would agree that they were not 'clinical'?

What I did in *Jung and the Post-Jungians* was to assume that all of the schools of analytical psychology knew about and made use of *all* of the ideas and practices available to them under the heading of Jungian psychology. My method was to say that actually there is a priority and weighting going on within each of

these rather different schools, which are connected by virtue of the fact that they are competitive with each other.

I also admitted that the schools are creative fictions, because there is a huge amount of overlapping, and that in many respects it was the patients who had constructed the schools as much as the analysts.

To summarize, I said that there were three schools: (1) the classical school, consciously working in Jung's tradition, with a focus on the self and individuation. I made the point that one should not equate classical with stuck or rigid. There are evolutions within something classical that are quite possible. (2) The developmental school, which has a specific take on the importance of infancy in the evolution of adult personality and character, and an equally stringent emphasis on the analysis of transference-countertransference dynamics in clinical work. The developmental school has a very close relationship with psychoanalysis, although the word *rapprochement* that is often used is quite wrong, because psychoanalysis does not *rapproche* with analytical psychology, whereas analytical psychology makes frequent attempts at *rapprochement* with psychoanalysis. (3) The archetypal school plays with and explores images in therapy. Its notion of soul suggests the deepening that permits an *event* to become an *experience*.

That, basically, was the tripartite classification: classical, developmental, and archetypal. Jung's colleague Joseph Henderson made gentle fun of me once at a conference in 1991. He said he really liked this classification, and he thought it was pretty much reliable, but he would like to assert that he personally was preclassical! I think what I produced in 1985 was reliable. But I also realize it was a provocative thing to have done, because of the Jungian investment in individuality and authenticity that is a characteristic of our tradition. Moreover, there is the folk history that we have got, which is that Jung was not interested in being a leader, so that any Jungians can do what they like, and if they do what they like they are really true Jungians. There are all kinds of slogans attributed to Jung ('Thank God I'm Jung and not a Jungian'). I thought this was just nonsense because I had no problem with Jung's being a leader and trying to influence other people. It is only a part of human nature, after all. I could see many ways in which Jung was a leader, many ways in which all of the schools could even be seen as aspects of Jung and his way of thinking, so, for me, there was no problem with an exercise in professional self-reflexivity which was probably needed at that time.

Undoubtedly, a shadow element of my own was present in the book—there was an Olympian syncretistic fantasy perhaps in doing a classification like that. I hope that the usefulness of it has over the years outweighed the shadow features. Actually, I did not write the book out of Olympian clarity; I wrote out of the confusion of being a recently qualified analyst who needed to understand what my elders and betters got so agitated and divided over. If there was a God over the book it was Hermes rather than Zeus.

In the book, and subsequently, I have taken a much less literal stance in relation to the schools. What I would say now is that within each Jungian analyst there is a classical school analyst, a developmental school analyst, and an archetypal school analyst. This means that it is potentially open to any Jungian analyst or candidate, or Jungian-oriented psychotherapist, to access a very broad spectrum of ideas, practices, values and philosophies which constitute the overall field of postJungian psychology and analysis. This enables us to salute the emergence of what I call now the 'new model Jungian analyst'. This is somebody who, because of the differentiating work that I and others did, is able to know when they work in any particular way which specific ideas and practices they are drawing on: classical (self and individuation); developmental (infancy, transference-countertransference); archetypal (soul, particular images). They can draw on all of them, some of them, and, as we will discuss in a moment, none of them. They can vary the mix throughout their practice; they can vary it in the analysis of an individual; and they can vary it within the confines of a single clinical analytical session. While I still think that I said something valuable on a factual, literal, scholarly, history-of-ideas level, I also think that the model says something valuable about the internal experience of being an analyst and the crisis of choice that today's increasingly well-educated analysts face in the clinical context all the time.

The post-Jungians today

I could stop here with everything seeming to be fine. But, of course, things are by no means fine—hence the title of the chapter. I want to move on to discuss certain problems that I see as afflicting and facing the post-Jungians today. What I want to offer now is today's classification of the schools of post-Jungian analytical psychology.

As I see it, now, there are four schools of post-Jungian analytical psychology. The classical and the developmental schools have stayed pretty much as they were. The archetypal school has been either integrated or eliminated as a clinical entity—perhaps a bit of both. But there are two new schools to consider, each of which is an extreme version of one of the two hitherto existing schools, classical and developmental. I call these two extreme versions Jungian fundamentalism on the one hand and Jungian merger with psychoanalysis on the other. The four schools could be presented on a spectrum: fundamentalist, classical, developmental, psychoanalytic.

Like all fundamentalisms, *Jungian fundamentalism* desires to control who and what is in or out. Hence it tends to be cruel and stigmatizing. One hears this sometimes in the assessment for training situation: 'He or she is not psychologically minded,' it can be said. Or typology is used to settle complex interpersonal, cultural or social situations in an altogether unproductive, oracular way. Intellectual women may get short shrift. Jungian fundamentalism denies its role in the market place—it tries to convince us that it just *is,* that it does not

have a persuasive project, looking for influence, like the rest of us. There is an attempt to deny this commercial aspect, including the financial aspect. Jungian fundamentalism stresses Jung the man and his prophetic and even, it is sometimes claimed, divinely inspired words. But what gets particularly stressed is how Jung lived. Sometimes this is called 'the Jungian way'. I abhor the notion of there being 'a' or 'the' Jungian way, but Jungian fundamentalism trades off it.

Jungian fundamentalism exaggerates our undeniable needs for order, pattern, meaning and a presiding myth. I am not saying these needs do not exist. I am saying that they are being exploited and exaggerated, and frozen or fossilized. Other features of human psychology, to do with its evanescent, shifting, antifoundational, anti-essentialist, playful nature cannot find a place in the Jungian fundamentalist *Weltanschauung*. Moreover, it is a worldview that tends to ignore everything else that is going on in psychotherapy generally, or in the worlds of ideas, politics, the arts or religion. I will never forget talking about Freud's famous case of Dora with a leading Jungian analyst, whom I would regard as a Jungian fundamentalist, and she said to me: 'Dora who?'

The positive aspect of Jungian fundamentalism is that there is something good and worthwhile in the idea of living in accord with psychological principles, and striving, perhaps against the odds, for authenticity of experience.

Let me move on to make a similar critique of the contemporary Jungian tendency towards *merger with psychoanalysis*. I wish to emphasize that I am not against Jungian usage of psychoanalysis, as in the developmental school. How has this tendency towards an actual merger with psychoanalysis come about in the Jungian world? First of all, I think it has often been based on something exceedingly personal in that many Jungians who have had classical or even developmental school Jungian analysis were not satisfied by their experiences therein. Hence their espousal of a Jungian merger with psychoanalysis may be based, in my view, on anger and on an idealization of psychoanalysis as being in some way clinically superior, as possessing exquisite and superior clinical skills when compared to ours.

This leads to Jungians themselves overlooking the enormous clinical contributions that have been made by Jungians. I am not making the usual complaint (referred to above) that nobody acknowledges that 'we' thought of it first. My complaint here is that Jungians themselves of the psychoanalytic school are not paying attention to certain ideas of ours, which are our birthright and our inheritance.

I think of the importance of the real relationship in analysis, the therapeutic alliance, and of the ineluctably interactional nature of analytical work. 'You can exert no influence unless you are open to influence.' 'The countertransference is a very important organ of information.' These are the pioneering statements made by Jung in the 1920s. Or there is the crucial non-literal understanding of regression in the clinical situation as implicated in processes of psychological growth and maturation; not necessarily regression to childhood in a literal sense but regression to a 'something else' that is difficult to name precisely. Or the role

of personification in the human psyche, which so many humanistic and transpersonal psychologists depend on for their work. What about the quintessentially Jungian idea that there are other styles of consciousness than ego-consciousness? Or the notion that there is a whole-of-life psychology—not just a psychology of the nursery, the first three years, the first six months, pre-birth, birth, whatever? The notion of a whole-of-life psychology would give us a framework in which to discuss some of the collective and cultural psychological issues involved in the major changes in the workplace and in connection with provisions of welfare and pensions currently taking place worldwide.

We should not forget that there is a Jungian hermeneutic approach to clinical material: clinical material comes alive *not* because of its causal nature, *not* because of a deterministic understanding of the predicament the patient is in, but because of the way in which meaning emerges from the tracking of one's past traumas and difficulties that goes on in analysis.

Too many analysts involved in the Jungian merger with psychoanalysis in some countries—Germany, Britain, the United States—have elevated the analytical frame over the analytical relationship, and sometimes have elevated a professional version of the analytical relationship, called transferencecountertransference, over any kind of attention being paid to psychological contents such as fantasy images. The analytical relationship is understood mainly in terms of the mother-infant dyad—what I call mammocentrism—in which nutrition, and the relationship of mouth and breast, or mouth and nipple, is regarded as the paradigm for understanding what is going on between the analysing pair.

In this psychoanalytic school, there is a flight from the analyst's disciplined use of self-disclosure to the patient of feelings, fantasies and bodily reactions to that patient. It is not merely fear of malpractice suits. We have actually gone quite deliberately in different directions from those which our tradition supports. We have adopted the psychoanalytic dogmas of neutrality and abstinence as rules to govern our work. This is what I mean by a merger with psychoanalysis.

I need to stress a positive point which I made above. I trained in the developmental school. It was different from any merger with psychoanalysis. It involved the use of psychoanalysis by Jungian analysts as Jungian analysts and not the merger of our identity as Jungian analysts with the larger and hence highly seductive one of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis learning from post-Jungian analysis

There may be ways in which a post-Jungian perspective could illuminate problematics within contemporary psychoanalysis. For example, there is an intense debate in psychoanalysis over the status of 'the baby' or 'infancy' when it comes to the understanding and interpretation of clinical material. Is the baby in the patient a flesh and blood baby whose observed experiences have cultivated and coloured (and perhaps caused) the main features of the adult personality with

whom the analyst is engaged? Or is it more a question of patterns and meanings, a hermeneutic justification for taking an mfantocentric perspective on clinical material? Or is the baby a symbol of rebirth and regeneration, a metaphorical baby as in one of the alchemical illustrations presented by Jung? Or a combination of the above? The question of what analysts are doing when they introduce or extend the patient's introduction of the baby is a perennial one.

Jung's idea of *amplification* may be unfamiliar to some readers. It was first mentioned specifically in 1908 in an essay in a collection edited by Freud (Jung 1908:186–8), in which Jung stated that he did not wish the process of interpretation to proceed 'entirely subjectively'. In 1935, Jung spoke of the need to find 'the tissue that the word or image is embedded in' (1935:84). There he made the claim that amplification follows a kind of natural 'logic'. By 1947, the value of amplification is to be found in the fact that it can enable us to reach, by inference, the archetypal structures of the unconscious mind which, by definition, are unrepresentative in and of themselves, must be distinguished from their representations in culture, and which can therefore only be accessed by means of techniques such as amplification.

As many other readers will know, amplification is a technique that involves the use of mythic, historical and cultural parallels in order to clarify, make more ample, and, so to speak, turn up the volume of factual, emotional and fantasy material that may be obscure, thin and difficult to attend to. Analysts wait for associations to dream imagery to reach its personal meanings. Amplification goes in the other direction. By amplification, the analyst enables the patient to reach beyond the personal content to the wider and/or deeper collective, cultural and social implications of the material. The patient feels less alone and can locate his or her personal neurosis within humanity's overall suffering and generativity.

For Jung, the method of amplification was also a means of demonstrating the validity of the concept of the collective unconscious. Jung's early understanding of the collective unconscious was that it consisted of primordial images which were, to a large degree, consistent across cultures and epochs. As amplification involved the assembly of parallels from diverse sources, it could be regarded as performing this evidential function. Present-day Jungian analysts, especially those touched by postmodernism and its eschewing of metanarratives, are far less convinced that universal and eternal images exist.

Let us return to the question about the epistemological status of infancy in the interpretation of clinical work. I suggest that the thinking behind the idea of amplification (not its classical use as a technique which can sometimes be overacademic) can be extended to apply to what analysts do when they interpret in terms of infancy. The ordinary, everyday procedure of interpreting the patient's material, especially the transference contents, in infantile terms may also be seen as a kind of amplification. This would be different from either hermeneutic or causal-positivistic appearances (whether hard or soft). Say the patient is upset at the analyst's forthcoming vacation. Whether the interpretation is pre-Oedipal or Oedipal, whether it is couched in terms of abandonment, envy

or jealousy, this may be seen as an amplification of the emotional content of relatively silent, ordinary material—as when the patient merely wonders where the analyst is going, without tears, pleading or symptom production. In addition, relating the material to general models of unconscious functioning and personality development has a very similar effect to that of amplification in its classical, Jungian sense: to expand the horizons and to deepen the patient's experience in the here-and-now, turning the events of analysis into experiences in analysis. More primitive and infantile layers of meaning may be uncovered and understood, leading to a reduction of the patient's sense of isolation and persecution.

Mourning Jung

Have we adequately mourned Jung? And what does that question mean? Obviously, one's feeling function says that one should honour Jung the person and focus on Jung as a great man, the fount of enormous wisdom, and the founder of a school of psychology and psychotherapy. But to focus on him too much and honour him too much is also a defect of the feeling function. If the feeling function is about balance, evaluation, judgement, then too much stress on Jung is as much a defect of feeling as an arrogant disregard and throwing over of the old man. I think we do have a mourning problem. We are not the only ones. It is not just us. The aforementioned Robert Wallerstein said, in the presidential address to the psychoanalysts previously cited: 'For so many of us, Sigmund Freud remains our lost object, our unreachable genius, whose passing we have perhaps never properly mourned, at least in an emotional fullness.' What an incredible thing to say, on the part of the same president who used crude tribal loyalties and outrageous misrepresentation of the facts to leave the Jungians out so that he could include everyone and get away with it! In 1988 he actually had the courage to say to his psychoanalyst colleagues that they had not properly mourned a man who died in 1939.

If we had not properly mourned Jung, we would be depressed. And I do think that there is a depression in the Jungian world today which makes it difficult for us to value ourselves sufficiently to open ourselves up to other psychotherapists and intellectuals generally. What would mourning Jung mean? It would mean getting beyond an idealization-denigration split in relation to him, a split that I feel still infects some of our thinking and indeed our practices.

Making Jungian theory and practice good enough

My enquiry here concerns whether or not we have dealt as well as we should with the well-known problems of Jung's elitism, sexism, racism and anti-Semitism—not in terms of Jung the man, but in terms of us, the Jungian analysts, with our own responsibilities. Not *his* problem, but *our* problem. The answer, in my view, is 'yes and no'. Things are on the move; there is a critical

revisionary spirit abroad. Let me give an example from my own work. I started to write about Jung and his anti-Semitism in 1988. It almost cost me my emotional connection to the Jungian movement worldwide. Initially people were very upset with what I had to say. There may well have been failures of style or of tact on my part to account for some of this, but it really was as if I had committed a major betrayal. (This material can be read in Chapters 12 and 13 of *The Political Psyche,* 1993a.) Nearly ten years later, the change in response is remarkable. Not only do people outside the Jungian world look more kindly on us (for it was not just me) for having addressed this issue; within the Jungian community there are even signs of gratitude and approbation for our having opened up this particular can of worms. Facing the shadow, as we know, often leads to productive outcomes.

Let me make one quick point here. It is not enough to say, when we look at Jung's racism, sexism, anti-Semitism and so forth, 'Well, he was just a man of his time'. The problem with that, especially in relation to the anti-Semitism, is that he wasn't. There was a wide acrimonious debate about what he was doing and saying in relation to Jews and Germans at the time. In 1936, when it was proposed to give him an honorary degree at Harvard, there were virtual riots. Henry Murray defended him. Gordon Allport, an equally great psychologist, attacked him. So it was not as if Jung could not have done anything else. People at the time knew that he had various options open to him.

Jung in the university

If there is any one setting wherein I see definite hope for the survival of postJungian analytical psychology, it is in the universities. We are currently witnessing a substantial increase of academic interest in Jungian and post-Jungian studies in many countries.

There are many possibilities. One concerns outcome studies and quantitative or qualitative approaches to issues of clinical efficacy. Most centres for depth psychological studies, as presently constituted and resourced, could not undertake the large-scale controlled trials that are required. However, I can see an interesting angle in a comparative and critical study of the various protocols or statements of intent that psychotherapy researchers usually set out in their published proposals or reports. We can explore from a meta-research angle some of the clinical assumptions (which, as Jung hinted, are usually images of a kind) that underpin the research projects themselves. The laying bare of these assumptions is of interest, not only in itself, but also in terms of the establishment of a series of outcome studies into the efficacy of long-term analytical psychotherapy. It is generally agreed that such studies are under-represented in the literature.

A second line of enquiry in clinical research concerns research into the clinical process. This would be mainly, though not exclusively, of interest to clinicians, and would focus, for example, on how practitioners employ the

theoretical concepts with which they are equipped, or on how responses to particular kinds of material with which they are confronted by patients are managed differently by different practitioners on the basis of theoretical orientation and personal variables (for example, sex and ethnic background of practitioner and patient).

A third possible avenue of research concerns (in general terms) overall practice issues such as the advisability and desirability of the practitioner explaining or describing to the patient the likely nature, evolution and progress of the process he or she is undertaking. Classically, psychoanalysis has been reluctant to offer explanations to the patient of therapeutic principles and prognostications for many cogent reasons. When I proposed (Samuels 1993b) that clinical practitioners might consider a controlled trial in which initial explanatory procedures were or were not employed, there was an interested response. A possible use of such research would also be in creating clear and reliable ways of informing the public generally (not just patients) about the scope and experience of psychotherapeutic treatments.

It has been argued that research in 'difficult' areas such as analysis and psychotherapy is entering a new era. Following quantitative and qualitative research, we are now in the stage of 'collaborative research'. This implies (but is not restricted to) involvement of patients in the research at every point and at every level. Feminist empirical research and oral historical research might also inform such a project, which would be congruent with the dialogical and dialectical traditions of Jungian analysis.

Many of Jung's central ideas underwent extensive revision in the course of his working life. However, because he was less concerned than Freud to systematize his thought, it is difficult to tease out the historical evolution of, for example, the theory of archetypes. The *Collected Works of C.G.Jung* often presents important texts in a manner that makes a historical/variorum reading very difficult. Hence in the university, as opposed to the clinical context, the mutable and historical elements within Jung's theorizing could be emphasized. Teaching of analytical psychology should include comparisons with analogous theorizing in all kinds of psychoanalysis (Kleinian, object relations, self-psychology, Lacanian and post-Lacanian, Laplanchian, etc.) as well as with humanistic and existential approaches. Moreover, there is a buried theory of group psychology in Jung's writings which can be recuperated and evaluated in comparison with psychoanalytic approaches to group processes. In many centres for psychoanalytic studies, a great amount of the research undertaken is of a historical kind. This acts as a salutary inhibition on any claims which psychoanalysis might make of a totalizing and universalistic nature.

Applications of analytical psychology in other fields might include explorations of possible intersections of analytical psychology with social and political theory and the general applicability of a psychoanalytic contribution to the study of political institutions and processes. I am interested, for example, in a multidisciplinary critique of existing models of leadership and citizenship and

also in an exploration of whether or not we may justifiably speak in terms of a psychology of social connectedness as well as of a psychology founded on notions of lack, rupture and castration. Work remains to be done on social aspects of Jung's concept of the 'psychoid unconscious'.

Then there is also a contribution that can be made by analytical psychology to literary criticism and the history of art. Analytical psychology can also make a contribution to gender studies, cultural studies and lesbian and gay studies. While the classical theory of animus and anima is often contested nowadays, there is increasing academic interest in how to explore images of men and women held by men and women, taking these as indicators of contemporary fears and fantasies. In post-Jungian analytical psychology, there is a good deal of work on theories of gender construction and of sexual difference, while Jung's rejection of the idea that homosexual sexual orientation is perverse or in itself pathological provides a useful basis for a contribution to the study of dissident sexualities.

Many Jungian analysts have hoped to deploy analytical psychology in a psychological account of the social phenomena of ethnicity and 'race'. I have to admit to some doubts about this. Instead, I would reframe the issue in terms of a consideration of the role of universalizing discourses within both analytical psychology and psychoanalysis in preventing the formation of transcultural approaches to psychology and psychotherapy.

Traditionally, analytical psychology has been of interest to academics working in the field of religious studies. My experience in several universities has been that this is where one might well find careful and critical readings of Jungian texts taking place.

Other possibilities for collaborative, multi-disciplinary work on applications of analytical psychology may exist in philosophy, law, anthropology and psychology. As far as psychology is concerned, my experience has been that there is still interest in Jung's role as the originator of the Word Association Test and of the theory of psychological types, as well as his influence on Henry Murray in the evolution of Thematic Apperception Tests and on projective testing generally.

A Jungian charter

Like so many charters, mine has ten points. If I appear to be putting this in a somewhat sloganistic and polemical vein, it is quite deliberate. My intention is indeed to put energic charge into this.

1 Post-Jungians should speak up for the link that exists between inner and outer worlds, especially in relation to what look like outer-world issues, such as political or social problems. We should build on the very good start that has been made in Jungian psychology in engaging with pressing issues in the world today. Michael Vannoy Adams' book on the raciality of the

unconscious, entitled *The Multicultural Imagination* (1996), is a good example.

2 The pressing contemporary question of multiculturalism versus universal monoculturalism engages virtually every Western democracy. Here, our ideas have enormous relevance; we are well placed to develop what I call a 'universal-enough psychology'. Judicious generalization leaves a place for individual difference and diversity. We must try to avoid our tendency to pre-define people's cultural experiences: Jews are…; Germans are…; homosexuals are…; Freudians are…. Instead, we might try to talk about the *experience of being* a Jew, a German, a homosexual, a Freudian. Can we be experiencefocused, rather than definition-focused? We are also going to have to learn not to do it in complementary terms, so that Jew and German, man and woman, straight and gay, Jungian and Freudian, all divide to either side of some sort of imaginary vertical line, and we get these suspiciously neat binomial oppositions. Complementarity and pre-definition won't help in the multiculturalism debate.

3 There is a general disillusion, at different levels of theory, with the notion of an autonomous, disconnected, separate self. There is a feminist critique of that self as being rooted in male pathology, and not having much to do with female health. But there is also an important political critique. Human selves do not have to struggle to connect with one another. They have the potential to be in a primary state of connection, of which patriarchal capitalist socie ties are very suspicious, because that state of primary connection is the crucial basis for the radical imagination, which the owners of capital, and the possessors of power, are rightly rather frightened about. I think that Jungian psychology can become a socialized transpersonal psychology, recognizing that the spiritual and the social are two sides of the same coin, a new kind of psychoid level of the unconscious. Charles Péguy, the French theologian of the nineteenth century, said: 'Everything starts in mysticism, but ends in politics.'

4 We should join in the celebration of the great cultural shift in our understanding of what knowledge consists of. Sometimes, although I do not like the term, this is referred to as the 'feminization' of science, or the feminization of knowledge. The subject-object divide, as the basis of the scientific paradigm, is increasingly being questioned. I think that not only Jungian psychology but psychotherapy in general is an epistemological or knowledge path that does not depend on this subject-object divide. So we can not only join in a cultural move that's going on in the universities and in society generally, we can lead it, because our very work has always depended on going beyond the conventional subject-object divide of classical Cartesian science.

5 'Multidisciplinary work is good for the soul.' Jungians should perhaps draw back from what I call the 'amateur expert syndrome'. A Jungian writer knows a lot about some obscure tribe, or one particular fairy tale, or one

particular mythologem, or subatomic physics, and appears, in the Jungian world, to be a big authority on it. But when you actually go out and find academics who are into fairy tales, or that particular tribe, or that particular myth, or mythology in general, or physics, what they have to say about the level of the sort of knowledge and sophistication shown by the Jungian is rather damning. I have had this experience in relation to my work on politics. What I would like us to do is to create multidisciplinary partnerships with people from other disciplines, so that we can contribute our psychological 'bit'. In my own work, in the field of political and social policy, my fantasy image is of a spectrum of experts available to any policy-making group, or politician trying to devise a policy. At one end of the spectrum we will find a statistician or an econometrist, or someone similar. At the other end we would have a depth psychologist, or therapist. One among many specialisms in a task of producing new ideas.

6 I think Jungian psychology could develop further its well-known moral perception of the reality of evil, but not in a foundational way. When two 10-yearold children throw a 5-year-old child out of the window, to cite one such case, we often think of the reality of evil. Could the notion of evil as a reality be used in a sober, serious, investigative way, alongside psychiatric and sociological observations? It is something I think we should be thinking about doing.

7 We should value our clinical excellence. Jungian analysis today combines rigour with vision, respect for the patient's aspirations, and a search for meaning. As long as we do it without prejudging anyone in terms of gender, class, religion, racial or ethnic factors, or issues of sexual diversity and sexual orientation, I think that Jungian analysis is certainly good enough.

8 We should get our hands 'dirty' by engaging in professional politics, locally, nationally and internationally. Let's stop complaining at the successful dirty tricks campaigns of other groups of psychotherapists and psychologists and mount some of our own.

9 It's time to stop moaning about attacks on psychotherapy, whether it is about the managed care crisis in the United States or a media onslaught in the UK. The managed care situation, in which insurers have declined to pay for longterm psychotherapy, is a disaster in one sense. But it is also a terrific opportunity for American Jungian analysts to redefine their professional identities, and also, in my view, to do something that will be good for their souls. The fees in the United States had got too high, and hence the incomes of some of the analysts had become too large. This was not just a Jungian problem, it is also a psychoanalytic one. It has to do with the professional self-image of the psychotherapists being aligned with the professional self-image and hence income expectations of gynaecologists, ophthalmologists, surgeons and the like. Is that really where analysts are, in terms of their location in culture and in society? Are we not in fact more healthily and usefully and accurately aligned with pastoral counsellors, ministers of

religion, social workers, academics, and so forth? I think that if fees are cut, people in the United States will continue to seek out Jungian and indeed other forms of depth therapy in spite of the fact that the bill is not being picked up—or at least not very significantly being picked up—by an insurance company. I would also say that we should do more than just cut fees. We need to think in terms of affirmative action for Jungian analysis because of the enormous costs of training and the perceived Eurocentrism of Jungian analysis for the patients.

10 I would hope that post-Jungians will be open to criticism by others, but I would also like us to be proud when that is appropriate. I would like to suggest that we think of ways in which the Jungian world generally—analysts, candidates, psychotherapists who are not analysts, and what is referred to as the lay public—could relax and enjoy each other more. Eros could be brought into our institutions wherever possible, without our forgetting or denying that the human tendency to compete is somewhat incorrigible.

Packaging Jung

I mentioned above my little association experiment with university students, in response to the word 'Jung'. As a conclusion to this chapter, I want briefly to recount my approach to the study of those themes that figured so prominently in the replies to my request for associations to 'Jung'. With regard to the relationship with Freud and its aftermath, I have tried to show (1) that there was a pre-Freudian or non-Freudian Jung (for example, we can see this in his Zofingia Lectures of 1895); and (2) that there is that striking phenomenon to observe in which psychoanalysis takes up and renders consensual many ideas and practices that were controversial when first introduced or theorized by Jung. I do not do this in a spirit of showing Jung to have been a prophetic 'genius'. The intellectual framework has been a study of the way in which, within a profession, ideas and practices are sorted into hierarchies on the basis of affiliations and involving issues of power and leadership/discipleship. In other words, the proposition that psychoanalysis has taken on an increasingly 'Jungian' cast is presented in terms of the history of ideas rather than as a 'good result' for the Jungians. I consider competition, envy and the distortion of opposing views as motors of intellectual production within the field of depth psychology.

As far as the allegations of anti-Semitism and Nazism are concerned I have made an extensive study of the whole issue, involving many publications that present new historical and archival material (Samuels, 1993a). Succinctly, I believe that the critics of Jung are right to ask of contemporary analytical psychologists that they explore this particular part of the history of their profession. I conclude that, by doing this, analytical psychology can not only re-establish its ethical credentials but that there is much in what Jung was attempting, with disastrous results in his own personal case, in the psychological

study of nationalism, national psychology and cultural psychology that could form part of a contemporary approach to these issues. While there are important differences, I also think that the point made by philosophers and historians of philosophy concerning the need to continue to study Heidegger's texts (both in the context of his Nazi affiliation and, so to speak, relatively independently of that context) applies to analytical psychology and Jungian studies. In both instances, one task is to examine the degree to which involvement in the social events of the 1930s influenced the thinking of the two men.

As far as the notion that Jung was a 'mystic' or adhered to an 'occult' way (or even, as has recently been argued, that he started a 'cult') is concerned, and as hinted at in this chapter, I tend to approach this notion from the point of view of changing attitudes to epistemology and to support it with understandings gleaned from the history of science. Jung's approach to psychology challenged the observer-observed divide and foregrounded 'subjectivity' in the research process. I do not see him as the empiricist he claimed to be. Rather, I see him as fostering a systematic analysis or self-analysis by the observer of his or her responses to phenomena in the experienced world. Contemporary clinical theorizing about the analyst's countertransference greatly extends Jung's 'scientific' study of subjectivity leading to the possible usage of such an approach in relation to social and political thematics (cf. Samuels 1993a: 24–50).

Another problematizing response to 'Jung-as-mystic' has been to explore why the very idea excites such strong negative responses (save, perhaps, within departments of religious studies). We can see that the secular world has not completely evacuated religious responsiveness which we observe emerging in the West and beyond in the (widely differing) forms of religious fundamentalisms on the one hand and the 'New Age' phenomenon on the other. 'Spirituality' seems to be what many students want to study and I confess to not yet having evolved a complete answer to the problem of how to address this from the standpoint of post-Jungian analytical psychology.

Perhaps this is a fitting note on which to end: a note of bafflement on the part of one who, in spite of the rigorous thinking and passionate feeling that has gone into the post-Jungian project, still cannot clarify what his relationship to Jung has been, will be, or should be.

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Chapter 2
Analysis and tragedy

Luigi Zoja

I was born in 1943. My secondary schooling, in Milan, was in classical studies, and my university degree, again in Milan, was in economics and sociology. But in 1968, at a time when many others were ever more earnestly committing themselves to sociological endeavours, I left this field behind me and enrolled at the Jung Institut in Zurich.

I received my diploma in 1974 and then remained in Zurich for another four years, working at a psychiatric clinic. I returned to Milan in 1979 and have worked there ever since as a privately practising analyst. I have served several terms as president of my national association, the CIPA, and am at present vice-president of the international association, the IAAP.

During the initial phase of my activity, and especially in my period of employment in Zurich, my interests were mainly directed towards clinical problems. But in the course of the last ten to fifteen years, my interests have come to centre on the anthropological aspects of analytic psychology, with particular emphasis on precisely that field of classical literature, history and mythology to which I had remained so indifferent at school.

Two of my books have also appeared in English: *Drugs, Addiction, Initiation* (Sigo 1989); and *Growth and Guilt* (Routledge 1995), which hinges on a study of the Greek roots of Western culture. At present 1 am working on an essay on the theme of the father, partly as seen through the figures of Hector, Ulysses and Aeneas. In the course of my research, I also continue to gather material on tragedy, especially ancient tragedy, since this genre of literature seems to me to deal with problems that are not very far removed from those which the analyst has to face. The following reflections are a first and partial approach to this theme.

What is analysis? A 'talking cure'? That's hardly an answer. Would a 'talking cure' be a specialised form of therapy (a particular kind of 'cure'), or a specialised form of narrative (a particular kind of 'talking')? In the latter case, would it constitute an autonomous form of expression, like poetry or the novel, theatre or the cinema?

The answer to such a question can be highly complex, or extremely direct. At the cost of risking an over-simplification, let's choose the second course.

The analytic narrative abandons allegiance to the modes of clarity and rationality that hegemonise our times, and the words of the language through which it finds expression are obscure but highly charged, and capable of explaining a great deal more than words that promote clarity while remaining irrelevant to the affects. It constitutes a world of its own. Its codes of expression and its contents belong to itself alone, and they are governed more by principles of drama than by principles of grammar.

Such a genre is quite different from the forms of narrative to which we commonly turn our attention today, and indeed can be seen as their complement; but it is not without precedent. As a discipline of knowledge, analysis finds its roots in the vast developments that took place in the field of psychiatry in the nineteenth century; but it descends as a form of expression from a much more ancient ancestor: the tradition of tragic narrative.

Rather than any of its heroes or gods, the true protagonist of tragedy is the narrative itself. The tale and its telling are the one true religion to which all of its personages, without exception, pay obeisance.

The characteristics which have always signalled the difference between tragic narrative and the other genres of expression are on the one hand highly obvious, while also no less mysterious than the meaning of tragedy itself. One notes, for example, that poetry, romance and the novel are stable forms, in the sense that they never die out once having come into existence, whereas tragedy appears and flourishes only in extraordinary epochs, and not even in all such epochs. It clearly finds its nourishment in the spirit that enlivens such times, but one cannot say how. It arises in civilisations which stand at the height of their splendour: in the Ancient Greece of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, in Elizabethan England, in the France of Racine and Corneille, in the Spain of Calderón, and in German Romanticism, but not in the Italian Renaissance.

There is another sense in which tragedy is utterly autonomous: it is not a genre of expression that comes when one calls for it. It is not a continuation of day-to-day forms of expression, and the kinds of questions to which it replies are not consciously posed. One cannot sit down at a writing desk, command it to appear, and then proceed to compose it in the way in which a novel, in the final analysis, allows itself to be composed. A novel is the work of its author, whereas tragedy appears to be the work of an invisible tragic spirit: its author is only a chosen mouthpiece, charged with the task of declaiming it to a public, which in turn must also be chosen for participation in the tragic spirit. Despite its invisibility, the tragic spirit often assumes the guise of the spirit of a time and a place, or of a *genius loci* which controls and inspires both an author and a public.

Tragedy knows no modesty. It presents itself through great names and in great times, or it doesn't present itself at all. In spite of numberless studies the real reason for such a fact remains a mystery, The very notion of tragedy seems however to laugh at our distress, declaring that tragedy is the celebration of mystery.

The Christian West—to which we belong even if as well we are Jews, Muslims or Buddhists—is the most self-critical civilisation history has ever known: it is charged not occasionally with discontent, but *always*. This phenomenal sense of permanent discontent concerns analysts no less than historians, and analysts ought to propose explanations for it.

Like Peter after the crowing of the cockerel, the Christian West suffers from feelings of guilt and remorse. Like Peter before the crowing of the cockerel, the Christian West has committed treason. But, unlike Peter, its treason was in no way circumstantial: its treason is synonymous with its very birth.

The West betrayed its Greek cultural roots by joining the revolution that turned it away from myth, mystery and the tragic spirit, impelling it instead towards philosophy and rationalism, as Nietzsche describes throughout his work, but especially in *The Birth of Tragedy*. And it betrayed its religious roots through the very fact of its adoption of the new faith. The first Christians—whether Jews or Pagans, Greeks or Romans—were in any case heretics and apostates: the convert, universally, can know no other destiny.

Treason has thus remained in the genes of the Christian West, and in its tormented mind, no less than in its blood. Christianity has even insisted on the nature of the act that founded it in its celebration of the anti-religious rites that Dostoyevski describes in his story of the Grand Inquisitor: the Grand Inquisitor condemns the Christ who would hope to return to Earth and supplant the tolerable compromises of the Church with His own intolerable purity.[1] This, I believe, is the source of the Christian image of Judaism as wholly compact and self-consistent: the people and the faith are a single entity, and the faith remains the same throughout the whole of time. As long as the people exist, the faith exists. In this sense, the Christian (even the secular, non-practising Christian) always regards the Jew (even the secular, non-practising Jew) with eyes that are charged with admiration; and this truth remains unchanged even when admiration lapses into envy, and envy into persecution.

We 'Christians', on the other hand—quotation marks are obligatory, since a status as a people isn't felt to be enough to define us, and the spirit that might define us has long since taken flight—are always plagued by the knowledge, in some corner of the soul, that we find our origins in those two betrayals: the rejection of the tragic wealth of ancient myth in favour of the simplifications of monotheism; and the rejection of the terrible profundity of Hebraic monotheism in favour of the unilateral goodness of Christianity.

This corner of our souls may also perhaps contain a sense of guilt for having abandoned a view of the world which was much more fearsome, but also, in many ways, more true, since it more completely corresponds to the profound difficulties of living. If this is the case, our discontent can no longer be remedied, since the whole world has grown unilateral, everywhere pursuing this analgesic simplification and this impossible notion of universal goodness. This feeling of culpability finds its manifestation in a 'Christian' ethics and education which

distance from Christ and revolve around guilt: the sense of guilt is the very foundation on which they have been constructed.

All of this is at odds with psychology. If the presence of guilt in external, practical life is eternal and *inevitable,* what sense can there have been in the introduction of the notion of forgiveness? What sense can it have had to free ourselves from the ancients' myths, mysteries and sense of tragedy—such enormous treasures of the soul—if instead of creating choice we return to instituting guilt, again denying the soul an original condition of freedom? Can we truly avoid the suspicion that it might indeed have been better to hold to the course of the preChristian spirit of Greek pessimism? That spirit, indeed, included guilt, but revolved around its *inevitability,* which in turn forced the individual immediately to come to terms with it. Guilt was a question of destiny, and not of individual responsibility: there was nothing for which to ask to be forgiven, and nothing that inspired a *sense of guilt,* as we understand the term today. Guilt was an inward evil, and an integral part of life, just like external evils. Imprisonment in the category of moral guilt, and in all the self-torture that stems from it, is on the other hand a psychological 'guilt' —a psychological 'sin' —on the part of the Christian insistence on morality, and it reveals the way in which tragedy, nominally dead, continues to guide us along our path. Such invisible 'tragedy' derives from the demise of visible tragedy: one can suppress the literary form, but not the state of pain and laceration which it narrates. That state is a part of the soul's original condition.

The figure of Jehovah, often absurd and implacable, as we find him in the Old Testament, still preserves many of the characteristics of the ancient pagan gods: terrible and ambivalent, but profound. With Christianity, such characteristics tended to disappear as the divinity grew more rational, foreseeable, loyal and fair —from human points of view—and unilaterally good. The merits of C.G.Jung also include the distinction of having drawn attention[2] to the fundamentally different ways in which these two different notions of divinity affect the collective mind, both conscious and unconscious; his having couched this perception in terms of an opposition between two peoples, or even between two races, will likewise appear on the list of his major errors.

Christianity—and especially Roman Catholicism, its original and still most widespread form—shows no toleration for opposites that forever intertwine, the one around the other. It tends to resolve them with a unifying synthesis, with a goodness that transcends them, with a dogma, with its election of the image of the shepherd who lifts the burden and torment of choice from the shoulders of his flock. This Christian path—Christian and Cartesian—leads towards rationalisation, simplification and peace, even in spite of Christ's admonition, 'Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword' (Matt.10:34). Such a path is in every way similar to the course pursued by the natural sciences with their clear and distinct pronouncements of yes and no, with their fixed and forever-established truths that rout and abolish ambivalence.

Yet the original ambivalence of the inner life finds constant reformulation in life itself, and especially in the ways in which life is experienced by metropolitan humanity, ever more thoroughly abandoned by God, in our complex modern world.

The line of descent from Descartes to the modern individual is not entirely straightforward. After the triumph of the Age of Enlightenment—or indeed of light, *lumière,* in the language of those who invented the Enlightenment—the human individual expected to find him or herself definitively at ease in the world, and thus to proceed with ever more speed towards rationality and modernity. But instead we were forced to realise that a world made entirely of light, without shadows or *chiaroscuro,* could be a place of enormous suffering. This realisation was the prelude to the birth of Romanticism, which appeared with considerable emphasis: a paean to the night as opposed to the day, to irrationality as opposed to reason, to mystery as opposed to knowledge; a rediscovered love for savage nature as opposed to the urban environment, for primitive peoples and their sense of magic as opposed to European needs for a world of predictability. It was likewise rediscovered that the individual consists not only of consciousness, but also of unconsciousness. This perception found its first formation in German Romanticism (in a language with a penchant for depth, and even at times for obscurity, just as the language of Descartes loves clarity and linearity). And then, since this rediscovery of darkness was a movement of great profundity that did not wish to remain confined within the halls of speculation, it descended into the real experience of life, into the world of real ambivalence that continues to torture our nights, in spite of the lives we live by day. It is here that we discover the birth of psychoanalysis.

The manifesto of this new perception of complexity was Faust's exclamation: *Du bist dir nur des einen Trieb bewusst,/O lerne nie den andern kennen!/Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust/Die eine will sich von der andern trennen* ('You are aware of but a single drive,/And may you never know the other!/Two souls, ah! live within my breast/The one would take its distance from the other' (*Faust,* Part I, *'Vor dem Tor'* 1, 1110–13).

Bleuler lifted the Faustian split from the complex world of poetic imagery and transformed it into a psychiatric concept, inaugurating the use of the notion of ambivalence.[3] Psychoanalysis was an essential part of this general cultural revival, and especially in the case of Jung, who was Bleuler's major student at Burghölzli.

It is said that those who do not know their history do not know themselves; and if we analysts are less than clearly aware of belonging to this great historical current of thought that turns new attention to the soul, we too might be accused of an insufficient knowledge of ourselves and our profession.

So, psychoanalysis had to be invented in order once again to give a space to obscurity and profundity. These are things of which the modern man would no longer like to have to bear the burden, but they check his every intention to throw them off, and doggedly continue to pursue him. Psychoanalysis had to be

invented in order to reconstruct a place where mystery might again be a sacred guest rather than always an enemy, always to be slain.

The obscurity, depth and complexity which our souls can never definitively resolve find manifestation not only in the terms of Bleuler's notion of ambivalence, but also in the two forms of thought described by C.G. Jung.[4] Basically, morality, law, science, politics and a large area of philosophy are all concerned with the part of us that shapes clear thoughts, and which is gifted with the faculty of choice. Analysis, on the other hand, is left almost entirely alone—even religion is more than content to desert this field—with everything within us that is paralysed by ambivalence, hypnotised by mystery, and fearfully immersed in eternal contemplation of the uselessness of all the greatest efforts of the will. This portion of ourselves is far from small or insignificant. Most of us seem indeed to pass directly from a womb to a tomb with few clear thoughts in between, and never having chosen anything for ourselves. Most of the few of us who exercise some faculty of choice in the course of our lives seem only to do so at crucial moments.

Ambivalence is the rule of the way our psyche functions; whereas choosing and taking a stand on things constitute the exception, an exception that finds its birth in very great pain. So, ambivalence is the original condition, still mantled with primal confusion; and Freud quite justly noted that ambivalence grows increasingly stronger as we shift our eyes to the individuals of ever more primitive cultures.[5] The frame of mind and the narrative form which directed their attention to this far from tiny part of the human being were referred to as tragic. We find their beginnings in ancient epic and their first culmination in the Greek tragedies, true and proper.

The tragic spirit sees the human being, from the moral point of view, as an inseparable mixture of good and evil—not good and evil by turns as a result of some conversion, but always both, at one and the same time. In terms of will and the drawing of mental distinctions, the human being is eternally trapped in ambivalence: we desire a thing and its opposite not in successive moments, with one desire supplanting the other owing to a change of ideas, but simultaneously.

Since the era of classical antiquity, tragedy has suddenly reappeared in various epochs. But on the whole, it receded to an ever greater distance in the course of history, and was finally abandoned in favour of more modern and optimistic forms of narrative. The tragic spirit was deposed to make room for other attitudes, increasingly influenced by science, which was assuming ever more importance and taking the place of religion; these newer attitudes were therefore much more positive and more concerned with objective fact. But since the human being continued all the same to experience ambivalence, we found ourselves with the need, in the very midst of the modern age, to invent a new form of narrative through which to give expression to ambivalence. This is why analysis was invented: for the purpose of providing a cure for the unilateral modes of expression that typified the modern age, and not for the purpose of providing a cure for psychic disturbances which had always existed.

When we take a close look at the tragic myth of Oedipus, we have to conclude that the great discoveries of Sigmund Freud have little to do with this hero. As I attempted to show in a former publication,[6] the hero of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* is not afflicted by a sexual problem, but by a problem of knowledge. Oedipus wants to know his origins, as would surely be natural in any epoch. Yet he lacked a likewise natural respect—natural at the time of Sophocles—for the residue of mystery that lies around the question of origins, no less than around the question of the final purposes of life: a residue of mystery which rational thought can never eliminate. Oedipus attempted to apply the abilities of a modern police detective to the task of the reconstruction and clarification of all the events connected with his birth. Instead, he made the acquaintance of the mystery and tragedy that lie behind every human life; the drama tells us quite literally that blindness, rather than clarity, lay at the end of his path.

We are finally faced with the kind of victory that a tragic destiny typically achieves, with all its derision of the trivial will of men. To understand the drama of Oedipus we have to understand this logic, and we have to attempt to remain within it, accepting its internal completeness and total self-consistency. If we imagine. for example, that blindness was a punishment for an error on the part of Oedipus, we have already missed the mark and entered the sphere of a much more modern logic: the logic of Christian morality, and of the scientific notion that effects are always provoked by causes. But the triumph of blindness is the triumph of the realm of mystery. At the beginning of *Oedipus Rex,* only Tiresias, the wise man, is blind: blind and limited. At the end, Oedipus too is blind, who had previously derided Tiresias, calling him the seer who could not see. Oedipus has reached and accepted the limits of knowledge, and they have brought him to a form of natural wisdom.

Those who struggle for clarity alone—as in the case of Oedipus, the hero of rationality—finally turn out to be ever more exhausted voyagers, since they are always ever more distant from a port: every clarification brings the formerly unsuspected need for another in its wake. Those, instead, who accept the realm of mystery are like a sailor who has reached a shore: it is fearful and dark, but land lies solid beneath his feet.

Tragedy insisted that the human being, even when we think ourselves to be exercising the faculty of choice, is only a tiny instrument in the hands of destiny, just as analysis teaches that the human ego is basically only a tiny instrument in the hands of unconscious forces. Tragedy couches this statement not only by way of its contents, but also by way of the fact of its very existence or non-existence: in the sense that its manifestation is not determined by its author. And just as tragedy, unlike other narrative forms, is independent of its author and controlled by a tragic spirit far too profound to be identified, it is in much the same way that analysis, unlike traditional medical therapies, is not controlled by the therapist, but by forces too unconscious to be truly guided. Like destiny again, such unconscious forces (we prefer to use 'unconscious' as an adjective, since we don't want to formulate a metaphysics, but only to describe the desperate

limitations of our forms of knowledge) use all the facets of ambivalence, and all the daily manifestations of tragic impotence, as tools with which to guide our lives, revealing such things to supplant us, and leading us to face the fact that they are vastly more powerful than we are.

The moments when we imagine ourselves to be in the act of making a choice are often, in fact, the very same moments when we are smallest, weakest and most entirely damned. We imagine our mental clarity to have vanquished the human passions, and in fact remain in the grip of the most treacherous passion of all: *hybris,*[7] the arrogance that makes us blind, or, more precisely, that makes us incapable of perceiving the proportions and limits of everything human, *Hybris,* moreover, is the only sin which is common to all religions. It is also the only sin which is common to every epoch: a sin both religious and secular, natural and cultural, ancient and modern. It is the sin of pride for Jews and Christians, the sin of the illusion of action for Buddhists. It is the endless multiplication of needs which offends the laws of nature; and it is the arrogance of the individual which offends the laws of society. The ancients saw it as a sin against the equilibrium of nature; in the modern age it is a sin against the principles of psychic equilibrium (the *hybris* of consciousness, the absurd and pretentious demand that everything which takes place in the psyche be conscious and free from mystery[8]). This final sin closes the circle, bringing us back to antiquity, since Oedipus suffered from a cognitive arrogance of precisely such a nature.

With its condemnation of *hybris,* tragedy had already taken up the task of teaching a form of modesty that corresponds to what modern psychoanalysis refers to as the reality principle. *Hybris* is the insolent conviction that one can deal as one sees fit with the laws of destiny and the forces of the psyche. It is the arrogance of the man who believes himself able to substitute himself for God; in the governance of the inner world, since he decides to guide the emotions with the will, and thus to control the autonomous life of the soul; or in the governance of the outer world, since he takes on the part of God in the administration of the truth, and often, as well, of life and death. The incredulous horror inspired by the acts of political terrorists lies less in the sight of so much blood than in the sight of their omnipotent stupidity. Whenever an assassin has thought himself able to reach a rational decision on how best to change the course of history, he has always, instead, unleashed an unforeseeable series of passions of infinitely greater complexity than the workings of his simple intellect.

In general, *hybris* is the naivety of the person who pursues his courses of action in an attitude of idolatry for his own decisions. The vast mistrust with which most of the Western world regards its politicians has less to do with disinterest, or with preferences for other politicians, than with a feeling of diffidence for all the incurable *hybris* of people who wield power.

Our times present us with still another paradox. As a form of narration, tragedy has disappeared. But the tragic narrative found its subject in *hybris,* and presented a parable on the ruin and uselessness of arrogance. And *hybris* today is more widespread than ever.

How is all of this reflected in analysis? 'How' is difficult to say. And yet it is reflected constantly. Analysis might be defined as an attempt to become more conscious through a continuous act of self-criticism: a slow labour of deconstruction on all the ingenuous attitudes of omnipotence that we carry within ourselves. But a constantly growing consciousness can itself be tempted by omnipotence, like the frog that mistakes itself for a bull.

The analyst sails between Scylla and Charybdis; the patient is plagued by a lack of self-confidence and the analyst has to help the patient back on to his or her feet; but the analyst must also help the patient to put on the brakes when he or she is possessed by the frenzy of consciousness, by the arrogance of analysis for the sake of analysis. The analyst has to remind the patient, as it is put in the New Testament, that 'whoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted' (Matt, 23:12; Luke 18:14, etc.).

It's precisely here, however, that we find the greatest danger, for the analyst as well as for the patient. The analyst has to speak like the Gospel while remaining clearly aware that his or her words are not the Gospel. So, *hybris* is a hidden and ever-present danger for the analyst as well. This holds true not only for the analyst as an individual, but also for the whole of analytic theory. It is enough to look back at some of the words which were written by various masters in the 1960s and 1970s, at a time when they were ready to declare that the diffusion of analysis, in association with the revolution for a more just society, would promote a kind of general psychic hygiene. We read these words today and recognise the *hybris* of a mode of positive thinking which saw itself on the road to a happy ending that would take the form of a universal adventure in psychotherapy. Yet our language may now have grown more refined, but with little change in substance. Even the titles of a number of the books which criticise the *hybris* of our times might be cited as examples: *We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World's Getting Worse.*[9] Whoever said that it was going to get better? Who, if not an anti-tragic *hybris,* which analysis itself should combat?

Guilt is a universal presence, but it does not explain everything. The great fascination with which North Americans look back at the history of the Native American peoples cannot, for example, be explained as exclusively a question of feelings of guilt for the genocidal wars of the past, nor indeed as a question of the current need to adhere to politically correct ideologies. If that were the case, it would be enough to rewrite history from the point of view of the vanquished and to actuate programmes for the rehabilitation of those marginal niches of society in which they now find refuge. But the realisation of such ideas on even the vastest of scales would not assuage the American hunger for the culture of the North American Indians. America's fascination with its native peoples goes far beyond anything objective, concrete and rational, and is also a great deal more than a feeling of anxiety with respect to the discovery of roots, given that the quantity of Native American blood which flows through the veins of the rest of the people on the North American continent is a good deal lower than the

percentage of alcohol that is permitted in the veins of a person at the wheel of a car, and that the very name America is Florentine.

There is a very simple way of explaining this situation. As the guiding force of the Western world, America has also invented the form of narrative that dominates it. Hollywood has written the codes that control modern narrative and has thereby established the nature of the modern hero: we are presented with men and women who choose, who align themselves with the powers of goodness, who entrust its redemption to wilful action, and who never doubt its final triumph. It cannot be said that this form of narrative is necessarily inferior to others; but it can be said to show an anti-tragic unilaterality. It sanctions the disappearance of tragedy from the language of our times.

In the great panorama of American history, one does not have to go very far afield—either in space or time—to discover a redress for this partial and one-sided view of things. The discourses of Joseph, of Crazy Horse, and of every other Indian Chief give us precisely that vision which is most conspicuously absent from America's narratives on the triumph of positive, human will, and indeed, more generally, from the whole of the modern, developed world: the vision of tragic dignity. The Hollywood hero strives for justice when his rights have been offended; the Indian Chief knows that life is the seat of drama, not of justice, and prepares himself in all tranquillity for the next blow of destiny. The Hollywood hero fights a battle which he fully intends to win; the Indian Chief knows that he can only postpone defeat. The Hollywood hero believes in the supreme power of will; the Indian Chief, like the tragic hero, believes that will counts for nothing, even if none the less it has to follow its course. It has to follow its course as a part of the plans drawn up by destiny, and not at all by virtue of the worth of any plans of his own. The Hollywood hero is ingenuous; the Indian Chief is wise. America's thirst for the narratives of the continent's native peoples asserts itself so powerfully because the narratives of the dominant culture are so thoroughly unilateral. And they present themselves as unilateral not only from historical points of view but also, or indeed primarily, from the point of view of the spirit.

Thus, America's need to lend an ear to the voices of its 'primitive' peoples is more than an historical necessity; it also corresponds to a psychological need of the American collective conscious, or, more generally, of the modern collective conscience, And what about the psychological needs of the modern individual conscious? We can point to a situation which is absolutely parallel. The will is an insufficient tool for confronting the obstacles of life. It is often to be noted that highly wilful individuals are precisely the people who are most prone to encounter a state of psychic paralysis: they find themselves blocked not by external circumstances, but by interior ones. The modern individual becomes aware of desiring opposite things at one and the same time, and he or she also realises that such a situation is more than a question of some specific snag in a given and specific circumstance: it presents itself instead as a kind of 'natural'

and permanent condition, as a condition that corresponds to the rediscovery of the deep psyche and of all the ambivalence that riddles it.

The most natural solution to this 'natural obstacle' is to take the problem to an adequately trained professional, who goes by the name of analyst. It is not, however, that the natural thing is to accord so high a level of trust to this professional; as a rule one will not know this person, or not in any personal way, and one's attitude of trust is self-imposed: a self-imposed faith in the general, modern notion of technical proficiency and specialisation, and, as well, it is once again the product of an act of will. The natural thing is the inclination to recount one's torments, and the faith that it serves some purpose to do so. What is archetypal is the faith in narration. And the narration of ambivalence is the rediscovery—unconsciously, and in ways which are therapeutic and individual—of the tradition of the narration of pain: the tradition of the tragic narrative.

So, it's not at all by chance that analysis has spread so widely in the twentieth century—'the American Century'.[10] It's not because our epoch is necessarily more neurotic than those that preceded it; instead, it's because our epoch, like every other, needs narration. And since our century's controlling emblems are those that find their extremes in the anthropology of Hollywood, our century's conscious values are afflicted by much the same forms of optimistic insistence on the power of human will, and by the same anti-tragic unilaterality. To compensate for this unilaterality, the people of North America, and indeed of the whole of the modern world, have given great space, in their cultural lives, to the narratives of so-called primitive peoples; and the same compensation, in their private lives, is supplied by the narrative of analysis.

When the mass media tell us that economic and social conditions are preparing to give us a tragic future—which is something one hears quite frequently here in Italy—they intuit something central, but turn the problem upside-down. It's not that social and economic problems will give us the feeling of living in a tragic world, but rather that the lack of tragic feeling will remove all sense from an economy and society which in any case are by far the most sated that history has known.

The Ancient Greeks thus invented the basic narrative of the Western world: we can take the epics and tragedies as a single, unified entity, and refer to it as the tragic narrative.

The Greeks believed that life is the briefest of moments, whereas the narrative that tells its tale is eternal. So, the narrative of life is superior to life itself. Not even our modern experience—grounded in omnipotent individualism—can contradict that feeling. It is clear that we have lost all access to the myths of origin from which the Greeks derived the plots and actions of tragic narrative, and that we no longer have any knowledge of the state in which we existed before our birth, just as we no longer know what will happen to us after we die. But in spite of this, and indeed precisely because of this, narrative remains, for modern humanity as well, the more important experience, and indeed remains eternal.

The mind's need for the eternal by no means disappears, nor even diminishes, with the lapse of all discourse on eternal things—with the loss of myth, of religion and of metaphysics—in the world that lies around the mind. The contemplation of eternity no longer finds its home in a glorious collective tradition, but in narrative accounts of ordinary, individual experience, as in Camus' *L'Étranger,* or Joyce's *Ulysses*. For people who belong to the modern world, true narrative has to spring up out of life: it is found in the instant that transcends itself and makes itself eternal; which expresses not chance but meaning; and even—and this is more than a game with words—the meaning of chance. Existentialism too sees narrative as a place of refuge from daily life. Our minds are committed to secular thought, or to secular points of view, and we no longer attempt to turn narrative into the seat of religious belief. But we unfailingly—archetypally?—continue to believe in narration.[11] Thus, a psychotherapeutic cure seems to us to be good and convincing when it takes on the structure of a well-told tale. But we should also see that this is a moderno-centric prejudice. It is not that the cure assumes the guise of narrative, but rather that the act of narration assumes the guise of a cure.

We can see the tragic narrative as having conserved its own autonomy, and as having asked to be reinvented. The tragic tale was invented in ages that long preceded psychotherapy, and already at the time of its origins it sought to serve the very same purpose which its rediscovery was to posit for itself in the course of the last century: not pleasure, but meaning.

In order to exit from meaninglessness and pain, human beings have always come together around a fire and a story-teller, no less in Homer's Greece than among the tribes of all the world's five continents. Homer, however, achieved eternal renown by virtue of the fact that someone, one day, wrote down his stories. Since that time, the story of the events that Homer relates moves us just as much as the events themselves, and indeed somewhat more. Homer's immortality lies in his having formulated this one fundamental statement: that important facts come about for the purpose of being narrated. The gods desired the destruction of Troy in order that the tale might be told (*Odyssey,* VIII,579–80). Odysseus, who could hold back tears while watching the suffering and death of persons he loved, didn't know how to hold them back *while listening to the tale of his own adventures* (*Odyssey,* VIII, 86–8, and 522–31). The protagonists of the Trojan War cannot avoid pain, nor indeed would have dreamed of doing so: what they see as important, and as filling their actions with meaning, is the fact that their actions will later be recounted (*Iliad,* VI,358).

Do we analysts really do anything much different from that? Analysis appears to restore a sense of life to the individual insofar as it rearranges the events of the individual's life and gives them an order which in fact is both narrative and creative, rather than interpretative.[12] The analytic setting is just a little less strait than solitude: two of you sit beside the fire. Experience has taught us that the transformation of pain is due far less to its medication on the part of an external force, than to the activation of an internal force that can organise it into a

narrative. If the narrative of life is superior to life itself, pain too is of lesser moment than the narrative of pain.

Notions of happy endings forget this wisdom that comes from antiquity, just as they forget this lesson that comes from the experience of analysis itself. All their attention is simply directed to the attempt to overcome pain. This, perhaps, is the most dramatic of the many forms of repression that typify our times: it amounts, in fact, to the repression of all sense of drama. One wonders if the next millennium will be a millennium that knows no tragic sentiment.

As Nietzsche reminds us, the birth of philosophy, or, better, the appearance of Socrates, also occasioned the birth of the optimism of the will: philosophy opened the road to science and rationality, and to the disappearance of depth and mystery in a sated and utterly secular world.

Even if constructed on the basis of a pre-Enlightenment, and largely pre-Socratic logic, which preferred the individual sage to abstract wisdom, analysis is an obviously modern phenomenon. Yet analysis, rather than philosophy, presents itself as the true heir of tragedy: analysis marks the return of the cult of repressed Dionysus, the ambiguous god, the ambivalent god, the god of the indissoluble dualism of the good and evil in the clay from which God moulded us, the god of the inalterability of destiny, which lives within me, just as God, the soul and the unconscious live within me. True analysis is undertaken in the tragic spirit and with tragic decision, and not in the medical spirit that insistently wants to heal, while lending no attention to the soul. One faces up to analysis in order to nurture oneself on that personal piece of destiny which Jungian jargon refers to as individuation.

The sense of belonging that derives from recognising a destiny as ‘one’s own’ doesn’t necessarily lead to a healing. But it leads to the experience of a ‘metaphysical consolation’ not dissimilar to the consolation which Nietzsche saw as inherent to tragedy.[13] The story of a life is tantamount to the rediscovery of the sense of self which makes us who and what we are, precisely by virtue of being the progeny of just that story—that story, that history, those precise roots—and not of any other.[14]

Analysis hinges on the experience of interminable paradox, as well as on the experience of ambivalence and contradiction as events that do not wholly define me, but which none the less give me an identity. If this is analysis—and certainly analysis is *also* this—it stands at a very great distance from the optimism of Socratico-medical thinking.

Secret affinities can act as a bridge between phenomena which belong to vastly different times, and which a superficial view of history would see as quite separate from one another. Tragedy and analysis, on the one hand, are related to one another, just as are philosophy and medicine on the other. The first pair respects the inherent ambivalence of human experience: the common model of tragedy and analysis shows great regard for the mystery of life and makes no attempt to turn the world into an image of the ego, accepting the fully self-evident fact that the world precedes the ego. Philosophy and medicine, on the

other hand, share a univalent tendency that thinks in terms of finalities, and of the value of human will.

Analysis thus presents itself as one of the very few antidotes to modern *hybris*: to the temptations of the search for ever greater power—the power *to do*—and of the tendency to confront all problems with the thought of being able to solve them. The patient's goal does not lie in achieving the ability *to do* something new (which, at best, is the specific characteristic of brief therapies that aim for specific results). The patient's goal is *to be;* even at the times when nothing, or nearly nothing, is the only thing that he or she can do.

One might wonder if these reflections on tragedy can be of any help in the actual, day-to-day practice of analysis with actual specific patients. I believe they can be. It is usual for practising analysts already to be quite accustomed to showing a great respect for their patients' moments of 'drama'—for their patients' most painful experiences and for the moments and ways in which their patients present them. These are moments in which the analyst is likely to be in the habit of postponing interpretation: instinctively, since our feelings tell us that interpretative intervention would interrupt the patient's narrative. We know that the narrative, in moments like these, has to take precedence over everything else. But if we see the model of the analyst's work in the light of a 'tragic model', the ancestor to which it runs parallel, we can help the analyst understand the reasons for such behaviour; such behaviour doesn't spring up by chance or in that particular moment: it is a fruit of the very same tree that once produced tragedy.

On a private and individual plane, analysis can again call up that tragic spirit which, in great, crucial and very special moments, has taken hold of the whole of certain cultures. History, in fact, makes it clear that tragedy can never be the permanent, ordinary mode of expression through which a culture speaks. When ordinary times return, tragedy disappears, and then shows a tendency to reappear in subsequent moments of transformation and creativity.[15]

Doesn't something similar happen with the individual? When patients subject themselves to permanent analysis, their enthusiasm wanes: they turn into bureaucrats of the unconscious. Patients, on the other hand, who don't turn analysis into a permanent undertaking—a programme for the unconscious—are able to return to it at the proper time; they are able to resume analysis when a new period of transformation autonomously presents itself, more than in the wake of any sort of plan. Basically, this is no different from the sort of discussion we table when we reflect on a patient's motivation, and on the importance of careful assessment, both at the start of analysis and repeatedly as events progress. Patients who undertake analysis because analysis has been prescribed, or on the basis of intentions simply to exploit its techniques, and who do so with no deep passion, have limited possibilities of success. In any case, chances of success are a great deal higher for patients who enter analysis for fortuitous or circumstantial reasons without really understanding why, but who nevertheless recount their stories with desperate enthusiasm. This would seem to be a paradox. But it is actually equivalent to saying that the first model, the model of the

medical cure, is less appropriate to analysis than that of the tragic narrative; the courage to exist within paradox was in fact the kind of courage that typified the tragic hero.

Every patient who goes to the bottom of what we call the confrontation with the shadow has something in common with the evil heroes to which tragedy has accustomed us. These sorts of hero (Medea, Macbeth) can indeed see the evil in which they are involved, but they look on in amazement at the powerful perversion that holds them in its tow. They no longer understand themselves, nor why they have to act out this torment: they know themselves to be two things at the very same time, and yet they also know that their ambivalence will not prevent them from acting. It is not that Medea murders her sons because she does not love them; she murders her sons in spite of the fact that she loves them.

The Holly wood villain has lost this sort of human complexity, and to live in the Hollywood century means no longer to have any models for our lacerating conflicts, for our confrontation with the shadow. To rediscover the tragic spirit, we are forced to make it over into 'the century of analysis'. If we succeed we will finally obey our passions; and perhaps we will also discover the depths of such a well of obedience to offer a redemption more profound than any hardly credible, sudden and utterly intentional change in our behaviour. Like the tragic hero, the patient is likely to feel that the conviction of being able suddenly to change for the better can conceal no small amount of *hybris*: the arrogance, for tragedy, of those who desire to alter their destiny; the arrogance, for analysis, of those who desire, immediately and at any cost, to impose consciousness on the unconscious.

If the patient is to be a tragic hero, the analyst too has to have the ability to respect the patient's status as such. In precisely those moments to which we refer, significantly enough, as 'dramatic', the analyst's task is not to interpret the patient, but to observe the patient in much the same way that a viewer observes a tragic drama: in a spirit of respect for the greatness of the personage—all of us ought to have our own particular greatness—and in a spirit of participation, free of all preconceived theories, with respect to the actions of that personage. Like the appearance of the truly tragic denouement, the appearance of the moment of truth in analysis—and this is the manifestation of true analysis—is frequently not theorisable, nor foreseeable, because it is not concept but vision: only later can we deal with it on any such terms, after the drama has found its consummation.

The patient who enters analysis brings along two things which are always highly personal: a personal narrative and a personal pain. Both are unique and cannot belong, or be made to belong, to anyone else. The analysis, indeed, might be mortally wounded if the analyst were to tell the patient that this particular narrative and this particular pain were anything other than totally unique. Just as the narrative and the pain are tied together by a knot that cannot be undone, they are likewise tied, by a similar knot, to the patient's individuality. This particular suffering and this particular narrative are things that this particular patient cannot, and must not, forget. The novelty which the narrative is able to produce

is meaning. The narrative can redirect the energy and the gaze which before bent only backwards—towards the torments of the patient's fragmented past—and project them into a continuity that gives them a painful place in a unified train of events which also includes a life that moves on into the future.

Christianity espouses values which are no less affirmative than those of science, and is always opposed to death. Analysis, on the other hand, like tragedy, is mysterious, problematic and ambivalent, and interrogates itself on the goal of life without knowing a reply from the start. The analyst knows that he cannot always voice an objection—always, and in any case, and with all possible force—to the patient who talks about suicide:[16] such words can be a necessary chapter of the patient's narrative. Here again, and again without being conscious of it, the analyst, finally, has invented no new vision of his own, and instead has rediscovered the classical attitude: it is an attitude that includes the tragic code which insisted, unlike Christianity, that the ultimate moment, the moment of choice in the face of death, was profoundly personal and had to be respected. It was less a question of addressing a choice than of sounding an inscrutable link between the individual and his or her destiny.

The profound relationship between the models of analysis and tragedy—and their common distance from the medical model—tell us why the analyst can be no constant partisan of an always inflexible defence of life. The analyst must indeed be passionately allied with the patient—with the patient's well-being, with the patient's life, and even, at the final extreme, with the patient's death - but paradoxically (and we know by now that paradox is a confirmation, not a contradiction, of the tragic spirit) the analyst has to control that passion. Freud too —despite his commitment to a medical model, and notwithstanding his lack of all use of the concept of individuation—was already thinking this thought when he counselled the therapist [17] to avoid any over-intense desire to heal, adding as well that one should not make too many plans in the course of any healing. We have reason to remember that Freud's profound experience in analytic technique was accompanied by a thoroughgoing knowledge of the Greek tragedies. The tragic myth gave warning that blindness was the lot of precisely the person who had wanted to see too much, and Freud may perhaps have taken those words more seriously than we imagine.

We are familiar with the notion of the action which aims to achieve a goal and which hopes to procure a good, since it belongs not only to the positive thinking of the medical frame of mind, but also, from much further back in antiquity, to the Hebrew and Christian frame of mind. The torment of Job was terrible, but we cannot call it tragic, since it reflected the will of God and was an instrument of God's justice.[18] The notion of justice, and of establishing justice, is the factor that sets up the absolute difference between the attitudes, on the one hand, of science and religion, and, on the other, of tragedy—and as well, as I see it, of analysis. The sufferings of the patient do not, in fact, present themselves, in their very own right, as 'just' or 'unjust'; neither do they belong to a divine plan for the final establishment of justice. It is true that they may acquire a meaning some day, but

they can also remain a meaningless waste. The only thing that is certain is that a narrative account of these sufferings can be composed and listened to. The ideal analytic experience suspends intentions without suspending emotions, on the part of the patient no less than on the part of the analyst, and what results is a kind of pure emotion. But this, precisely, is the way in which *tragic emotion* would be described. James Joyce describes it thus:

> The tragic emotion…is a face looking two ways, towards terror and towards pity, both of which are phases of it. [He wrote a few lines earlier that 'Pity is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the human sufferer. Terror is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the secret cause.' He continues:] You see I use the word *arrest*. I mean that the tragic emotion is static…. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic emotions…. The [tragic] emotion…is …static. The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing.[19]

Notes

1 Dostoyevsky, F. (1879–80) *The Brothers Karamazov,* V, 5.
2 Jung, C.G. (1952) *Answer to Job, Collected Works,* Vol. 11.
3 Bleuler, E. (1955) *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie,* Berlin, Göttingen and Heidelberg, Springer, Part II,3,I. Bleuler intuits the essence of ambivalence when he speaks of it as an *intimate, tragic laceration*. He seems to me, however, to go astray and to speak in reductive terms when in his attempt to establish psychiatric classifications he sees it as the basis of a disturbance of the mental functions. Ambivalence should instead be recognised as the normal and fundamental basis on which the psyche operates.
4 Jung, C.G. (1911–12/1952) *Symbols of Transformation, Collected Works,* Vol. V, Parts 1,II.
5 Freud, S. (1912–13) *Totem and Taboo,* Standard Edition XIII, Chapter 2.
6 *La Pratica Analitica,* 10–11, maggio 1995.
7 I dealt with this argument in *Growth and Guilt* (1995), London and New York, Routledge.
8 Jung, C.G. (1940) *Psychology and Religion,* CW 11.
9 Hillman, J. and Ventura, M. (1993).
10 See Alvi, G. (1966) *Il secolo americano,* Milan, Adelphi.
11 Studies of serial killers have revealed that a number of such individuals have consciously chosen to consign themselves to life imprisonment or to death by execution rather than to live out the intolerable suffering of a life so anonymous that it could never be recounted. (I owe this information to a still unpublished essay by Carole Beebe Tarantelli.)

12 Jaffé, A. (1967/70) *The Myth of Meaning,* Zurich, Bollingen.
13 Nietzsche, F. (1872–1972) *The Birth of Tragedy,* Chapter 17.
14 The notable success of an apparently small-scale book like *Power in the Helping Professions,* by A. Guggenbühl-Craig (1971, New York, Spring) lies precisely in the tragic spirit—charged with emotional participation but free from all laments—with which it describes the inevitability of the presence of the shadow in analysis, which in spite of this, and indeed for precisely this reason, preserves its meaning.
15 Steiner, G. (1961) *The Death of Tragedy,* see especially Chapter 4.
16 Hillman, J. (1964) *Suicide and the Soul,* New York, Harper and Row.
17 For example, in 'Ratschläge fur den Arzt bei der Psychanalytischen Behandlung', in *Zur Technik der Psychoanalyse* (1911–12), S.E.XII.
18 Steiner, G., op. cit., Chapter 1.
19 *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1971), Harmondsworth, Penguin Modern Classics, p.204.

Part II

Individuation

Chapter 3
Toward a Jungian analysis of character*

John Beebe

This chapter addresses the question of the patient's character, taken in the moral sense of "good" or "bad" character, as it figures in the practice and goals of analytical psychotherapy. I have devoted a large part of my professional career to the study of what I call "moral process," most fully in my book *Integrity in Depth* (1992). Here, I particularly explore the fantasies that surround the Jungian ideal of individuation which I inherited from my own analysis, teachers, and reading. I point out that the classical notion of individuation, which is deeply rooted in alchemical imagery and fantasy, encourages the expectation of a dissolving of the shadow traits of character as development proceeds to maturity. To bring the claims of analytical psychology into line with the more hard-nosed moral psychological reasoning offered by Bernard Williams and other contemporary moral philosophers, who have stressed what human beings are like rather than what we would like them to be, I feel it is necessary for analytical psychologists to recognize that integrity, understood as the self's willingness to be responsible to all its objects, and accountable for its impact upon them, is what individuates in deep psychotherapeutic work on the self—not the entirety of one's character. The bestanalyzed person's character will somewhere remain faulty. It is my conviction, however, that the development of integrity, which an analysis can facilitate, *is* enough to enable the individual to embrace, and in that sense to contain, the continuing limitations of character that belong to the human condition.

Introduction

When I use the word "character" in the title of this chapter, "Toward a Jungian analysis of character," I don't mean character in a psychoanalytic, diagnostic sense, such as "anal" or "narcissistic" character.[1] Neither do I mean character, in the literary sense of Hamlet's "character," as the spirit or style of an individual.[2] Nor do I mean what James Hillman has recently called "the soul's code," that mysterious, perhaps immutable daimon which informs the unfolding of a person's fate.[3] Rather, I mean something even more deeply rooted in Western culture: the notion of good or bad character. Just as the elements of a calligraphic

Chinese "character" are evaluated not only for their contributions to meaning but also for their cumulative aesthetic impact, the particularities of an individual are, when we speak of the individual's *character,* evaluated on the basis of their moral impact.[4]

I am thus writing about moral character. This chapter is part of my continuing work on the depth psychology of moral process,[5] and it carries my hope that Jungian analysts can make a contribution to the currently blossoming field of moral psychology.[6] This is a relatively new interdisciplinary discourse, which has managed to revive moral philosophy from its nearly moribund state after the devastating blow dealt it by the twin horrors of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, which confirmed beyond anyone's expectations the very debunking of moral idealism that this century had been challenged with at its outset through the writings of Nietzsche and Freud. Moral psychology has rebounded with a new insistence on psychological realism in philosophical discourse about morality. It inquires of literature, history, psychoanalysis, sociology, feminism, and ethnic studies what people are really like, examining differing notions of good and exploring diverse lures to self-deception. It has taken up anew the effort to examine what might foster a healthier moral development in a world that calls out to be treated more justly, more fairly, and more carefully.

So far this field has received scant attention from depth psychologists, and little participation by practicing Jungian analysts, although we have much to offer it. I would like, as part of this collection, to offer these remarks in the spirit of opening something, with the suggestion that we turn our efforts toward entering into, and thus including ourselves within, this renewed discussion of the moral impact of individuals.

I

Asked about Jung long after the break, Freud is supposed to have muttered, "Bad character."[7] A generation or two later, Heinz Kohut was only a degree more charitable when he referred to the impressive therapeutic effect of Jung's "commanding" personality as "in the last analysis" a "cure through love—albeit a largely narcissistic love!"[8] Such negative characterizations of Jung the analyst would not be worthy of our attention if they did not inform a more serious criticism of Jungian analysis as a healing discipline. This criticism is one that I would imagine every Jungian psychotherapist has had to face sooner or later—the assertion that Jungians are soft on character issues. We are told by our critics

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that we fail our patients in their work on character because we have to be their friends—because, that is, we emphasize loving connection at the expense of objective scrutiny of their faults and the reasons for those faults. Nowhere are our limitations said to be more evident than in our handling of patients with significant drawbacks of character. These are the patients who exhibit decided lacks in empathy and self-control, who are deficient in both the capacity "to take importantly into account the rights, needs, and feelings of others" (empathy) and the willingness "to take importantly into account the more distant consequences of present actions" (self-control).[9] For such patients, not all of whom are criminal, antisocial personalities unlikely to be seen in an analytic practice, the narcissistic, loving, Jungian brand of empathy is judged to be very poor medicine indeed, and it is sometimes even asserted that a long Jungian analysis can foster the unfolding of latent character pathology.

It will be the purpose of this contribution to a volume on post-Jungian viewpoints on practice to take up this criticism, to take it to heart, and to see, not whether, but in what degree, it applies and what we may yet do about it. I therefore ask the indulgence of the reader for my sincerity in approaching these attacks upon the integrity of our field. I do realize I am dealing with a level of criticism which may not, if analytically scrutinized, turn out to arise from as high a chakra in each individual critic as the heart. Nor is a naive empathy necessarily at the heart of the Jungian ethos of analysis, even if Jung did say we should let the psyche of the patient wash over the analyst without restraint and a number of his followers, like von Franz, have told us that from the start of his career Jung met each patient with "total relatedness."[10] Nevertheless, I do not consider it my job here to unmask the various projective identifications of the critics, but rather to search for the hooks in my thinking about practice and, by extension, the practices of our field that may have provided convenient resting places for these projections. This approach has the advantage, not only of satisfying the critics, but also ourselves, that we have done what we can with what has been brought to our attention.

II

The most familiar criticism is that Jungian work tends to neglect early childhood, but I think the usual assumption that Jungians devalue what they call "reductive" analysis is simplistic. Even outside the London School of frankly developmental analytical psychology, I have never met a Jungian who did not take the patient's original childhood problem quite seriously or who was not willing to meet in the transference the child in the patient. I belong to the generation of Jungians whose orientation to our field began with a reading of Jung's *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. There Jung starts with a quite trenchant description of his parents and his childhood, making clear that this was the "handicap" he started out with and that this was the problem that all his later symbolic achievements were attempting to solve. I have also noticed the continuing attention that Jungian

analysts of my generation on both sides of the Atlantic have paid to the work of Klein, Winnicott, and Kohut, as well as the burgeoning international interest in sandplay. I believe these developments reveal a Jungian conviction that the child is somehow central to our work.

On the other hand, I think we *can* identify hazards in our field for anyone attempting work on character, hazards that for the most part have not gone unrecognized by its founding figures, but that we sometimes neglect to mention or to discuss as fully as we should. It may be useful to address them once again here, both as a way of answering our critics—that we do know that these pitfalls are there—and of keeping ourselves alert to them, lest they become problems for our patients in their work with us on their characters.

The first of these hazards emerges from the very power of Jungian work. Power is easily misused by a person with a character disorder. As seminal popularizer of what psychotherapy could do for people, Jung is probably as responsible as anyone for the inflation of therapeutic expectations, but he seems to have caught on relatively early to the danger of confusing psychological healing with helping people progress with their ambitions. One of his cases, reported in the Tavistock Lectures of 1935, shows him absolutely refusing to collude with a patient's ambitious "mountain climb." This was a man who had come from a humble peasant background to occupy a good post as the director of a public school—and now wanted to go on to become a university professor. His neurotic symptoms included vertigo, palpitations, nausea, peculiar attacks of feebleness, and exhaustion. Realizing the similarity of these symptoms to mountain sickness, Jung compared him to a man "who has climbed in one day from sea-level to a level of 6,000 feet—and immediately wants to scale peaks towering 12,000 feet high in front of him, without a rest." Jung warned the patient of going any further with overambitious plans, arguing that "he ought to realize how much he has achieved considering who he was originally and that there are natural limitations to human effort."[11]

A second hazard is that Jungian work sometimes tilts the moral balance between self and other in such a way that the self comes to seem more important than the other. This is sometimes spoken of as the narcissistic use of psychotherapy, and it is assumed to go unchecked by us. A Jungian psychotherapy is often remarkable in the empathy that it can offer to the patient's self. Sometimes that empathy is extended to the patient's intrapsychic others—the various autonomous complexes that bid for the patient's attention. The same empathy, however, is often withheld from the patient's outer world others, such as the spouse, the parent, colleagues, and, in the transference, the analyst. (And, if the patient happens to be a psychotherapist, the patient's own patients.) Yet when we speak of work on character, the handling of others and the client 's relation to the wider world become paramount, and assuredly should be our focus in treatment. Here too, we have a Jungian tradition of taking this up, although few Jungian therapists have followed it.

Von Franz describes a case in which she was able to break the narcissistic spell. It was her very first case, a control case conducted under the supervision of Jung himself, with another medically trained analyst serving as medical supervisor. The patient, a woman "very much obsessed by the negative animus," was having trouble with the medical supervisor and went, at von Franz's request, for a special consultation with Dr Jung. Jung took her complaints seriously, chiming in with whatever he could agree with. Then she "rang up the medical doctor analyst and told him everything Jung had said against him, plus a bit more, making mischief with it." Jung advised von Franz "to kick that lady out of analysis, telling her what a lying, cheating devil she was." But since, as von Franz puts it, "one is kind of lovingly attached to one's first case," she was at first too terrified to take this extreme step. After a week of hesitation she finally took Jung's advice. According to her surprised account, "The plain result was that from then on she [the patient] was much better. After many years of no treatment she was practically all right! The kick in the pants did it, and after eight years I even got a letter from her thanking me."[12]

On the other hand, we should not misread the von Franz example as a license to discard empathy in the analytic handling of aggression. Taking the patient's aggression seriously involves considering the possibility that it may stem from the patient's recognition of what is finally not good for him or her in the treatment. Jung certainly recognized that resistance could be an expression of the self, and he was much more willing than Freud to honor resistance. But Jung's strong emphasis on what alchemy called *coniunctio* in his paper "Psychology of the transference" has led to a third hazard in the Jungian analysis of character, a tendency among us to set up an ego-shadow axis by breaking down healthy defenses against bonding with the therapist when the therapist is in some way shadowy for the patient.

Here Michael Fordham's work on defenses of the self can come to our aid.[13] A defense of the self involves a flight from the object world that is felt not only to be not-me, but also toxic. When a defense of the self is operating, fresh infusion of material to the psyche is unwelcome, and the therapist is not accepted as a compensatory figure.[14] It is my conviction that a defense of the self appears in a patient with a character problem when the person is being pulled away from his or her own compensatory processes that would normally keep him or her in check. This can easily happen when an analyst and patient are typologically opposite, as, for example, when an extraverted intuitive analyst tries to influence an introverted intuitive client, drawing the latter, if a man, away from his own extraverted sensation anima as a compensatory inner process. The patient's resistance to the analyst may be the only way to preserve the integrity of his own balancing process, even if it looks like nothing but an authority problem.

Work on character is frequently a place where the alchemical *separatio* has more to teach than the image of *coniunctio* that is sometimes indiscriminately drawn upon to guide the clinical practice of analytical psychotherapists. An

analyst should try to discriminate what is shadow in the patient and what is groundable ego.

The argument from those who have looked critically at the Jungian handling of the therapeutic relationship has been that our tendency as Jungians to foster overoptimism, narcissism, and the uncritical use of relationship are not necessarily disadvantages in the relief of neurotic symptoms, but that they are indeed destructive when work on character is to be done. Most Jungian practitioners I know watch out for these very dangers, importing the ideas of Klein and other hard-nosed psychoanalysts as needed to correct these "Jungian" blind spots. But is there a more fundamental danger in our approach, one that our critics may sense, but that our field has not yet learned to watch out for?

I think so. It is our idea of *individuation*. Individuation has several meanings in philosophy and psychology, all strangely tied up with will: it has been used to refer to the will of things, including people, to manifest in space and time, to become autonomous from their progenitors, and finally to be "themselves." In Jungian work it has come to mean the will of the psychological individual to become conscious and, though assuredly not perfect, psychologically whole; that is, with no part of the self split off in the unconscious, inaccessible even to dialogue with the ego. Our image for this goal of undissociated wholeness is the philosopher's stone of the alchemists. As Jungian analysts, we experience individuation as the emotional pressure toward this ideal, and we imagine ourselves tending the affects, watching the images, and maintaining the space in which the work proceeds as if we were alchemists, or alchemists' assistants engaged in the production of the self-coherent narrative that is the natural philosopher's stone. We do not always realize, however, that despite our psychological satisfaction with alchemy's apparent inclusion of the material bodily shadow that traditionally Christian moral perfectionism leaves out, this work has also embedded in its aim the fantasy of overcoming the limitations of individual character.

Overcoming the restrictions of character was always what alchemy was about, for alchemy, since its rise, just after the widespread acceptance of astrology, was conceived as the human being's only recourse against what the Stoics called *heimarmene*. *Heimarmene* was the compulsion of the stars, the fatedness that had been charted by the Chaldeans with such telling specificity in the natal horoscope. Astrology was a serious matter for the generations that followed the Chaldeans and remained so right up to the Renaissance, because the patterns revealed in the horoscope were demonstrably immutable, the imprint in the heavens of one's moral luck at the time of birth. One had, according to the chart, a certain definite character, and an inbuilt liability to a certain fate, until the moment of one's death, which was itself predictable. One's character and associated fate were determined by the position of the five planets, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, and the two lights, the Moon and the Sun, in the natal chart. But there was one hope, offered by the theory of correspondences, which taught that—as above, so below - things in heaven have their earthly

counterparts. The hope for overcoming *heimarmene* lay in the metals—lead, tin, iron, copper, mercury, silver, and gold which were the earthly equivalents of the planets and lights. And that is where alchemy, which grew out of metallurgy, came in.[15] If one could change the metals, one would effectively be changing the planet's influence on the person. If one could turn lead into gold, one would, by turning Saturn into the Sun, be dissolving a malign old fate and coagulating a bright new one as a conscious, commanding personality. Alchemy therefore offered the possibility of remixing character, and, since character was fate, reinventing one's fate.[16] This is the fantasy that underlies the alchemical idea of individuation, which resurfaced in the psychotherapy of our time with the interested support of C.G.Jung.

Alchemy, I believe I should emphasize, went well beyond the idea of transformation of character. It sought as much as possible to do away with the problem of character altogether. In its images of the philosopher's stone in touch with the *unus mundus,* it pointed to a state of mind—or soul—that did not need to concern itself with character and individual characteristics at all. We should be careful in applying this fantasy of the individuated stone. As we shall see, it is an oily idea. To be sure, Jung, as James Hillman has reminded us in his 1990 Eranos Lecture, warned that the alchemical stone is only the *idea* of the goal—but surely our idea of the goal shapes the work. When we think of applying this model to work on character, Hillman's fascinating discussion of the properties of the stone contains some passages that should give us pause. Discussing the *ceratio,* the alchemical operation that makes the stone wax-like, Hillman tells us that it is:

> an idea of the goal that is tender, soft, like sugar, malleable as wax. This stone melts easily; it receives impressions like a *tabula rasa* and then just as easily lets them go again. It asks to be affected, penetrated and because transparent, seen through. As its borders are not fixed, its defense is yielding and its answers always indefinite. It allows itself to be pushed around without altering its substance. Like wax, its condition reacts to the climate of its surroundings. With the warmth of the human touch, it takes the shape of the hands that hold it, remaining, nonetheless, self-consistent despite the repeated meltings and congealings that wipe away all the struck and engraved typological characteristics. Any moment offers the fresh start, the innocence of a slate wiped clean.[17]

On the one hand, Hillman seems to be supporting, against rigid notions of character, a process conception of selfhood when he notes that he

> used the term "typological characteristics" because both words, "type" and "character" refer at their Greek root to defined engraved markings. Ceration, making wax-like, seems intentionally designed to obliterate a

> psychological episteme of types, traits, characteristics—anything that would rigidify the idea of the goal into categories of knowledge.[18]

But on the other hand individuation so conceived is antithetical, not only to rigid character, but to all work upon character. I feel in this description of the goal a sense of solace through self-erasure that, played out to its limit, might also be the aim of such disordered characters as Woody Allen's Zelig and Melville's Confidence Man—to escape being bound to any character for which they would have to be held accountable. This tricksterish caricature of individuation conceals the frightening idea that we are in fact stuck with our character. It is simply the manic idealizing flight from that despair, an obsessive defense against what, for moral development, is a necessary realization.

I have therefore come to see as a peculiar danger of our psychotherapy the problem that the fantasy of individuation, which arises out of the discovery that character is in fact not so very susceptible to change, can be used in counterphobic ways to supersede the felt need to work on character. One can find this danger signalled in the dream of a patient I had many years ago when I was in training. This was a patient with a character disorder, who in the midst of idealizing fantasies of what his psychotherapy was doing for him, dreamed he dropped a little girl he was taking on a mountain climb. This infantile anima figure had carried for him in earlier dreams the image of everything enduringly problematic about his character, the unshakable residue of his developmental history, his hard "moral luck" that had led to the "fragility of" his "goodness," with which the transcending notion of individuation would finally not allow him to stay in touch.[19] I connect the little girl with his moral development because, in the way of a really significant anima figure, she had become for my patient a compelling image of otherness,[20] an otherness he could not only value but feel responsibility for. This internal object presented to him by his dreams had enabled him, in other words, to experience and embrace the notion of his "infinite responsibility for the other"[21]—a critically important attitude for integrity.[22] It was therefore quite a shock to us both that he dropped her as his therapy progressed. In this sense, his dream could well have concealed the feeling that in my collusive countertransference excitement over his progress I had somehow abandoned a part of him that was dependent upon me for its continued life, what I would now call his budding integrity, rooted paradoxically in a sense of shame stemming from a traumatic early childhood.[23] In fact, the patient had with my help overcome serious obsessive compulsive symptoms, only to encounter long defended-against trends toward aggressive sociopathy which the analysis could not only not reverse, but had actually unblocked him to enact.

The danger in the idea of individuation is really twofold where work on character is concerned. First, there is the danger that an immature person can mistake progress in realizing ego ambitions for individuation. This is a danger which analysts close to Jung have long recognized, insisting that we not confuse

individualism with individuation, lest contact with the unconscious serve only to activate a charismatic power shadow.[24]

Second, there is, I believe, an even more insidious danger of confusion about what it is that individuates; that is, becomes more wholly conscious over time. Character as a whole does not individuate, although we may make great progress in overcoming our susceptibility to possession by particular complexes and thus more aware of our character. Character belongs to our embodied nature, and has a structure which allows for permanent strengths and permanent shadow attributes. Parts of our character may develop, but its basic nature is present in us very early: how often have we noticed that the distinguishing character traits of an adult were remarked upon in that person's infancy?

What *can* individuate out of a person's character is integrity,[25] that accountability for the impact of the self upon others which makes the work on the rest of character—recognizing it, allowing for it, compensating for it, training it—possible. I have defined integrity as accountability emerging out of a willing sensitivity to the needs of the whole,[26] meaning the entire matrix of self-objects in which any self is embedded.[27] It is the self's willingness to be responsible to all its objects, and accountable for its impact upon them. This is the attitude which we bring to our work on character and to our decision-making process as we interact with the world. If character is body, integrity is spirit.[28] Integrity is the paradoxical combination of vulnerability and confidence that makes work on character possible. We cannot find our integrity, however, until we know our character, which is one reason why even a psychotherapy which seems to stumble on the limitations imposed by particular complexes frequently strengthens integrity and fosters the sense of individuation. If we recognize that it is our integrity that individuates, and not our basic character itself, then we will see that long work in analysis, however interminable, has something to show for self-examination and the questioning of impulses that seem to stem from the self. In the alchemical model, integrity could be seen as the unmarked stone that recalls the *integritas* of the risen Christ as well as that of Adam before the Fall, while the fuel and glue of the work—Mercury—can be understood as conscience, exactly as asserted by the first psychological interpreter of alchemical symbolism, Ethan Allen Hitchcock.[29]

III

How might we then conceive the work on character in Jungian analysis if we dispense on the one hand with the notion that, through individuation, character problems are eliminated or vastly mitigated and, on the other, that we are simply stuck with character and therefore cannot really be held accountable for it? Seeing the development of integrity as the opus of individuation, and responsibility for character as the ongoing job of integrity,[30] how might we imagine the work? Here, I would offer as an alternative one of our oldest and yet most modern fairy tale motifs, the image of Beauty and the Beast, whose story

has been so remarkably dreamed forward in the past decade by Disney in what is really a clarification of the mythologem.[31] We have been used to understanding this tale symbolically in terms of the individuation of Psyche and Eros.[32] I would like to ask you to go one step further with the familiar story by imagining it, allegorically, as the dance of Integrity with Character.

Following the formula of many Hollywood films, Disney Studios cast the story as one of a young woman caught between two male rivals for her attention. One is Gaston, the local bully, and the other Beast, the enchanted Prince. Gaston, in the manner of an inflated ego, has many plans that he wants to impose upon others. Beauty detaches herself from him. Her movement is toward Beast. Beast would represent the seeming hopelessness of character disorder, with all its ugliness, narcissistic rage, and deeply human soulfulness. Beauty, confident and vulnerable as she leaves her collective village to follow her path of individuation, is an apt representation of integrity; Beast, who is kind and cruel at the same time,[33] is a marvelous depiction of character. That the teapot rules over the story of their coming together suggests that this is a four o'clock in the afternoon story, a mid-life tale.[34]

What is moving in Disney's telling is not the ultimate transformation of Beast by Beauty's love back into a charming Prince: that feels strangely disappointing, despite our recognition that our harshest character traits—for example, narcissistic rage—can be transformed by empathy into quite acceptable expressions of our selfhood. The numen of the fantasy, as we watch it, and as Angela Lansbury, the wise old woman, sings it to us, is not Beauty and the Prince, but Beauty and the Beast. Why is their dance so numinous, the image of them together so satisfying, and the song sung about them so archetypally right? I think the image suggests a home truth, that our difficult character is the psyche's life partner.

The image in the film also belongs to the present moment, when issues of character are everywhere under scrutiny, in politics, in education, in our institutions, and in our consulting rooms. For a disillusioned time, the image suggests a more humble deployment of the idealizing fantasies that have previously driven our quest for individuation. Beauty represents everything in us that hopes for something it can value, the beautiful self that knows what is good for itself, and it is strange but fitting that she has chosen to embrace the Beast. I read her turning from Gaston and toward Beast to mean that the psyche may be ready to value a conscious relation to our most shameful disorders of character—what Guggenbühl would call our crippled Eros[35]—over the ambitions of the ego for self-advancement. That the Beast's replacement by the Prince feels to so many people like a regressive afterthought marks a step forward in collective feeling.

But finally I experience Beauty's hold on Beast as conveying the quality of mature moral experience. Years later, in a public place, I ran into that patient with antisocial traits who had dreamed of dropping the little girl on a mountain climb. As his dream perhaps predicted he would, he had long ago dropped out of

therapy also, and was now involved in the legal aftermath of a fresh brush with the law. When I saw him and he related this latest episode to me, there was an ironic shared sense of the incompleteness of our therapeutic work. Yet he was also able to tell me that he was living the life that was right for him, even though it would not suit most people. I would like to hear that remark, for all its asperity and its tragic sense of his fate, as having come from someone who had begun to accept the limitations of his own personality, enough at least to experience the potential value of shame, and to look upon the assailability of others more charitably—someone in vital touch, that is, with his character.

Notes

1 For good surveys of the psychoanalytic theory of character, see Ruth F. Lax, ed. *Essential Papers on Character Neurosis and Treatment,* New York: New York University Press, 1989, and Manfred F.R.Kets de Vries and Sidney Perzow, eds., *Handbook of Character Studies: Psychoanalytic Explorations,* Madison, CT, International Universities Press, 1991. The latter volume has a very useful introduction (pp.1–19) and on page 1 we read, "character refers to the singularities in the person's cognitive, affective, and behavioral functioning as those singularities are observed by another."

2 Christopher Bollas discusses character from this point of view in the title essay of his book *Being a Character,* New York, Hill and Wang, 1992: "Being a character means that one is a spirit…" (p. 63). "To be a character, then, is to abandon the 'it' of one's idiom to its present choosings, an unraveling and dissemination of personality: a bearer of an intelligent form that seeks objects to express its structure. The idiom that gives form to any human character is not a latent content of meaning, but an aesthetic in personality, seeking not to print out unconscious meaning but to discover objects that conjugate into meaning-laden experience" (pp. 64–5). See also Bert O. States, *Hamlet and the Concept of Character,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

3 James Hillman, *The Soul's Code,* New York, Random House, 1996.

4 Gordon W.Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation,* New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1937, pp. 50–3. Allport places the evaluation of character in the context of an implicit moral code. "When a man shows 'character' by resisting temptation, or when it is said that the aim of education should be the 'development of character,' what is really meant is that the man has behaved, or the child should be trained to behave, in ways that are approved by prevailing social and ethical standards. The exercise of 'will' in each case is a phenomenon of personality. *Character enters the situation only when this personal effort is judged from the standpoint of some code*" (p. 51; Allport's emphasis). Generally, as James Q. Wilson puts it in *The Moral Sense* (New York, The Free Press, 1993, p. 240), "by character we mean two things: a distinctive combination of personal qualities by which someone is known (that is, a personality) and moral strength or integrity. We judge people whole, assessing their strengths and weaknesses and reckoning up the totals into a kind of human balance sheet."

5 I would include in this work my essays "The Trickster in the Arts," *The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal,* Winter, 1981, pp. 22–54, and "The Father's Anima as a Clinical and as a Symbolic Problem," *The Journal of Analytical Psychology,* 29 (3), 1984, pp. 277–87; my "Discussion" of Andrew Samuels' "Original Morality in a Depressed Culture" (where I first used the term "moral process"), in Mary Ann Mattoon, ed., *The Archetype of Shadow in a Split World* (Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress for Analytical Psychology, Berlin, 1986), Zurich, Daimon Verlag, 1987, pp. 84–9; the talk, "The Ante has Gone Up: The Conscience of the Post-modern Artist," C.G. Jung Institute of Chicago, 1987 (which is on audiocassette); the paper, "Primary Ambivalence Toward the Self: Its Nature and Treatment," in Nathan Schwartz-Salant and Murray Stein, eds., *The Borderline Personality in Analysis,* Wilmette, IL, Chiron Publications, 1988, pp. 97–127; my book *Integrity in Depth,* College Station, TX, Texas A & M University Press, 1992; and my "Response to Aimé Agnel's Paper" ["An Added Degree of Complexity"] in *The Journal of Analytical Psychology* 39, 1994, pp. 21–6.

6 The most helpful books I have found to orient me to this very wide field are Paul Crittenden's *Learning to be Moral: Philosophical Thoughts about Moral Development,* Atlantic Highlands, NJ, and London, Humanities Press International, 1990 (paper, 1992), and Owen Flanagan's *Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991.

7 Duane Schultz, *Intimate Friends, Dangerous Rivals,* Los Angeles, CA, Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1990, p. 224.

8 Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self,* New York, International Universities Press, 1971, p. 223n.

9 These quotations are from James Q.Wilson's "Introduction: Thinking About Character" in his book *On Character,* Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991, p. 5. Wilson, a political scientist often concerned with drug abuse, criminality, and education in American society, in addressing what "anyone can reasonably mean by 'character'" asserts that this word "cannot stand for every trait we like in another person, for some traits are matters of taste and style or accidents of personality that have no fundamental moral significance." Without claiming "complete satisfaction" with his own answer to this question, he offers as "a starting place: to have a good character means at least two things: empathy and self control" (ibid).

10 Marie Louise von Franz, *C.G. Jung: His Myth in our Time,* New York, C.G.Jung Foundation, 1975.

11 C.G.Jung, *Analytical Psychology: its Theory and Practice,* New York, Pantheon Books, 1968, p. 88.

12 Marie Louise von Franz, *Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales,* Zurich, Spring Publications, 1974, p. 172.

13 Michael Fordham, "Defences of the Self," *Journal of Analytical Psychology,* 19 (2), 1974, pp. 192–9.

14 Judith Hubback points out that breathing, for the infant, is the very first instance of taking in from the other; that is, the environment at that stage (which for Hubback is even pre-part object). Therefore, breathing offers the potential basis for all later object relations as correctives to narcissism.

15 "Within Alexandrian Hellenism or parallel to it, Hermetic alchemy appears to have developed as an extension of Hermetic astrology, proceeding from the notion of a sympathetic correspondence between particular planets and metals." Antoine Faivre, "Ancient and Medieval Sources of Modern Esoteric Movements," in Antoine Faivre and Jacob Needleman, eds., *Modern Esoteric Spirituality,* New York, Crossroad, 1992, p.6.

16 See Luther H.Martin, *Hellenistic Religions: An Introduction,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 38–42; 44–5; 106–7; and 146–50. Martin spells out the logic behind alchemical attempts to overcome *heimarmene.* For instance, "To a first century reader, heimarmene most probably carried the astrological significance of the deterministic powers of the material cosmos. Originally a Stoic concept that expressed the philosophical assumption of natural order, *heimarmene* was reappropriated in popular thought to name the negative aspects of that order" (p. 106); "Hermeticism sought escape from the astrological claims of the planetary powers through practices that negated their influence" (p.149); and "Through the reductive application of water and fire, or the influence of liquid (Mercury) and fire (Mars), a Saturnic nature was moved in the direction of silver (Moon) and gold (Sun)" (p. 45).

17 James Hillman, "Concerning the Stone: Alchemical Images of the Goal", *Sphinx* 5, 1993, p. 255.

18 Ibid., p.255.

19 See Martha C.Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, for the philosophic background to these concepts.

20 Gareth S.Hill, "Men, the Anima, and the Feminine," paper give at a conference on The Feminine, sponsored by the C.G.Jung Institute of Los Angeles, 25–26 October 1975 (unpublished).

21 Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in *The Levinas Reader,* ed. Sean Hand, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp.75–87. See especially p.83, where Levinas explains: "Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other's death even before *being*"

22 *Integrity in Depth,* Chapter 2, "The Shadow and Integrity," pp. 33–5.

23 I discuss the role of a sense of shame in building integrity later in Chapter 2 of *Integrity in Depth,* pp. 59–69.

24 See, for instance, Marie-Louise von Franz, *C.G.Jung: His Myth in Our Time,* New York, C.G.Jung Foundation, 1975, p. 263, where she associates this danger with the shaman's shadow, the "psychopathic black magician, who misused his inner experience (the experience of the spirit-world) for personal power aims."

25 Professor R.W.Hepburn in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (ed. Ted Honderich, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) nicely defines integrity as "the quality of a person who can be counted upon to give precedence to moral considerations, even when there is strong inducement to let self-interest or some clamant desire override them, or when betrayal of moral principle might pass undetected." Psychologically speaking, integrity is the willingness to own responsibility for all one has been and done, an attitude of accountability that is

linked to the desire to accept responsibility for the entirety of one's life—including the out of awareness and therefore morally problematic area that Jung calls the shadow. In his classic study of what we can expect from our passage through the human life cycle (*Childhood and Society,* New York, W.W.Norton, 1950), Erik Erikson places integrity as the optimal outcome of the final psychosocial crisis of old age, but I have elsewhere pointed out that all of his stages involve some level of the experience of integrity, which actually matures through successive developmental crises such as early infantile "trust vs. mistrust," adolescent "ego identity vs. role diffusion," and mature "generativity vs. stagnation." (See my 1992 interview with Jeffrey Mishlove, "Integrity in Depth," in *The Thinking Allowed Video Collection,* obtainable from Thinking Allowed Productions, 5966 Zinn Dr., Oakland, CA 94611, for a full discussion of this point.) It is therefore more psychological to see integrity as a maturing attitude of accountability for the needs of the whole life pattern of which one at any point in time is only a part, and only partially aware of.

26 *Integrity in Depth,* p. 125.

27 This language is Kohutian. For a concise review, from a Jungian analyst's perspective, of the formulations that led Heinz Kohut to postulate an ecological relationship between a self and its self objects, see Herb Wiesenfeld, "Kohut's Self Psychology" in *The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal,* 1,3, Spring 1980, pp. 1–25.

28 See C.G.Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis, Collected Works,* Vol. 14, Second Edition, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970, para 742, p. 521.

29 Ethan Allen Hitchcock, *Remarks Upon Alchemy & the Alchemists: Indicating a Method of Discovering the True Nature of Hermetic Philosophy* (reprint of 1857 Boston edition), Salem, New Hampshire, 1976. Hitchcock, a colorful figure (he rose to Major General in the US Army) was evidently a Swedenborgian. His contribution to the depth-psychological understanding of alchemy was first recognized by Herbert Silberer in *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism,* now available as *Hidden Symbolism of Alchemy and the Occult Arts,* New York, Dover Publications, 1971, pp. 151–8. The excitement for me about Hitchcock's formulation is not that it reduces the alchemical mercury to conscience but that it discovers Hermetic conscience, a moral instinct that in my experience is the most reliable guide for the development of integrity in psychotherapy. Hermetic conscience—in contrast to a rigid, moralistic superego on the one hand and a sociopathic absence of conscience on the other—is naturally liminal, capable of maintaining its autonomy as it negotiates moral opposites (such as Andrew Samuels' "original morality" and "moral imagination") and as it moves through archetypally fixed moral positions (such as Murray Stein's "solar conscience" with its paternal ethic of justice, and "lunar conscience" with its maternal ethic of care). (See Samuels' "Original Morality in a Depressed Culture," in *The Plural Psyche,* New York and London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 194–215, and Stein's s *Solar Conscience, Lunar Conscience,* Wilmette, IL, Chiron Publications, 1993.) This is a psychological conscience that gradually builds up a psychological attitude toward work on character. It is worth noting that Mercurius revealed himself to the seventeenth-century alchemist Michael Maier only *after* Maier had descended again through the planetary houses he had previously ascended along the traditional alchemical route from Saturn up to the Sun that was supposed to release

him from *heimarmene;* it was as he was going down again, back to Saturn and the intractable cold realities of character that remained there, that he met Mercurius, who proceeded to disclose his secrets to him. It is in discussing that downward return to the bedrock of individual nature that Jung gives us his most humble description of individuation, saying that "the maximal degree of consciousness confronts the ego with its shadow and individual psychic life with a collective psyche." Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis,* para 313, pp. 233–4.

30 Hillman, in a personal communication (February 1993), said as much: "All life destroys-so integrity means to me carrying this *limitation"*

31 The best discussion of this film can be found in Chapter 18 of Marina Warner's *From the Beast to the Blonde: On Fairy Tales and their Tellers,* New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994, pp. 313–18. Chapters 17 and 18 of this book discuss the background and evolution of the tale itself. My own, clinical amplification of the imagery of the film as representing a postmodern dialogic attitude toward the unconscious can be found in my paper "Attitudes Toward the Unconscious" in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology,* 1997, 42, pp. 3–20.

32 Here I am thinking mainly of Marie Louise von-Franz's exposition of the tale in her *The Golden Ass of Apuleius,* Boston, Shambhala, 1992, pp. 77–121, and of James Hillman's discussion of it in *The Myth of Analysis,* Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1972, *passim* and pp. 52–3 and 92–107. Most Jungian readers were introduced to the story by Erich Neumann's *Amor and Psyche,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1971 (paper). But see James Gollnick, *Love and the Soul: Psychological Interpretations of the Eros and Psyche Myth,* Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press (for Wilfrid Laurier University Press), 1992, for accounts of—in all—five Freudian and six Jungian interpretations of the myth. For the interesting suggestion that the tale of Psyche and Eros (or Amor, or Cupid) is really a version of "Beauty and the Beast," and not the other way around, see Iona and Peter Opie, *The Classic Fairy Tales,* London, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 137–8. (On pp. 139–50 the Opies reprint the original 1756 English translation of "Beauty and the Beast," from the classic text of Madame Leprince de Beaumont, whose familiar version of the story was used, with considerable modifications, for the Disney movie.)

33 See Joseph Henderson's discussion of "Beauty and the Beast" in his chapter "Ancient Myths and Modern Man," in Carl G.Jung *et. al.,* eds., *Man and his Symbols,* pp. 137–40. On page 138, Henderson writes, "As Beauty's father comments, the Beast seems cruel and kind at the same time." I have elsewhere called this hallmark of severe character disturbance "primary ambivalence toward the Self' (see note 4 above).

34 Viewing the film as a portrait of the masculine personality at mid-life and analyzing its typological structure, Beauty would represent the anima carrying the inferior fourth function, activated at mid-life, and Beast the demonic eighth function that lurks in the shadow of the anima, making its presence felt. In the movie, Gaston, the discredited ego figure, exhibits inflated extraverted thinking, Beauty anima introverted feeling, and Beast demonic extraverted feeling. For a discussion of the relation of archetypal complexes to psychological types see "The role of psychological type in possession" in Donald Sandner and John Beebe in "Psychopathology and Analysis," in Murray Stein, ed., *Jungian Analysis,* second edn, La Salle, IL, Open Court Publishing Company, 1995, pp. 322–330.

35 Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig, *Eros on Crutches: On the Nature of the Psychopath,* Dallas, TX, Spring Publications, 1980.

Chapter 4
The qualitative leap of faith
Reflections on Kierkegaard and Jung

Ann Casement

Introduction

This chapter is a piece of 'bricolage', a term I first encountered in Claude Lévi-Strauss' *The Savage Mind* (1962). In its original meaning, the French verb 'bricoler' was applied to ball games and to sports like hunting and riding and was used to describe a ball rebounding or a horse swerving from its direct course. The noun 'bricoleur' is now used for a Jack of all trades who uses devious means and whatever is at hand to perform his task. The mytho-poetic reflection I employ in this chapter is by its nature a work of bricolage. Hence I use the allusive tools inherent in the postmodern intellectual process—a nut from here, a bolt from there, a screw from somewhere else—in an attempt to describe the bricolage that is embedded in the writings of Kierkegaard, Freud and Jung.

Kierkegaard

Jung makes only two references to Kierkegaard in *The Collected Works.* In *The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,* he writes: There are many Europeans who began by surrendering completely to the influence of the Christian symbol until they landed themselves in a Kierkegaardian neurosis' (Jung 1959:8).

Again, in *The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation:* 'In the same way Western man is Christian, no matter to what denomination his Christianity belongs. For him man is small inside, he is next to nothing; moreover, as Kierkegaard says, "before God man is always wrong" ' (Jung 1958:482).

Hence it would appear that Jung believed his ideas had little affinity with those of the Danish philosopher. Nevertheless, I will argue that there are important and striking similarities in some of their writings. This chapter concentrates primarily on Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Dread* (1844), and an attempt will be made to relate the anxiety about the future, encapsulated in this work, to Jung' s concept of individuation.

One striking affinity between Kierkegaard and Jung was that both were deeply spiritual men who, at the same time, were antipathetic to conventional

Christianity. Each had a problematic relationship with their fathers, who were themselves inextricably caught in an unresolved religious dilemma.

I will begin by giving Kierkegaard's biography, because it may be unfamiliar to readers from psychological backgrounds. This chapter has taken his biographical details mainly from *Kierkegaard* (1988) by Patrick Gardiner, and from *Sophie's World* (1995) by Jostein Gaarder.

Soren Aabye Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen in 1813. Prior to his birth, his father, who had a lifelong influence on him, was a poor tenant-farmer's helper in the desolate region of western Jutland. One day the father, while still a young boy, desperate with rage at his suffering and at divine indifference to it, solemnly cursed God. Shortly after this incident, he was sent to work for an uncle in Copenhagen who was a hosier and from this time he prospered, ending his life as a rich man. He left his son a sufficiently large fortune so that the young Kierkegaard never had to earn his living and could devote his life to writing.

Although the material facts of Kierkegaard's life are very different from those of the young Carl Gustav Jung, what is far more relevant was the psychological inheritance which each received from the father. Kierkegaard's father combined a strict adherence to orthodox Lutheranism with a penchant for formal logic, both of which were enlivened by a captivating imagination. He devised an austere training for his brilliant son which incorporated all these elements. But there was a chronic melancholy in the father of which the son was disquietingly aware and he never managed to shake off the influence of his father's overpowering personality.

At an early age, Kierkegaard became aware of the burden of guilt that weighed on his father for the boyhood curse the latter had hurled at God. This, in turn, seemed to have brought down a curse on the whole family, as evidenced by the death of the mother and five of the seven brothers and sisters. In despair, Kierkegaard himself turned to a life of dissipation which he led until the death of his father in 1838, when he resumed his theology and philosophy studies.

In 1840 he became engaged to Regine Olsen, the daughter of a well-placed civil servant. A year later he broke off the engagement giving a variety of reasons for so doing. Although he never wavered in his choice in spite of her protestations, the broken engagement caused him great anguish both at the time and from then on, and he often alluded to it in disguised form in his work. After this traumatic incident, he devoted himself entirely to writing. From the perspective of Jungian psychology, Regine may have been an anima figure and inspiring muse who could not be contaminated by the sensualities and everyday aspects of marriage.

The Concept of Dread can be seen as anticipating what was to become depthpsychology and psychoanalysis. Before reviewing it at greater length, it will be necessary to place Kierkegaard's psychological and religious ideas in the context of their time. These grew out of his increasing rejection of Hegel's notion that distinct forms of consciousness follow one another in a dialectically necessary sequence, with opposing standpoints being reconciled at higher stages in the progressive evolution of universal mind or spirit. Kierkegaard also

abandoned a cognitive validation of religious belief from his own growing conviction that it was the subjective consciousness from which such belief sprang that should be the real subject for study. In his view, the Hegelian system inevitably led to an attitude to life based on *knowing* rather than *being,* with the result that ethics and morality were based on abstractions.

Kierkegaard saw this as reducing ethical living to a set of precepts that were passed on through didactic discourse by an autocratic authority figure who was deemed to hold the key to such knowledge. This kind of indoctrination results in mass-psychology and to an abnegation of responsibility by each person for his or her manner of living. The only way anyone can live consciously and responsibly is through interior reflection so that each person's choice is generated by individual feeling and passion rather than through cognitive learning.

It would be helpful at this point to summarize Kierkegaard's three stages of life —the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious—as he writes about them in another work *Either/Or* (1844). Each of these stages will in turn be related to relevant Jungian concepts.

The individual who lives his life aesthetically will be committed to nothing permanent or definite and will exist only for whatever pleasure, interest or excitement he can experience at the moment. He quickly tires of or becomes bored with whatever activity he is involved in and is easily diverted from his task by another interest. Jung's term for this phenomenon is the 'provisional life' exemplified by that of *the puer aeternus* or eternal youth, whose tendency to fly too high needs to be grounded through commitment to work. In Kierkegaard's view, if the individual chooses to remain stuck at this stage, he ends up being fatalistic or even cynical about life. Jung would describe this as an *enantiodromia,* an uncontrolled swing to the opposite of the eternal youth which is what he calls the negative *senex* or old man.

The ethical stance is one of living in a reciprocal relationship with one's surroundings so that such a man will usually enter into marriage, have a job or useful occupation and conduct his civic duties in a responsible manner. At the same time he may be conscious of his lack of faith. It is this that underlies the religious life and an individual can only attain it through what Kierkegaard called a qualitative leap of faith, which is a spiritual and not a rational movement. In the final analysis, this is a deeply paradoxical path which may even be opposed to society's mores. Kierkegaard's ethical stage resonates with what Jung terms the 'collective life' and also with Hegel's idea of combining individual conscience and civic responsibility into a socially based concept of morality.

However, it is the religious stage which is the individual's highest achievement and is equivalent to the way of life of one who has embarked on what Jung calls individuation.

Both Kierkegaard and Jung are 'existential' thinkers who draw their entire existence into their philosophical reflections. Jung refers to the personal equation in his work as follows: 'Every psychology—my own included—has the character of a subjective confession' (Jung 1961:336).

The Concept of Dread

At the time of the Enlightenment, the contents of the Bible came under fresh scrutiny, with the myth of the fall of Adam and Eve receiving most attention, depicting as it does the timeless conflict between Good and Evil. The exegetical exercise that started in the eighteenth century continued into the twentieth, with Jung's *Answer to Job* (1958) standing out as one of the most controversial of these works.

Jung wrote elsewhere: 'Neurosis is intimately bound up with the problem of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person' (Jung 1953:20).Our angst-ridden age was heralded by Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Dread,* which postulates that dread is a *prelude* to sin not its *sequel* and may precede a shift from a state of ignorance to attainment of new awareness.

It follows from this that innocence is ignorance so that when it is stated in the *Book of Genesis* that God said to Adam, 'Only from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you must not eat', Adam does not understand, for the distinction between the two would only follow as a result of his eating the fruit. Thus Adam is in a state of ignorance when the voice of prohibition awakens in him a new set of possibilities, including the possibility of disobedience.

It is the end of his ignorance, the beginning of his ethical responsibility, but he still cannot say what he is responsible for. Contrary to most theological speculation on the subject, Kierkegaard has shown that Adam could not have interpreted the meaning of the prohibition in ethical terms, for the simple reason that he had first to eat the forbidden fruit in order to acquire knowledge of good and evil.

Having defined dread as a prelude to sin which precedes the attainment of new awareness, it may be useful to further differentiate it from, on the one hand, fear which is focused on an object and, on the other, anguish which is retrospective. As opposed to both of these, dread is prospective, objectless and free floating.

The qualitative leap of faith

It is necessary now to retrace our steps to the first section of this chapter and concentrate on the last stage in Kierkegaard's three categories of the aesthetic, ethical and religious life. The latter depends on what he calls a qualitative leap of faith which owes nothing to reason but is instead to do with an individual's inner experience of spirituality. This is presaged in the story of Adam by feelings of awesome dread in relation to the forbidding father.

Much of what follows in the next few pages will be touching on familiar material in the Jungian canon. To start with, there is Jung's reaction to his famous dream at the age of 12 which bears a striking resemblance to what happens to Adam in the above account. Jung recounted this shortly before his

death in 1961 to E.A.Bennet, a member of the Society of Analytical Psychology, as follows:

> 'I was in the rather gloomy courtyard of the Gymnasium at Basel, a beautiful medieval building. From the courtyard I went through the big entrance where the coaches used to come in, and there before me was the Cathedral of Basel, the sun shining on the roof of coloured tiles, recently renovated, a most impressive sight. Above the Cathedral God was sitting on His throne. I thought: "How beautiful it all is! What a wonderful world this is—how perfect, how complete, how full of harmony." Then something happened so unexpected and so shattering that I woke up. There the dream ended. I could not allow myself to *think* of what I had seen…for had I done so I would be compelled to accept it, and this I couldn't possibly do. So I made every effort to put the thought from my mind…. I lay in bed, unable to get to sleep again, thinking of the dream and of the horrifying picture I had seen. The next day I looked worried and pale, and my mother asked if there was anything wrong; "Has something gone wrong in school?" "Oh, no," I replied. "Everything is all right."'
>
> (Bennet 1961:16)

The next night the same unwelcome thought returned to disturb him, but he could not allow it to enter his consciousness as he was at the time a devout Christian. It recurred again on the third night and this time he thought to himself:

> 'Perhaps God wants me to think this thing as a test, to see if I am a true believer. But where could such an awful thing come from? Could it come from the Devil? But then the Devil would be greater than God.' Then came the idea: 'God is testing me, and if I could accept the awful thought it would prove my belief in God.'
>
> (Ibid.: 17)

Jung went on to tell Bennet that in his torment he associated the terrible thought with the Fall of Adam and Bennet's narrative continues:

> Then came a great moment: he (Jung) sat up in bed sweating and trembling, for he felt: 'God must mean me to accept this awful scene as my own thought,' and at that moment he did accept it. It was as follows: From his throne God 'dropped' a vast faeces on the Cathedral and smashed it to pieces. This was a terrific thing, for it could only mean that the Church, his father's teaching, and his own beliefs had to be thought of in an entirely different way.
>
> (Ibid.)

Once he had accepted the thought all the anxiety associated with it faded, and he realized that he was now his own person and had separated from an identification with his father. This qualitative leap brought home to Jung that from then on he had to accept responsibility for himself through listening to his inner experience and to think his own thoughts based only on what he understood. This leap into faith for Jung, as for Adam, came through transgression of the law of the father. In other words, the paradox posed by the religious life is that it emerges as a result of sin rather than through conformity. As Kierkegaard puts it in *Philosophical Fragments* (1992:81):

> But in that case is not Faith as paradoxical as the Paradox? Precisely so; how else could it have the Paradox for its object, and be happy in its relation to the Paradox? Faith is itself a miracle, and all that holds true of the Paradox also holds true of Faith.

Paradox also applies to the Janus-faced father that Jung points to in *Answer to Job,* who shows the Tree of Knowledge to Adam and Eve but at the same time forbids them to eat of its fruit. This points to yet another paradox, namely the role of frustration in the evolution of consciousness where the role of the father who says 'no' is secretly a subversive one and is implicated in the creativity of coping with life. In this way, Yahweh unintentionally brings about the Fall.

Freud and Jung

The unresolved religious dilemma that Kierkegaard's father remained caught in throughout his life has been touched on above. In material terms, however, he was a successful self-made man. In contrast, the fathers of both Freud and Jung were on the surface kindly men but experienced by their sons as weak and as failures in life. Their mothers, on the other hand, were powerful women from whom both sons never ultimately managed to separate psychologically. Jung's mother had what he described as an 'uncanny' side to her which filled him with mixed feelings in childhood. Freud's complex feelings towards his mother meant that women always remained a mystery to him and he described them as unknowable as a 'dark continent'.

Freud's father, on the other hand, was old enough to be his grandfather, and the son's equivocal feelings towards the father may be illustrated by two experiences. One day when he was walking with his father in the street the latter told him how much conditions had improved for Jews. He illustrated this by telling the boy that when he himself was a young man a gentile walking towards him on the pavement had knocked his hat into the gutter exclaiming: 'Jew, off the sidewalk!' Freud's father's response to this insult was submissive, which Freud could neither comprehend nor accept.

In contrast to this, his father faced death in 1896 with dignity and courage, qualities replicated by the son in 1939. Initially, Freud did not seem to be unduly

affected by this death, but years later, struggling with guilt feelings for surpassing his father, Freud came to see *The Interpretation of Dreams* as 'a piece of my selfanalysis, my reaction to my father's death, that is the most significant event, the most decisive loss, of a man's life' (Gay 1988:89).

Murray Stein's illuminating book, *Jung's Treatment of Christianity,* includes an account of Jung's childhood which shows how his attitude to Christianity was to a great extent a response to its ailments and to the resultant withered spiritual life of his father. Jung the elder was a pastor in the Swiss Reformed Church but, in spite of being a religious, he was unable to help his son in the latter's struggles with Christian theology and doctrine. As Jung matured, he held the Christian Church, as well as his father, accountable for their inability to struggle with the great spiritual issues of the day. Stein's convincing argument is that Jung saw his spiritual vocation as the path to healing the source of his father's suffering. In this way, Jung's attitude to Christianity was akin to a patient who needed 'treatment'.

As far as Jung was concerned, his father had gone along with the conventional Christian attitude to God as all good and had never had the courage to experience and survive the immediate living dark side of God. 'This made his religion shallow …and in the end, Jung felt, "faith broke faith with him" ' (Stein 1985: 74).

It is against this background of their relationships with their fathers that one needs to examine, on the one hand, Kierkegaard's and Jung's lifelong dedication to the spiritual life and, on the other, Jung and Freud's relationship with each other, culminating as it does in 1913 in a calamitous rupture which had enormous repercussions for future generations of their followers.

They were first drawn to each other out of mutual self-interest. Freud's theory of repression served to underwrite Jung's Word Association Tests, whereas the latter for its part could be used to prove Freud's theory. The mechanism of repression derived from the theory of neuroses and similarly, in experiments with word association, Jung found that there was either no response or a disturbed one to a stimulus word if it touched on a psychic conflict.

However, even at this early stage, although Jung wholeheartedly accepted the mechanism of repression, he could not do the same with what Freud postulated lay behind repression, namely that it was always sexually generated. As Jung recounts in the now contentious *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1963), even at their first meeting in Vienna in 1907, he could see that Freud's theory of sexuality was of enormous philosophical and personal importance to him and the latter argued persuasively with Jung to this effect. Although Jung was impressed, he could not finally decide whether the strength of Freud's argument was based on subjective prejudice or on empirical experience.

Paul Stepansky proposes another reason for the Freud/Jung rupture in his chapter, 'The Emipiricist as Rebel: Jung, Freud, and the Burdens of Discipleship' (Stepansky 1992). The gist of his thesis based on the Freud/Jung correspondence is that Freud had tolerated Jung's doubts about the sexual theory

and even allowed him plenty of scope to develop his own theoretical differences within the psychoanalytic movement, because he needed Jung to be a bridge between psychoanalysis and a hostile gentile world. Furthermore, he wanted Jung to take psychoanalysis further than he had done previously and apply it not only to the neuroses but also to the psychoses, which Jung as a brilliant psychiatrist would have been ideally placed to do. Freud goes on to say to Jung: 'With your Germanic blood which enables you to command the sympathies of the public more readily than I, you seem better fitted than anyone else I know to carry out this mission' (McGuire 1974:168).

Stepansky's thesis is sound as far as it goes but it serves only to explain the more conscious interaction between these two fascinating figures. But the passion that ran through their association and subsequent rupture and the abiding sense one is left with of neither ever fully recovering cannot be explained only by Freud's fear that, in the end, and in spite of his usefulness, Jung was too disruptive in the psychoanalytic movement so that Freud finally felt impelled to withdraw his support of him.

In both E.A.Bennet's account of Jung and in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* it is libido theory that appears as the insurmountable obstacle to their continuing co-operation in the psychoanalytic enterprise. Jung recounts how Freud pleaded with him in 1910 'never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark.' (Jung 1963:173).

When Jung asked what it was a bulwark against, Freud replied: 'Against the black tide of mud of occultism' (ibid.). Jung concluded from this impassioned plea that Freud had, in spite of his conscious aversion to religiosity, constructed a dogma. In other words, sexual libido had assumed divine form and taken the place of religion in the guise of a hidden or concealed god but in this form had the advantage of being scientifically acceptable. As Jung says: 'For Freud, sexuality was undoubtedly a *numinosum*' (ibid.: 175).

After the parting of the ways in 1913, Jung spent several years trying to resolve its impact on him. As for Freud, Bennet recounts a meeting he had with him in 1932 when Freud said quietly: 'Jung was a great loss' (Bennet 1961:56). In contrast, it is not difficult to discern who Jung is really alluding to when he writes of Yahweh:

> With his touchiness and suspiciousness the mere possibility of doubt was enough to infuriate him and induce that peculiar double-faced behaviour of which he had already given proof in the Garden of Eden, when he pointed out the tree to the First Parents and at the same time forbade them to eat of it.
>
> (Jung 1958:13)

The trickster father

The above quotation points to the archetypal trickster father but Jung is still, even at this late stage, living it through projection. He himself, like Freud, was a trickster father to his followers, being seemingly unaware of his own ambivalent creative/destructive impact on them. The father's attitude towards his children, particularly his sons, is always ambivalent and the more unconscious he is of this the more it will be lived through projection.

John Beebe has illustrated this well in his paper, 'The Father's Anima' (Beebe 1985), where he emphasizes both the androgynous and trickster aspects inherent in this anima. Like Kierkegaard, Beebe turns to the Bible for his inspiration and the story of Joseph and the coat of many colours. The latter was the son of his father Jacob's favourite wife who died in childbirth. Jacob saw the beauty of his wife reflected in Joseph and grew to have a greater love for him than for all his other children. Their resulting envy caused them to throw Joseph into the pit just as later his rejection of Potiphar's wife's sexual advances ended in his imprisonment. Beebe sees both of these events symbolically as Joseph's descent into depression and the realization of the hidden resentment behind his father's loving expressions. 'When finally Joseph emerges from prison …he is a very different person from the youth who naively paraded his dreams before his father and his brothers' (Beebe 1985:104).

There is a clear affinity between the story of Joseph and Jacob and that of Jung and Freud, and as Beebe goes on to say: 'When a previously encouraging fatherfigure snatches back his anima, it can feel like a major betrayal' (Beebe 1985:104). Depression always follows an act of betrayal—witness Adam's depression (descent from paradise), Joseph's depression (the pit and imprisonment), and Jung's depression after the break with Freud. This is the psyche's way of allowing for self-reflection and many people come into analysis after an experience of feeling betrayed or of betraying. This kind of depression is experienced as a fall from grace from the idealized relationship with the all-loving father and the letting go of the resultant feelings of omnipotence. It has in it the potential for individuation of the son/ daughter, who is the carrier of the raw material for the humanized father and who suffers as he does.

The coiled serpent

My own 'awakening' from identification with the idealized father came at the border stage between 20 and 30 years of age. I had started, in my first analysis in my mid-twenties in the 1960s, to look more deeply at a recurring life situation. I quickly became fascinated and my analyst and I entered a mutually idealizing transference/countertransference. Apparently I had analytic potential and within a year of starting analysis I had been introduced into the London Jung Club, which at that time housed all the UK Jungians under one roof. I felt daunted by the presence of Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler but I seemed to be

welcome in spite of the age differential between myself and most of the other members. I began to realize that this was in part due to my having the necessary 'credentials', i.e. I was an introverted thinking intuitive. It seemed that one was an acceptable person if one displayed such qualities and this, of course, served to reinforce my already strong thinking function. The fact that my analyst was also a 'thinker' added further to this.

After a few years of being in analysis I was encouraged to think of training as a therapist myself. I was accepted at one of the training institutions after a brief interview with a senior male therapist. Shortly before beginning training I had the following dream:

> *I am walking alone and come to a gate. I look over and see a large coiled cobra asleep on the other side. I have a camera with me and lean over the top of the gate and start to take photographs of the serpent.*

I was mindful of feelings of unease in association with this dream. I took it to my next session of analysis and became aware that my analyst was also looking worried. I was told that I was behaving like a tourist in the unconscious and to beware of awakening the serpent. This dream changed the highly collusive analytic relationship that had existed between us up to that time and I felt betrayed as if I had been cast out of Paradise.

Shortly after this I started training, and within a brief space of time was assigned my own clients. At first I had little idea what to do in sessions, but had always had a convincing persona of competence to the extent that authority figures were confident I was doing well (and told me so). I was given even more clients to work with. Only my supervisor, a Kleinian, was aware of my difficulties and she began to reflect this back to me. But I misconstrued her concern as envy and became antagonistic towards her. In this I was backed up by the other powerful authority figures at the place—most of whom were men.

Around this time the serpent awoke. I would like to recap on the dream and to draw attention to the fact that the serpent featured in it was an Indian cobra. This particular sub-species spits its venom when aroused and if it hits the victim in the eyes leads to temporary or even permanent blindness. I found myself in a completely unknown place, one in which my intellect was of no use at all. My body became the theatre where all this was acted out and for several months I was at the mercy of strange bodily sensations resembling panic attacks. At first I felt that these were only negative sensations, but slowly began to realize that I was experiencing being in my body in a way I had never known before. This realization helped to reduce my fear and slowly the attacks began to abate.

No one else seemed to notice that I was experiencing life in a totally new and perplexing way, but I eventually decided that what was happening to me needed to be valued rather than wished away and that I must take some time off to be with myself. At this point, several of the senior authority figures at the institute where I was training reflected back to me that what I was going through was

evidence of my analytic potential and that I must seriously consider training as an analyst in the near future.

I myself was quite aware that this was in fact my 'calling', but I realized I was passing through a major inner transformation and that I needed to follow my psyche in directing my energies inwards rather than outwards.

I completed my training at the therapy institute and then took myself out of any further training for some time while I allowed myself to negotiate this rite of passage. The awakening cobra had indeed blinded me temporarily so that I could not *think* about what was happening to me but only experience it. As the blindness lifted I began to 'see' in another way—the way of the psyche.

The (unconscious) murderous father

I have had the privilege of accompanying other people who have been in analysis with me on a similar rite of passage towards individuating. I present below a piece of case material from a long analysis with a woman which was completed some time ago. She was happy for it to be used at some future date in any way that might be useful for others. I am doing so *mutatis mutandis*. The analysis lasted for several years at a frequency of three sessions a week and the patient initially started on the couch. I will call her Joanna for the purposes of this chapter.

The woman is not British but is from another Western culture. She had come to England two years previously to be seconded to a firm in London by the home company. She was in her early thirties when I started to see her and her presenting problem as she put it to me was that she had left her family behind physically and it now seemed like the right moment to work on leaving it psychologically.

I always ask myself: 'What rite of passage is this individual needing to negotiate?' When I asked her: 'Why now?' she responded that the trigger was a deepening relationship with an Englishman in which she realized that she was repeating patterns; for instance, there were already problems she recognized as ones she had encountered previously. She named one in particular in the sexual area —at the beginning of any interaction with a man this was usually satisfactory and even good, but subsequently she always ended up being the dominant partner and this seemed to affect the sex. She was really invested in this new relationship and wanted to give it a chance to work instead of 'killing it off as I usually do'.

The family background was convoluted and reminded her, she said, of the kind of dark family life depicted by François Mauriac in *Le Noeud de Vipères,* which she had read while taking the equivalent of A level French. Her father was from a lower social background and also much older than her mother. He had married her even though he did not love her because 'she could teach him to use a knife and fork'.

The real marriage though was between the father and the mother's father. The former had transferred his need for a strong father on to the latter, his own father having been a nonenity who achieved nothing. The latter does sound as if he

remained a lifelong puer. His son had despised him for this and reacted by being overweeningly ambitious to succeed in business, make money and become socially acceptable.

The three children of the marriage were psychologically the offspring of the union between the father and the mother's father. Mother was a puella who had never really matured into a woman and so could not be a wife and mother but remained the 'nothing-but-daughter', both of her own father and of her husband/father. This is of course a repetition of the father's relationship with his own father, and the mother was patronized within the family circle as she had never really grown up.

My patient was the single daughter in a family of three children with an older and a younger brother. The first son was bullied and pushed to achieve by his father to the point where he had a complete depressive breakdown in adolescence. He had periods of hospitilization and was often on anti-depressants. He seemed able to cope with life better since he met and married an older woman in his thirties and is now a compliant son to his father and works in the family business.

The younger son rebelled against the father's bullying by being a drop-out for several years and taking hard drugs, eventually becoming dependent on cocaine. He and his father had a tense relationship for years but the son finally went into a drug rehabilitation centre and is currently a mature student at university.

The daughter was the achiever of the three, doing well at school and university and then later in the kind of career of which her father absolutely approved. She was the father's anima and they were locked together in a psychologically incestuous relationship. She had a number of superficial affairs as time passed but none managed to dislodge her from this incestuous relationship.

Then, at about 25 years old, she fell in love, and her father's reaction to this was one of outrage and of feeling betrayed by her. He eventually came round to accepting it on the surface and even agreed to her marrying her new love. But he pleaded with her not to have children too quickly after marriage but to continue to develop her career.

Around the time of the wedding Joanna had herself fitted with a contraceptive device. It was troublesome from the outset and turned so bad on her that she had to have it removed. In the process, it was discovered that the device had damaged her reproductive organs and eventually this resulted in her having to be sterilized.

This terrible sequence of events finally dislodged her from the idealized identification with father and she began, instead, to experience him as only negative. All the repressed anger towards him erupted on her. She told me that at this time she remembered how when she was an adolescent she had had pretensions to be a writer. She used to write prose and poetry and often showed them to him.

One day, he reciprocated by giving her a manuscript to read that he had written years ago and tried unsuccessfully to have published. It was a sleazy

thriller in which three young children are brutally murdered one after the other by a sadistic man. To her horror, she realized that he had written it at the time when she and her two siblings were the same age as the three children in the story, and that it must represent his unconscious murderous feelings towards his own three children.

At the time of reading it her dawning awareness of his repressed feelings were too horrible for her to contemplate, and she quickly put away the memory of the manuscript and all that it represented. But after the trauma of losing her reproductive capacity, for which she blamed her father, she remembered the murderous feelings he had expressed in the manuscript and turned against him completely. He was devastated by her rejection, particularly as he had no understanding of why it had happened. Her marriage also never recovered from this blow, and shortly after it fell apart, ending in divorce.

Joanna tried to have therapy in her own country about this time but could not stay in it, the ostensible reason being that the (male) therapist was 'not very bright'. Her bitterness against life in general and men in particular hardened her and she decided that from then on she would devote herself to her career and only have superficial sexual interactions with men.

This is a not uncommon reaction to a sudden eruption of the dark numinous feelings that are part of psychological incest so that the idealized one becomes the hated and rejected one. Sometime after all this she left her country and was sent by her firm to London for a long stay.

To recap what was said at the beginning of this case study: Joanna started in analysis with me about two years after arriving in London. At the outset of any analysis that I undertake, the patient sits in a chair initially while I listen to some of the life history and make an assessment of how many sessions of analysis per week are needed and whether the patient would need to lie on the couch or remain in the chair. In this instance, I decided that this patient would benefit from being on the couch, as she tended to come to sessions with an agenda and to need to keep me in view. We looked at the possibility of her moving to the couch and she almost immediately seemed to feel quite positive about this. At the following session, she went over to the couch and lay on it.

At first we seemed to be working well together, and I was aware of her shifting transference feelings on to me. Sometimes I was the mother to be patronized, sometimes the clever father whom she idealized. My own countertransference feelings to her were warm and I believed I would need to be aware that we did not fall into a symbiotic father/daughter closeness, the traumatic loss of which still had her in its grip. It seemed to me that the rite of passage that she needed to negotiate was actually mourning this loss as a prelude to leaving childhood behind and beginning an initiation into womanhood. I also became increasingly aware that although she had a well-functioning intellect, emotionally she was out of touch with her feelings and there was little sense of her being well placed in her body.

After about two months of her using the couch, I began to experience a change in her and she increasingly regressed to being a frightened child. She would bury her head in the pillow and whimper. At the same time, I was aware of powerfully sadistic feelings towards her when she behaved in this regressed way. I realized that as she was re-experiencing me as the fearful father in the transference, this was simultaneously calling up murderous feelings in me.

In the past, Joanna had dealt with this fear by identifying with her father and becoming the bright child he wanted her to be. She had remained locked in this until his traumatic 'killing' of her own maternal capacities when her love for her father fell into its opposite of hate. Over the next few months she was able to mourn the loss of her father/lover and then to marry me symbolically. As the alchemical marriage became increasingly internalized she began to experience being in a much more positive relationship to herself emotionally, psychologically and physically. This eventually manifested 'out there' in an adult relationship to a man for the first time in her life.

The analysis continued for some time, but this was the most vital transmutative stage in the process.

The transformative father

Andrew Samuels in his writings on fathers suggests that the trickster element may be there in them in order to sublimate infanticidal impulses towards their children. In the case I have described above I have tried to show that where these impulses are so unconscious, they may be acted out in the kind of tragic way that I have described in Joanna's case and in the way that John Beebe describes in the Joseph story from the Bible. Paradoxically, this in turn may signal the beginnings of the person's own individuating process.

The trickster father appears in Kierkegaard's account of the story of Adam and in Freud and Jung's experience of their own fathers. This tricksterish element then erupted on both in the course of their relationship to each other which was that of idealized father to idealized son.

Samuels brilliantly encapsulates this archetype in a few words: 'The peculiar Trickster blend of unconsciousness, grandiosity and a kind of wild… transformative capacity are, to some degree, locked up in father imagery on the ordinary, human level' (Samuels 1993:127).

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Part III

Clinical papers

Chapter 5
Archetypal affect, anxiety and defence in patients who have suffered early trauma

Donald E.Kalsched

Introductory remarks

Patients who have suffered early trauma present special difficulties in the psychoanalytic situation but also special opportunities for understanding the inner world of the psyche, especially the dramatic ways in which *archaic* and *typical* (archetypal) defences seem to protect an essential core of the person from unbearable affect and anxiety. I have called these defences the 'self-care-system' of the personality (see Kalsched 1996). The self-care-system is equivalent to Winnicott's 'false self' identified with the mind (Winnicott 1960), to Ferenczi's 'wise baby self' representing the traumatically progressed part of the original whole self (Ferenczi 1988), and to Corrigan and Gordon's 'mind/object', an omnipotent fantasy image that provides self-holding in the face of a breakdown in transitional processes (Corrigan and Gordon 1995:21). In the pages that follow, I hope to show that the self-care-system is also something 'more' than these designations, i.e. that it has an archetypal basis and is explainable only in terms of Jung's model of the psyche which includes the 'psychoid' realm where the archetypes reside. By 'psychoid' Jung meant a supra-individual or 'transpsychic reality immediately underlying the psyche' (Jung 1928b, para 860), which can appear simultaneously as both a psychic and a physical phenomenon (Jung 1955b para 964), thus pointing to the sphere of the *unus mundus* (Jung 1955a, para 852).

Early trauma is by definition an experience that causes the child unbearable psychic pain—pain so severe that it cannot be processed by the psyche's symbolic and integrative capacities, owing to the ego's immaturity. Henry Krystal (1988: 140–6) describes how the traumatized child is left flooded by volcanic eruptions of 'affect precursors' or 'ur-affects', leading to a paralyzed, overwhelmed state, psychic numbness and dissociation. Winnicott refers to the 'primitive agonies' of a traumatic infancy, experience of which is 'unthinkable' (1963:90). Finally Kohut distinguished between two types of anxiety in the clinical situation—the first experienced by a person whose self is more or less cohesive, the second comprising anxieties experienced by a person whose very

self is beginning to disintegrate, threatening total fragmentation and estrangement from body and mind (1977: 102–4). Such 'disintegration anxiety', says Kohut, is 'the deepest anxiety man can experience, and none of the forms of anxiety described by Freud are equivalent to it' (1984:16). All these descriptions emphasize the 'unspeakable horror' of early trauma and the lasting anxiety it evokes in the personality—trying to describe in ego-language an experience that is essentially indescribable. We might think of it as an experience of *archetypal anxiety*.

When psychic pain is 'unthinkable', an essential core of the person which we will call the 'personal spirit' is threatened with extinction. This must be avoided at all costs, and so what Winnicott (1960) called 'primitive defensive operations' come into play to ensure that the overwhelming affect is not fully experienced or retained as a 'memory'. Instead, such affects are dissociated, encapsulated, evacuated into the body (later to appear as physical symptoms) or acted out in a blind 'repetition compulsion'. With such severe splitting, the coherent structures of the inner world —its organizing affect-images (archetypes)—break down, leaving meaningless affects and 'disaffected' images afloat in a melange of disconnected 'bits' (Bion 1959). The person continues to live but lives falsely, terrified of a future breakdown *that has already been experienced* (Winnicott 1963:90) but cannot be remembered.

Although Jung wrote much about dissociation and complex formation as the psyche's natural response to anxiety, he said very little about traumatic levels of anxiety in early childhood and still less about the defences against such anxiety. A careful reading of his early writings about schizophrenia and psychotic levels of dissociation shows that while he clearly recognized Winnicott's 'primitive agonies' or Kohut's 'disintegration anxiety', he was not inclined to trace these to early developmental failures in the child's object relations. Instead, he preferred to describe them in terms of *religious experience*—part of the ego's encounter with what Rudolf Otto (1958) called the 'Numinosum'.

For example, to a young scholar who was studying the role of anxiety in Kierkegaard's work, Jung wrote:

> To the question whether anxiety is the subject or object of the philosophers, I can only answer: anxiety can never be the object unless it is, or was, first the subject. In other words, anxiety, as affect, always *has us*…. Question: is it an object worthy of anxiety, or a poltroonery of the ego, shitting its pants? [Compare Freud, 'The ego is the seat of anxiety', with Job 28:28, 'The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom'.] What is the 'anxiety of the ego,' this 'modestly modest' overweeningness and presumption of a little tin god, compared with the almighty shadow of the Lord, which is the fear that fills heaven and earth? The first leads to apotropaic defensive philosophy, the second to knowedge of God.
>
> (Jung 1973:333)

Here Jung disparages the ego and ego-anxieties as superficial compared to those incomparably deeper anxieties involved in an unmediated encounter between the ego and the numinous 'shadow of the Lord', i.e. the dark side of the numinosum or Self. In this very 'non-clinical' statement, Jung sets forth part of the challenge that this chapter hopes to meet. How do we reconcile Jung's mythopoetic religious fantasy about the 'deeper anxiety' in the psyche with the best in contemporary analytic research, which invariably traces such 'deeper' anxiety to early trauma and the defence-organization that follows it as severe personality disorder?

In approaching such a reconciliation, it seems clear that Jungian thought must be expanded to include the findings of early object-relations theorists and self-psychology on the subject of early trauma, its anxiety and defences. At the same time, contemporary psychoanalysis stands to be enriched by Jungian thinking on this subject. For example, while psychoanalysis has long understood how destructive primitive defences are in causing severe psychopathology, rarely do these defences get any 'credit', so to speak, for having accomplished anything in the preservation of life for the person whose heart is broken by trauma. And while everyone agrees how maladaptive these defences are in the later life of the patient, few writers have acknowledged the miraculous nature of these defences —their life-saving sophistication or their archetypal nature and meaning.

Because these primitive defences seem to be co-ordinated by a deeper centre in the personality than the ego, and because they involve *prehistoric* fantasy-forms seemingly identical with Jung's notion of the archetype, they have been referred to by Leopold Stein (1967) as 'defences of the Self'. Stein further proposed that such defences might operate (or fail to operate) much like the body's immune system. Michael Fordham (1974) extended these speculations into his work with early infantile autism where he found that 'unthinkable' affects (such as a mother's death-wish for her infant) were defended against by autistic encapsulation even in the very first days of life.

Neither Stein nor Fordham systematically developed their concept 'defences of the Self', although the idea of early anxiety and defence has found its way into many papers by Jungian authors. The basic goal of these investigations has been to bring Jungian thought into line with the theory and treatment of the more serious personality disorders, including the borderline conditions (Sandner and Beebe 1982; Schwartz-Salant 1989), depression (Mudd 1989; Hubback 1991), addictions (Salman 1986), schizoid disorders (Proner 1986; Savitz 1991), psychosis (Satinover 1985; Redfearn 1992) and early trauma (Early 1993; Kalsched 1996). This chapter is a continuation of this effort, specifically as related to defences of the Self and early trauma.

A dream showing archetypal anxiety and defence

The inspiration for this chapter comes from my encounter with an especially disturbing set of nightmares, or dream motifs during psychoanalytic work with

patients who (it later emerged) had suffered significant early emotional trauma in childhood. In the typical anxiety-dream of these patients, the helpless dream ego (or other vulnerable image with which the dreamer is identified—often a child or innocent animal) is persecuted, chased or attacked by terrifying dark 'forces', including vampires, demons, Nazis, or vicious animal-like 'beings'. Often the dream ego's body is dismembered, tortured, shot or set upon by destructive forces such as stinging insects, rats or atomic radiation. Sometimes the overwhelming figure anaesthetizes the dream ego with drugs, or imprisons it in a concentration camp where sadistic torture often ensues. How do we undertand this?

Jung was explicit about how dreams often portray traumatic anxiety. He once said:

> a traumatic complex brings about dissociation of the psyche. The complex is not under the control of the will…it forces itself tyrannically upon the conscious mind. The explosion of affect is a complete invasion of the individual, it pounces upon him like an enemy or a wild animal. I have frequently observed that the typical traumatic affect is represented in dreams as a wild and dangerous animal—a striking illustration of its autonomous nature when split off from consciousness.
>
> (Jung 1928a, paras 266–7)

The idea that explosive, traumatic affect might actually be represented in dreams as something wild, dangerous and terrifying gives us a preliminary way of imagining that 'unthinkable' anxiety to which Winnicott and Kohut refer. As I began to pursue this idea, I also realized that the horrific violent imagery of so many trauma victims' dreams might be the way dreams 'outpicture' the archetypal affects (rage) and fantasies (murderous attack) employed by the defensive system in the service of 'dismembering' experience. These ideas combined to form a central hypothesis of this chapter, i.e. that primitive anxiety and its defences are personified in dreams and other imaginal products of the psyche in the form of archetypal daimonic images and motifs. Dreams therefore give us access to early trauma, its affects and defences, in ways not available to us before, and thereby increase our understanding of the 'unthinkable' affects of infancy.

If this hypothesis were valid, it would mean that a great deal of dream imagery that we tend to interpret constructively (telos of the dream), symbolically (synthetic message of the dream), or compensatorily (ego-corrective aspects of the dream) really represents something altogether different, namely the psyche's self-portrait of its own archaic defensive operations. This struck me as a revolutionary hypothesis. And yet, as I turned the idea over in my mind, its validity seemed likely. After all, every living organism is centrally 'preoccupied' from birth until death with self-protection and defence. The miracle of life is matched only by the miracle of life's manifold self-protective capacities. One

thinks for example of the intricate patterns of camouflage in the animal kingdom and across the whole spectrum of living things, including the almost unfathomable complexity of the body's immune system. How could it be otherwise in that liminal space of the collective psyche where the 'spark' of the personal spirit is menaced on one side by the lacerating edges of traumatic reality and on the other by volcanic archetypal affects threatening to dissolve or annihilate it?

Reasoning further along this line, I then asked myself: 'Under what conditions does the violent self-attacking imagery that might qualify as trauma-linked affect and defence appear in the analytic process with trauma patients?' A preliminary review of my cases indicated that most of these horrific dream images appeared at moments when my patients' original, long since 'forgotten' traumatic affect was being 'remembered' in the transference. Technically it would be more accurate to say 'repeated' in the transference, given that repetition *was* the only memory. For example, a highly defended, self-sufficient 35-year-old woman, in therapy for one year, was just now beginning to trust the analytic container enough to open up her heretofore private hell of childhood pain. After an especially dramatic session in which she reviewed some shame-ridden early experience to the point where she began to panic in the session with trouble in breathing, she returned home and that night had the following dream:

> I am captive with a group of young girls on a houseboat on some canal system. It is an inky dark night. The Captain keeps trying to kill us one by one. I'm trying to escape with a young girl with whom I'm chained at the ankles but she is weak and can't keep up with me until finally we are captured. The young girl lies in shallow water. I keep trying to pull her up with the chain so she can breathe, but she keeps falling back into the water. The Captain is watching this with pleasure. He comes over and with his boot on her throat pushes her under. I'm overcome with grief and rage.

When nightmares such as this emerge in the psychoanalytic process, they often seem incomprehensible to both patient and analyst alike. Their violent archetypal content does not appear to be part of a synthetic individuation process guided by the 'wisdom of the psyche' or the Self. One searches in vain for compensatory themes in such dreams. Nor can one legitimately ask the patient to 'own' or take responsibility for the archetypal sadism of the violent figures in these dreams as 'shadow-parts of themselves'. This would be equivalent to forcing a collective content on to the personal ego and would only serve to exacerbate the patient's inner feeling of badness.

In early 'classical' Jungian circles one used to hear the optimistic interpretation of such nightmares that 'perhaps something in the person needs to die'. Such optimism expresses a central tenet of Jungian theory, i.e. that all suffering has a meaning and that dream-figures are all unrecognized parts of the whole personality which seek to compel the ego's recognition (Jung 1934, para

362). While this is no doubt true for most 'normal neuroses' and their unconscious complexes, it does *not* appear to be true in the area of severe early trauma and the archetypal defences against disintegrative levels of anxiety liberated by trauma. While we can imagine that such a malevolent attack by one part of the psyche against another has a 'meaning' in the overall economy of the psyche, it is not the usual *compensatory* or *prospective* meaning which Jung saw in neurosis.

In fact the 'purpose' of these defences, if one can find one, seems to be the annihilation of all integrative connections in the inner world and hence an attack on meaning itself. Such 'attacks against linking' (Bion 1959) do indeed have a purpose, when considered in light of the personality 's need for defences, but this purpose is not to be found in imagery of wholeness and integration. In fact, for the traumatized psyche, integration is the worst imaginable thing, apparently equivalent in the 'mind' of the defending Self to some early horror—never to be repeated. It is as though integration threatens a re-experience of the 'unthinkable' affect. Therefore, connections among the components of experience are attacked in true 'auto-immune' fashion.

To return now to our dream. My patient 'knew' that this dream was a direct response from her psyche to the session the day before in which she had risked heretofore unbearably painful memories from her early childhood. What she did not know was how much an unknown part of her 'hated' this vulnerability and how deeply divided she was about the shameful aspects of her past. Her dream depicts this splitting as the malevolent 'Captain' and his sadistic relationship to the young girls he is 'killing'—especially the weak, fragile young girl to whom the dream ego is 'chained'.

In the dreams of early trauma victims that I have analysed over the years, our diabolical 'Captain' and his 'companion' seem to be such a typical dyad that we have reason to believe it represents a universal bipolar defensive structure in the psyche consisting of a ruthless persecutory figure and an image towards which this persecution is directed—sometimes the dream ego itself. These dual imagoes, yoked together as an inner 'tandem' (see Hillman 1983), make up the archetypal self-care system to which I have referred earlier. One part of this dyadic system is usually tyrannical and abusive. Its partner or 'client' is innocent, fragile and vulnerable —often a child, frequently feminine, and somehow reprehensibly 'bad' in the eyes of the tyrant. Clinicians across disciplines have recognized this dyadic self-care-system in the dream and fantasy products of traumatically disturbed patients, a fact that attests to its archetypal basis (see e.g. Odier 1956; Bergler 1959; Guntrip 1969; Fairbairn 1981; Hillman 1983; Grotstein 1987; Ferenczi 1988; SchwartzSalant 1989).

In our specimen dream, the 'innocent' remainder of a previously whole self (the young girl chained to our dreamer) seems to represent (or to carry) what we might call the 'imperishable personal spirit' of the individual. This personal spirit in turn is the mysterious essence of animation in the personality—what Winnicott called the secret 'true self' and what Jung, wishing to underscore its

transpersonal origins, called the 'Spirit archetype or Self' with a capital 'S', a prefiguration of the incarnate personal ego which under ideal circumstances embodies a 'spark' of the Spirit and thereby becomes a 'sacralized' ego and the Self's 'affiliate' (see Neumann 1976). (It is the 'spark' which incarnates in an individual body that we would describe as the 'personal spirit' and not the Spirit archetype itself.)

The struggle for embodiment is represented in our dream by the patient's efforts to pull her young companion out of the water *so that she can breathe*. Both the patient and I realized that this imagery related to her breathing difficulties in the session on the day of the dream. Some part of her (the 'Captain') clearly did not want the vulnerable feelings related to her trauma to 'surface'. His role was to 'kill' these feelings and to 'kill' her access to them. He thus personified her resistance to embodied affect and his paralyzing effect on her body was to literally stop her breathing.

As I asked the patient to 'breathe into' her emerging pain, more affect could surface, but she could only get out a few muffled sobs and then the 'Captain' would constrict her throat once again and her psychic numbness would return. Here we see an important feature of the archetypal defence. As an anti-embodiment factor, the archaic defence was working here against the natural process through which the personal spirit embodies—a process Winnicott (1970: 261–70) called 'indwelling' or 'personalization'. Winnicott envisioned this as that slow process whereby the mother constantly introduces and re-introduces the baby's mind and body to each other (ibid.:271). In trauma there is a reversal of indwelling, a splitting of affect from image and the corresponding splitting off of the personal spirit from mind/body unity and back into the 'psychoid' realm where, we might imagine, it remains until embodiment is possible.

Preservation of the personal spirit in a dream

One aspect of the relationship between archetypal defences and the personal spirit was well illustrated for me in another case with a similar dream. The patient was a young divorcee whose attractive outer appearance concealed an inner life full of encapsulated despair. Her personal history unfolded around the central theme of a pathogenic and deeply conflictual relationship with her unstable and hysterical mother. As a child, she remembered being so impressionable and 'sensitive' that when a teacher read the story of *Snow White* she became lost in the story and screamed 'Don't eat the apple!' The patient soon learned that this soft core of her true personal spirit—in such intimate contact with the imagination and with life—had to be protected from the critical, invasive and physically abusive mother. Severe anorexia developed. She became isolated and withdrawn. As these early memories began to open up in the first year of her therapy, she reported the following dream:

> I am in an ancient city, like Troy. I'm trying to escape from ancient warriors, dressed in armour. In front of the stone city wall is a horse. With the horse is a pretty, innocent young girl. I decide to take her with me. We mount the horse and try to escape together, but finally we are captured. At the moment of capture, only one thing becomes important—that they spare the life of this beautiful young girl! They must know that she has nothing to do with all this. I must make them believe this—i.e. convince them that I'm the one they want. I know I can handle the punishment, but she can't. She's still too young and fragile. I let them capture me and throw me to the ground. They threaten to take me back to town and display me for ten days as a sacrifice. They take spears and put them through my hands and into my mouth. I am bleeding profusely. I make the bleeding even worse by twisting my hands so they know they're really killing me. The only important thing is to save this girl!

My patient had few associations to this dream. She remembered that Troy was a walled city, recently excavated, impenetrable except by a trick involving a horse, also the vehicle of escape here and closely associated with the beautiful young girl (both of these images carry her 'personal spirit'). The walled enclosure, she realized, represented her long-standing schizoid defences, now 'opened' at the gate, but not for long. Her escape is cut short by the armoured warriors, representatives of the self-care-system and its tyrannical defences against her personal spirit's aliveness. However, this dream was different from many others.

In the final 'crucifixion scene' the malevolent warriors attack only the dream ego and not her young companion. In Christlike fashion, a willing blood sacrifice is made by the dream ego acting as a 'third' factor between the usual antinomies of the dyadic self-care-system. The dreamer 'takes all the badness on herself' in order to preserve the 'goodness' of an innocent inner figure. This 'identification with the aggressor' in herself cements her own 'bad' self-representation (it's all my fault) but preserves intact the image of a lovable young girl who must not be violated. Her 'personal spirit' is thus saved from violation. It is as though the archetype of the Spirit or Self, now co-operating with the ego's voluntary sacrifice, preserves the possibility of its future incarnation as a whole Self, dark and light—if its malevolent 'dark side' represented as the bloodthirsty warriors can be slaked by the dream ego's 'bleeding' and conscious suffering. At this level of trauma and defence, the 'almighty shadow of the Lord' seems to demand nothing less than blood sacrifice!

Archetypal levels of violence

How do we explain this malevolent level of violence in the psyche? When I first began to encounter this persecutory figure in the dreams of patients, I thought I was witnessing the attacks of some abusive 'perpetrator' in the patient's early life —in other words, the inner tormentors were 'introjected' participants in

some actual trauma. However, this explanation was only half correct. Frequently no such historical abuse could be found in the patient's life. Second, even if abuse did occur, the inner tormentor's punishment of the inner world was far worse than anything occurring in reality. What finally became clear—and what Jung also emphasized—was that in this terrifying imagery, the patient had access to the unconscious fantasies that structure all experience for the immature ego existing on the 'magical level' (Piaget) or 'mythological level' (Neumann) of consciousness. Here, as Odier (1956) has shown, lurk the great daimonic 'beings' of the archetypal psyche and, like all daimonic contents, they can personify as either angels or demons. In trauma's inner world they are usually demons.

Jungians have often called our daimonic figure the 'negative animus' (e.g. Asper 1991), but in my experience the figure is not always male and not always contrasexual to the dreamer and can even appear in animal form. If anything, our diabolical figure appears to fit best with Jung's description of the archetypal shadow. But this is also problematic, because on rare occasions in analysis, after an extended wrestling process with the patient, the previously malevolent figure changes its countenance in dreams and presents a more benevolent, protective side.

These reflections and clinical experiences with our persecutory figure forced me to recognize that I was dealing here with an archetypal emissary of the original ambivalent Godhead or Self which appeared to have taken over the care of the traumatized patient's inner world in the absence of adequate ego mediation. The Old Testament Yahweh was such a figure, as Jung says, 'both a persecutor and a helper in one' (Jung 1952, para 567). This figure seemed to have at its disposal all the primitive archetypal aggression in the personality which under normal circumstances would have been available for adaptation to the environment but which, instead, was directed back into the inner world. It seemed to operate (if we can imagine its inner rationale) as a kind of inner 'Jewish Defence League' (whose slogan, after the Holocaust, reads Never Again!). 'Never again,' says our tyrannical caretaker, 'will the traumatized personal spirit of this child suffer this badly! Never again will it be this helpless in the face of a cruel reality. Before this happens I will disperse it into fragments (dissociation), or encapsulate it (schizoid withdrawal), numb it with intoxicating substances (addictions), or keep *killing* it so it will stop hoping for life in this world (depression). In this way I will preserve what is left of this prematurely amputated childhood—of an innocence that has suffered too much too soon!'

However, there is a tragic irony here. Functioning as archaic defence, the Self ostensibly mistakes each new life opportunity for a dangerous threat (of re-traumatization) and attacks it. Here is where Stein's (1967) early immunological analogy proves useful. Proper immunological response, Stein noted, depends on the ability of the immune system to accurately recognize not-self elements and then attack and kill them. But our primitive defence does not seem to learn anything about realistic danger as the child grows up. Dispersing the awareness

of pain that has emerged, or is about to emerge, it continues to function on the magical level of consciousness with the same level of awareness it had when the original trauma or traumas occurred. In other words, the archaic defence is not educable. As the old unbearable affect begins to re-emerge the defence is triggered, and with it self-destruction. This is a truly auto-immune disease of the psyche.

By now the reader has a fairly good sense of the major aspects of our attempted integration between Jungian and non-Jungian theory on traumatic anxiety and defence. In order to fill out this rationale, the ideas thus far need to be traced to their roots in Jung's early writings and then brought into relation to some of Winnicott's ideas about trauma and the foreclosure of transitional (symbolic) space. The chapter concludes with a case illustration of how the defence slowly changes in the process of psychotherapeutic work.

Freud's and Jung's early work on unbearable affect and anxiety

The earliest discussions of anxiety in psychoanalysis had to do with higherlevel 'neurotic' anxiety—anxiety that stemmed from an idea or feeling that was incompatible with the conscious attitude or superego and that led to neurotic symptoms or (for Jung) complexes. On this level of relatively mild psychopathology, Freud said that the ego was the seat of anxiety, which served as a signal alerting the personality to danger from within or without so that adequate defensive measures could be instituted (ego defences). As an example of how these defences worked Freud cited conversion hysteria where some traumatic event or idea would awaken such painful feelings in the ego that it was compelled to 'forget' and the incompatible psychic material would make a 'leap' into somatic symptomatology. Once the traumatic sensation or idea could be remembered, the underlying conflict was made conscious and the symptom disappeared (Freud 1894:50).

However, there were other psychosomatic symptoms that did not go away when their underlying repressed idea was uncovered. In fact, no such repressed idea could be found—just raw undifferentiated anxiety for which the somatic symptom was a kind of substitute (Freud 1895:94). Whatever the event or sensation that lay behind this anxiety, it was apparently so overwhelming that it had been denied access to the psychic apparatus altogether and therefore could not be worked over or defended against in the usual fashion (ibid.: 115). Here Freud was clearly describing more primitive defences than repression—an idea he failed to develop in his lifetime.

Working along different lines, Jung discovered a similar level of primitive psychic material in his work with complexes. Instead of a drive and ego defence model, Jung's central dynamic organizing principle of the psyche was *affect*. 'The essential basis of our personality is affectivity', he declared (Jung, 1907, para 78). Moreover, affect could have either an organizing or disorganizing effect

upon the psyche. In the normal or neurotic range affect acts as the 'glue' holding together the particles of experience (sensations, ideas, memory images, judgements) in functional units called 'feeling-toned complexes' (ibid., paras 78ff).

But beyond the 'personal complexes' which corresponded to Freud's repressed idea-hysterias, there were some complexes whose affects, according to Jung, did not seem to act as 'organizing units' of the psyche:

> Certain complexes arise on account of painful or distressing experiences in a person's life, experiences of an emotional nature which leave lasting psychic wounds behind them. A bad experience of this sort often crushes valuable qualities in an individual. All these produce unconscious complexes of a personal nature…. But there are others that come from quite a different source…the collective unconscious. At bottom they are *irrational contents of which the individual had never been conscious before*…. So far as I can judge, these experiences occur…when something so devastating happens to the individual that his whole previous attitude to life breaks down.
>
> (Jung 1928b, para 594, my italics)

Here was Jung's independent discovery of that traumatic affect which Freud had earlier said was denied access to the psychic apparatus altogether. How did Jung explain the banishment of such material from the psyche? He didn't. Lacking an understanding of early infancy and its projective-identificatory defences (Klein), Jung was left with as little understanding as Freud. However, he did notice something which later psychoanalysis has corroborated, namely that corresponding to the two 'levels' of what we might call 'bearable' and 'unbearable' affects/complexes are two levels of dissociation and its severity. Here Jung was beginning to talk about two levels of defence against anxiety—a discussion with which present-day psychoanalysis is not yet finished.

In the 'normal neurotic' level of dissociation, according to Jung, the functional unity of the complex—its 'gluing together' of all elements of experience (sensation, feeling, idea, memory images, etc.) —is not disturbed. When such a complex is dissociated, the dissociation is *systematic* and preserves the meaningful connections of sensation, thought and feeling inherent in the complex. (In object-relations language, the complex will appear in dreams as a 'whole object'.) However, in the dissociation characteristic of 'latent schizophrenia' (what today would be called the serious personality disorders), there is destruction of the architecture of the complex itself, i.e. the dissociation is *unsystematic*. The affect that normally holds the elements of the complex together fails to do so at this level and the elements of the complex fall apart (such complexes will appear in dreams fragmented into 'part-objects').

> Whereas the neurotic can rely instinctively on his personality dissociation never losing its systematic character so that the unity and inner cohesion of the whole are never seriously jeopardized, the latent schizophrenic must always reckon with the possibility that his very foundations will give way somewhere, that an irretrievable disintegration will set in, that his ideas and concepts will lose their cohesion and their connection with other spheres of association and with the environment.
>
> (Jung 1907, para 559)

Here Jung was describing terrors of psychic disintegration already noted by Kohut, Winnicott and Krystal (above) as the hallmark of early trauma. He did not specify what the agent of 'unsystematic dissociation' was but did acknowledge its violence. 'The immedite cause of this disturbance,' he said, 'is a violent affect which leads to menacing and sinister schizoid fantasies' (ibid., para 560). Today we understand that primitive levels of anxiety associated with archetypal fantasy are responsible for triggering this disintegration and we understand such violent attacks against integrated experience as a defence engineered by the Self against the potential annihilation of the personal spirit.

Primitive anxiety and defence: from Ferenczi to Winnicott

The idea of 'unthinkable' psychic pain in infancy or childhood did not enter psychoanalytic discourse until the writings of Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest during the 1930s and secondarily with the British object-relations theorists, notably Klein, Fairbairn, Bion and Winnicott. Melanie Klein (1946) in particular described two levels of primitive anxiety, the deepest being *paranoid* or *persecutory anxiety,* from the boomeranging of the infant's hatred (projectively identified into the part/ object breast/mother) back upon the self whose destruction the infant then fears will come from 'outside'. Later, she described a second *depressive anxiety* which she saw as anxiety about the fate of the whole object (containing both good and bad breast) now both loved and hated. Each form of anxiety was interwoven with primitive defences, and these defences in turn were understood to employ prehistoric fantasies—patterned instinctual processes active in the infant long before they could be represented symbolically (i.e. archetypal fantasy).

To these two levels of anxiety Winnicott added a third, deeper level of anxiety pre-dating those of the paranoid/schizoid or depressive positions and closer to what we may imagine as archetypal anxiety. Judith Metrani (1993) has called these third-level anxieties 'unintegration anxieties' and traces their origin in Winnicott to failures in the earliest physical and mental holding of the infant by its mother. With faulty holding, the infant is unable to experience states of 'unintegration' (the normal precursor to relaxation and play) but is threatened instead with total non-being—utter annihilation of the human self. Disintegration is then a defence, engineered by the primal Self against archetypal unintegration

anxieties which would annihilate the personal spirit (see Winnicott 1963:89). Here we have a further insight into the dismembering activities of 'the Captain' or 'the armoured warriors' in our specimen dreams. The horrors of disintegration are preferable to unintegration and actually defend against it.

Continuing to explore the nature of the defending Self under these circumstances, we realize that the archetypal anxiety of early trauma is not experienced by the embodied ego (this would be equivalent to the effect of a lightening bolt hitting the human body). It is experienced by whatever 'prehistoric matrix' is present in the 'mythological' mind of the infant. In Jungian language this precursor matrix is the primal Self as the psychic totality, rooted in what Jung called the 'transpsychic reality immediately underlying the psyche', i.e. the 'psychoid' realm. To ensure the ego's safety, the Self apparently prevents overwhelming archetypal affects from ever reaching the ego for registration. It behaves, in effect, like the main circuit-breaker on the electrical panel of a house. If lightning strikes, the Self disintegrates whatever unified psychological experience was extant at the traumatic moment, dispersing it to those areas of the deep unconscious psyche inaccessible to memory or consciousness. Here we have an explanation for what Jung called those 'irrational contents of which the individual had never been conscious before', or what Freud labelled anxiety so overwhelming that it 'had been denied access to the psychic apparatus altogether'.

To expand this idea, and begging the reader's indulgence, we might imagine the primitive defence operating in relationship to the psychoid realm as follows. Given the Self's disintegrative defensive activity, the archetypal *affect* associated with the trauma would be split from its associated image and displaced into what Jung (1954) called the 'infra-red' pole of the unconscious, i.e. into the body as a somatic symptom. Meanwhile the image associated with the banished affect would find residence in the 'ultraviolet' pole (e.g. as a hallucinated image in the mind). Affect and image would exist in some synchronous 'relation' to each other but would never so to speak 'get together' as a psychological experience until the banished affect could be suffered in modified form within a mediating human relationship. Only then would the archetype be constellated as a whole, bringing body and mind together as a re-experience (really the first experience) of the trauma—now in an adult ego. Prior to this moment, the Self's disintegrative activity would have to assure that the archetype could not yet function as a meaning-generating organ of the psyche in the sense meant by Jung when he said that the image is the meaning of the instinct (Jung 1954, para 398). The Self's dissociation at this level would account for the 'unsystematic' dissociation of the complex typical of latent schizophrenia and other forms of severe pathology where the archetype itself has been found to be split within its own structure (see Sidoli 1993).

A restatement of this hypothetical scenario in a Kleinian metaphor may be helpful. If Klein is correct, what we are calling the Self's defence of the future personality (its self-regulatory immunological activity) is constituted of

archetypal fantasies or proto-fantasies (Bion). In other words, the child's 'mortal terror' is not explainable simply because the 'circuits' are overloaded with anxiety, but because the 'unthinkable' anxiety of trauma immediately gets associated with a potential attributed *meaning,* and this meaning comes from the archaic unconscious fantasies pressed into service by the child's immature ego/ Self to 'understand' the unbearable pain, even if this understanding bears no relationship to outer reality. Hence, for example, a return to an unintegrated state will be 'unthinkably' associated in the child's mind with primitive archetypal fantasies—falling forever (the abyss), being devoured by a mythical animal (the monster), evaporating in air (chaos), end of the world (apocalyptic imagery), etc.

Later, when this 'child' comes into psychotherapy, if these terrifying affects/ images are eventually experienced in dreams or other fantasy material, this will be an improvement on the infant's mortal terror in the face of unintegration anxiety, and hence will be the beginning of healing—the opportunity to experience the archetype operating as an organ of 'meaning' for the first time—even though this meaning is terrifying. Here is an explanatory answer to our earlier enquiry as to why such malevolent dreams haunt the victims of early trauma. We might imagine that such violent dreams provide archetypal images of second-level paranoid/ persecutory anxiety—an 'upgrade' from the deeper 'third-level' unintegration anxieties, their imageless horror and their 'unsystematic' dissociation. Anxiety, in effect, now has an 'object' and ultimately if this anxiety can be re-experienced in the transference, a human object with whom the trauma can now be worked through.

Defences of the Self and attacks on transitional space

In the preceding remarks we have seen how the self-care-system with its archaic defences of the Self attacks the links between body and mind, affect and image, in an effort to prevent 'meaningful experience' from occurring. This amounts to an attack on the symbolic process itself and the resulting devastation results in severe pathology of the symbolic function—something most Jungian psychology has not really considered.

In this section, I would like to share with the reader my clinical discovery that the Self's inner attack upon symbolic meaning is equivalent (looked at from the outside) to an attack on that 'potential' symbolic space lying 'between' self and other; in other words, an attack on what Winnicott called 'transitional space'. This is an especially malicious aspect of our defence because what we have called the inviolable personal spirit thrives in the playful imaginative space between self and other. An attack upon transitional space by the archaic defence therefore interrupts the transitional processes through which archetypal affects are humanized, and this effectively leaves the personal spirit disincarnate—stuck in the 'oblivion' of the psychoid realm.

I will not soon forget the occasion when this possibility dawned on me. I had been working for several months with a depressed, withdrawn but highly

imaginative and likeable young woman, whose early childhood showed all the signs of those 'primitive agonies' which are appropriately described as 'unthinkable'. Her mother had suffered a post-partum depression at her birth, and the patient's earliest memories were of a constant bruise on her forehead from chronically banging her head on the floor in agitation, which the mother apparently ignored. The patient's passionate attachment to her father was interrupted by the latter's psychiatric hospitalization for a psychotic episode when the patient was 2 years old, leaving her with various panic reactions and fears of ghosts. A year later she was seriously injured in a car accident, and spent six months in hospital undergoing many painful surgical operations. The following year, at the age of 4, her beloved grandfather died and the year after that her parents were divorced. Somewhere during this period the imaginative little girl, who was later my patient, simply gave up hope for a full life in reality. She withdrew into herself, never to come out for many years.

As we explored this early history of trauma, the patient remembered two repetitive events that occurred when she was 5 years old. First, in kindergarten art class, she repeatedly drew a large black circle in the centre of her paper. When asked what this was she responded each time, 'a tunnel'. No one knew what this meant, but she was aware that her teachers were concerned about it. All her little friends were drawing happy faces with sunshine and she could only draw a black 'hole'—the entrance to a tunnel. Second, a repetitive nightmare began at age 5 which now came back to her as we explored this early history:

> The scene is kindergarten. A female teacher (not my real teacher) is taking pictures of all my animal friends who are sitting around in a circle talking and playing. It is such a wonderful scene—all mine—like a garden. But suddenly something is wrong. As the teacher takes the pictures, each animal turns into a stuffed replica of its former self. I am horrified. I rush helplessly from one animal to the next—screaming and crying—trying to stop this, but the 'teacher' keeps snapping until all the animals are 'dead'.

What quickly became clear to me and my very astute patient was that in this image of the de-animation of her childhood reality by a 'teacher', we had a dramatic picture of her self-care-system in operation. The diabolical yet caring teacher accomplishes a petrification or freezing of animated transitional reality (self-world relations) and hence, one might surmise, a 'preservation' of childhood animation at a time when the patient's animated connection to life was simply too painful to continue. Instead at this time. her imaginative life became dissociated, disconnected from *outer* reality and buried in a dark tunnel within herself, there to remain until a later time of 'thawing out' in psychotherapy when she could start to hope and dream again within the transference.

Later in this woman's therapy, as she began to separate from her autistic self-soothing world (with great rage against reality), the 'teacher' (representing the dark side of her defence) appeared frequently as a terrifying witch who fought

furiously to retain control over the younger, more vulnerable part of the patient's inner life. One such dream which recapitulated her whole life up to this point was as follows.

> I was a Prince. There was a witchy woman, an enchantress, extremely powerful and very seductive. The scene was like the Wizard of Oz. There were monkey-like demons. I was swinging all over killing these creatures in a fierce battle. I won, but I realized that a little piece of this old witch had gotten inside me. I was in the Arctic with my entourage. I knew that this germ of her was growing in me and would become more powerful. I had them chain me up. Then they were saying they'd have to kill me because I was getting dangerous. I asked to kill myself. I saw a hole in the glacial wall. I knew if I went through it, death lay on the other side. We had a moving, touching goodbye. I crawled through the hole. I tumbled down and down until I came to rest somewhere. As I 'came to' I realized I was being tended by Tibetan Monks! They were going to take me in as their protégé. They were full of knowledge and I was the young apprentice. But after a while I got bored and wanted to escape. Eventually I made my escape back out of the hole. I came out in an arctic landscape. It was all mountainous. I saw a shepherd with an arctic goat. I was overcome with gladness at seeing a human being there. Then there was a humming in my bones, deep in my body. The sun started to rise and its first rays warmed me. The snow melted. Rivulets of water began to trickle down the ice. I was filled with life!

My patient had few associations to this dream, except that the *Wizard of Oz* was her favourite childhood film and she had always been terrified of witches and ghosts. As we reviewed the dream together we realized it included the 'tunnel' image of her childhood drawing (the hole in the glacial wall) and further that this dream gave us a glimpse into why she had entered that 'tunnel' at the age of 5, i.e. a 'piece' of the old witch (the dark side of the persecutory Self) had got inside her (possessed her ego), leading her to feel that she was dangerous to herself and to others. Her terrifying fears of her own aggression and uncontrollable rages had led further into the 'petrification' of schizoid detachment and isolation recorded in her childhood dream of the 'teacher'. She retired into nature, into poetry, literature and into a melancholy dreaminess. Here within the inner world she found the positive side of the Spirit archetype (the Tibetan Monks) and while the negative side of this same archetype (the old witch) had driven her into isolation, the caretaking side of the Self provided 'spiritual' sanctuary for a while. But this rarified diet of illusion and 'mystery' could not sustain her indefinitely. Finally (with the beginning of therapy) she made her way back. The 'freezing' of the animals in her childhood dream 'thawed out' as she emerged from her tunnel and she could feel gratitude for the presence of a human person (her therapist?) in this otherwise frozen landscape.

Transformations of the malevolent defence in psychotherapy

A final clinical vignette will give the reader a glimpse into the slow transformation of the archaic defence as it is projected in the transference. The patient was a depressed middle-aged woman whose tyrannical inner 'voices' constantly belittled and attacked her for even the smallest steps in the direction of self-expression, e.g. 'you're an asshole…you're sick…you're stupid…you're psychologically retarded…you should kill yourself', etc. Not infrequently she would attribute such feelings to me or others she idealized, but each time the 'voice' occurred, we were able to find a fragment of anxiety associated with some hope or vulnerability she was beginning to risk, and her 'voices' were dead-set against this hope. We could witness this and talk about it. She began to understand how the defence worked and began to develop an observing ego.

The following dream occurred towards the end of the second year of her analysis, before my extended summer vacation.

> I come upon a man wrestling with a woman. I don't seem to be frightened for the woman because the scene has an almost ritual quality. The man cuts off the woman's left forefinger at the knuckle, then goes after the right forefinger. By this time I'm the woman and can feel the man's knife cutting through my finger—without pain—and probing for the ligament that connects the first two digits which he was trying to sever from the rest of the finger and hand. He was apparently unsuccessful, because the last image of the dream is of the otherwise severed finger hanging by the ligament. I have the thought that this could be re-attached.

My patient had no associations to the man or woman. To the forefingers she associated 'making a point' and talked about how she was becoming, in fact, increasingly confident about speaking her mind and expressing her point of view. And then, quite spontaneously, she said, 'yes and just as I get more confident about my feelings and really want to work on them, you go away!' After a moment of silence I replied, 'and cut you off.' She laughed and said, 'yes, and for the second time! You took a long time off last summer too.'

In this brief exchange my patient and I had interpreted her dream with its by now familiar dismembering defence. Our spontaneous repartee proved to be a very important communication, because my patient was not accustomed to letting on that our work and the transference relationship which sustained it was important to her on a feeling level. Her spontaneous remark had 'given herself away' and opened up the meaning of the dream. She then acknowledged how much she would miss me and our work together even though this time my leaving did not seem quite as bad—that a ligament was still intact, linking the otherwise severed digit. This corresponded to her feeling that there was a deeper connection between us or in herself that would survive the long break. We

discussed ways in which she could keep our connection alive during the oncoming break.

So here again we have the dyadic self-care-system represented in the dream as a strange man cutting off parts of her body, attacking the ligaments (links) which she associates with self-expression. The man with the knife is not yet a transference figure, but rather an inner 'stranger' (dark side of the Self as defence) with whom she 'wrestles', sustaining a wound as did Jacob in his wrestling with the dark angel at the river Jabok. This 'angel's' dark 'intention' would seem to be the dismemberment of her expressed feeling for me in the transference (although he now allows some connection). In my response to her 'pointed' remark I stepped into the shoes of this archetypal figure, as it were (took on the projection), and she then had a brief experience of *wrestling with me* in the transference. In this way, the archetypal defence, already moderated to the point where she could risk a spontaneous gesture, was further personalized. The dismembering demon could now be 'played with' as he was projected on to me and then taken back. Vulnerable feelings could be admitted. Some of the anger directed back into the inner world at her 'neediness' could be released and find form in her negative feeling expression outwardly about the approaching 'abandonment'.

This example illustrates how the establishment of a playful space in the transference re-establishes the transitional space foreclosed in the patient's early life, leading to her archetypal self-care-system and its splitting defences. In this field, personalization and 'indwelling' of the personal spirit can again occur and the trauma defence, with its archetypal affects, is gradually humanized and affect tolerance increased. The dark stranger with the knife, whose job it has been to 'cut her off' from vulnerable feelings of neediness and dependency 'attacking the links' (ligaments) of her expressive selfhood, no longer needs to sever all the links but leaves a *ligament* that can be re-attached. One is reminded that the Latin verb *ligare,* meaning to yoke or bind, appears after the prefix 're' in the Latin *religio,* suggesting connection or re-connection to the divine.

This etymological coincidence is no accident, because in working through early trauma and its archetypal defences we are, in effect, slowly freeing the whole Self from its dark role as 'the almighty shadow of the Lord'—an organ of disintegration and dismemberment, to play its larger role as guarantor of the individuation process. When human mediation makes the defence unnecessary, we witness the spirit's return from its liminal suspension in the psychoid realm to the hallowed particularity of *this* personal body at *this* moment in time, never to be replicated. In this stormy work, success or failure depends to a frightening extent upon the commitment of both partners in the dialogue to the grounded, mundane and particular *human connection* in psychotherapy. Archetypal affects do not personalize, embody and become human feelings without it. Jung once said:

> God wants to be born in the flame of man's consciousness, leaping ever higher, and what if this has no roots in the earth—if it is not a house of stone where the fire of God can dwell but a wretched straw hut that flares up and vanishes. Could God then be born? One must be able to suffer God. That is the supreme task for the carrier of ideas. He must be the advocate of the earth. God will take care of Himself.
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> (Jung 1973:65)

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Chapter 6
Archetypal patterns, mental representations, and replicative processes in infancy*

Mara Sidoli

In this chapter I will discuss the connection between Jung's concept of archetypes as organisers of experience, the Jungian development model adopted by Michael Fordham, and the concept of mental representations as described by infant researchers. I will also explore the importance of replicative sequences in the development of the interaction between mother and child. Using case material from infant observations, I will demonstrate how both members of the dyad, given their unique individual needs, temperaments and idiosyncratic behavior, constellate from very early on the life-enhancing or the life-destroying aspects of the mother and child archetypes.

I received my training as a child and adult analytical psychologist in London at the Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP). At that time, the director of the Jungian child analysis training program, Michael Fordham, had introduced an experimental seminar on infant observation. The seminar had been developed at the Tavistock clinic by the Kleinian analyst Ester Bick. When Fordham first introduced his seminar, the close connection with Kleinian methodologies created some uneasy feelings among the SAP members. In particular, the infant observation seminar stirred controversy within the broader Jungian analytic community. Many traditional Jungians could not see the relevance of observing an infant's actions in the early stages of mental and emotional functioning. After all, Jung had not been interested in infants; his emphasis had stressed the importance of the development of the psyche in the second half of life. However, Fordham not only tolerated this opposition, he in fact encouraged it as a step toward the integration of the various members' positions.

When I completed my training at the SAP, I decided to explore the idea of applying a Jungian conceptual frame to infant observation. In my view, Jung's theories of the adult psyche should be applicable to the psyche at the onset of life, and I was eager to introduce this idea to the larger community of Jungian analysts. Fordham had already intuited that Jung's concepts could be applied to infants and children; I believed that infant observation was a means of exploring the microcosms of the beginnings of life and could be used to test this intuition.

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The self, the ego, and the archetype

Before progressing further, I will present a brief overview of Jung's concepts of the self, the ego, and the unconscious forces within the self that he called archetypes. These concepts derived from his studies of oriental religions and mysticism.

Jung used the word "self" to describe the totality of the psyche and soma. The self includes both conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind. The conscious aspects form the ego; unconscious aspects include the archetypes-primal experiences or patterns that are common to all humans. He conceived archetypes as the organisers of experience that operate in the service of the ego, although he also viewed the self as a whole as the archetype of order. Hence there is a paradoxical nature to the self. Jung (1939) notes:

> [The archetypes] are innate predispositions which, although not characterised by the quality of experience which we call consciousness, none the less determine and structure the relationship between the internal and external world.

Although Jung did not carry out specific research on childhood, he did mention that he had found in children's drawings and dreams "self symbols" (such as rudimentary representations of mandalas or circles) like those he had discovered in the material brought by adult patients.

From Jung's idea of the self, Fordham derived his concept of the "primal self'. For Fordham, the primal self represents the totality of psyche and soma in a germinal state from the very start of intrauterine life. In infancy, the primal self is conceptualised as a "steady state of integration" from which the child's ego and bodily growth will unfold through dynamic processes that Fordham terms "deintegrationreintegration" (Fordham 1976). Deintegration, according to Fordham, occurs when an instinctual drive takes over the whole of the infant and induces the primal self of the infant to open up to the outer world to satisfy an internal urge. Reintegration occurs once the instinctual drive has been satisfied and the infant's self can withdraw into itself.

According to Jung's theory, archetypal activity—that is, the potential to create mental representations and/or the innate predisposition to experience life according to certain patterns—is located within the self. We can assume, through observation, that this archetypal activity becomes operative during the first deintegration of the primal self after birth, and that the experiences for which the archetypes generate mental representations are "collective"—that is, common to all human beings. With regard to these archetypal representations, Fordham (1976:5) writes:

> By conceiving archetypes as dynamic structures closely related to drives, expressed in impulses originating in neurophysiological structures and

> biochemical changes, the theory of archetypes brings body and psyche together and makes Jung's thesis as to their bipolarity particularly meaningful: the archetypes are unconscious entities having two poles, the one expressing itself in instinctual impulses and drives, the other in spiritual forms. In contrast to the instinctual drives, which are relatively fixed and few in number, the spiritual component has wide and flexible application. Transferring this idea to childhood and starting from the spiritual components, the theory of archetypes means that a predisposition exists in the child to develop archaic ideas, feelings and fantasies without their being implanted in him or without his introjecting them. These can be influenced and refined by education which, in turn, as feedback systems provide suitable imagery through which the unconscious archetypes can find expression in consciousness. It is on the spiritual pole that parents build when they mediate the culture pattern of the society in which the developing organism is living.

In early infancy, when neurophysiological drives and discharges prevail, oral, anal, and uretheral impulses provide the ground roots for archetypal imagery of a primitive and violent character later in life. We can infer the existence of protoimages, such as shapes and patterns, in the baby's mind. These proto-images, enriched by sensuous experiences, will in time develop into proper images of objects and people.

Jung's *Psychology of Transference* (1946) illustrates his theory of mental functioning in relation to instinctual discharges. In discussing the bipolarity of the archetype, Jung writes: "The instincts and their specific fantasy-content are partly concrete, partly symbolical (i.e., 'unreal'), sometimes one, sometimes the other" (p.175). In the early stages of life, we have to take into account primarily the "bodily pole" of the archetype. The symbolic and spiritual polarity, although potentially present, is not yet available to the infant. Infant life is an immersion into sensuous experiences of a subjective and undifferentiated kind: a stage where, for instance, impulses toward the breast give rise to unconscious fantasies of devouring or being devoured. The child will express these impulses later on by projecting them on to gobbling mouths, devouring teeth, biting monsters, or beasts with fangs as these images become available to him through the influence of his environment.

An infant's needs have an anxious urgency. His urges are expressed in fits of screaming, panic, and other kinds of affect-loaded somatization. He has as yet no means of representing these urges symbolically and no language with which to communicate them. In childhood and later life, such anxiety states come to be represented in play or dream material by volcanic explosions, bombing, earthquakes, fires, drowning, floods, and so on. The satisfaction of these early violent and instinctual urges, and the psychic digestion of sensuous experiences, made possible by the constant interaction with a caring mother, produces a state of total well-being. This state of satisfaction gives rise to feelings of joy,

which later in life can find expression in symbolic play imagery, in art, and in creative emotional relationships.

According to Fordham's theory of development, the activity of the primal self in infancy is intense, and structured according to deintegration-reintegration processes. Ego consciousness, on the other hand, is discontinuous and unstructured. Thus we can infer that an infant tends to experience the absolute dimension of archetypal forces. At this stage, while the infant's ego is shaping itself, threats of disintegration as well as experiences of unintegrated and incoherent states constitute a large part of the baby's everyday life. Because the dynamic systems of the self act as disturbances that run counter to the nascent ego's need to find structure, the infant deals with experiences according to whether they feel "good" or "bad". Hence, the innate predisposition for human experience is organised according to patterns (archetypes) that recreate extreme collective contents in the individual human being. The early experiences of total bliss and fulfilment, as well as those of panic, dread, and unthinkable violence, are undifferentiated at this preverbal and preconceptual stage of life. The boundaries between subject and object are blurred in as much as separateness provokes survival anxiety in his helpless state. Hence each experience has an all-encompassing feel to the infant.

Jung thought the archetypal patterns of behaviour were an aspect of the ontological history of human development, and hence are manifested universally and consistently in human nature regardless of differences in culture or education. All archetypes may have a life-enhancing or a life-destroying potential. Whether an individual constellates the positive aspect or the negative is largely determined by his predisposition and his experiences as an infant, since it is in infancy that the human being lives totally immersed in the archetypal world.

The hunger storm

Daniel Stern is the researcher who, perhaps more than anyone else, has tried to penetrate the emotional-interpersonal world of the baby. I would like now to quote a passage from his book *The Diary of a Baby,* in which he attempts to enter the infant psyche and lend words to the experience of hunger in a six-week-old baby. Stern(1992:31–6) writes:

> It is four hours since Joey's last feeding, and he is probably hungry. Suddenly his lower lip protrudes. He starts to fret. Soon the fretting gives way to jerky crying, then moves into a full cry…. A storm threatens. The light turns metallic. The march of clouds across the sky breaks apart. Pieces of sky fly off in different directions. The wind picks up force, in silence. There are rushing sounds, but no motion. The wind and its sound have separated. Each chases after its lost partner in fits and starts. The world is disintegrating. Something is about to happen. Uneasiness grows. It spreads from the centre and turns to pain. It is at the centre that the storm

> breaks out. It is at the very centre that it grows stronger and turns into pulsing waves. These waves push the pain out, then pull it back again. The wind and the sound and the pieces of sky are all pulled back to the centre. They find one another again, are reunited. Only to be thrown outward and away, then sucked back in to form the next wave—darker and stronger. The pulsing waves swell to dominate the whole weatherscope. The world is howling. Everything explodes and is blown out and then collapses and rushes back towards a knot of agony that cannot last—but does.

Using poetic metaphor, Stern has attempted to describe here the world as it must appear to Joey. The world is disintegrating, and Joey is experiencing a profound disruption of his "going-on-being." His feelings are diffuse, without focus. He is entering upon the huge task of making sense of the disintegrating parts of the world. Both Joey and his world are disintegrating at the same time. In time he will begin to learn, with the help of his mother, that he and the waves, the storm, and the shattered sky are not one and the same thing. The process of learning and differentiating will then have begun to take place in his ego.

Role of the mother

In early infancy the presence of the mother is of the utmost importance. It is she who will help her baby tolerate, make sense of, and finally give name to his chaotic emotional swings and the states in which anxieties of annihilation or flooding, exploding, or melting create panic and dread. As time goes by, the infant will accumulate experiences of satisfaction through the mother/breast. These positive experiences will in turn strengthen his ego. Eventually, the ego will be strong enough to take on for itself the role of the "good-enough" mother, and manage his previously unmanageable anxieties and frustrations. He will learn to wait with greater ease, confident of eventual satisfaction.

The archetypal experience of the "good mother/breast within" takes place when the experiences of successful feeding and loving care outnumber the negative experiences of deprivation, frustration, and misfits at the breast. Eventually, the archetypal states become incarnated in human experiences, and the internal world of fantasy begins to be differentiated from the external reality. The infant begins to exist in space and time. It is in this dynamic that replicative sequences acquire extreme value for the child's growth and development. When repeated sequences of bad experiences outnumber good ones, however, the relationship with the maternal object does not acquire positive human features; the negative archetypal images predominate and colour the infant's perceptions of the world and relationships.

Experts on infancy from many different perspectives have come to agree that the infant's emotional life develops in the context of the relationship with both the conscious and unconscious aspects of the mother's personality. Furthermore, there is agreement that the mother's mental representations or unconscious

fantasies about her child influence the baby's experience more than does her conscious behaviour, gripping her in a sphere outside her conscious awareness, and cannot be modified. The infant, on his part, however, has extreme expectations dictated by the life or death quality of needs that must be met by the parental object. In the infant, too, there exists the potential to create a mental representation of the mother. Particularly at the beginning of life this representation is fantastic and magical, because it is heavily influenced by archetypal characteristics. Therefore, his mental representation of the maternal object is either totally good or totally bad according to whether or not his expectations are met within a time span that he can tolerate. The situation is complicated by the fact that while he is struggling with the need to have his expectations met, he also needs to be able to organise his experiences. He must adapt to constant internal and external changes. His emotional stability is extremely short-lived, but is maintained by the maternal object appearing to appease his yearnings. Hence, the sense of continuity in space and time is dependent on the relationship with the mother.

Studies on infancy in the last decades have brought to light increasing evidence of the complexity of the newborn human psyche. It was only in the 1960s that experts began to realise that a great deal of experience was being amassed and stored by infants in the very first weeks of life and by foetuses in the womb. It has been observed that foetuses can make choices, in that they prefer certain stimuli to others. Thus, one can infer that an opportunity of learning already exists in utero.

The famous American paediatrician T.Berry Brazelton (1981) writes:

> We can now conceptualize how experience can be represented in the memory of infants and how it can shape them towards future responses. These early experiences, when they are repeated and when they are accompanied by a behavioural representation of recognition in the infant, must be considered as potential precursors of future ego development or as precursors of cognitive patterns shaping the infant towards preferred psychomotor patterns…. If they are successful patterns in early infancy, the chances are that they will be repeated, learned, and will eventually become preferred patterns in the older infant…. The immaturity of cognitive neuromotor and psycho-physiological equipment of the baby limit the infant's potential for developing clearly definable emotions in the early months. The immaturity of these systems places obvious restraints on development, but their experiential maturation forms the base for future emotional experience. As infants "learn" to cope with a stimulus from the outside world, they experience a sense of achievement, and the feedback system that is activated may give them an inner representation of mastery. (unpublished paper)

By contrast, change—because of the unknown and unfamiliar elements it brings about—represents a threat to the sense of mastery and potentiality. Hence, change produces anxiety; and when it is too sudden or too great, it acquires a catastrophic quality. Change is then defended against by the infant self. Infantile "defences of the self," to use Fordham's phrase, act like an immunological system against the forces that threaten the baby's survival. We encounter these defences in the form of repetitive patterns and autistic rituals.

The function of repetition in the emotional life of the infant

The first spheres, within which the spatial world of objects is created by the baby, are the area of the mouth and the encircling of maternal arms. The experience of being encircled defines the boundaries of the infant's body, and the sensation of mouthing gives tridimensional shape to objects, expanding the information received from sight and hearing. In the very early stages after birth, the appearing and disappearing of the mother/breast are a presence and absence experienced by all the senses together with the infant's inborn archetypically determined predisposition for separation. These experiences are the major factors influencing the baby's development, eventually allowing him to acquire a sense of the dimensions of time and space. Since the baby is unable to move, he can only follow his mother's movements until she disappears from view. He then waits and looks, searching for her, eventually fixing his gaze on the spot where she disappeared, and then expectantly anticipates her return. Thus, the rhythms of repeated comings and goings contribute to his space/time learning, and are connected with feelings of reassurance, safety, familiarity, and constancy. The repetitions of finding and losing and finding again the mother/breast are experienced as "pauses" in the sense of space, a sense that is internal as well as external.

We can thus appreciate how the relationship between the infant's complex instinctual drives and his archetypal expectations, coupled with the repeated appearances of the mother as he needs her, allow for the growth of the ego. The rhythms of feeding and nurturing interventions contribute to building a positive world where the infant can wait for satisfaction without disintegrating. He gradually acquires a sense of time, trust, self, and containment.

It is because of the replication of events, as well as his capacity to remember, that the infant learns to distinguish pleasant from unpleasant events, and finally acquires skills of all sorts, and not without extreme effort, as you may have noticed in observing a young toddler's attempts to take his first steps. The stage is prepared by the repetition of preparatory movements. When he finally manages to get up and take his step, he feels he is on top of the world; then down he goes again, flat on his bottom. The faltering toddler is actualising an archetypal potential of the human species, but the determination to try over and over again has been sustained in him by his trust in the benign and supportive environment created for him by his mother.

Some findings of infant research and infant-parent psychotherapy

Stella Acquarone (1993), a Kleinian child psychotherapist in London who specialises in infant-parent psychotherapy, writes:

> It is now well documented that the infant is capable at birth or shortly thereafter of organising in an adaptive fashion. He can respond to pleasure and displeasure (Lipsitt, 1966); change behaviour as a function of its consequence (Gerwitz, 1965 and 1969); form intimate bonds and make visual discriminations (Klaus and Kennell, 1976; Meltzoff and Moore, 1977); organise cycles and rhythms such as sleep-wake alertness states (Sanders, 1962); evidence a variety of affects or affect proclivities (Tomkins, 1962 and 1963; Izard Ekman, 1972); and demonstrate organised social responses in conjunction with increasing neurophysiological organisations (Emde, Gaensbuer, and Harmon, 1976). From the early months, the infant demonstrates a unique capacity to enter into complex social and affective interactions (Stern, 1974a, 1974b, and 1977; Brazelton, 1974).

Combining her psychoanalytic background with the findings of infant research, Acquarone has developed a methodology for intervening in disturbed infantparent relationships. Using insight derived from transference/ contertransference communications and observations of infant—parent interactions, she is able to intervene with helpful suggestions to facilitate communication. Thus, she is able to provide positive reinforcement and teach the child and its parents a new loop of feedback systems. Acquarone points out that a baby's physical manifestations can be a signal of emotional difficulties, such as depression, or the fear of being dropped, or the feeling of being insecurely attached to the mother. At times the situation can be improved fairly quickly by making the mother aware of some unconscious negative mental representation of the infant that prevents her from seeing who her baby actually is. In cases where the baby has been able to adjust satisfactorily to the new maternal awareness, a cycle of repeated, potentially negative interactions is modified, and a positive infant-parent relationship can be established.

Infants observed

I would like to present here two vignettes from infant observation sessions that demonstrate the impact of repetitive negative behaviour on the emotional development of the infant.

The case of Paul

Initially at four days of age, Paul was rescued from a potentially destructive situation by prompt maternal intervention. Subsequently, however, a series of negative repetitions occurred and Paul was unable to modify his frustration. Destructive elements in the mother-child relationship were reinforced to the point that the relationship became pathological. In Paul's case, the cycle of repeated negative events was determined by Paul's fragile emotional constitution. He was a baby with an extremely low tolerance for frustration. The description of the initial observation of Paul at age four days is very similar to Stern's description of the "hunger storm" in baby Joey quoted above.

> Mrs B. came to the door with Paul in her arms. He was fretting a bit. His eyes were tightly shut. He moved his arms to his mouth, opened it and put his left fist in. Mother talked to him and to the observer for about five minutes. Paul had stopped fretting and lay quietly in mother's arms. Mother lay Paul on the changing mat and removed his wet nappy saying, "I know you don't like this." As a response, Paul started crying, and his cries grew in intensity. He waved his arms about while being undressed, became red in the face, and his eyes remained shut. Mother said that each time she changed him, he cried in protest as she fastened his nappy. He had now burst into a loud cry. As soon as she had finished, mother lifted him up and rested him on her shoulder. He stopped crying immediately. She sat down and offered him the breast. Paul started sucking straight away with his right hand resting on the breast, the other to his side. After five minutes of sucking, mother sat him up and winded him. She put him back to the right breast and he took the nipple right away and resumed sucking, once more his hand resting on her breast…. During the time that Paul was engrossed in the feed, nothing seemed to disturb him. He appeared totally absorbed in an ecstasy of feeding until he dropped into sleep with the nipple in his mouth.

Here we witness a situation where a mother responds quickly to the urgency of the instinctual hunger discharge of her infant, and peace is quickly restored.

Because of Paul's deintegrative sequences due to his vigorous discharges and emotional needs, however, the situation deteriorates as time goes by. Paul is the third child in the family, and the mother cannot always respond promptly to the urgency of his demands. The other children have claims, too, and so does her husband. The mother begins to feel overwhelmed, and her own chaotic feelings become activated internally in response to Paul's fits of frustration. She begins to feel she is a "bad" mother and that Paul is a "bad" baby. The stage is now set for a cycle of negative interactions dominated by feelings of anxiety, frustration, and persecution in both mother and baby. An observation recorded at twelve days of age shows the beginning deterioration of their relationship:

> The doorbell rang, so Paul's feed had to be interrupted. Mother put him in his cot while she went into another room to be examined by the midwife. The observer was left to watch him. The interruption lasted altogether four minutes. It must have felt like an eternity to Paul. He started to cry and his crying escalated into screaming. It sounded like a protest of rage that could go on forever. As soon as the midwife left, Paul's mother picked him up and began to walk about with him, talking to him, hoping to soothe him. He had soaked and dirtied himself in his fit of desperate, explosive rage. The observer helped mother to collect some clean clothes. By now Paul's crying tone had softened. But although his mother was holding him and talking gently to him, he seemed not to hear her voice. He resumed screaming when she attempted to change him. He would not be comforted or calmed while this operation was going on. She appeared upset and worried and said she had never heard him cry in that way. She held him close to her, soothed him by rocking him gently and telling him: "What a naughty mummy you have!" Finally he calmed down, but not without twice refusing the breast. This added to mother's bad feelings about herself.
>
> (Observations recorded in London by Veronica Marlow)

This observation shows Paul in a state of disintegration that started a downslide in the relationship. As time went by, the relationship became very sadomasochistic. The emotional storms of this baby proved to be too much for his mother to contain and transform since they were repeated with unusual and unbearable frequency. Paul did not learn to tolerate even minimal frustration. For her own pathological reasons, the mother refused professional help offered to her and the baby. Eventually she defended herself by gradually distancing herself from the increasingly enraged/depressed baby. Paul withdrew into himself, and his development by age eight months was severely impaired. He exhibited a series of somatic symptoms through which he tried to regain the maternal attention he had lost.

The case of Barry

The following case is an extremely dramatic one, indicating what happens when a very depressed, angry, and unempathic mother is unable to respond to her baby's normal demands for cuddling and gentleness. Barry is a sensitive and potentially adaptable baby, born to a very deprived and hard young woman. The mother is unable to tolerate any close, soft, intimate moments with the baby. She constantly pushes him away in an attempt to "toughen him up." Barry's father is a hard rock musician and the mother has lived in a world of hard rock music. Both parents are recovering alcoholics. The mental representation of a baby boy in this young mother is of a tough, phallic-macho guy who should not have any sensitive softness about him. She feels threatened by soft, tender feelings. She

had stopped being intimate with the baby after weaning him at about nine months. We had observed a positive relationship between the two for the first nine months, but became aware that the situation started to deteriorate when the mother stopped breastfeeding him. It was as if she had enjoyed nursing him, and was resentful of his growing up and not needing her for his survival in that way any longer. In the observation that follows, Barry is desperately trying to regain his lost "good mother," while systematically being rejected by an angry, sarcastic mother. His frustrated expectations enrage him, and he turns the rage against himself. He started to bang his head, to scavenge food off the floor, and eventually started hitting his mother hard. He was gradually becoming the "tough guy" who fitted his mother's unconscious representation. His negative experiences had been replicated time after time, and his positive early experiences at the breast were fading away. He was banging his head against the wall of his mother's hard shell. The mother was increasingly acquiring the archetypal connotation of the "bad" mother—the "witch." At the time this observation was recorded, Barry was seventeen-and-a-half months old. Because of repeated experiences of rejection and his mother's sadistic teasing, he could not receive any comfort from her care.

> Mother opened the door to let me in. Barry was walking around the porch. I said "hi" to both of them and we went into the living room. … I sat down. Barry was walking around, and the TV was on. Mother said that Barry had been crabby all day. She went into the kitchen as she was saying this, putting the gate up behind her. Barry walked around the living room for a minute, picked up a book, *The Busy Baby,* and handed it to me. Then he walked over to the gate, put his hands on it, tried to climb it, and began whining and crying. Mother asked him if he wanted grape juice. He continued to hang on the gate, whining. She poured him some grape juice in a regular glass and stood there holding it on the other side of the gate, watching him cry and reach up to her, wanting to be picked up. After a while he took the grape juice, drank a little, and started walking towards me. I commented on his having a regular glass. Mother said she did that sometimes, mostly because his other cups were dirty. Barry came over to me almost running, looking like he wanted me to pick him up. I caught his arm just before all the grape juice went flying. Some of it splashed on me, some on the floor. He looked disappointed that I didn't hug him or pick him up. He noticed I was concerned about the juice. I felt bad, too, that I was worried about the juice, and not focusing on him. By this time mother had come and seen the juice spill. She got some cleaner to wipe it up, telling me that she had been jealous that her best friend had got all new furniture, but that after the juice spill the other day and now today, she was glad not to have good furniture. As she was cleaning, Barry was standing right behind her. She was scrubbing and wiping, and as she was finishing, Barry climbed up on the chair and sat on the spot she was cleaning. He sat

there, but did not look at mother; he was looking off in the distance. She told him she needed to clean where he was sitting; he did not respond. Then she said something to me about how she and Barry were talking different languages that day. As soon as she was done, she went back into the kitchen. Barry went over to the gate, tried to climb it, crying, screaming and whining, reaching out for mother. Barry lay down on the floor, clanking his head as he lay back. Mother said, "Oh, that was dramatic." For the next ten minutes or so, he lay there on the floor, crying and whimpering. He would roll over on his side. For a while he was under the table, leaning against the wall, sometimes whimpering, sometimes just sitting. His eyes began to close several times. At one point mother said to him that this was just pathetic. Then he lay in the corner by the gate, whimpering. At one point he became distracted by something on the wall, then after a minute started crying again. I thought he was going to fall asleep, but he didn't. He just lay on the floor, half crying. Finally he got up and went over to the gate, arms out, crying. This time mother opened the gate and picked him up, holding him against her. He moulded to her shoulder. Immediately she went over to the TV, holding Barry, asking him if he wanted to watch Batman. She changed the channel and then sat down with him on the couch and they started watching TV. Barry tried to climb into her lap; she pushed him back and pointed to the TV saying Batman….Barry climbed again into mother's lap, and this time she allowed it. She said, "Let's show Betty all your new tricks." She had told me earlier that just past week Barry had learned so many new words, and that he could point to his eyes, ears, hair, mouth, and "Buddha belly." Barry was facing mother, sitting in her lap, and she was trying to get him to touch his hair, eyes, etc. She was asking him where things were, and he was pointing to her eyes, putting his fingers in them. He held hard on the nose, and she said, "Honk." She asked him where his Buddha belly was, and he started slapping her breasts. She was saying, no, she didn't have a Buddha belly, only babies have Buddha bellies, and was patting his stomach, making it a game. Then Barry hit mother hard in the face. She grabbed his hand, saying, "Not like this, be soft."

(Observation recorded in London by Betty Harrison.)

This sequence of distress and despair in Barry is difficult to tolerate. The mother is constantly criticising him, belittling him, and teasing him for his attempts to get close to her and be comforted. He is left to scream on his own on the floor. There is no compassion or helpful intervention on the part of the mother who treats his distress as a sort of hysterical fit. She has put a barrier between herself and the child, of which the closed gate is a concrete representation. He keeps trying to get close to her, but she cannot tolerate this. Here, the memory of the earlier good feeding still supports Barry, allowing him to hold on to a loving feeling for his mother. However, after many failed attempts to reach her, he falls

on the floor, exhausted and hopeless. To this, the mother does respond by picking him up briefly. He moulds into her arms, ready to make up with her, but she cannot tolerate his affectionate gesture and puts him down again, trying to interest him in the TV. Barry finally loses control and begins to hit her breasts harder and harder. The mother stops him and finally caresses him, telling him he must be gentle and shows him by stroking him gently.

It seems that only when the boy has turned into a harsh and violent aggressor does she stop her tormenting behaviour and become soft. But her tormenting and distancing actions have taught Barry to be harsh with her. And Barry, in spite of his desire to have a loving relationship with her, has adapted to hurting his mother in order to get her to respond to his needs. Thus, we can observe in this case how replication of negative actions on the mother's part, caused by her own pathology, has created a serious disturbance in her child.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the Jungian model of the psyche and described how the archetypes—the mental representations of instincts—contribute from birth to the development of consciousness and relationships. The archetypes are conceived as organisers of experience and are activated by deintegrative-reintegrative sequences in the self. They form an ontological link within the human species, storing ontogenetic psychosomatic information that is expressed in each individual's idiosyncratic manner, offering the infant typical imagery in which to clothe his experiences. In this way the early undifferentiated and chaotic flooding sensations become structured in innate self-organisational patterns of relational feedback loops. The mother, father, and child images are collectively and archetypally predetermined, insofar as they are passed down from generation to generation, shaping each individual experience of being mothered or fathered, and of being a child.

I have emphasised the essential function of replication for learning. Without repetition no learning can occur. In this learning process, repeated good experiences counteract repeated bad ones, and if the good experiences outnumber the bad, a healthy enough emotional development can take place. However, the repetition of negative experiences which constellate the negative aspect of the mother archetype contributes to the development of severe pathologies. Further, repetition as a compulsion can also be used by the infant to defend itself against change, and ultimately against growth.

In my view, it is important to study those aspects of infantile psychic development that could be defined as archetypal. We encounter these in the deintegrationreintegration patterns of the infant. As we have seen in the above case observations, when these patterns relate to the mother, they challenge her ego strength and her capacity to adapt to the baby's needs without falling prey to rigid or negative unconscious representations.

When we become aware of the complexities and risk factors inherent in the early mother-infant relationship, we can appreciate the miracle of healthy development. By observing parent-infant interactions, we become more aware that low dysfunctional interactions set in. Consequently, if we are able to intervene at an early stage, many severe disturbances can be prevented by setting in motion a cycle of positive, repetitive reinforcements that will break a development pathological cycle.

Finally, we must keep in mind that there is no one single way to approach such therapeutic interventions. Although it may be true that all of us share a certain ontological collectively, each individual is unique, and interprets and responds in his own way to his experiences.

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Part IV

Fairy tales

Chapter 7
Can you change your fate?
The clinical use of a specific fairy tale as the turning point in analysis

Verena Kast

As a child, I was eager to listen to and read fairy stories. I felt wonderful in this world full of fantasy but, at the same time, I knew quite well that the world in the fairy tale was not the everyday world. On becoming an analyst I cultivated my interest in symbols and emotions, and worked for years on the question of how these and imagination work in the analytical process, and on how they can be used for transformation.

Some remarks about fairy tales

Fairy tales are, at least in Europe, favourite stories of our childhood. Structurally, fairy tales begin with a typically problematic situation which can be easily transferred to everyday problems. They then show how the situation might be dealt with by describing processes that have to be lived through. A path of growth emerges that leads through and out of the problem that was described at the outset. The fairy tale's protagonist symbolizes a certain attitude in the face of a problematic situation. The fairy tale addresses universal human issues by means of the protagonist, whose difficulties, trials and adventures can be compared with our own.

The fairy tale speaks to us in symbols and images. The symbol mixes experiences, psychic contents and especially emotions into a sum total that cannot be represented in any other form. Thus Bloch calls symbols 'categories of condensation' (Bloch 1986). Although we never give up trying to understand and interpret symbols, each attempt can only bring a partial aspect to consciousness. The symbol has a surplus of meaning; it is 'overdetermined'. It reveals and opens up perspectives that gradually unfold before our eyes and stimulate our phantasy.

In therapy there is an attempt to create an environment in which the tale can speak to us at the level of the imagination as many of our inner images have become hardened and stereotyped. When they are softened in a therapeutic environment and become accessible to the input of the fairy tale, there is a chance that our prejudices and fixations may stand some alteration. Maybe the power of fantasy can even be revived. Through the funnel of the inner image, the

fairy tale can have a huge impact on the chemistry of our emotional transformations. Thus, listening to a fairy tale already has a therapeutic effect; if we are receptive, the story's images 'work on us'. The images in the fairy tales are, in addition, part of a narrative structure which draws a conflict to a creative solution. Therapeutic work with fairy tales refers to and is dependent on this narrative process. We take our own images—evoked by the tale—and 'enter' them into a developmental 'programme' that is encoded with the hope that difficulties can be overcome, characteristic of fairy tales. According to Bloch, every living symbol—that is every symbol that speaks to us—contains the 'hope that is encapsulated in the archetype' (Bloch 1959:187). Surely therapy should be about the business of making this power of the human psyche available.

I would like to mention here some of the many Jungian analysts who have used fairy tales clinically. Three who have published works in this area are Marie Louise von Franz, whose *Interpretation of Fairy Tales* came out in 1970. Hans Dieckmann published *Träume und Märchen als Helfer des Menschen* in 1966, and Ingrid Riedel, who published *Tabu im Märchen* in 1985.

There are different ways of working with fairy tales in psychotherapy. (Kast 1996:525). One is the possibility of working with a fairy tale or fairy tale motifs as countertransference reactions in the analytical process. I define countertransference as the analyst's emotional reaction to the analysand, and, in particular, to situations of transference (Jung 1954, para 422). An essential aspect of countertransference is that an image, a fairy tale motif (archetypal countertransference), a memory, an emotion, an intuition of the analyst cannot be explained by the course of events between the analyst and the analysand, nor is it a logical consequence of their communication. The analyst's countertransference is also a compromise between the images and emotions he or she perceives and his or her defence mechanisms.

Bad luck girl: on changing one's fate (Kast 1995)

Case example

A 37-year-old lawyer in private practice began therapy because she felt she was incapable of having a relationship. In the course of treatment it became evident that she was extremely destructive. As soon as something began to grow she cut it down again. This applied to her therapy as well, which was put to the test. The moment there was trust in the air, she was hard at work questioning the therapy and her therapist. It became clear that there was a huge fear of intimacy, leading to anxiety about being committed to anyone who might possibly abandon her. This anxiety caused her to end all her relationships before they got started.

Of course there was a history to this. Heidi—as I will call her here—had a father who died a mountaineer's death shortly after her birth. Her mother never recovered from his death, after which she became substance-dependent. Heidi

could remember when she was small having to go to pharmacies to collect what her mother needed. Her mother led a strange and turbulent live where nothing ever lasted for long. This meant that Heidi had to prepare for a change of scene every time her mother entered into a new relationship. Her mother had a number of different boyfriends and Heidi was shuffled back and forth between her mother and her grandmother, depending on how good the current boyfriend was with children.

She enjoyed being with her grandmother, in whose presence she found stability, order, and warmth. She would have liked to have stayed permanently with her grandmother, but as soon as each of her mother's relationships ended she was called back again since the mother couldn't stand living alone. After a while, Heidi developed a method for coming between her mother and her boyfriends at an early stage of the game, which had the advantage of preventing her periodic exportations. There were several variations on the theme. She could be intrusive, demanding, possessive of the boyfriends, or she could try to seduce them. These tactics almost always succeeded in causing either her mother or the boyfriend to break off the relationship, which is how she succeeded in achieving her goal of staying with her mother. Nevertheless, Heidi's mother was more like her child than her mother, and the former had to take on the corresponding responsibility. In the process, she had to deny a great deal of hate which resulted in her perceiving the mother as a nice woman without a home, who at least did a lot of interesting things and was different from other adults. Her mother lived with Heidi until her death when Heidi was 30 years old.

In the course of her studies, Heidi realized that she had disrupted practically all of the happy couples with whom she came into contact. Her disruptive behaviour was compulsive. She had a bizarre talent for pulling couples apart, attracting the attention of one or the other partner, and then dropping him or her as soon as she had it. She had always seen her behaviour as 'justified', nor did she see any reason for giving it further thought.

She repeated her famous trick by stealing a co-worker's boyfriend. The coworker didn't accuse her of anything—which was a big surprise—but rather came to cry on her shoulder, to tell her that she had ruined the first relationship in which she could really trust someone (the woman was 40). Suddenly Heidi felt really bad and asked herself what she was doing, and this was the reason why she began therapy. This 'game' included feelings of guilt and rage at herself. It didn't take long for Heidi to see that a certain pattern from her childhood was being repeated, and that this game dealt both with her fear of as well as her desire for an intimate relationship. After raining yet another relationship she came to therapy, sighed, and remarked, 'I wish I could trade in my fate for another one.' I responded, 'You can do that in folktales', and suddenly a fairy tale I haven't thought of for years came into my mind—a sort of archetypal countertransference.

The analytic relationship was extremely difficult and my comment was a response to her wish as much as my sense of hopelessness about the whole

matter. Heidi tried everything not to become dependent—then, I could die—and she would be abandoned once more. Interpretations in connection with her experiences as a child she found very interesting, as she could use them in dealing with her clients. But they did not help her. If we got closer to her feelings of hurt or neglect she regularly suggested finishing therapy—or missed the next session. Sometimes she brought a dream which showed attractive parts of her personality. She criticized the dream or the dream interpretation. I asked her only about her feelings and associations to the dream. She told me that analysis did not help at all but came to see me nevertheless, and expressed feelings of panic about my leaving her. I tried to adopt an attitude of not letting her destroy me, in, for instance, clinging to the idea that even this analysis could turn out to be a helpful one. I hoped that if Heidi experienced my surviving her destructivity she would perhaps start to trust me. So when I had the idea that her destructive wish could at least be fulfilled in a fairy tale, I hoped that we could leave this difficult analytical situation in which she often felt ashamed. Moreover, I felt the need for some symbolic material and wanted to hear something from her besides tales of wrecked relationships. To this end, I told her the story of the unlucky princess the way I remembered it. She then read it and immersed herself in it.

The story (Megas 1965)

There was once a queen who had three daughters, but she couldn't find them all a husband. She was very upset about this because all the other young women around were getting married. What if her daughters—the daughters of the king—grew old without any man at their side? One day a woman visited the castle and begged for alms. When she saw how unhappy the queen looked, she asked her what was wrong, and the queen told the woman her troubles. The beggar-woman gave her the following advice: Take a good look at your daughters tonight in bed, Tell me tomor-row what position they were sleeping in.' The queen did as she was totd, That night she took careful note. The eldest daughter had her hands over her head, the second had her hands folded over her chest, the third had them folded between her knees. The next day when the beggar-woman came, the queen told her what she had observed. Then the beggar-woman told her, 'Listen to what I say, Mrs Queen. The third daughter, the one with her hands folded between her knees is the one with the unlucky star. It is her fate that stands in the way of the others.' The queen pondered long after the beggar-woman had gone, 'Mother,' said the youngest daughter, 1 want to tell you something. Don't worry. I heard everything and I know now that I am the reason my sisters can't find a man to marry. Give me my dowry in gold coins, sew them into the seam of my dress, and let me go'. The queen did not like the idea of letting her go. 'But where would you go, my dear little one?' But she

didn't hear her mother's question. She got dressed up like a nun, and was off after bidding her mother farewell. The minute she passed through the castle gates, two suitors went up the front stairs to call on her sisters.

The unlucky princess carried on walking until she came to a village at night. She knocked on the door of a trader and asked him if she could spend the night in his house. He invited her to come in and sleep in the house, but she denied the invitation, insisting on staying in the cellar. That night she was visited by her woman of fortune, who made a terrible mess ripping to shreds the cloth that was stored there. The girl told her to stop, but the woman of fortune only threatened to tear her up as well. The next day when the trader went down to the cellar to see the nun he found a huge mess. All of his things were wrecked and strewn across the floor, 'Oh Mrs Nun,' he said, 'How could you do this to me? You've ruined me. What shall become of me now?' 'Caim down; she said. She opened up the seam of her skirt and pulled out some coins. 'Will that do?'—'It'll do, it'll do….' She left that day and continued on her way, She went on and on until night overtook her again. That night she found lodgings in the house of a glassware seller. it was the same story there. She asked to be allowed to stay in the cellar and in the night her Moira (her personal guardian spirit) came and wrecked the place. The next morning the seller went to check on the nun and saw the disaster. He started to scream and have a fit But when she stuffed his hands full of coins he shut up and let her go on her way.

The bad-luck girl continued on her journey. At last she arrived at a castle in another land where she requested a meeting with the queen, so she could ask her for a job. The queen was smart enough to see that underneath the habit there was a woman of royal blood, so she asked her if she knew how to make pearl embroidery. She said that she was good with pearls and so the queen gave her a place to stay. But while the bad-luck girl sat and embroidered, the people in the pictures on the wall jumped out of their canvases, stole her pearls, and pestered her continuously. The queen saw what had happened and felt sorry for the poor girl, The maids of the court often came to the queen to tell her about how every night some of the china was broken. They were sure it was the girl who was to blame. 'It's not her fault' the queen reprimanded them. 'She is a princess and the daughter of a lord, but she has bad luck.' Finally one day the queen said to her, 'Listen, darling; I've got something to tell you. Things are never going to get better if you go on like this. Your fate is behind you every step of the way. What you'll have to do is find a way to get a new fate for yourself.' But what do I have to do? How can I get a new fate?' 'That's what I'm going to tell you. You see that big mountain way over there? That's where all the women of fortune are, That is their castle and here is the way you'll have to go. Go on up to the top of that mountain. Find the woman of your fortune and give her this bread. Then say to her, "Dear Moira who gave me my late: give me a different one" Don't go away no matter what she does to you. Make sure she keeps the bread in her hands,'

The princess did as she was instructed, She took the bread and went down the road and up the steps until she came to the top of the mountain. When she knocked at the garden gate, a beautiful, well-groomed girl opened it and came out. 'You're not the one I am looking for,' she said to her and went back in again.

Soon another one came out who was just as attractive. 'I don't know you, darling dear,' she said, disappearing again.

Another one came, and another and another, but none of them claimed her as their own, until one came to the gate who was all dirty, her hair tangled and her clothes creased. 'What do you want, girl, why did you come here?' she said to the princess. 'Go on, beat it. Get out of here. I'm going to kill you.' The bad-luck girl gave her the bread and said to her, 'Dear Moira who gave me my fate; give me a different one.'—'Get lost. Go back to your mother and get yourself born again. Lie on her chest and have her sing you to sleep. Then you can come back and I'll give you a different fate.' The next morning the other Moiras said, 'Give that bad-luck girl another fate. She belongs to you and stumbles about, and yet she is a princess. Give it to her. Give it to her. 'I can't She should get out of here.' Suddenly she took the bread and threw it at the girl's head. It bounced off and fell to the ground. The girl picked it up, went up to her and told her, 'Take it, my dear Moira, take it and give me a different fate.' But she chased the girl away and threw stones at her.

Finally the girl's persistence broke through this rigid system of allotted fates. When she handed the bread again to the bad woman of fortune she suddenly changed her mind and said, 'Alright, give it to me,' and grabbed it. The girl was trembling, afraid that she would throw It away again. But she held on to it and said to the princess, 'Listen to what I'm telling you. Take this ball,' tossing her a ball of silken thread. Take good care of It. Don't sell it and don't give it away. If somebody wants it be sure you don't trade it for anything that doesn't have exactly the same weight. Go on now and do well.'

The girl took the ball of thread and went back to the queen. Her bad luck was over. In a neighbouring land a queen was getting married. She was having a dress made but there wasn't enough of the right kind of silk to finish it. The people at the castle were asking around if anyone knew where to find another piece of that silk. They had heard that in a neighbouring kingdom there was a girl who had a ball of silken thread. They visited her and pleaded with her to come to the queen's palace so they could check to see if her silk matched that of the dress they were making, When she arrived they held up the ball of thread to the dress and saw that it was a perfect match. They asked the girl what she wanted for the silk. She said it was not for sale. She would only trade it for something of equal weight. She put it on the scales, and on the other side they put gold coins, but the scales didn't budge, They kept piling on more and more coins but nothing happened. So the prince stepped on to the scales himself. Then the scales balanced. 'It seems that the silk weighs as much as me. If we're going to have the silk, you'll have to have me,' commented the prince. And that's what happened. The prince married the princess, they had a big celebration and lived a good life ever after.

Therapeutic considerations

Heidi was captured by the courage of this princess to change her fate, as she could have ended up with one that was even worse. Heidi found herself identifying with the protagonist of the story. The bad-luck girl made her own fate

look mild by comparison. If she could do it, Heidi could do it too. From the folk-tale's heroine Heidi gathered the courage she needed to deal with her fate.

As indicated, I was looking for a way to shift the therapy on to a more symbolic plane, to get the perspective that larger images might provide, and to help us out of the transference-countertransference deadlock in which we continually found ourselves, The story gave us a common language, something to talk about, something that fascinated both of us. It was something in common that didn't need to be dismantled right away. It was a transitional object in two senses of the term: first, work on the folk-tale made visible the dynamics of our relationship. Second, it allowed the analysand a glimpse into the problems behind the scenes, and provided contact with a layer of the psyche from which motivation to change can come. Much later on Heidi confided how important my telling her the story had been, even if I had to paste it together from the pieces I still remembered. She had been making noises about breaking off the therapy, to which I responded by telling her the story. To her this seemed like a kind of instinctive maternal response.

What is going on in this story?

The story suggests that fate is not something that is fixed once and for all, but rather something that can be worked on, something against which one can pit oneself. Let us ask what happened before the birth of this bad luck, and what is the road that leads to the place where it can be exchanged. The story tells us about a queen who had three daughters. There is no mention of a king. The problem is that this princess can find no mate for herself and there are no relationships that would guarantee the fertility of the land and the continuity of its people. The lack of a relationship can be seen as the lack of real relationships, or as the lack of an inner relationship between masculine and feminine principles. Outstaying their appointed time at home, these daughters of the queen have no life of their own. They are unable to take the next step in their growth which is to leave their mother.

What is at the bottom of this? The beggar-woman provides the answer: the youngest daughter is cursed with a bad fortune. There is the indirect suggestion that at her birth the mother did not adequately pay homage to the 'goddesses of fortune' who are exponents of the great mother. Perhaps she offered them too little salt and bread. In Ancient Greece there was a custom of offering salt and bread to the fates, the Moiras, at the birth of a child. This was done in the hope that if the gods could share in the enjoyment of human food—a sign of human life—they would be more apt to grant the child a long and prosperous life. The custom was based on the archaic belief that spirits and gods need to be given their place alongside human beings if anything good was to be expected from life. This idea grew out of Greek culture, in which there was the belief that every person had his or her own personal guardian spirit—a personal fate—that needed to be taken into account. The fate, who was called Moira, embodied that portion

of fortune that was allotted to each individual. Gradually the multiplicity of fates was reduced to three: Klotho spins the thread of life, Lachesis takes up the thread of life through all chance events, and Atropos cuts it (Walker 1983). The goddesses of fate, busy with the thread of life, are historically related to the pre-Hellenic earth mother, who was also portrayed as spinning thread. The queen in the story must have had a warped relationship with the powers of destiny and, by failing to observe them, she underestimated their influence. This would explain why her daughter had been allotted an unfortunate destiny. It also makes sense of the fact that the beggar-woman knew how to find out which daughter had the bad fate while the queen herself had no idea and could only worry. Beggars depict parts of us that we have crossed out of our lives, that have to beg to be given a place. Wisdom dwells with the beggar. In a Sicilian parallel to this tale, 'Bad-luck Child', poverty is the result of war.

Perhaps in this Greek folk-tale, too little attention was paid to a mother whose divine qualities could satisfy a child of this world. Perhaps it had been forgotten that every child is a citizen of two worlds. The daughter who sleeps curled up in foetal position is the one with the bad luck whose development has been arrested. Her mother is not a bad mother and does not wish to get rid of her daughter 'My dear little one', she calls her, but seems to be somewhat helpless when it comes to protecting the daughter from her fate. She manages to avoid telling her daughter the bad news and the girl spares her mother this upsetting confession. Here is another indication that this mother portrays a psychological issue. She is helpless, or 'compliant' as we now put it; she shies from wrestling with reality. This goes along with the idea that she has lost contact with the woman of fortune and has become insecure about her feminine identity.

Putting ourselves in the place of the princess, we brace ourselves for a shock as her life takes a nasty turn for the worse. One minute she has all the comforts of home, the next minute she is out on her tail. Not only does she suffer the loneliness of exile; she is also burdened with an incredibly difficult existential task without having the slightest idea where to turn for help. Even so, she is calm and composed as she goes down her road. The beggar-woman 'knew' and the girl seems to 'know' as well. She cashes in on her inheritance, taking everything that she can from her place of origin as she leaves. Covering herself and retreating from the world, the girl disguises herself as a nun. She has entered on the path into her interior depths through which she will end up becoming herself, rather than finding a man. But first she must find out what her bad fortune is all about. Her unfortunate fate is revealed in the things that her woman of fortune does. On the first night, the woman of fortune makes a mess of the cloth dealer's merchandise. The girl tries to wrestle with her destructive fate but can do nothing to stop her, although she does at least pit herself against it. The very woman of fortune who spins the thread of life and the interconnecting web of existence is the same one who pulls it all apart again. We see the bold contrast between what she can do and what she can undo.

Rather than bringing various threads together to make a whole, to create relationships, all the energy that is available is devoted to the project of cutting through the thread of anything that might hold things together and bind single parts into a greater whole. There is even the danger that the Moira will rip apart the girl herself. There is the danger of a psychotic reaction. If it had not been for her ability to pit herself against the destructive Moira and to resist accepting personal responsibility for her, the girl would have run the risk of total annihilation. Here we see what can happen when we are attacked by our own destructivity. Even if this violence can be regarded as something for which the girl is not personally responsible, it is she who has to pay for it and she is able to do so due to her endowment.

Things were bad enough where cloth was involved, but next the girl's bad luck turns to the destruction of glass. Of course everything that human hands have crafted with love and grace will be smashed to bits. We can imagine that some of the wares the glass dealer was selling were vessels, which are symbols of the human capacity to receive, preserve, nurture and transform. The 'container' is shattered. The girl cannot hold on to what life offers. It slips through her fingers.

The queen whom she now visits turns out to be a good mother. Until now the girl has always insisted on sleeping in the cellar, isolating herself from others. With the good will of the understanding queen she becomes integrated. She is given the task of embroidering with pearls, and what she embroiders are images from her life. The shards of her violence are woven into the picture. Embroidery suggests an attempt to integrate the fragility of life into the total picture.

Figures step out of the pictures on the wall which depicts the fact that the princess is harassed by figments of her imagination. In other words she is hallucinating. Nervous and touchy, she takes everything as a personal affront, even the pictures on the walls. The rage that until now has been directed outward now turns inward, dissolving her ego-identity. She experiences herself as fragmented and smashes a lot of china. However, the queen takes up a protective and knowing stance with her. Rather than being deluded by her present appearance, she recognizes the princess within her. The queen knows that the girl is not bad in character but has just had bad luck. In this way she is able to separate the girl from her fate and the problem can now be looked at and dealt with, so that when the violence threatens to escalate the time has come to do something. It is the queen who knows what must be done: the princess has to find out who her fate is, and bring her the bread provided by the queen. She has to ask the Moira in person if she can give her up in exchange for another fate. One suspects that the queen is another woman of fortune in disguise, a fairy godmother who can undo the curse of the evil fairy. In more psychological language we could say that the princess portrayed the plight of a young woman who behaves destructively, and suffers from hallucinations and other psychotic reactions. She needed to stay for a while in a place where her need to be mothered would be responded to, where her problems as well as her strengths would be recognized. Then she could begin to gain more control over her

violence. By looking at her violence within the protective space of the good queen, and by taking a stand against it instead of letting herself be swallowed up by it—she has not yet abandoned her pearl embroidery—it constellated in her the positive mother archetype. There is now an opening in the fabric of her life for something good to come her way—something without which therapy would be impossible. It is the bread given to her by the psychically nourishing mother—appearing in the figure of the queen—that the princess must bring to her Moira. Bread is what humankind makes out of grain, out of the gifts of the earth mother, out of nature. It can be left as an open question whether the queen is taking responsibility for the girl by simply giving her the bread ready-made, or whether the bread is a symbol for the nourishing resources that the princess has made available for herself and others through her confrontation with her evil fate. In the final analysis, nothing much can be made of this experience that might be nourishing for self and others without the influence of the positive mother archetype. This influence radiates through the maternal attitude of someone with whom one has a deep relationship.

The queen knows of the mountain where the women of fortune reside. This is an Ancient Greek idea; the gods and goddesses dwell in the mountains, for example, on Olympus. The souls of the dead also dwell at the place where earth and heaven meet and there at the top of the mountain the princess will either undergo a radical transformation or she will meet with her death. She must go to the very edge of existence and in order to climb this mountain she needs every fibre of her strength, the courage that only comes of desperation, and the hope the queen has baked into her bread. At this point the folk-tale reassures us. So many beautiful woman of fortune are paraded before our eyes. We are reminded that many people are blessed with good fortune. 'Beautiful' and 'good luck' are synonymous in the language of follk-tales. Our princess has to be able to survive a situation far beyond the limits of what most people have to deal with. Her woman of fortune is dirty and crooked and threatens to kill her. She is uprooted and dangerous. She is destructive because she has been deprived. She says something that we all say at one time or another: 'I wish I could be born again of a different mother.' Here is another indication that something went wrong at her birth and entry into the world.

'My good Moira', the girl addresses her—but this plea to her woman of fortune's good side is not yet of any use, although, in general, this is an effective way to deal with evil figures in folktales. But the Moira drives her back, pelting her with stones. There can be no doubt that the princess's fate, the most important basic ruling figure in her psyche, is sadistic, and has put her in the position of the victim. But she is no longer willing to play this part and instead has made up her mind to stick up for herself and demand a new fate. She stands on the solid ground of her conviction and courage. Refusing to back down until she has given her Moira what she must in order to receive the better fate that she has earned, she refuses to accept the tyranny of self-destructive thoughts. In this way she shows her intrapsychic persistence and the spectre is driven away by the girl's

nurturing side. By taking the bread, the Moira has accepted the offering that the princess's mother failed to observe at her birth but not that all doubts have been banished. The girl is still afraid that this twist of fate will untwist itself again, as is anyone who has managed to free him or herself from a destructive power but who may not yet feel safe enough to take a deep breath. One is afraid that the destructive thing might be getting ready to pounce again the minute one relaxes. The Moira delivers a ball of silken thread, symbol of a fate that is 'normal' in comparison to what the girl had before, and yet its silkiness shows its preciousness. The goddess of fate seems to have spun it specially for her. That was the end of her bad luck, the story tells us. She has confronted violence and survived. In leading her to the foreign prince, the ball of thread is the result of her good fortune. Trust in her fate has grown substantially, affecting both the prince and princess in bringing them together in the end. The extent to which the fate of the princess is bound to that of the prince—or from a collective perspective the extent to which the 'disturbed' Moira also penetrates the life of men—comes to expression in what seems to be only a minor detail—a piece of string—preventing the prince's marriage. But marriage in folk-tales is always much more than the observance of a mere norm; it is a union of great promise without which the continuation of human life and the fertility of nature cannot be assured.

The core of this folk-tale consists of a confrontation with violence. As soon as this violence has been recognized—especially the wound that underlies it and feeds it—something can be done about it. The wound has been recognized on two levels, first at the level of the Moira, and then at the level of the princess.

The tale in therapy

Heidi was at first very critical of the tale, in spite of her fascination with it. She was not satisfied with the story's statement that the princess was no longer disturbed; she felt there should have been a better description of how the bread transformed the Moira. By means of her scepticism, Heidi was in effect expressing her conviction that the Moira itself—her Moira—needed to be healed. Here she was providing information that was important for her therapy. The goal she had in mind was well taken, for unless her Moira went through a basic reconstruction, she would never be free of her concern that she could easily slip back into her old, destructive ways.

Heidi chose to make an image of the violence that was personified in the Moira —as had the heroine of the story—to confront it and to stay with it until it changed. She decided to practise this in fantasy and chose the method of Imagination (Kast 1993).

The task in this method is to activate inner figures to the point that they take on a life of their own—to let them speak in their own language. This assumes of course that we are willing to let them have a life of their own, which means that our ego-consciousness may have very little control over them if any. It is then

the job of the ego-complex to try to gain contact with these figures. The work is supported by the enabling conviction that these figures may well metamorphosize if we are able to reach and speak with them. In the process it is not only the inner figure that is transformed but also the ego-complex, which gets involved with this newly emerging and sometimes disturbing part of the personality. One can begin an imagination with an image that had a particular impact. In contrast to free-form imagination, here the folk-tale gives fantasy a grid on which to construct one's own fantasy structure. Heidi chose to begin with the scene on top of the mountain. Envisioning herself on top of the sacred mountain she couldn't locate any Moira, and she realized that she hadn't brought any bread with her. She felt ashamed of herself and went back down again. 'No bread, nothing to give my Moira.' She realized that, as usual, she had been expecting to hop right into something without being properly prepared. So she went back to the scene of the first night in the cloth dealer's cellar.

Imagination

Cloth is actually quite fitting. Everything I have woven, the warp and woof of my life…. In my nun-habit I feel oddly protected. The Moira cannot touch my naked skin. I wait nervously.

She bursts in—a dark-haired, wild, dirty woman—and begins ripping everything apart. it makes me mad. I hit her arm. What a waste of material! She spins me away. I try pleading with her. 'Please stop.'

No response.

'Stop you crazy woman!' 'You stop yourself, or I'll rip you apart too.' apart too.'

I am overwhelmed by sadness. It's hard to tatk to her.

Heidi's sadness lasted long after the imagination had ended. She felt sad about her own violence, about how stupid it was, and she was disappointed that the woman in her imagination had refused to behave the way she wanted. She was worried that she might be too much under the influence of the story. Her violence seemed mild in comparison to that of the story.

In the next session, Heidi said she needed to find a name for this destructive, wild, malicious side of herself. She chose the name 'Heidrun'. She attached no particular meaning to this name other than the fact that she had heard it recently and that it appealed to her. Heidrun was also the name of the mythical Germanic goat that nourished fallen warriors with its milk in Valhalla, behaving in an explicitly nurturing, maternal way for the benefit of those masculine parts that had met their end in the heat of battle. Heidi discovered a connection between her 'violent' part —which could also be nurturing—and the male warriors. And to be violent could also mean to be wild. The goat, even if it was only mythical, gave Heidi permission to be very obstinate.

Once this part of her had a name, it was not long before it began to behave more in the fashion of the analysand's choosing. Heidi worked on this imagination with great persistence and, in the beginning, memories from her life formed a large part of this work. She recalled incident after incident of having mercilessly destroyed something in a fit of 'ecstatic desperation'. She felt especially crushed by the realization that she had destroyed her mother's relationships, which had been so important for her. She understood her actions as a child, which did not prevent her from feeling remorseful about them. And yet the fairy tale told her that it was not bad will, it was fate which she could not fight as a child. In her thoughts she apologized to her mother. She attempted to deal less destructively with her everyday frustrations, and with those involved in therapy. She had long been aware that she became destructive whenever she felt injured, something that she sensed indirectly by noticing that she was feeling brave and in need of controlling her temper. Having been injured so many times as a child, it did not take much to make her feel injured as an adult. She tried not to beat herself up every time she fell back into her old patterns. She set herself the goal of seeing Heidrun as one aspect of herself that implied another at the same time. She had a very caring side that came to the fore when she was involved with people who were somehow dependent on her. She also tried to gain insight into her constant attempts to disparage therapy and her therapist, to remember that in spite of this she remained in therapy, and thus in dialogue with her issues. It deserves mention that her negative attitude towards therapy grew milder once we began working with this story.

In the end Heidi made the following observation: the princess in the story had not achieved everything in the direct confrontation with her Moira. Her stay with the good queen was also essential. The process of recalling the times that violence had played a role in her life, without forgetting those parts of herself that had not been affected by this violence, could be compared with the nights the princess spent in the homes of the cloth and glass merchants. The stay with the queen, she added, was something she experienced in therapy. For her, I was someone who understood without judging; I came to her defence when she was threatened by herself, by others, and by her accusing inner figures. I was very pleased to witness this development into a positive transference. When a relationship is structured by the positive mother archetype, the qualities of the queen that she had ascribed to me could also become qualities that she could develop in herself. The projection could be withdrawn. Naturally, one might ask whether her idealization was simply a reverse of her previous negativity. Taking into account the fact that the therapeutic relationship as a whole was not at all restricted at this phase to a idealizing transference, I believe it is safe to say that the positive mother archetype had become more strongly constellated now than previously. And yet the question remained: would Heidi have to busy herself with some sort of figurative pearl embroidery as the folk-tale suggests? We agreed that she would go through her entire life history one more time, attempting to replace accusation with empathy towards herself. As she did this,

she found that she was able to contact a bit of the good mother in relation to herself. 'When I see myself lying to the pharmacist to get that medicine for my mother, I wish I could take myself by the arm and whisper words of reassurance.'

These recollections gave her greater respect for herself and for all of the things that she had survived and achieved in her life, in spite of the violence. A memorable comment marked the conclusion of this part of the work: 'I have bread, I have made something of my fate, I can nourish, I can go to Moira now.'

Imagination

The climb up the mountain is long and hard. I focus exclusively on my encounter with Heidrun. There she is. She is expecting me, looks down on me as I arrive. She is awaiting me so she can humiliate me. I won't let her do that to me. I bring her my bread. No more no less and I ask her to be less destructive J ask her to change my fate.

'Please take my bread; it is more than just bread. Take my bread, it is good, it with nuts and tears of water.'

I don't need anything, I don't take anything from you.'

She takes the bread and throws it back at me. What a slap in the face! I would like to throw it right back at her. I have to get control of myself. She is the wild one. A bird circles overhead. It gives me courage.I hold out the bread once more. She takes it and eats it. She goes inside the mountain.

'Wait,' she tells me.

I wait, nervous and full of hope. She returns. She has brushed her hair. She still looks wild, but she is clean, and somehow I like her. She will go with me back into the valley.

The imagination with this female figure went on for months. The malicious Heidrun lost none of her wildness, but her destructive rage gradually metamorphosized into constructive assertiveness. Crucial to Heidi's experience was the discovery of a source of concentration and centring within this violent energy. She learned that being destructive was often the only way for her to keep herself from fragmenting, and yet that violence did not ensure the survival of her self since the sense of centring it provided never lasted.

It was not enough for Heidi to become conscious of her wounds, to become aware of how she felt injured by the happiness of others, who triggered her past wounds of feeling excluded, isolated, cut off and unlucky. She was also continually confronted with the question of how to centre her self, to be present to herself in a constructive way, especially in moments when she was hurting. Heidi 's imaginatings gave her the opportunity to practise centring herself. It also helped to prepare her for the joys and trials of relationships. Out of her Moira, Heidi created an *alter ego* who was anything but a figure to imitate and follow along the path to self-actualization. Although it was a figure that may well have

portrayed the most energetic part of Heidi's personality, it was a figure that she had to confront in order to invite what was creative about it into her life and to get control over what was destructive. The more this figure became integrated, the greater was her sense of personal responsibility for her violence, even if it was originally not her fault that she was violent. The woman of fortune from the story thus metamorphased into a figure who symbolized human qualities. In the process she lost her divine attributes, although she did not completely lose her numinosity. This transformation is legitimate and extremely helpful when dealing with folk-tales in therapy. Yet Heidi never completely gave up the thought that by working on the woman of fortune and on the issue of violence she was working over the evil fortune that plagued her entire family. She noted that violence had played an important role not only in her mother's life, but also in that of her father, and that each member of her immediate family had their own unique version of it. When she looked at her work on violence in this manner, she saw that she was not only doing something for the sake of her own personal pathology, but was also doing a service for the 'woman of fortune.'

In the analysis of Heidi, the work with this fairy tale was a turning point. From now on she was able to relate to me and to her unconscious in a more constructive way and she took responsibility for her behaviour.

The fairy tale—used as a transitional object

When we use a fairy tale in therapy, we change the style and the tenor of analysis by telling a story. This means that we refer to an early experience—or an unfulfilled wish for an experience—in childhood, which is to do with being able 'to get something' or to listen to a voice—and, in this way, to become connected to a whole atmosphere of images, emotions and comfort, which can help in becoming more grounded.

A symbolic process, such as one that is expressed in a fairy tale, can take on the function of a transitional object in the sense of Winnicott (1986). The storehouse of the archetypal symbols which are experienced in fairy tales can be seen as a collective earth mother, from which the personal symbols can be evoked in the psyche of the individual person—with the goal of coping better with anxiety and of becoming more creative. I see the supporting elements of the collective unconscious, which become accessible to us in fairy tales, in myths, in parts of stories or poems, addressing somewhat differently these same themes. They offer something we can provide for others so that the problem might be reworked. This, in turn, also has an effect on the structure of the ego and thus of the creativity and the competence in dealing with everyday life. Only rarely does one copy the solution offered by the inner image. Fairy tales spark imaginative processes that are unique to each individual, alter deeply entrenched feelings and accompany us in the practical business of restructuring our daily lives.

I like to see all the stories we human beings (and our culture in general) have collected as a transitional space, as the reservoir of the collected creativity of all

human beings in the past and in the present. The more the symbols that are used are reformulations of archetypal structures and dynamics, the more they seem to trigger the personal fantasy and the fantasy of survival, and the more they help one to work on actual and repressed problems. In this way, one does not get stuck in the past but can find that life becomes more meaningful.

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Chapter 8
Splitting: resolved or reserved?

Hayao Kawai

Splitting in the present age

The concept of splitting becomes extremely important in thinking about the way present-day people's conscious should be. When Freud began psychoanalysis, in the beginning he turned his attention to patients suffering from hysteria. Applying the mechanism of strong repression of the hysterical patient's conscious, he discovered that psychological matter which could not be approved by the conscious was pushed into the unconscious. In such cases there is a severance of the conscious and the unconscious, and he explained that through the dissolution of this severance, the patient can be cured.

Freud's method of understanding and treating this kind of human psyche thereafter became an important model in psychotherapy. However, in recent years there are many cases that cannot be understood according to this kind of model. The psychic condition of the patients in these cases is not the kind of horizontal severing of conscious and unconscious discovered by Freud, but what is more appropriately called 'vertical severing'. In later psychology, the term 'splitting' came to be used. As is well known, splitting is a major problem for present-day psychotherapists, and it is an important key concept for understanding borderline cases.

The problem for psychotherapists is how to cure this kind of splitting. However, I think there is one pitfall in putting this into practice. In Freud's model for curing hysteria the patients are influenced by the therapist, and when dealing with borderline case patients or those with other splitting problems, it is acknowledged that the therapist may be too hasty in trying to complete the process of separation-reintegration. In the case of hysteria, the psychological content to be reintegrated is within the unconscious. The psychotherapist points this out to the patient, for it helps the patient to make it conscious. This kind of method is very easy to understand and it is clear what kind of role the therapist should play. Accordingly, this kind of thinking exerts an influence on therapists in the treatment of borderline cases as well.

It is well known that in borderline cases, patients do some violent acting out. Criticizing or attacking the therapist becomes exceedingly intense. Sometimes

they will threaten to physically attack the therapist and actually carry it out. When patients proceed to attack themselves, we see self-inflicted injuries and attempts at suicide. However, it is necessary for the therapist to reconsider whether or not his or her attitude towards the patients is provoking their strong acting out. In other words, in dealing with the condition of splitting, if the therapist tries to readily conform to the scheme of separation-reintegration, the patients, while partially feeling it is justified, feel in some way dissatisfied at not being properly understood and try to somehow convey their own real situation. However, it is nearly impossible to put it into words, so they must act it out.

Temporarily setting borderline cases aside, it seems as though people today are suffering from some kind of splitting. Even people who are currently leading normal lives are splitting inside. There are many people who think this should be resolved somehow. Speaking from my own experience, as a Japanese person I maintain a traditional Japanese lifestyle, but because I have adopted certain aspects of Western culture I must suffer from being split into two persons. I will not go into this problem here since I have discussed it in detail elsewhere (Kawai 1996). In the modern age there are probably many people with this kind of splitting due to cultural differences, who take it upon themselves as their own problem. A special feature of these cases is that rather than a matter of one or the other being repressed inside the unconscious both are to a certain degree conscious but cannot find a simple means of integration.

The fact that there are frequent occurrences of multiple personality in Europe and America demonstrates how often this kind of present-day splitting mechanism is used. The symptoms are different from the double personality frequently reported in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The latter kind of splitting is explained according to the concept of dissociation, whereas in the former kind, the psychological mechanism is splitting. Even so, I am afraid there may be a tendency to use the methods of treating double personality to cure multiple personality. The therapist who endeavors to resolve multiple personality by integrating them into one personality may cause new splitting in the patient. On the contrary, the symptoms of multiple personality may be intensified because of this.

One of the chief causes which gives rise to this kind of psychological treatment problem is that, in thinking about the way the human conscious should be, there is a tendency to attach great importance to the ego born in the Western modern era. There are considerable differences in what the human conscious should be according to culture. Originally, it was considered difficult to pass simple judgement, but in the twentieth century we must recognize the reality of the ego born in the Western modern age, armed with science and technology, which has become an exceedingly strong force in the world. As a consequence, the entire world has been influenced strongly by European and American culture. Erich Neumann has done some remarkable research concerning the formation of this collaborative ego, pointing out that the ego is appropriately manifested as a male hero image (Neumann 1954). Neumann gives a full account of stories in which a

strong hero slays a monster, frees the maiden taken captive by the monster and marries her, demonstrating that they symbolically express ego formation.

However, with regard to the subject of present-day people, we must consider the way the conscious has overcome Neumann's idea of ego. As I stated previously, with a split conscious, a treatment plan in which one represents the hero that 'subjugates' the other part only intensifies the problem. In order to avoid this sort of thing, it is necessary for us to consider the consciousness which is different from the modern ego. In order to do this, I would like to look at fairy tales for clues in the same way that Neumann employed images from mythology.

Splitting in fairy tales

Fortunately, with regard to splitting there are some very fitting fairy tales, which I would like to use. In Japan I would select the kind of stories grouped under the title 'Oni no Ko Kozuna' (Seki 1978–80). One of these is a story called 'The Laughter of Oni', the details of which I have discussed elsewhere (Kawai 1988). Since I did not touch upon the subject of splitting at that time, I would like to discuss the story again here. First of all I must explain a little bit about the *oni* to which I am referring here. *Oni* are imaginary monsters who appear in Japanese fairy tales, dreadful beings who eat people, but who sometimes reveal a humorous side. There are also *oni* who are thought to be the spirits of dead people or ghosts. The first fairy tale I would like to discuss is called 'Katako' (Half child). A short synopsis follows.

> An *oni* appeared while a woodcutter was working, and asked him if he liked *ankomochi* (buns with bean jam filling). The woodcutter replied that he liked them enough to trade them for his wife. After eating his fill of buns from the oni, he returned home to find that his wife was not there. He went in search of her, and ten years later reached Onigashima (Oni Island). There was a boy of about 10 living there, who was half *oni* and half human. He said he was named Katako and reported that his father was an *oni* chief and his *mother* a Japanese. The boy took the woodcutter to the oni's house, where he met his wife. When the woodcutter tried to take his wife and leave, me oni said only if he won a round, challenging him to a contest of eating buns, cutting wood, and drinking sake. The woodcutter won all of them with the help of Katako, and while the oni was intoxicated the three made their escape by boat. When the oni came to his senses he drank the seawater and tried to suck in the boat with it. But Katako was clever and made the oni laugh,causing him to spit out the water, and the three returned home to Japan safely. Katako was later called 'Oniko' (son of Oni) and pepole refused to have any-thing to do with him, making him difficult for him to live in Japan. He left a note for his parents that when he died, if they cut

> the oni half of his body into small pieces, skewered them and hung them in the doorway, the on/ would probably be afraid to enter. If that didn't work they should throw rocks, aiming for the oni's eyeballs. Katako then killed himself by throwing himself from the top of a Keyaki tree. His mother cried and cried as she did as Katako said, and the *oni* appeared, saying how terrible Japanese women were to skewer their own sons. He went around to the back door and tried to break in, but Katako's parents threw rocks, and the *oni* ran away. This was the beginning of the practice of skewering sardines and scattering beans at the festival known as *setsubun*.

The hero of this fairy tale—Katako—was half *oni* and half human, a form of splitting. When I first read this story, I was extremely shocked at Katako's suicide. I saw myself as a kind of 'Katako', for while Japanese, I was studying abroad in Switzerland where I was subjected to influences while developing my philosophy of life, and thus I was shocked by the tragic outcome. I was struck by the fact that in this story Katako refers to his mother as a 'human', explicitly calling her a 'Japanese person'. The phrase 'people refused to have anything to do with him, making it difficult for him to live in Japan' also lingered in my heart. After passing my analyst's examinations in Switzerland I returned to Japan in 1965, and for a while I experienced exactly the same feeling. In Japan one receives little direct criticism, but there is a strong unseen force to eliminate foreign, heterogeneous things which eventually becomes unbearable. Katako was unable to endure this and committed suicide.

I will come around to examining Katako later, but here I would like to touch upon half persons. The cultural anthropologist Rodney Needham says myths or fairy tales with 'an imaginary person appearing on only one side of the body' or 'a human form that is divided vertically or horizontally, with each half embracing a different temperament', appear worldwide (Needham 1980). As an example he cites that in the Ibo tribe in South Africa, it is thought that the body of the man who performs a particular rite becomes half human, half spirit. The right half of his body is painted black and the left half white. Since Needham says that there are examples throughout the world where two half bodies possessing contradictory personalities become one body, he concludes that the cultural symbol of a half person can be considered as an archetype with its origins in psychological elements.

Setting aside the issue of whether or not we agree with Needham's conclusion, from it we learn that the subject of a half person appears in many myths and fairy tales worldwide. I would like to contemplate the psychological meaning for us of stories of half humans. As one means to consider the meaning of a half person, I would like to discuss an Italian story with this theme in comparison to Japanese fairy tales. A synopsis follows of 'The Cloven Youth', which is included in a collection compiled by Italo Calvino (1956).

Not knowing it was the garden of a witch, there was a woman who ate up all the parsley. Since the woman was pregnant, the angry witch said that after the was born, when it reached the age of 7, she would take half of it. A boy was born and when he became 7, the witch cut him vertically into two halves and took half with her. The half boy who was left behind grew up and went fishing one day and caught a big eel. Since the eel begged the man to save him, he let it go but it got caught in the net again. The eel said, 'for the sake of the little eel release me and I will give you anything you desire', so he let it go.

When the man went into the city, the princess and her servants laughed at his strange half form. The man flew into a rage and prayed for the sake of the little eel let the daughter of the king bear my child'. Before long the princess became pregnant and there was a great uproar. Her parents asked her if she had any idea who the father was, but the princess no. Finally a boy child was born. At the suggestion of a sorcerer, the king gave the baby boy a gold apple and a silver apple and invited a lot of people to come. The boy was supposed to give the silver apple to his grandfather and the gold apple to his father. The boy immediately gave the silver apple to the king, but the father could not be found, Eventually the gold apple was handed to the Cloven Youth. The king was angry and put the princess and the Cloven Youth into a barrel which was set afloat in the sea. The two were saved when it washed ashore. The Cloven Youth made several wishes, 'for the sake of the little eel', whereby he became handsome whole man, married the princess and came to live in a great palace. He invited kings from nearby lands to visit, and had a tree made with gold and silver apples for the occasion. He then asked the guests to please not touch the apples. When the father of the princess came, the Cloven Youth arranged to have a gold and silver apple put in his pocket when he wasn't looking. When it was announced that someone had stolen some apples, the king was discovered as the culprit. The king claimed he had no recollection of how it happened, whereby the Cloven Youth said, 'but even though the person had no recollection, something happened and you punished them, didn't you? You will receive the same punishment.' He was going to put the king in a barrel and set it afloat on the sea, but the princess pleaded with him and the king was saved.

The hero in this story is different from the Japanese 'Katako', for he was a person who only had half a body. While the theme is still a 'half person', in contrast to the Japanese story in which a non-human element is added, in Italy half of the human elements are taken away. In either case, however, the stories are concerned with splitting. While the Japanese story has a tragic ending, the Italian story has a classical happy ending.

Here I would like to discuss the meaning of the Italian fairy tale. It is clear that this tale is based upon the Garden of Eden episode from the Bible, as well as the story of the Immaculate Conception. Here 'crime' or 'sin' and 'good versus evil' are the main subjects. The use of apples as stage props is probably a reflection of the forbidden fruit in the Bible. However, while the theme in the story is a crime,

the subject becomes 'innocent crime'. With regard to crime, there is punishment. But it is clear that innocent crimes are not punishable. The problem is 'unconscious crime'. What happens in this case? People who rely upon a splitting mechanism are often criticized by others. However, are not the actions of these people mostly 'unconscious crimes'?

Let us look at the Italian fairy tale from the beginning. A woman eats all the parsley in someone else's garden. That is obviously stealing. However, in the story it is not so simple. The passage concerning the witch's parsley garden reads: The garden gate was always open, and since the parsley was so abundant, all who wished could go in and help themselves.' In other words, the parsley in this garden was not 'forbidden'. But the woman aroused the witch's anger by eating all the parsley. Perhaps the witch purposely left the garden gate open and was waiting for a woman—a pregnant woman—to appear and eat all the parsley. I think the witch was leading her into temptation.

No matter that the woman committed an 'unconscious crime', she was punished by the witch so that when she gave birth to a son and he reached the age of 7 he would be cut in two, and half would be taken by the witch. This is rather severe punishment. What is really interesting here is that the half of the child which was returned to the mother led a completely ordinary life. Nothing is said about any inconvenience by being only half; on the contrary, he even goes fishing. This implies that this 'half person' led a normal life just like other normal people. In other words, the half taken by the witch had no connection to his normal self. Previously I stated that half of the child's human elements were taken away, but perhaps it would be more correct to say that among the elements of a person, the elements unrelated to a normal life were taken away. It seems that the general public was unaware that he was a 'half person'. When the princess saw him and laughed at his half appearance, the fact that he became extremely angry suggests that up until this point he had not experienced this kind of ridicule.

Thinking along these lines, the world is probably full of half persons, but in general they are viewed as regular people. The princess being able to see his true form brings to mind the story of 'The Emperor's New Clothes'. Her innocence is what triggers her natural reaction towards reality, and she should not be punished on account of her innocence. I would like to comment upon the laughter of the princess. Laughter is an important element in fairy tales and myths. There is not enough space to go into it in detail here, but the essence of laughter in this story expresses that the world has opened up, and that there is a transformation in the level of the story. Indeed, 'The Laughter of Oni' was important in the synonymous story of Katako, and the laughter on that occasion embodies the same meaning.

A great transformation occurs as a result of laughter. The hero, who had worked hard up until then, releasing the eel he caught and doing only good things, became angry and took revenge on the completely innocent princess. In other words, evil unexpectedly invades the good world. This can be regarded as an opportunity for the half person to be restored to a whole person. The

'Immaculate Conception' of the princess is neither attributed to divine will, nor is she given notice, but rather it occurs without warning through revenge as a result of ill will. The princess had no knowledge of it. It is true that it was provoked by her thoughtless laughing. One could also call this an 'unconscious crime'. The princess committed a crime while remaining completely unaware of the import of her actions, and in this regard can also be considered as splitting.

The punishment dictated by the king for her 'unconscious crime' was too severe. She, her husband and her son were put into a barrel and set afloat on the sea. The three in the barrel do not die but are washed ashore and, through the eel's power, miracles occur one after the other, resulting in a happy marriage. However, what sort of being is this eel who causes these miracles to occur? I see the eel as a 'serpent of the sea'. Here, the serpent who tempted Eve is living in the deep sea, performing the role of helping human beings, almost like a god. When the half person, through the power of the eel, becomes 'completely whole', it is not by joining with the half taken away by the witch.

If we take a broad view of this fairy tale, we can regard it as a story in which the unconscious innocence, namely the splitting due to the realization of evil, was cured and recovered wholeness. But the fact that nothing is said about the way of life of the half taken away by the witch raises some doubt. Since I will re-examine this point later, for the time being I will end my discussion of the Cloven Youth. I would like to consider further the point of good and evil which becomes important in this story.

Good and evil

When splitting occurs, it is easiest to understand it as a splitting of good and evil. The bad side behaves completely independently from the good side, and neither side recognizes the other's existence. As I stated previously, the process of curing that kind of splitting is portrayed in 'The Cloven Youth', but at the end there is some remaining doubt. Italo Calvino wrote a novel (or story) in which no doubt remains at all (1956). The title is *Il Visconte Dimezzato* (The Cloven Viscount). It was published in 1952, whereas the collection of tales including 'The Cloven Youth' was published in 1956. The issue of whether or not Calvino knew of this folk-tale when he wrote 'The Cloven Viscount' has not been resolved, but it is suspected that he was aware of it. Without going into the details of this problem, I would like to consider the psychological meaning of this novel.

The hero, Medardo Viscount, took part in the Turkish War where he was cut in half by the enemy. However, the two halves both continued to live as the good half and the bad half of Medardo Viscount. In the end, the divided halves join again to become one. The details of that story are very interesting, but first let us continue with the subject at hand. As one might imagine, the Viscount's bad half repeatedly performed bad deeds such as cutting animals in half. But I would like to call attention to the actions of the good half. Of course it did only good things,

but this did not result in only good things occurring. He lectured on virtue to people who frivolously, selfishly, idled their time away, admonishing them over and over again. Since the people were unable to do as they liked because of this—for if they did they were soon rebuked—in order to seek revenge they waged war and increasingly met with misfortune. Thus they said that of the two halves, in the end, the good side was much worse than the bad side.

The villagers under the Medardo Viscount's rule felt themselves torn between inhuman wickedness and the same level of inhuman virtue, and their feelings gradually weakened and they became listless. It is interesting that not only the bad half but also the good half (which was completely severed from the bad) in the end brought about unhappiness. One might be completely at loss as to how to resolve this, but a clue arises from an unexpected quarter.

The Viscount's bad half willfully did bad things, but became aware that he didn't know what regular people called love. In order to experience this he fell in love with a woman named Pamela. Pamela was a woman who could communicate with animals and who had strong ties to nature. With the help of animals, she fled from the bad half and went to live in a secret cave in the forest. I will not go into all the later details, but the bad half promotes the marriage of Pamela to the good half. When they marry, of course while the good half is also the Medardo Viscount, the bad half decides to play a trick and take his place. Since the good half is a good person, it does as the bad half says. Pamela agrees to marry both the good half and the bad half.

In the end it comes down to a duel between the good half and the bad half. This duel becomes a strange event. The swords are mistakenly thrust into the opponents' fluttering capes, and somehow relentlessly stab the missing side of the respective opponent; that is to say, the side that is supposed to be himself. So neither wins. However, in the end, they aim at the line where they had been cut in two, cut downward from the forehead, and, by each other's sword, sever blood vessels and collapse. A doctor joins the severed blood vessels just in time, making the good half and bad half one.

In this manner, happily, the Medardo Viscount becomes one person. He had completely returned to being one person who was neither good nor bad, but good thoughts intermingled with bad thoughts, and his body and outward appearance were the same as before he was cut in two. However, since he had the experience of being two halves before becoming one, now he was more considerate. Thus the tale comes round to having a happy conclusion.

There is no need to dwell at length upon the psychological meaning of this story. The process of separation-reintegration is demonstrated, and the story relates how many difficulties there are in the process, that it is risky business, and that the love of a woman is necessary. At the beginning there is the state of completely splitting into good and evil, which before long becomes a condition that could be appropriately called conflict, proceeding towards reintegration, and splitting is resolved. The process shown here, just as it is, is a symbolically related version of the process that takes place in psychotherapy.

If this is true, can this story be useful in treating present-day cases of splitting? I think it can definitely be of some help. However, we must recognize that social conditions have changed considerably since 1952 when this story was written. In the splitting that we encounter in the present, does this degree of clearcut splitting between good and evil exist? Even if to a large extent we accept the meaning suggested by Calvino's image of transcending the simple scheme of good triumphing over evil, in thinking about splitting in the present day it is necessary to probe further, beyond the former issue of a confrontation between good and evil.

Since at the beginning of the story there was the passage about splitting exactly into two halves, the image of reintegration of the good half and the bad half is associated with splitting, and in looking at the process, I think it is rather close to the previously mentioned image of horizontal severing. The process seems like that used in treating a dual personality. For some reason the expression 'integration of opposites' is easy to understand so it is conveniently brought in, but I would like to explore a different idea.

Reservation of splitting

The Japanese story of Katako discussed above had a tragic ending. I attempted to investigate whether or not there were synonymous stories which did not end with Katako's suicide. In the first synonymous story, since Kata or Katako was half *oni*, he was unable to live in Japan and therefore returned to his father's place. This is probably one kind of resolution, but even if he returned to his father's place, since he was half Japanese, he would probably have just as much trouble.

The second synonymous story (Inada and Ozawa 1982). His childhood name was Kôsuke. The ending is as follows. As Kôsuke grew older, every day he would say, 'Mother, for some reason these days, I want to eat people, and since I cannot control myself, please put me in a bottle and bury it in a corner of the garden. Then three years later I want you to dig it up.' The mother said she could not do such a thing, but Kôsuke was insistent, so reluctantly she put him in a bottle and buried it. Three years later, when she dug up the bottle, it was filled with money.

One probably does not think of the transformation of a child into money as a happy event, but let us look at this a little more symbolically. The child's name was Kôsuke (the first character of which is the same as the Japanese word for *Kôfuku* or good fortune), which hints at an auspicious ending. First of all, I would like to call attention to the fact that in this story, the child himself asks to be placed in a bottle. This suggests that the splitting self itself initiates the process of transformation. It is not a question of which half and how the splitting should be treated, but a case of entrusting the treatment of splitting to the self. The section on being 'bottled' is similar to the Italian folk-tale in which the hero, the Cloven Youth, and the princess, who is also afflicted with splitting, are put into a barrel. In other words, by reserving splitting for a while in the barrel, they wait

for a transformation. In the Italian folk-tale, after this reserve, a miracle occurs and the hero and the princess get married. In the Japanese folk-tale, since marriage is not invested with high symbolic value (Kawai 1988), this is transformed into money (in other words, available energy).

A third synonymous story is helpful in taking this idea one step further. After returning from the *oni's* place, the child disappears. While searching for him the parents grow tired and fall asleep. A deity appears in a dream and announces: 'I became a child in order to help you, so you can stop looking'. This story made an impression on me because the embodiment of splitting up until now—a half person who is viewed in a negative light—is actually manifested as a deity with a positive meaning. In other words, splitting is assessed in an affirmative way.

The previously introduced story (through Needham) from the South African Ibo tribe could probably be classified as a story in which a half person is positively assessed. The idea that half of the body becomes a spirit after the rite is over indicates that this person is singled out as being different from regular people. Since spirits are quite far removed from humans, they cannot be integrated. This half person undoubtedly behaves mysteriously for a human being. However, it possesses a higher level, different from other human beings.

If we think along these lines, we can understand the meaning of why the Italian folk-tale does not relate that the half taken by the witch returned. The half-existing person at the witch's place cannot be integrated. Rather it is left in the experience of splitting between a witchlike existence and a human, while the hero comes to function as a single human in the level of the normal human world. In the Italian folk-tale, there is an eel (or sea serpent) who opposes the witch, but the eel is not completely good, for when the Cloven Youth gets angry at the princess, the eel aids in making her become pregnant. In the end there is a move towards good actions, but in any case, there is no clear distinction between good and evil as in the story of the Medardo Viscount, but rather good and evil take on delicate nuances. In accordance with this we probably cannot judge the witch to be completely evil.

In the third synonymous Japanese fairy tale, splitting becomes the domain of a deity. This is personified by Katako, who returns to the domain of the gods and is restored to a normal life in his existence as a human being. A similar idea is expressed the Italian folk-tale, in which it seems that the half at the witch's place will remain there until the end.

In thinking along these lines, the ending of the story of Katako is not as tragic as initially indicated. If the suicide is taken literally it is tragic, but viewed symbolically it can also be interpreted as self-resolving of the splitting. The transformation in appearance is to prevent the *oni* from entering later. The *oni* is not captured, so at some point in the future it could probably enter through some other means. But in that case, a new story can probably begin.

Finally, I would like to try to compare the above fairy tales (as well as related stories) with actual problems in psychotherapy. A special feature of splitting, as it occurs today, is that the split sides cannot be judged from the simple criterion

of good and evil. For example, as for myself—a Japanese with traditional qualities as well as things learned from the West—it is not possible to pass judgement on what is good or superior. At least from my own experience, an integration of both persons is nearly impossible. From the previously introduced fairy tales we learn that splitting is maintained without aiming to choose or integrate, and from there examples of merit come forth. Splitting is imminent, and under ordinary conditions a person who is split is generally regarded as one person. I have had some experience of this sort of thing.

Even with borderline patients, I try both methods. Instead of pointing out the conditions of splitting and considering in detail how to cope with it, what is most important, above all else, is that the therapist exists as the container of splitting. If this proceeds smoothly and it is no longer a question of how the therapist manipulates/ handles it, the split contents begin to transform themselves. To the extent that this is possible in the process, I faithfully go along with it. To make this into a slogan, rather than attempting to *resolve* splitting, one *reserves* it.

As related in fairy tales, splitting brings about crises. Yet on the other hand, splitting can be helpful in getting through crises, and even has the power to positively give birth to new things. If we understand this, the extent to which the psychotherapist himself can continue to successfully reserve inside of himself is related to his capability as a therapist. If the therapist, without any inherent splitting, endeavors to extinguish the patient's splitting as fast as possible, that therapist becomes simply a person with good intentions, and the patient is forced into the role of a bad person. Splitting occurs whereby the therapist is the good half and the patient is the bad half. The patient, in order to attack the irrationality of this, will repeatedly act out, increasingly exposing the bad half's manner, and a vicious circle is born. In order to avoid this, instead of the scheme of separationreintegration, I feel that following the concept of reservation-transformation is more suitable for the actual situation. In the case of the former, the idea of 'finished' or 'completed' is experienced, but in the case of the latter, at best there is the feeling of 'finished for the time being', not simple 'completion'. If we think of human life as a process, and see self-realization as a process, not as a goal, this kind of thing is unavoidable. This does not mean that the period of treatment should continue indefinitely. If the patients themselves understand the meaning of splitting and reserve and are able to do it themselves, it is probably not necessary to continue meeting with them. The relationship between therapist and patient dissolves and they respectively embrace their own splitting and, on the basis of their individual characters, while considering ways of associating, walk individual paths.

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Part V

Ethnicity

Chapter 9
The challenge of backwardness

Roberto Gambini

If growth and transformation are immanent qualities of every living being, retardation, deviation or failure to grow can be considered as pathological conditions tolerated by nature but unacceptable to feeling and to an ethical intellect. Gardening and therapy, teaching and public administration, medicine and spiritual practices are all based on the same premises that not every living situation must be accepted as it is but can, through work and effort, in some sense evolve and bear fruit. This is at least the way we Westerners for at least twenty-five centuries have been used to look at life, at ourselves and our fellowmen, at society, institutions and history.

Whenever growth stops, goes in the wrong direction or is retarded, something destructive has gone into play, whether our object of research is a patient or a whole society. Of course growth is not an even process; of course some win and many lose. Fight for survival and fulfillment is the main law of life, not fair play or equal opportunities for all.

When an individual or a whole society lags behind in its curve through life they may well not reach the mark, disappear, or most commonly just remain in a peripheral position of uncreative chronic mediocrity. This is all too obvious and has always been so. What is not so obvious and much more intriguing to all of us who work with the sufferings of soul is that backwardness contains in itself a germ of movement and transformation in the form of a challenge, if only the heart is touched. When feeling gets connected to this possibility all four functions start to work in such a way that the negativity affecting the object is perceived in its paradoxical condition of hiding an opposite as strong as the manifest one. Backwardness then forces one directly into alchemy as the only alternative to nothingness.

I work as an analyst and live as a citizen in that part of the planet that has come to be known as the Third World, and I reflect about my patients, my country and myself drawing from my two sources, the social sciences and Jungian psychology. I cannot understand a person if I do not know his or her environment, as I cannot understand a country if a ignore the psyche. These two realities walk eternally hand in hand and if for one I am attracted to research Jung's ideas, unconscious mechanisms and the phenomenology of the spirit, I

feel constantly called upon to reflect about this country to which I belong. Bringing together the social scientist that I originally was and the analyst that I have become, I have been trying to grasp the nature of my country's soul—and for this reason I had to go back to ancestral times.

We suffer, as a people, from a great problem: a myth of origin is lacking in our psyche. We are ashamed of our remote past, always regarded as a black hole, a mist, a vague image. We place the official beginning of our history in a magical event called "The Discovery"—which we know is a false term, a better word for it would be Invasion—and we have built an identity starting in 1500, the year in which two very different parts of mankind met on this side of the world, as if there was nothing before that date. We simply do not search for a myth of origin. It seems to me that this fact has serious consequences in what concerns the structuring of our collective consciousness and the way we relate to the deep layers of the collective unconscious. Since we deny our ancestral origin, we distort it and turn it into an empty precariousness. We start therefore as a people, to destroy our most precious asset, our immemorial soul. I discuss this idea with great interest because I think it helps us to understand that underdevelopment has not suddenly happened in the present century. A whole historical process was unleashed and lived through in a psychologically underdeveloped state of mind. The ancestral soul of countries inhabited by autochthonous peoples any where in the world is so rich, so complex, so profound and so beautiful that, had we not denied and destroyed it, we would all be now passionately working at a great alchemical synthesis between the European and the Amerindian ways of being human. But no such synthesis ever occurred; what actually happened historically was the domination of one polarity over the other.

It would be psychically very helpful if we could begin to think that in our background there lies an ignored and denied treasure. How this has come to happen during the last five hundred years is not so hard to explain. Much more difficult is to acknowledge that this same denial keeps reproducing itself up until the present inside our psyche and this is what moves me to write about the present topic. Generation after generation, the destruction of our most precious value is reenacted in our culture and in each one of us.

When I say "precious", I have in mind something very clear. Current archaeological evidence indicates that the New Land was occupied by humans not three or four thousand years ago, as is commonly believed, but twenty, thirty, maybe fifty thousand years ago (notably field research done in the northeastern state of Piauí by visiting archaeologist Niède Guidon's team). Here we have a theoretical dispute involving heavy academic interests, because if it comes to be generally accepted that man has penetrated South America coming down from the North some fifty thousand years ago, many self-evident theorizations about territorial occupation, cultural diffusion and dating would have to be reviewed. There are too many pseudoscientific statements and academic power positions involved, but what concerns us here is the psychological implication of the

problem: how is modern man's soul affected if it becomes conscious of its long and meaningful past?

All of mankind's great questions were worked on and solved by the indigenous peoples inhabiting the New World since pristine times. How can one survive and conquer hunger, danger, abandonment? How can people relate to each other and organize a society? How can material culture be produced? How can one see meaning in life? What is good, beautiful, true and just? What is cruel, evil, unfair? What is death and its aftermath? What is sickness and how can it be overcome? How has everything started? What makes life worthwhile? How can one make fire, measure time, cross a river, kill a jaguar? All these questions have been answered by so-called primitive peoples of the Americas and, put together, they make up a vast area of wisdom very distinct from ours and this is what I call *treasure*: a long and detailed list of observartions of nature's workings, confirmed by endless repetition throughout the ages concerning earth, body, spirit, flora and fauna, wind, sky, water and fire, feelings, pain, imagination, dreams and desire. The very stuff of the soul.

The ancestral soul is the supreme human patrimony to be transmitted through education whenever possible and incorporated at a deeper level as a quality of the collective unconscious. What is an archetype? An archetype is a format immanent to the psyche, but with a point of origin in time, in history and in space. The archetypes of father or mother were born in the darkness of past eons, first in animals and later in human beings, through countless trials and repetitions that finally crystallized in our psyche as a readiness to act, react or conceive in specific situations evoking each one of these behaviors. It is therefore relevant, for the sake of the soul, to have in mind quite literally that archetypes were formed also in prehistoric Brazil, precisely in this remote and denied past that we imagine as not belonging to us and that we search for in learned books that describe and conjure them up everywhere else but *here*. Certain archetypes upon which our collective psyche is structured are very well dated and located in the Amerindian soil. Jung repeatedly insisted that psyche has earth, it does not live in the air. Mind and earth, spirit and matter are but two faces of the same reality and we should not think of that only when reading *Mysterium Coniunctionis*. This mystery reveals itself even in those psychic wastelands where the soul is not recognized. I propose that we amplify this fact to the point of exaggeration (to compensate backwardness and inferiority) and that we consider what could happen to us as a nation and as individuals if we would only learn how to tap water from this hidden layer by means of a deep-reaching root. What would then happen in the psychic domain? Our historical task is therefore to promote and fertilize this root's growth in order to absorb from that underground layer the sap that can take us away from underdevelopment. And turn all of us who work with this challenge into Brazilian Jungians, in the sense that we would be expressing and cultivating that soul which in fact supports us all in whatever we do. Whether or not we know it, we move through life carried all the way by this

soul's energy—since denied or not (as one can read above Jung's doorway) it is always present.

There are myths in our ancestral imaginary—as, for instance, those forbidding cannibalism or incest—whose kernel must date back from the lost times when man was learning that he had to hunt to live and not eat human flesh, that he could slowly come down from up the trees and look for shelter in caves. No one among us has so far made an attempt to date these mythologems—and why would anyone have the trouble to try it, if no importance is attached to the psychological assimilation of these lost fragments of ancestral soul by modern consciousness? The prohibition of incest as a necessary condition for the birth of culture—a topic so dear to Freud, Jung or Lévi-Strauss—is established by means of dramatic images in Indian mythologems certainly contemporary to the first social rules. A woman who is turned into a snake avoids copulating with her brother; instead, she swallows his body up to the head and later regurgitates it entirely covered with body paintings. This is the Indian way of saying that incest is forbidden for the sake of art and society. Kept inside the warm nest of incestuous endogamy, a young man would stay forever with the women of his blood and would not venture out into the world in search of others. There would be no circulation of women (to use Lévi-Strauss' terminology), which alongside with the circulation of goods and of words, constitutes one of the elementary structures of cultural life in society. Where incest prevails there is no culture, no exchange, therefore no human evolution.

Well, this very idea, theoretically expounded by anthropology, psychoanalysis or analytical psychology, is well represented in Brazilian Indian mythology, It would certainly be growth-promoting to have these facts clearly established in our consciousness, since we are used to look always to what is foreign, envying perhaps the dignifying four thousand years of the Gilgamesh epic …but what about our ignored myths? I am sure that had Jung had the opportunity of knowing native American culture better he would have incorporated all this rich material into his work, whether as an object of study in itself or as amplificatory material. Instead, the task is left to us. I propose precisely that we think of it all from the point of view of the soul.

We analysts work with the soul. We must therefore be able to detect which parts of it are silenced, which parts are arrested, how much libido is invested in our soul, since that is what can help us become whatever we can become and stop being *under*developed; *under,* that is, not reaching that level of being which is potentially ours. This is our great and essential drama, and our challenge—the challenge of backwardness. We remain always below and behind—and the solution lies not in building more, buying more, studying more, nor in absorbing the First World, nor in ascribing this task to politics, to the economy, to international law. This is truly the psyche's task: finding a way out of the endless doom of not being all that we potentially are and awakening the dormant soul of a nation.

Each patient who comes to us brings inside this story in miniature, saying without words: "Perhaps I could be more intensely that which I really am." We hear the message indirectly, and whatever our theoretical school, we will try to contact that unlived dimension in our patient. For that purpose we have to perceive him or her as a small part of a whole that also awaits to be understood, much the same as we should look at ourselves as instruments to unveil and awaken what is still not there.

These are the central ideas I have so far developed concerning our myth of origin and the ancestral soul; now I propose to focus on those animic constituents that came to replace the ancestral soul after its negation from 1500 onwards. This is the point in time I originally chose to start my research. My diploma thesis for the C.G.Jung Institute in Zurich was an analysis of the letters sent by missionary Jesuits in Brazil to their headquarters in Lisbon. My main hypothesis was that these religious men carried at the back of their minds a certain image of Indians, basically a negative one, which corresponded to their shadow and was projected on to them from the very beginning. This image determined all their actions. In the first of a series of hundreds of letters dated 1549, the newly arrived father Manoel da Nóbrega starts a report with which other voices will gradually join in, describing the new land and its inhabitants. I suspected that understanding what these letters were all about would let me know, as an analyst, which was the original conflict upon which our collective soul was structured.

The year 1500, if we have in mind Jung's ideas exposed in *Aion,* was one of the points of inflection of the archetype of duality that rules the two thousand years of Pisces. According to the astrological diagram, the middle point of the second fish corresponds more or less in that period to the Renaissance and the Discovery (i.e. Invasion) of Brazil by the Portuguese. That was the time when the soul of classical antiquity was being rediscovered and revalued. But Jung does not mention, since this fact was not so central to his thought, that this was also the time when two sharply opposed types of civilization (polarities) were coming into contact in several scattered points of the Americas. The "discovery" of the New World was not just the outcome of the superior navigation skills developed by the Sagres school in Portugal, of mercantile expansionism and the need for new markets, or of an outstanding spirit of adventure plus an enormous amount of extraverted libido constellated in the psyche of Portuguese men, but a remarkable historical fact archetypally determined: the encounter of two parts of mankind of contrasting character. Each party lived and still lives the consequences of such a portentous event. For the Portuguese, that was the climax of their ultramarine courage, their unequalled capacity to penetrate and conquer—and also the moment to meet their opposite. For the native peoples, it was the beginning of the end of their ancestral soul and of their descendance.

For us Jungians this idea, or this historical fact, can bear fruit. Because the individuation process, personal or collective, is the search of one by the other. Each one of us searches for an unknown other inside, and likewise a backward

society must reveal another, kept inexistent by the official one. Consciousness looks for its eternal other, the unconscious. Our ego searches for its other, an ego no longer identified with shadow and persona, but one striving to express the self. The quest for the other is always archetypal, and for us *this other is the Indian*. Literally and symbolically. Each one of us carries an Indian inside to the degree that we carry an unconscious and inasmuch as we are not merely what we show to our fellow men and to ourselves. There is more to it. This *more* I call Indian.

When we remember that in our history the Indians were Christianized and soon after forced to work as slaves, and that as early as 1500 their culture (our immemorial soul) started to be destroyed, we find ourselves in front of two possible objects of analysis: our country and our psyche. We can then immediately realize that our work to rescue what is still alive cannot be done in a lifetime, because the degree of destruction was calamitous. A certain type of consciousness took shape in us in which access to this Indian is practically lost (maybe only a feeble connecting thread remains); our consciousness lacks adequate concepts and categories and actually no longer knows how to access him. We must then admit that alongside this conscious and corporified being of ours there is a wandering soul, the remaining phantom of a human essence deprived of body and realization because there has been no synthesis. Alchemy can only take place in ourselves, but as it does not succeed, that unintegrated part becomes a renegade in our psyche and in its own land, an outcast, an incorporeal soul destined never to be real again.

This is no doubt a loss, an execration; it is a factor uninterruptedly at work in our conscious and unconscious life. This other dimension that we are unable to incorporate is right here at our side, over our left shoulder. Not just because we might not want to synthetize it, but because *there is no way to do it.* An enormous amount of soul work has to be done before this integration becomes a psychological possibility. Knowledge of the ancestral soul, of Indian culture and mythology, would have to be disseminated over the whole land, in order for the new generations to be educated in such a way that their imagination might bring back to life all the snakes, all the jaguars and rainbows, all the spirits of the forest, the wonders, terrors and metamorphoses that lie disactivated at the bottom of our unconscious. Once this renegated world is reintegrated by the imaginal thinking of our children, they will naturally start to develop other kinds of concepts and values and after a certain point they will be asking why this and why that, why are we the way we are, why must a river (for example, the Tocantins) be dried for a dam to be built, why is the rain forest being devastated, why are Indians and animal species disappearing—in a word, what kind of life are we being forced to live? And all this questioning will not be the effect of ideological and political indoctrination, but the natural outcome of the new generations' imaginal thinking which lives on images and nothing else.

We are therefore in possession of a whole *Encyclopaedia Britannica* of images and yet they are not feeding our creativity. To relate to the soul one needs

soul, to talk to the imaginal one needs images. It will take long, too long. We will not see it happen, but we must do what is possible, here and now—as analysts. So it seems to me, what we can do is to work criticaly upon consciousness, showing it new possibilities, revisioning and rethinking our categories and our pseudo-mythology. The way Brazilian history is taught is stupidly anti-psychological, and untrue in many aspects. It is high time children learn that the country was not discovered but invaded; that this was not no one 's land, it had owners who *allowed* newcomers to enter, supposing they were saviors who had come to bring whatever was lacking. The Indians spread arms and legs wide to receive this new man, who came and erected a cross upon their religion, as a dagger piercing their soul. The stone pillar in Porto Seguro, Bahia, first sign of the Conquest—equivalent, in a modern analogy, to the American flag planted in the Moon's dusty soil by an astronaut—shows on one side the Portuguese coat of arms and on the other the Christian cross. These are the two symbols marking the beginning of our history. What is the psychological meaning of this union between cross and crown? How can one honestly look at the first mass celebrated in the jungle, so romantically portrayed by our academic painters, and fail to see in it the starting point of religious genocide? Who is the true sacrificed one in this Eucharist? Not for sure Christ's body, but the Indian soul—and this is exactly the shocking idea that collective consciousness must have the courage to face, since for centuries it was kept denied and repressed.

It must however be understood that if the Indian soul was the true object of sacrifice in this first mass and all the coutless others throughout the centuries, it did not coincide with the host, since it was not divinized, transfigurated and assimilated as Christ's body liturgically is. What had to be swallowed down as communion was a defensive catholicism, ever ready to install in Brazil the ageold mechanism of shadow projection. This was a religious attitude which encouraged Iberian man to see virtue only in himself and to project his whole shadow upon the Indians, heretofore perceived as a sinful and lascivious being created by the Devil, without law and without God, too lazy to work unless under command. The conquerors therefore felt ethically legitimated in their attempt to improve this inferior mass, giving them a soul through baptism so they would finally reach a human level. Jesuit missionaries re-enacted the Judaeo-Christian myth of creation, themselves playing the part of God and ascribing to the natives that of the clay waiting to be shaped in their likeness. This tragic farce is at the origin of our collective psyche.

The kind of pedagogy that was practiced in those times consisted in taking an Indian boy and telling him, as probably did the Jesuit José de Anchieta, now praised as patron of our education and soon to be canonized as a saint: "Forget who you are, be ashamed of your self and of your original sin, leave behind all that you possess, look at me and strive to be like me." This same proposition is still alive between us, because we are still ruled by models developed abroad, especially models of thought. The little missionary schools, around which gravitated Christianized Indians, were the starting point of our society: dark-

skinned boys reading prayers in Latin in adobe huts and at narrow crossroads. São Paulo, now one of the largest cities in the world, had such a beginning in 1554. But the kind of education practiced in these schools denied the very essence of the native way of being.

All these historical facts have to be revised and interpreted from a new perspective, so that we can find the track along which the soul became lost. Children of today must hear at school that upon their arrival here, the discoverers committed their first anti-ecological act, cutting down the very tree—brazil wood—whose name we carry. It is therefore in the sixteenth century that the origins of our current forest devastation drama are to be found. A sharp image conveying this information should be used as a cover for textbooks distributed by the Ministry of Education until it became absorbed by consciousness, replacing a whole gallery of alienating images that fill up the backs of our minds and all but reinforce unconsciousness. The tree is a universal symbol of the self. We begin by cutting down exactly that tree which is also our name. What has all this got to do with our everlasting difficulties to grow?

Portuguese men landed here with a Paradise fantasy in their heads: attractive naked women, totally different from the self-contained and repressed women left behind, fooling around in a generous natural environment in which everything was permitted and nothing punished as sinful. The ethical motto followed by the explorers was in fact "there is no sin below the Equator." A good document to be psychologically interpreted in a training program for analysts would be Pero Vaz de Caminha's letter reporting the Discovery to the Portuguese monarch: one can detect, reading between the lines, indications that the new land would have to carry on its back an enormous and very dangerous projection of Paradise. But this dreamland, born of their mind, was for the exclusive enjoyment of white men and never of the Indians. What would then happen? An absolutely masculine and phallic historic endeavor—the Conquest—would be carried out by white men on one side and Indian women on the other. Portuguese women had no participation at all in the breeding of a new people. For several years these facts have caught my attention, and I have come to the following conclusion: the anima was absent in our country's birth. The Portuguese brought with themselves not the anima, but a fantasy that was bound to remain unintegrated. If the Portuguese anima had been present exactly where eros and feeling were lacking, that highly elaborated anima that one finds throughout the sixteenth century in Camões' sonnets (comparable to those of Shakespeare), in Gil Vicente's moral plays, or in the lyrics of courtly love songs, I repeat: If the Portuguese anima had been present, the relationship that was established between the sexes would have been different and instead of a mere mating for reproduction a psychic fusion might have occurred. What in fact took place between men and women of different worlds was only biological, genetical—but not psychological—miscegenation. Very far indeed from the refined feelings described by the great poets of the time, expressing the soul's longing to unite

with the loved one. Unbridled greed and lust, not these anima feelings, actually crossed the Atlantic.

We are therefore a case of absent anima. Américo Vespucci landed here and gave the new land the feminine form of his name—but not of his soul. The name "America" is perhaps the first projection of all that was to follow. It was not though exactly an anima projection, but the projection of a void, of a soulessness, that when materialized over the whole Continent would destroy the true anima that had been there for centuries (Incas, Mayas, Aztecs, North American Indians), since the ancestral soul is feminine by virtue of its very non-rationality. The name "Peru" was also a projection. When the Spanish conquerors arrived from the Pacific and met a native man on a river bank he was asked, of course in Spanish, which land was that and his answer was *Belú* or *Pelú,* a quéchua word meaning his own name, or perhaps simply "river", the place where he was. This is how Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca, explains the origin of many names in his history book, the first to be written in Latin America in 1609. He was a hybrid, the son of an Inca princess and a Spanish conqueror. In a similar situation, the name "Yucatán" comes from *tectetán* and means "I do not understand you", the answer given by local inhabitants to questioning invaders. A little analytical psychology could enlighten much of our past. For instance, when the masculine principle—that is, a sixteenth-century increasingly rational consciousness—arrived here, it did not unite with the feminine, but denied it and at the same time projected a fantasy upon it. This phenomenon can be seen in navigation maps of the period, full of surreal beings and figures of the imagination, but most especially in a chart showing Brazil being divided into administrative regions. An absolutely straight perpendicular line (the meridian defined by the Tordesilles Treaty, an agreement between the Pope, Spain and Portugal whereby the former ruled the western and the latter the eastern half of Latin America) is intersected by horizontal and also straight lines defining fifteen clear-cut areas, each one donated to a deputy of the Crown who would then colonize it using Indian slave labor. We can see in the conception of this map the Cartesian mind being implanted in the colony and from that we know in advance the way the unconscious would be dealt with. In the ancestral and feminine soul there are no such straight lines, because it does not function in a Cartesian way. Phallic masculinity came to win at all costs and to reach its aims in a direct and straightforward way.

We know that the feminine principle was denied in the colony, but it was not in a much better condition in the Iberian Peninsula. The sociological outcome of this equation is a matrix in which a white father and an Indian mother will procreate and breed a whole people. The hybrid offsprings were the first Brazilians and our natural ancestors. This mixed-blood progeny will incessantly expand in the first settlements along the Atlantic coast.

This was therefore our society's proto-cell. And there begins the drama of our broken identity. This hybrid child could identify neither with father nor mother. Once baptized and having mated with a stranger, an Indian woman was no

longer accepted in her original tribe. She lost her place in society, with no possible return. She would not be able to transmit even her language to her children, because they would anyway be trained by the Jesuits their tutors to speak Tupi Guarani, which soon became the ruling Indian spoken language to the detriment of several hundreds other native tongues. Religion too she could not transmit, since it was not helpful for the new generations in their impossible task of finding out who they were.

Identification with a mother figure was therefore impossible, as it was with a father: in Iberian society there was no place for bastard hybrids. If, let us say, a certain Dom Manuel da Silva, after decades in the colony, made up his mind one day to return to Coimbra taking with him the sons (the situation for his daughters would be even worse, they would perhaps not even be recognized as such) he had had with six or seven Indian women, these young men would not be accepted neither by the Army, nor by the Church, the University nor by civil society at large. Having no social place to occupy and no legitimate social role to play, these Brazilian sons would be pariahs in their own father's land.

Who is this New World man, with no parental mirror to look at, with no society to be part of? In the words of the anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro, whose ideas I have been following here, he is a nobody. Therefore the collective soul born from the contact between two different traditions is but an anonymous nobody's soul someone who, unaware of his origins and lacking roots on both sides, is overburdened by an existentialist load that not even Heidegger would be able to relieve.

For the next three centuries, this growing amorphous human mass was to be joined by the sad contingent of African slaves, likewise uprooted from their original context and intermixed between themselves so that cultural differences would be levelled. The unspeakable and inhuman suffering the slaves had to bear wounded the soul at such a deep level that this fact has not yet been fully acknowledged in all its psychic consequences, even one hundred years after slavery was abolished in 1888. The second sociological matrix, white man and black woman, will generate mulattos and other hybrids stamped with the same existential unawareness. But bastards also had white mothers. Concerned with the sexual immorality that so soon pervaded masculine behavior, the Jesuits thought it a good idea to import white women through the Company of Jesus in Lisbon, to guarantee a minimum degree of genetical eugenics. And so in 1553 a ship of prostitutes arrived, and with them syphilis was introduced where it did not exist before. The Jesuits pushed men to mate with these newcomers as an alternative to Indian women, thereby placing both on the same level. Now it becomes clear that the anima figure which Portuguese men had on their minds was actually that of a whore. Indian women were doomed to carry this violent projection, and are still carrying it today.

Our great mother is therefore an Indian. This is our myth and our historical and psychological truth, yet nobody seems to know it. We analysts have to start considering this myth, and not only that of the great Babylonian or Greek

mothers that receive so much attention in Jungian circles. Again: if Neumann had had access to Brazilian mythology, he would undoubtedly have included a variety of animal, semi-animal and human mother figures of all types in his book on the subject—but there is no mention of our Indian mothers in the chapter "The Matriarchal World of America". Our collective consciousness also solemnly ignores this ancestral mother. There is not a single cultural representation of it in the arts and no psychological essay of any school with her as a subject, only total denial and oblivion.

But returning to our thread: according to Darcy Ribeiro, who puts it brilliantly, a nation had to be invented in 1822 (Declaration of Independence) so that this bunch of nobodies could at last claim they belonged to something. This is the true question behind the outer facts that led a young rebel prince who was identified with a young country, both expecting to be taken seriously, to cut political ties with the motherland. It is as if the collective psyche, having reached a certain point of maturation, pressed the institutions for a minimum level of collective persona to hold together the psychic vacuum of which we were made. The nationto-be wanted to take possession of its own nothingness. We then acquired the international status of a politically organized country in which we could be the little that we were. I sustain that our historical past should be considered from this analytical perspective, because only if we do so can we come into contact with that sense of indignation that can lead us beyond the present state of affairs.

We possess today one of the planet's richest genetic pools and an extremely diversified system of cultural synchretism. The challenge before us is: Will it be possible to extract the alchemical quintessence from this *prima materia*? Has our conscious understanding reached the required level to work at the opus? Our ancestral soul is today a wandering soul; and as we have seen, the modern soul that took shape from 1500 onwards, besides its inner conflicts and deep splits, has an inferiority complex and repressed creative energy. There has been no collective dream to compensate for the miseries of an unjust society, hopefully indicating what the unconscious expects from us pointing to new historical possibilities (let us hope there are still some). A dream like this was sketched in the 1960s, but military repression had the upper hand and curtailed our courage to have big dreams.

I would like to close this chapter by touching upon two final topics: an Indian myth that I will quickly comment on and two dreams the great Kamaiurá chief and shaman Takumã had in September 1996 when visiting São Paulo. These dreams were recorded by Carmen Junqueira, an anthropologist in long-standing contact with this tribe and now studying their ancestral wisdom. Let us take the dreams first. Takumã arrives in São Paulo and is for some days entertained in a country house. As a snake had been spotted some time before in a nearby wood, he was warned against this danger especially because his wife and children were with him. In his first night in this house he dreamed: "a huge snake appeared and I was afraid. But I calmed down when it told me that it was in charge of that

entire wood and was the chief of all the snakes. It said I must not worry because nothing bad would happen to us." And so it was. Here the ancestral soul manifests itself under snake form, bringing Takumã self-confidence and a sense of protection—maybe that is how he gets it, and not from his ego as we now do—and thus enabling him to deal with the literal or metaphorical snakes of our civilized world. The snake is the great power of the unconscious and this one rules over evil itself. This dream has very probably created in the dreamer an adequate attitude during his stay in the white man's jungle.

But let us look at the shaman's last dream, immediately before his return to the Xingu National Park: "An old Indian man came and asked if everything was all right and if I had got something. I said no, I couldn't get anything." Professor Junqueira was a little concerned when she heard the dream and so she asked him what this "something" might be and he answered: "a fax." The Kamaiurá were organizing a rudimentary cultural association and the young, more acculturated leaders had told him a fax machine could be very handy. This dream, fifteen days after the first one, shows how an Indian's unconscious encompasses from archetypal snake to modern technology. We Jungians hope to experience more of the snake dream. Two lines are presently crossing: some of us long to enter into that strange world, the Indians long for this world of ours. Each is attracted by the magnetism of the opposite, for better or for worse. The situation is coming to its zenith: we are living through the deep crisis of technological society and its confused values reaching the limits of growth, and they are on the verge of disappearance. Today there are some 200,000 Indians in Brazil still living a tribal life, whereas there were from six to ten million when contact was first made. It takes thousands of years for a language to appear; like a miracle, its structure emerges in its entirety from the unconscious layer where it was slowly built. Hundreds of them have already disappeared without trace. Some languages are nowadays spoken by just a few individuals and by the second half of next century perhaps not many will still be alive. Those who collect and translate living myths narrated in their original languages are making a very important contribution, like, for instance, the work done by the anthropologist Betty Mindlin with several tribes in the vast Amazon region.

Our Indian populations are losing their land and their culture. It has recently come to light that an international cartel specializing in selling genetic material for research is offering blood samples from Brazilian Indians (especialy the Suruí in Rondônia). These genes are sold for very high sums for pharmaceutical industries researching, for instance, which specific gene controls obesity, since the latter does not occur among Indians. But the Suruí, whose blood was stolen, will not receive a single cent. Here we have a contemporary image that literalizes all we have been saying. A certain Plant Medicine Corporation has already patented a native drug (huasca), used as an infusion by several tribes in the Amazon region, including many in Peru, to promote altered states of consciousness during religious rituals. New urban sects (such as *Santo Daime* and *União do Vegetal*) have appeared in which this drug is used, but royalties

will soon have to be paid to that corporation. News such as this is highly symbolic of our psychological condition. Indians throughout the country are losing their lands and will in the end be assimilated as unskilled labor at the lowest strata of society. There has never been an efficient Indian policy that really protected them. Even those in favor of their cause no longer know what to do.

I would like now to make a few comments on one of the myths collected by Betty Mindlin in her recent field research. Ever since I first heard it, I have been unable to forget it. Sometimes we got together to discuss these myths, each one looking at them from a different perspective. Our intention was not to interpret, but to make a contact of meaning with some of the images. It seems to me that a specific new methodology has to be developed so that Jungians and other specialists may work with an enormous wealth of material from a psychological viewpoint, in a way that could help us become more conscious of ourselves and of them. I personally do not recommend the sophisticated methodology introduced by Lévi-Strauss in his many studies, since he predominantly sees in myths metaphors of the social structure and of abstract mental patterns, but never images of soul processes. Our story here can be variously entitled "The Voracious Head", or "The Flying Head", or even "The Head that Lost its Body", and is told with variations by story tellers of different tribes. I will summarize here the Makurap Indians' version.

> Husband and wife lived in harmony. Every night they slept together in their hammock and each time the woman's head detached from the body and flew away, searching for food in other villages. The head ate during the night and before daybreak it returned home and connected again to the neck. When the husband awakened he saw his wife by his side as always, except that there was a little drop of blood on his chest. Both ignored what the head had done rftirlf»§ flie night Qne day her mother came into the hut, saw her son-in-law lying beside her daughter's headless body and immediately accused him of the deed. The whole tribe then turned against him and the body was buried. The husband fled. The head returned, but as its body was not to be found it perched on the husband's shoulder, where it stayed as a second head. The man felt more and more disoriented, because when he wanted something the head wanted something else. Very soon the head started to decompose and putrefy. He tried desperately to get rid of it, but the head would not leave him Finally he ran faster through dangerous places in the forest. The head pursued him until a night bird took it away to the bird kingdom

I believe the images of this myth are telling us that the search for knowledge is archetypally forbidden to Indian women. For some time it is possible to find new nourishment for the head, but in the long run this cannot be assimilated. The

taboo therefore determines that a woman's mind should stay close to the fireplace in which she cooks, around which her life and its meaning are organized and where her limits are placed. This is in fact the way Indian women have always lived, and they are much more introverted and conservative than their men, who predominantly deal with the outside world. This myth might then help to explain why women have always been bound to be so domestic and mentally shy. I have come across a similar idea in the work of Alícia Fernández, an Argentinian psychopedagog who studies the difficulties experienced by female elementary school teachers in developing thoughts of their own. Going back to Genesis, she reminds us that Eve was punished for having dared to accept from the serpent the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge forbidden by God. The subject is vast and would cause us to digress. Here we are not simply dealing with an archetypal commandment affecting Indian women but with something regarding the feminine principle, whether it is at work in a man's or in a woman's psyche, in the whole culture at large or in the soul's quiet intimacy.

But there is still another way of looking at these images. There was a mythical time in which the masculine and feminine principles were balanced and in harmony, but from a certain point onwards the latter could not expand and evolve because nothing new could be integrated. Our ancestral soul is just like this head. It lost its body, which would correspond to the materialization of a new synthesis after two opposing poles began to interact. As the old body is buried, a new one is sought but no living connection is possible. It is not the same here as with the alchemical figure of the androgyne, in which masculine and feminine are differentiated but united at bottom and the body belongs equally to both heads. Here we have a different image. This bodyless head is our own wandering soul, deprived of a body represented by our human concrete reality in all its psychological, cultural, and social aspects. Something immaterial rots and creates confusion, dissociation, madness, phantoms, unconsciousness. Consciousness desperately seeks to get rid of this evil ghost, and to maintain its prevailing rational structure. This myth depicts the drama of irreconcilable opposites and this is the archetypal problem of our times.

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Chapter 10
Jungian perspectives in new contexts*

Renos Papadopoulos

At the 'Jungians Today' conference I was invited to participate in the final plenary as a member of a panel discussing how, as post-Jungians today, our therapeutic work and style has been developing. This chapter is based on that presentation and will therefore follow a similar structure; however, as I will also attempt to locate my present comments in a wider context beyond the specific nature of the conference, this title is different from that of my conference presentation.

To begin with, I would like to address two important issues which are central to the very idea of 'post-Jungianism' and its current direction. The first refers to the term 'Jungian' and the second addresses the question of how individual therapeutic styles are formed and developed.

What is in a name?

The term 'post-Jungian' is based on the assumption that there is an entity called 'Jungian' in the first place. However, such an assumption should not be taken for granted and requires further examination. Although at a logical level a 'Jungian' should be a person who follows 'the' or 'a' Jungian approach, in actuality there is much confusion and ambiguity surrounding this term.

Within professional analytical circles, the term 'Jungian' is restricted to members of the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP) which is the official registering body of Jungian analysts in the world. However, there are many other practising psychotherapists (not members of the IAAP) who follow a Jungian orientation in their work and also call themselves Jungians. In addition, of course, there are many individuals from various professional or artistic backgrounds who call themselves 'Jungians' because they feel that their work is inspired by or is fashioned according to a Jungian orientation (at least, according to their perception). The picture is further complicated because not all Jungian analysts who are members of the IAAP call themselves 'Jungian analysts'.

In 1913, wanting to distinguish his own approach to 'depth psychology' from that of Freud's 'psychoanalysis', Jung introduced the term 'analytical

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* Based on a presentation at the conference 'The Jungians Today', November 1995, London

psychology' (Jung 1913a: 603; 1913b: 229). 'Depth psychology' (*'Tiefenpsychologie'* —the term was first coined by Eugen Bleuler) refers to those psychological approaches which consider the notion of the unconscious as central to their understanding of human personality and interactions. The idea of depth comes from the sense that the unconscious layer is 'deeper' than the surface level of consciousness. Although any further exploration and discussion about the history of the names of Jung's psychology would go beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that the *term* 'analytical psychology' was never based on a strong theoretical foundation. One gets the feeling that Jung introduced it almost in passing in order to delineate his own territory, and the brand name itself did not seem to matter. Jung had previously used 'psychoanalysis' and 'complex psychology' as the theoretical school where his own theories were located and later he used other names such as 'synthetic' (e.g. Jung 1921:252) and 'dialectical' (e.g. Jung 1935a: 3).

My argument is that it may not be accidental that analytical psychology has never had a secure name. One tangible implication of this legacy is that today neither the official Jungian societies (belonging to the IAAP) nor individual members of these societies have a uniform way of referring to themselves. The IAAP consists of societies which call themselves associations (or groups, centres or societies) of 'analytical psychology' or associations (etc.) of' Jungian analysts'; one society even calls itself the 'School of Jungian Psychoanalysis'. There are many Jungians who feel that the name which characterises them most aptly is neither 'Jungian analyst' nor 'analytical psychologist' but something else, e.g. 'psychoanalyst', 'Jungian psychoanalyst', 'archetypal psychologist', 'imagistic therapist', etc. The variability of names is so wide that a survey is currently being conducted in order to record the various names which IAAP members prefer to call themselves (Hall 1997).

The difficulty with the term 'analytical psychology' is that, in a sense, all 'depth psychologists' are, *de facto,* 'analytical' psychologists insofar as they are approaching the unconscious in an analytical way. To paraphrase an argument made in another context, the term analytical psychologist 'may be a mistake of logical typing, confusing subclass with class' (Papadopoulos and Byng-Hall 1997:3): all depth psychologists are analytical psychologists and to call one group 'analytical' implies that there are others who are not analytical. 'It would be similar if a group of dentists defined themselves as tooth dentists implying that all other dentists do not work with teeth' (p. 3). Thus, neither the terms 'Jungian' nor 'analytical psychologist' are precise enough to fulfil the requirements of a definition according to basic logical criteria, i.e. to include everybody who belongs to such a group as well as to exclude everybody who does not.

In a recent lecture entitled 'There are no Jungians—or are there?' Dr Adolf Guggenbuhl-Craig, an eminent Swiss Jungian analyst, examined the

phenomenon of Jungian identity. After discussing the various differences among Jungians in the world in terms of training, basic assumptions underlying their work, specific theoretical beliefs and clinical practice he claimed that 'Jungians worldwide seem …different, not only in details but fundamentally different, contradicting each other and becoming mutually exclusive' (Ulmer 1997:89). He believed that one could speak of a shared identity in terms of the 'historical identity' insofar as all Jungians had Jung as the common 'grandfather'. Moreover, distinguishing that 'Jung himself was led by three archetypes: the priest-theologian, the scientific doctor and the archetype of the shaman', he concluded that the shaman archetype was the one possible common element among all Jungian analysts. He emphasised that 'the shaman's work is not only dependant on the concrete, physical world but [is also] influenced by transcendental forces which can only be activated within special human relationships'. However, right at the end, when at least one common theme was found to characterise a shared 'Jungian' field, he claimed that 'the shaman archetype leads all psychotherapists' (Ulmer 1997:90); this means that practitioners of 'all schools' of psychotherapy, according to Guggenbuhl-Craig, may have this 'shamanistic' element in their identity as therapists.

Regardless of the validity of this claim, the question of who is a Jungian remains wide open because the one common characteristic which Guggenbuhl-Craig found to be shared by all 'Jungians', i.e. the shamanistic dimension of their work, in the final analysis, is not exclusively Jungian. I would argue that all these considerations lead to confusion because within the very nature of the Jungian opus there are several key paradoxical elements.

Jung repeatedly emphasised that he did not like to have disciples. In a letter to Freud, he wrote characteristically that 'one repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil' (303J, 3 March 1912, in McGuire 1974) and his famous dictum 'Thank God I am Jung and not a Jungian' captures even more dramatically his distaste for followers.

One way we can understand this attitude is that Jung genuinely believed that his psychology was the product of his own specific personality make-up and expressed his own 'personal myth'. By 'personal myth' Jung meant the specific meaning one attributes to his or her own life and which conveys the uniqueness of that personality in its own overall context. His autobiography epitomises this attitude insofar as it combines in a seamless way a narrative of both his life and work as expressions of his personal myth. Commenting about writing his autobiography, Jung wrote: 'Thus it is that I have now undertaken, in my eightythird year, to tell my personal myth' (Jung 1963:17).

This means that only Jung was a 'Jungian' and nobody else could possibly be one. As Jung felt strongly that each person should endeavour to discover his or her own personal myth, 'Jungian' analysts should also do the same and the basis of their theoretical and clinical approach should be their own unique and individual personal myths. Thus, as far as this particular meaning of Jungian is concerned, paradoxically, anybody calling oneself Jungian is essentially not

following the Jungian message and hence cannot be called a Jungian! This paradoxical cycle 'locks analytical psychologists within the most impossible koan' (Papadopoulos 1989:192). In order to get around this difficulty, Yandel attempted a rather clever twist by suggesting that 'it is necessary that we cease to be Jungians in a submissive or imitative sense if we are to become worthy Jungians in the authentic sense' (1978:75). His exaltation, though, does not erase the dilemma because if the 'worthy' and 'authentic' Jungian is the one who follows his or her own myth, then what is the sense of being called a Jungian at all?

Another meaning of the same dictum ('Thank God I am Jung and not a Jungian') is that Jung did not believe that his approach was a 'system' or a 'school' of psychology and that therefore it would be nonsensical to claim that he could possibly have 'Jungian' disciples. We may distinguish two perspectives inherent here: a theoretical and an organisational one.

From a theoretical perspective, this statement may refer to two facets of Jung's work:

1 Insisting on the uniqueness of each individual, Jung was against the imposition of set theoretical doctrines in therapy. He stated that 'since every individual is a new and unique combination of psychic elements, the investigation of truth must begin afresh with each case, for each "case" is individual and not derivable from any preconceived formula'; and again, 'we miss the meaning of the individual psyche if we interpret it on the basis of any fixed theory, however fond of it we may be' (Jung 1926:93).

   These statements show clearly that Jung did not believe in the value of set theories and he understood his own approach as that of sketching a series of practice-oriented insights: 'Our psychology is therefore an eminently practical science. It does not investigate for investigation's sake but for the immediate purpose of giving help. We could even say that learning is its byproduct, but not its principal aim, which is again a great difference from what one understands by "academic" science' (Jung 1926:93); 'I have set up neither a system nor a general theory, but have merely formulated auxiliary concepts to serve me as tools, as is customary in every branch of science' (Jung 1952:666). Therefore, Jung did not feel that he had founded a definitive 'school' of psychology which could have disciples.
2 Jung repeatedly emphasised that our psychology was limited insofar as it was Eurocentric and ignored important aspects of the human soul which were better expressed in other traditions and in earlier times. Characteristically, he wrote that 'the predominantly rationalistic European finds much that is human alien to him, and he prides himself on this without realising that this rationality is won at the expense of his vitality, and that the primitive part of his personality is consequently condemned to a more or less underground existence' (Jung 1963:273). His investigations across time and space testify to this attitude. For example, Jung studied alchemy in depth not for historical curiosity but because he believed that alchemists were in

fact comparable to our modern-day psychotherapists. He argued that the transformations which alchemists were aiming at were not limited to the chemical changes in the substances they were manipulating but were primarily of psychological and spiritual nature in the participants during the alchemical opus. By examining carefully the alchemical texts, Jung found that the imagistic language of al chemy was referring to transmutations in the psyche rather than in the metals. Similarly, when Jung met with healers in Africa, Asia and North America, he was not interested in them as a journalist or an anthropologist but as a psychologist trying to understand the psychological processes of change in which they were involved.

This means that one way of understanding Jung's work is to appreciate it as a reiteration of the basic therapeutic principles, distilled from comparable psychological practices throughout the ages and nowadays across different cultures and traditions. Jung gave several indications that this was precisely the way he understood the nature of his endeavours. For example, writing about the concept of the unconscious, he clarified that 'if we are to grasp its nature, we must concern ourselves not only with contemporary problems, but also with the history of the human mind' (Jung 1918:28). Again, this reading of Jung shows that he did not consider he had a separate and distinct 'system of psychology' of his own.

From an organisational perspective, Jung did not like the institutionalisation of psychotherapy because, as has already been outlined above, he insisted on the freshness of each individual approach based on the uniqueness of each psychotherapeutic encounter. He did not encourage the establishment of an institute to promote his 'brand' of psychology because he did not believe that he had such a 'brand' in the first place. It is not accidental that the C.G.Jung Institute in Zurich was founded so late in his life. He resisted the idea for a long time but finally succumbed when some of his colleagues presented him with drawn up plans for the establishment of such an institute; this made him realise that he could no longer resist the idea and finally accepted that it was better to join them and ensure that this institute was least harmful to him and his work (Franz Jung 1989). The same attitude survives until today in a slightly different form insofar as none of his houses are open to the public as a museum and many of his papers are kept by his family. This consistency does not indicate any obstinacy, mistrust or false modesty on behalf of either him or his family but represents a continuation of the firm belief that, regardless of how important his work might have been, it was not a grand 'system' or 'school' of psychology that needed to be institutionalised and preserved in a fossilised way. Hence, the Jung family has refused to allow his private home to become a mausoleum and place of pilgrimage.

Jung always treated his work as an intimate product of his own life, of his own 'personal myth', as well as a response to direct clinical needs; he was against abstract theoretical systems out of which professionals deduce principles for the

individual case at hand. However, insofar as his theories (according to him) were based on accepted wisdom and proven practices across time and geographical locations, inevitably (he claimed) they had some collective validity. This means that there was always an inherent tension within his own approach to his work: on one hand, he treated it as a private matter and, on the other hand, expected that it received public acclaim. It seems that the legacy of this tension is still evident today and both his theories as well as Jungians and Jungian organisations are still struggling with these paradoxical antinomies. His message to keep his work alive and allow it to continue to develop and transform is still heard in a crystal-clear way; but how are we to reconcile this with the demands imposed by its public side? It is not easy to honour something which one holds very valuable without preserving it in static form.

For all these reasons, there is something paradoxical in the establishment of 'Jungian' societies and set training programmes in 'Jungian' psychology; in a sense, they are contrary to the spirit of the Jungian ideas and yet they are inevitable developments within the modern climate of psychological professionalism. The same reasons are responsible for creating all the confusion surrounding the very term 'Jungian' and hence 'post-Jungian'. Unless these paradoxical elements are properly understood, there will be a vital element missing in our understanding of the whole debate about 'Post-Jungians Today'.

Choosing a therapeutic style

The second issue I wish to examine briefly is the development and choice of our therapeutic style as analysts. However shocking it may be, it seems that this most important issue has not received any attention in the literature and I am not aware of any studies exploring it. It is usually believed, as part of conventional wisdom rather than any actual evidence, that the style of analysts' therapeutic work is determined by two factors: (1) their own training, and (2) subsequently, their own free choice to select from the available therapeutic menus which exist in abundance around us. In addition, of course, there is a general belief that, somehow, the analyst's own personality is connected with his or her clinical practice in some undefined way.

I am sure that it would not be controversial to add to this list one's own life history as well as professional development and working milieu (including work settings, institutional attachments and the type of colleagues with whom one has worked). However, what may indeed be controversial would be to argue that (1) after all, we are not as free as we would like to believe we are to choose the way we evolve as clinicians, and (2) the way we evolve as clinicians may not be different from the way we evolve, (a) with reference to other more fundamental belief systems of a sociopolitical or religious nature, or (b) with reference to even less tangible positions such as our choice of a football team or our taste in music and art. Yet, our rational mind would like us to believe that we are masters of our own destiny and the way we evolve as clinicians is not dependent upon any

elusive or uncontrollable factors. Moreover, it would be disconcerting, if not frightening, for our consumers to think that they entrust their lives to the play of such unpredictable determinants.

It is a curious phenomenon that although we seem to readily accept several considerations with regard to the theoretical and therapeutic formation of our founding fathers and other famous psychotherapists who are public figures, we find it difficult to accept the very same factors with reference to us. For example, it is customary to talk very easily about the fact that Freud's work was a product of the combination of specific factors including his Jewishness, the Victorian morality in nineteenth-century Vienna, the psychological dynamics and socioeconomic background of his own family, the preoccupations in medicine and science at the time, etc., and to recite comparable factors with reference to Jung (cf. Atwood and Storolow 1977; Papadopoulos 1992). Yet, in private or public (professional) debates between analysts we will not hear anything about personal family histories or about their sociopolitical background; instead we hear a great deal about the 'issues' themselves in their abstract purity. It is somehow taken for granted that since we have 'successfully' undergone our training analysis and have qualified as analysts we must not look into these factors any longer certainly not in public. The only way that these factors are used are as derogatory (and indeed pathologising) remarks and not within the context of an open debate, or in a glib manner among friendly colleagues.

By no means am I suggesting that theoretical and clinical controversies among analysts should turn into public confessions or misplaced analytical observations (with interpretations used in a mud-slinging way). What I do suggest, though, is that allowances should at least be made for the host of these factors in such arguments; this would enable not only the mellowing of the tone but also the promotion of a more in-depth appreciation of the wider context involved.

In other words, I would argue that there is a paradoxical situation in this respect which holds two antithetical positions. On the one hand, there is an idealistic (and hence most unrealistic) belief that the differences in theoretical and therapeutic directions among analysts are based on tangible and rationalistic criteria and are products of the analysts' own free will which is exercised in a conscious and deliberate manner; and on the other hand, the very nature of analytical thinking suggests that there is a multiplicity of factors which unconsciously affect such directions and development.

This argument is advanced in order not to stifle debate among analytical schools but, on the contrary, to facilitate better understanding by pointing out some pragmatic limitations. The reality of the existence of four different official (IAAP recognised) training groups in the UK offers an apt illustration: to begin with, people try to understand the differences among these groups by focusing on their theoretical and therapeutic models; however, the careful observer, who would be able to go behind the advertised slogans, will soon notice that there is a wide variation of positions within each one of these groups, sometimes even wider than between the groups themselves. This is so because the original reasons for

their separate formation (and splits) were not exclusively of theoretical and clinical nature: there has been a combination of factors including personalities of their protagonists, a series of historical and circumstantial factors, as well as broader cultural and political considerations. I would claim that the theoretical and therapeutic arguments have been less responsible for such splits although these are the areas which are now focused upon during such debates (for a balanced discussion of the Jungian splits in the UK see Ann Casement 1995).

Discussing the difficulties and realistic limitations which prevent healthy debates between members of different groups in Jungian circles, Papadopoulos and Solomon (1995), in their investigation of how book reviewers in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* over forty years treated the reviewed texts, made the following 'epistemological observation': 'by and large the reviewer remains within her or his theoretical framework without reference to other approaches and expects the book author, who follows a different approach, to have addressed the reviewer's own concerns, moreover by using the same terminology' (p. 436). This observation offers another example of the genuine difficulties which exist when we attempt to compare and contrast issues of analytical practice as if they were purely abstract concepts and without accepting the pragmatic restrictions inherent in our positions. If anything, there is a hidden omnipotence in the expectation that we can comprehend and comment on systems in which we have not been trained. The idealistic notion of objectivity here may need to be tempered by our clinical modesty.

The difficulties involved in the term 'Jungian' and in the analyst's choice of therapeutic style/clinical direction have been elaborated here in order to attempt to provide a context for the 'post-Jungian' development; such directions do not develop in a vacuum or only in the context of theoretical factors.

How my clinical practice is evolving

The purpose of the final section of this chapter is not to discuss my own particular case for its own sake but in order to offer an illustration of the possibilities inherent in the Jungian ideas, in the context of the above two considerations. Although I do not feel that I have arrived at any ideal position, I hope that some of the excitement as well as uneasiness of my explorations may be sensed by the reader.

My clinical practice, as far as I can make out, is informed by mainly two theoretical paradigms and one overall consideration:

1 a Jungian (broadly defined)
2 a systemic (as in systemic family therapy)
3 my overall concern with placing my work within a sociopolitical context.

I
A non-sectarian Jungian approach

The background to the characterisation 'broadly defined' of my Jungian orientation is as follows. My academic and professional life took me through five different schools of psychotherapy: I began by being an orthodox Freudian while working with my clinical professor in Yugoslavia, who was a member of Freud's Wednesday group in Vienna, and my degree thesis was on Lawrence of Arabia, from an exclusively classical Freudian perspective; then, influenced by the behaviourist direction of academic psychology at the time, I moved to behaviour therapy in the late 1960s and for my Masters thesis I developed a comparison between psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy. When I moved to South Africa (for family reasons) and was working as a lecturer in the Psychology Department of the University of Cape Town, I established with some colleagues a humanistic 'growth centre' and practised and taught humanistic psychology (encounter groups, Gestalt, TA, etc.); finally, during and after becoming a Jungian analyst, I became involved academically and clinically in systemic family therapy.

In parallel to this psychology route, life moved me through four countries. I was born in Cyprus and grew up during the liberation struggle against the British colonial rule; in my late teens I survived the brutal civil strife between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and then with a UNESCO scholarship studied in Yugoslavia in the 1960s, participating in student protests in different parts of Europe. In South Africa I taught at the University, worked clinically and was involved with community projects in black townships for eleven years before coming to Britain in 1980. Throughout, I have been involved with the *rapprochement* between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.

Having lived in these four radically different environments where the basic belief systems were so deeply entrenched and dividing, and having belonged fully to (not just familiarising myself with) five different schools of psychotherapy where there was a corresponding entrenchment, perhaps it is not surprising that I cannot possibly get too partisan about one Jungian school against another. Moreover, when I moved to Jung, what attracted me most was precisely his anti-institutionalisation approach to clinical work. What I found appealing (and still do) is Jung's insistence that he did not have his own school of thought but that his approach was, essentially, a distillation of the basic therapeutic ingredients of the various human endeavours practised across time, in different historical periods (e.g. alchemy) and in different geographical places (e.g. oriental and African healing practices).

Hence, the Freud-Jung saga is not for me a useful framework because it is essentially divisive, excluding and promotes entrenchment and bigotry. I rather prefer the Jung of the pre- and post- Freud periods who is not caught up in either the adoration or condemnation of Freud. In other words, as I have argued elsewhere (Papadopoulos 1984), Jung was not just a Freudian disciple and his

direction was not developed just in opposition to Freud. Jung had a direction of his own before he met Freud, although he assisted Freud in a substantial way to develop psychoanalysis, and was able to continue and extend further his own direction after his rather prolonged reaction to the termination of their friendship.

Jung's contribution to psychoanalysis proper is frequently underestimated. Freud himself explicitly acknowledged Jung for at least the following five major contributions:

- the tradition of experimentally investigating psychoanalytic concepts
- the notion of complex
- the institution of training analysis as an essential part in the training of new analysts
- the use of anthropological and mythological material in psychoanalysis
- the application of psychoanalytic theory in the understanding of psychotic conditions as well as phenomena of deep disintegration and archaic states of raw archetypal possession.

In addition, we may discern the following contributions which Jung made to psychoanalysis that were either not acknowledged directly by Freud or were developed by Jung subsequently and are currently adopted by mainstream psychoanalysis:

- the value and positive use of countertransference
- the appreciation of the function of analysis as a container (a containing vessel in the alchemical metaphor of the psychotherapeutic process)
- the appreciation of the importance of the feminine dimension
- the critique of a reductionistic approach to analytical work and the emphasis on hermeneutic and phenomenological perspectives
- the appreciation of the importance of the collective/social dimension as it is interwoven into the intrapsychic world
- the role of language
- the emphasis on stories and narratives
- the notion of self.

Freud and Jung flourished together until, inevitably, they realised that their individual directions, styles, epistemology (and, of course, personalities) were too different and each one wanted to pursue his own separate path.

However, despite this impressive list of contributions, the predominant theme of the legacy of their association is that of bitterness and division. It seems that psychoanalysis and analytical psychology have settled into some unfortunate set roles: psychoanalysis feeling marginalised by society appears to need its own marginalised group; analytical psychology, in pursuit of its own identity and desperate to be accepted by psychoanalysis, tragically ends up fulfilling that role. The same cycle of marginalisation is further repeated among the various Jungian

groupings with equally lamentable consequences. There is something very sad about these self-destructive tendencies by which marginalised groups (of whatever kind) seem to get entrapped.

The legend of the Freud-Jung association has all the ingredients of any popular soap opera: a close friendship gone sour, filled with images of bigotry, plotting and betrayal. There is always an insatiable appetite for this particular combination of these eternal themes and society keeps creating and re-creating such scenaria with different protagonists and props, who, essentially, keep playing variations of the same theme. We are surrounded by such examples with protagonists from different walks of life: from members of the British royal family to sports personalities, from politicians to film stars. The Freud-Jung soap opera has proven to be a particularly enduring one because it keeps being recycled even with minimal or no new material being added. It is understandable that the public must be gripped by a powerful fascination in observing this particular soap in which the protagonists are the very same people who urge us to observe the meaning of such tragic relationships, i.e. the psychotherapists themselves. Freudians and Jungians must also have been responsible for perpetuating the legend because we are caught up in it ourselves: by focusing on these two founding fathers who are long dead, attention is diverted away from us and the ways in which we keep on repeating similar tragedies within our own analytical communities. Moreover, according to the cardinal rule of showbiz, any publicity is good publicity. In other words, it must be good for business to keep the legend alive!

Although, admittedly, this is an oversimplified view, it nevertheless conveys some key elements of this unfortunate state of affairs. In a provocative way, I would dare to suggest that analytical psychology can benefit a great deal if it were to move away from its central obsession of comparing itself with and validating itself against the Freudian schools, despite its natural kinship with them. By refusing to become entangled in this soap opera, one may find it easier to appreciate Jung's own and unique contribution.

I would distinguish three essential principles of Jung's uniqueness (which I always endeavour to retain in my clinical practice). These are (i) his epistemological openness, away from dogmatic formulations; (ii) his emphasis on more creative ways of conceptualising and applying the central analytical processes; and (iii) his attitude towards human suffering. He aptly described the first two positions as follows: 'My aim is to bring about a psychic state in which my patient begins to experiment with his own nature—a state of fluidity, change and growth where nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified' (Jung 1931a: 46). His third position is based on his emphasis on the meaning of suffering; while staying very close to human pain and suffering, without negating it or idealising it, he endeavoured to understand its meaning without pathologising it. Perhaps these two quotations capture his position best:

> We have come to understand that psychic suffering is not a definitely localised, sharply delimited phenomenon, but rather the symptom of a wrong attitude assumed by the total personality. We can therefore never hope for a thorough cure from a treatment restricted to the illness itself, but only from a treatment of the personality as a whole.
>
> (Jung 1931b: 355)

> The principal aim of psychotherapy is not to transport the patient to an impossible state of happiness, but to help him acquire steadfastness and philosophic patience in face of suffering. Life demands for its completion and fulfilment a balance between joy and sorrow…. [H]appiness is itself poisoned if the measure of suffering has not been fulfilled. Behind a neurosis there is so often concealed all the natural and necessary suffering the patient has been unwilling to bear.
>
> (Jung 1943:81)

2
Systemic approaches in the context of a Jungian perspective

Systemic approaches, for me, complement a Jungian orientation in a most syntonic way. Although the theory and practice of analytical psychology has largely been derived from and applied to the context of individual psychotherapy, I would argue that its central theoretical principles, for example those of the collective unconscious and archetypes, refer essentially to organising structures which are collectively shared, are fundamentally interactional systemic structuring principles and therefore can be applied to therapeutic work with families (as well as other systems such as organisations). Yet these concepts continue to be used almost exclusively within the intrapsychic (individual) context. This anomaly started with Jung himself who did not work with families because of several understandable reasons: family therapy began much later, and at the time no professional was working with families; in addition, influenced by his contemporary cultural movement which emphasised the sanctity of the individual and considered any form of collective with suspicion, Jung seemed to be unable to distinguish between the negative nature of the collective (mob, mass, herd) and the positive possibilities in collective forms (community, family).

The unconscious dynamics in the individual cannot be appropriately understood outside the context of the immediate network of family relationships and unconscious interactions. For example:

> The archetype of the 'devouring mother' presupposes that the mother has somebody to devour; moreover, the other members of the family must respond to this 'devouring' in some way, either by approving or disapproving of it. In other words, this phenomenon does not happen in a

> vacuum but in the context of others who are directly affected and shaped by one individual's archetypal possession. Moreover, the very occurrence of this archetypal possession is not an individual event and unrelated to the other members of the family. It has a meaning, a purpose, and a function for the whole family. This means that in so far as the impact of an archetype is on the family *as a unit,* it is difficult to even conceptualize that the archetypal possession is of one individual. The appropriate framework to understand such phenomena would, therefore, be the *network of archetypal images;* according to this, archetypal images interact with each other and with the family members as they incarnate them. In this way, one may say that the family, *as a unit,* manifests and works through a specific, archetypally orchestrated, destiny; so much so, that Jung himself wrote that it frequently takes generations of a family to work out a certain archetypal destiny (Jung, 1909).
>
> (Papadopoulos 1997a: 140, emphasis added)

A brief outline of the similarities between Jungian and systemic perspectives would include the following:

- Both emphasise the meaningfulness and usefulness of the symptom. The aim of therapy is to develop a context where the symptom will acquire deeper meaning and not be seen only as obnoxious and senseless.
- Both follow a stance according to which blame is not attributed either to the symptom bearer or to a preferred solution. Their resulting neutrality enables the emergence of the optimum solution for the individual/family. Jung's idea of the 'wisdom of the psyche' which in a corrective way offers from the unconscious prompts to the individual is comparable to the systemic understanding that once obstacles are removed, the family, as a self-regulating system, will find its own solutions.
- Both are against reductionistic, causalistic and linear approaches; instead they espouse systemic (circular), dialectic and synthetic ways of working. In addition to historical and linear causality, they appreciate the importance of fits and patterns, i.e. how certain themes, images and psychological constellations fit together and how they form distinct patterns.
- Both appreciate that the therapists and patients form unique relationships with each other because, essentially, they belong to the same system and it is not possible to pretend to have an 'objective' and detached approach to therapy. The Jungian alchemical metaphor for psychotherapy offers a clear understanding of how therapist and patient are deeply interconnected. Jung was responsible for emphasising the value of countertransference in psychotherapy, moving radically away from Freud's initial suspicion of it as interfering with the 'purity' of the analytical process.
- Both understand the process of change in terms of developing a new epistemology. Jung (1929:14–15) wrote characteristically:

> I have often seen patients [that] simply outgrow a problem that had destroyed others. This 'outgrowing'…proved on further investigation to be a new level of consciousness. Some higher or wider interest appeared on the patient's horizon, and through this broadening of his outlook the insoluble problem lost its urgency. It was not solved logically in its own terms, but faded out when confronted with a new and stronger life urge.

This is comparable to Bateson's (1973) theory concerning the 'power greater than self', which was illustrated by his work on alcoholism.

> Bateson observed that the therapeutic turn for the alcoholic occurs at the point when he 'hits rock bottom' and realises that he has, in fact, no control over his drinking. As long as the alcoholic believes in his ability to stop drinking, he lives with a false hope and cannot accept the fact that his drinking is bigger than him. Once he 'hits rock bottom' and gives up hope, then the state of surrender which ensues allows him to develop a new epistemology within which he appreciates his relative impotence. This very realisation is also his real hope for change. It is at this moment that the alcoholic may have a direct experience of the fact that his drinking is not located in himself but rather he is located in the broader context where his drinking is located. In other words, the system comprising the contingencies of his drinking as well as himself is bigger than his own individual 'self'.
>
> (Papadopoulos 1997a: 152)

This realisation breaks the separation between himself and 'his problem' and interrelates them together within a wider systemic context; this is what the new epistemology enables him to perceive and is likely to result in the loosening of the power of what Jung would call the archetypal grip.

Systemic family therapists have injected a freshness into the therapeutic world not only because of their attempts to conceptualise therapeutic dilemmas in new ways but also because of their emphasis on the epistemological dimensions of therapy itself. In other words they went back to the basics and have been asking questions such as 'What is it that makes us think that we know in therapy?', 'What are the basic assumptions which we import into our work, taking them for granted and without examining their effect on our very conceptualisation of our therapeutic interactions?', and 'What are the wider contexts within which our psychotherapeutic endeavours are located and how are we affected by them?'

Jung would have felt very much in tune with such questions because he had almost identical preoccupations. Three quotations may suffice to exemplify this kinship: 'What is the use of even the most accurate and punctilious work if it is prejudiced by an unavowed assumption? Any science worthy of the name must criticize its own assumptions' (Jung 1935b: 548). Addressing the same issue but with reference to psychotherapy, more specifically, Jung warned of the dangers

of abandoning our epistemological vigilance: 'The empirical intellect, occupying itself with the minutiae of case-histories, involuntarily imports its own philosophical premises not only into the arrangement but also into the judgement of the material and even into the apparently objective presentation of data' (ibid.). Finally, he was always aware of the wider context: 'A system of healing that fails to take account of the epoch making *représentation collectives* of a political, economic, philosophical or religious nature, or assiduously refuses to recognise them as actual forces, hardly deserves the name therapy' (ibid: 549).

Such examples indicate the close affinity between the Jungian and systemic paradigms and it is a pity that this has not received the recognition it deserves. The reader may appreciate the potential mutual enrichment which a closer relationship between these two groups of professionals may bring about. Unfortunately, by and large, such reciprocity, openness and potential mutual growth has not characterised the relationship between the Jungian and Freudian worlds and present-day Jungians may wish to explore more rewarding vistas until comparable potentialities develop in their interactions with Freudians, too.

3
Working with survivors of violence and disasters

Finally, I would like to mention that I have found my Jungian (and systemic) insights most useful in my work with survivors of violence and with refugees. Thus, the last section in this chapter focuses on my attempts to extend the application of Jungian approaches to work beyond the traditional settings of either one-to-one formal analysis/psychotherapy in a consulting room (as part of private practice or a Health Service establishment) or any other therapeutic work in Social Services or local authority agencies.

It is important to clarify that I did not seek out this kind of work. If anything, given my own background, I was hesitant to work in this field despite repeated encouragement from colleagues. Yet this work 'found me', so to speak, through a series of unpredictable circumstances.

Over the years, I have worked in various capacities with survivors of violence and disaster in different countries and contexts. More recently, following the war in former Yugoslavia, I have been working with survivors and workers both in that country and here in the UK. I have also worked with various aid organisations as consultant with reference to recruitment, setting up and supervising projects, training, debriefing aid workers who returned from the war zone, etc.

By way of illustration of the issues involved, I will focus here on my work with a group of Bosnian ex-camp prisoners who were brought to this country by the Red Cross during the war in Bosnia. This was the first group of prisoners who were allowed to leave as medical evacuees and they were brought to a hospital in southeast England for medical treatment. The hospital authorities approached the Tavistock Clinic (where I have a part-time appointment),

requesting psychological help for these eighteen men; my first visit to their ward was within a few days after their arrival in the UK. The men were suffering from a variety of serious medical conditions ranging from scurvy to physical exhaustion, from malnutrition to various physical injuries; some even arrived in a coma.

Understandably, the men were very frightened and did not want to talk indiscriminately to anybody; however, they found me acceptable because although I speak their language and am well acquainted with their culture and country, no member of my family or myself originate from any region of former Yugoslavia. In that way, I was accepted as a neutral professional.

I was acutely aware of the strange context of my presence in their ward because the men had not requested any psychological help; it was the hospital authorities that did. The men, in addition to their medical ailments, were suffering from a series of successive traumas and were, understandably, stunned and disoriented. Virtually overnight, close-knit communities were divided across ethnic lines and neighbour turned on neighbour with inhuman ferocity. The people suffered not only the loss of property and families but also something more important. They lost the security that the sense of 'reading life' offers. What I mean by this is that when a neighbour commits atrocities against you and your family, what you lose is more than your friendship, home, members of your family, and even (what is usually referred to as) 'faith in humanity': you lose the confidence you have in predicting daily events and you are left in a state of bewilderment. This affects the totality of your being—from behaviour to relationships, from a sense of reality to the very sense of personal identity (Papadopoulos 1997c).

Regardless of previous experience in other projects involving survivors of atrocities, I was very aware that my position and role in relation to these men had to be dictated by their highly specific context and I tried to minimise any ideas I had from other comparable situations. I had to constantly remind myself that these men were not patients in a psychotherapeutic sense, although they were receiving medical treatment. According to the cliché, they were 'normal people reacting to abnormal circumstances'. I therefore set myself the task of finding ways to apply whatever psychotherapeutic insights and skills I had to their specific situation without psychologising the evil nature of the atrocities to which they had been exposed and without pathologising the political dimensions of their predicament.

It would be impossible to discuss in this chapter the nature of my work in any depth. As my aim here is to provide an illustration of how a Jungian orientation may assist professionals in developing appropriate ways of working under these unusual circumstances, I will limit myself to outlining some key features of this work. I have described aspects of this work elsewhere (e.g. Papadopoulos 1996, 1997b, 1997c, in press; Papadopoulos and Hildebrand 1997).

Without concealing my professional identity, I positioned myself in the ward as a general helper, attending to whatever was needed, from translating to

assisting the nurses with anything I could do, including menial tasks. Gradually the men would ask me questions in trying to understand their own feelings or moods but in a way which did not position them as patients. This is similar to how one asks a friend or a relative (who is also a professional) for some advice. My intent was to maximise the therapeutic impact of my interactions with them while at the same time minimising the pathologising dimensions. For example, I appreciated their reserved stance as appropriate, and did not treat it as resistance, as a therapist normally would. Overall, I endeavoured to include two dimensions in my responses to them: the first would address their concerns in a therapeutic way and the second would place their concerns in the framework of their recent life events and experiences, thus providing a normalising context for them. Similar to all therapeutic situations, I would make every effort to convey these dimensions, mindful of their timing and formulation (in terms of using the appropriate language). Throughout, I did not have any expectation that they should speak to me about their experiences or see me at set times. I left them entirely free to interact with me in any way they wished, always trying to maximise the therapeutic elements of my interactions.

In this way, I understood my main role as providing what could be called a 'therapeutic presence' where my main function was a 'therapeutic witnessing' of their predicament, rather than imposing formal psychotherapy.

> The discovery which resulted from this witnessing, however unsystematic, contributed to an imperceptible articulation of a narrative which located the person as a subject and not an object; until then, the men were forced into a position of being passive recipients of imposed brutality and now had the opportunity to transform the trauma (which felt as if it were a detached natural disaster) and experience it as a lived experience within a personal story. The presence of another human being who was also aware of the complexities of the therapeutic encounter, provided the special kind of space within which the person could think and begin to comprehend the incomprehensibility of his life disruption; moreover, it enabled him to humanise the experience of the inhuman treatment he had received.
>
> (Papadopoulos 1996:62)

It is important to emphasise that although I was not offering formal psychotherapy as such (insofar as there was no set time, place or an explicit or implicit psychotherapy contract) I was constantly aware of the absolute necessity to maintain throughout the professional analytical stance. Without the protection of the usual parameters of a set therapeutic frame (referring system, institutional setting, time, place, roles, culture, etc.) I would have been wide open to what could be called 'archetypal radiation' of their unbearable anguish, following the multiplicity of their deprivation. Most other workers who got involved with them, overwhelmed by their spontaneous impulse to respond with human generosity and without the awareness of therapeutic boundaries, found themselves

inappropriately close to the men; most of these relationships ended acrimoniously with tragic and at times even violent confrontations.

Although it is impossible to pinpoint exactly the way in which my Jungian orientation assisted me in this work (as well as how my systemic framework also contributed), I would venture the following reflections:

With reference to the setting

- Jung emphasized the importance of the analytical vessel, the therapeutic frame as an indispensable container of the powerful interactions of the analytic process. Jung's alchemical metaphor of psychotherapy illustrates dramatically the necessity of a strong and clear vessel within which difficult and potentially disruptive material can be contained. In the context of this work, I had to re-invent and re-create such a container as appropriate as possible to the special circumstances of the situation. For example, although I did not have set times and duration for my meetings with the men, nevertheless, all such meetings had to take place within the allotted time I had for visiting them and not at any other time of the week. Admittedly, especially at the beginning, it was important that I stayed with them for longer hours, but at no time did I allow myself to exceed midnight, regardless of the acute nature of the interactions. Moreover, I gradually became aware of how I was using certain props to delineate my 'therapeutic temenos', for example, wearing a jacket and a tie (which I always wear when I work) and carrying my clinic desk diary, were the 'context-markers' which reminded me of the fact that I was there in a professional capacity and not just as a concerned friend. The created therapeutic vessel enabled me to have a safe emotional closeness within the context of a secure therapeutic container.
- Jung's openness in employing creative ways of applying therapeutic processes was an inspiration. By keeping a clear focus on the movements of the psyche he allowed and indeed encouraged creative and innovative ways of expression, using drawings and even dance movement at times. In my work, I allowed myself to be with the men in ways that felt most appropriate under the circumstances and regardless of how unorthodox they were, for example, watching TV with them, observing them playing cards (but not joining in myself) as long as I was able to remain in touch with their inner turmoil and be able to address it in a therapeutic way regardless of the unconventional nature of the external setting.
- Jung's awareness of the limitations of our psychotherapeutic practices as being Eurocentric. It was important for me to remember that the traditional therapeutic approaches as followed in the modern Western world are not the only valid ones. As with the point above, I felt empowered to venture into different ways of allowing them to convey their pain and I endeavoured to respond accordingly. For example, when one man talked to me endlessly

about his anguish following the killing of his two work-horses, I remained within that domain, not interpreting it in a wider psychological context. It was only a couple of years later that he was able to tell me that he also witnessed the massacre of his family.

With reference to the phenomena themselves

- Jung addresses the concept of evil not in any psychologising way but by accepting its reality and tangibility. 'Who says that the evil in the world is not real! Evil is terribly real, for each and every individual' (1959:465). Confronted with phenomena of unutterable horror, it was important for me not to attempt to psychologise them but acknowledge for myself and for the men that indeed those were evil acts committed by men who at the time were acting in a most evil way. Validating the men's experience was important as well as remaining with them in front of the incomprehensibility of evil. This stance seemed to have a containing effect without either pathologising their condition or psychologising the evil.
- Jung's attempt throughout was to find ways of appreciating human suffering in a non-pathological context. The quotation cited above in which Jung emphasises the importance to 'acquire steadfastness and philosophic patience in face of suffering' as well as claims that 'Behind a neurosis there is so often concealed all the natural and necessary suffering the patient has been unwilling to bear' (Jung 1943:81), are clearly indicative of his position. There was no easy way out of the men's predicament. Their country was ravaged, their communities devastated, the tragedy that befell them was of immense proportions and there was no way that one could treat their response as pathological. Their suffering was most real and the task of my 'therapeutic presence' was to be with them in their predicament and not to invent manipulative or sugar-coated psychological niceties to either distract them or offer them false promises of easy solutions.
- Anybody who has ever worked in this field will recognise the powerful fascination which is exerted at so many different levels. This ranges from the fascination with meeting the people who had gone through such powerful experiences, to the content and the events they relate; from the overwhelmingly heroic feeling which imbues all the workers, to the variety of emotional reactions one has in these situations. This fascination is not always about good things but it extends to darker aspects of the human psyche in most complex ways. Shadow elements emerge and threaten to engulf the personality; destructive images acquire obsessive fascination. There are real dangers that therapeutic work in these situations becomes a vehicle for unconscious mutual fuelling and reactivation of these images. Extreme polarisation of perceptions, ideas, personalities and situations threatens with its indiscriminate destructiveness.

All these can be appreciated as archetypal phenomena and Jung's deep understanding of them can be of considerable help. Archetypal possession is lurking dangerously and even if one manages to escape all this, one is still vulnerable to what I call 'archetypal radiation'. Although, alas, no Geiger type of meter exists to warn us of excessive levels of this type of 'radiation', a Jungian understanding of these phenomena can be immensely useful.

Ultimately, all these considerations can help a worker delineate the psychological from the political discourses which are closely overlapping in these situations. The worker needs to honour both, as well as appreciate the complex way they overlap. If one fails to do this, some form of violence will result when one discourse imposes over the other. One tragic consequence of such violation is the 'psychologisation of evil' which occurs when mental health professionals attempt to explain away atrocities by using clever psychological theorising.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to discuss (mostly in an outline form) my present position (as much as I am capable of being aware of it) as a Jungian analyst. My intention has been to provide an example of how Jungian analysts may be able to combine different ways of working (in terms of work settings and theoretical approaches). However, I am fully aware that not all analysts have the opportunity of working outside their consulting rooms, especially if they do not have an additional institutional attachment. I feel fortunate that in addition to my analytical practice I work at the Tavistock Clinic, an institution with a long tradition of working in innovative ways with social issues where I have been allowed to have the space as well as sufficient encouragement to develop this particular approach to this specific project.

In the final analysis, although it is difficult (if not impossible) to delineate precisely the different theoretical streams in my analytical work (as applied to the different settings), I do feel that I am informed by a 'Jungian' orientation, whatever this term may mean. I am aware that my work reflects the totality of my professional and life experiences (including training and work experiences) and it would be rather meangingless to isolate some theoretical points and hold them up as the emblem of my work. I sense that Jung's psychology has assisted me a great deal in trying to hold on to the relative uncertainty of all these considerations and has given me the freedom to constantly search for increasingly more resourceful ways of accessing and containing human suffering.

It may, indeed, be impossible to resolve on a *conceptual* level the tensions inherent in the paradoxical nature of the Jungian opus, as discussed above. However, each one of us, in our individual style, somehow finds ways of resolving them (to a degree) in each given situation. If we do not have the humility to acknowledge that these solutions are only temporary and with reference to specific contexts, it will be difficult for us to be prepared to re-

invent, next time, new working positions; then, left in stagnated positions, we are likely to need to elevate our fossilised schemata to idealised banners to be used in fighting others.

If we take seriously Jung's idea that 'one repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil' the task of every Jungian should be to attempt to extend the existing Jungian vistas. This would be one sensible way of understanding the notion of post-Jungianism. Jung has provided us with plenty of inspirational ideas and it is up to us to continue building upon his structure.

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Part VI

Gender

Chapter 11
Reflections on female homosexuality

Anne Springer

Translated by Margaret Ries

I

Time and again over the years there have been women among my female patients who were homosexually oriented in their choice of partner. Later patients always announced their homosexuality in the first interview, and they always either intimated or openly asked the anxious-aggressive question of whether I was an analyst who wanted to 're-educate' them to being a 'hetero-woman'. I believed that I could answer this question in the negative and insisted, for myself, on my usual criteria of selection: an assessment of the prospective possibilities coupled with the furthest-reaching fundamental acceptance of the patient's choice of lifestyle as possible and personal liking. I proceeded from the premise that the judgements about female homosexuality that undoubtedly existed in me could, to the extent that it was feasible, be dealt with through self-reflection. At the beginning of the analysis I also predominantly felt, on the conscious level, a sympathetic interest regarding the sexual inner and outer worlds of these patients.

On the other hand, when two female patients—one during a longer break in the analysis and one after its conclusion—began to develop a homosexual lifestyle, I certainly felt confused. I noticed that I could not agree with my patients' new orientation, even though both of these women clearly felt good. They seemed stable and happy, and in no way inflated. I realised that I felt pressure to justify myself. Was it acceptable for a *lege artis* completed analysis to produce this result?

The inner conflict I came up against, as I did time and again when analysing lesbian patients, demanded further self-analytic efforts from me, and not only on the individual-psychic level. Female patients who live out their homosexuality, even in a large city like Berlin, are exposed to a double social pressure: the objects of rejection and fascination for the heterosexually oriented majority, they also receive pressure from their own social milieu to be loyal.

I was confronted, additionally, with my female patients' transferences on to the theory of analytical psychology. Many patients, but above all the lesbian

patients, had specifically come to me as a Jungian analyst under the assumption that I would be more tolerant than a 'Freudian' regarding their decision to have homosexual partners. The lesbian patients, in particular, frequently expressed marked idealisations of Jungian analysis during the first interview or at the start of therapy. These can be approximately summarised as follows: Jungian analysts, particularly female analysts, are less preoccupied with the 'primacy of the phallus'. Femininity is not devalued for them, but rather has its own worth. Female Jungian analysts are emotional rather than rational, 'compassionately accompanying' rather than 'aggressively interpreting'. These homosexual female patients also presented the aggressive, masculine analyst as the external enemy, personified, among others, in the image of the 'Freudian', whom they frequently fantasised about as a sadistic, femininity-dissecting man.

An idealising transference of motherliness and femininity, which seem to be threatened by an aggressive-sadistic form of masculinity, is thus placed on to the thinking of the female analyst, i.e. on the analyst herself.

The transference character of these fantasies about the positive-motherly female analyst and her inner world, where the two women form a mother-daughter relationship, towards which a negative father/analyst is distantly or even inimically disposed, was very obvious to me. On the other hand, in order to do my work as well as possible, it seemed increasingly necessary for me to examine my own analytic theory and my transferences on to it

II

My search for a specific thematisation of female homosexuality in the literature of analytical psychology did not produce many findings.

In 1927, C.G.Jung discusses female homosexuality as a culturally determined choice about the form of one's life and relationships in his work *The Woman in Europe* (Jung 1927) There, he talks of the dangers of women identifying with the animus through their adoption of new, 'masculinely' defined social roles. Jung believed that this 'masculinisation' held the danger of women's emotional distance to men, of frigidity as a defence and of the development of an unfeminine form of sexual desire, which corresponded more to the aggressive form of male sexuality. With the help of this unnatural desire, women then attempted to reach the withdrawing man, i.e. the man who was becoming less visible in society. Jung continues: The third possibility, especially favoured in Anglo-Saxon countries, is optional homosexuality in the masculine role' (ibid.: 119). Here, female homosexuality is defined as a form of 'animus obsession'. Earlier in the same text, Jung writes that 'since masculine and feminine are united in our human nature, a man can live in the feminine part of himself, and the woman in her masculine part.... [But] a man should live as a man, and a woman as a woman' (ibid.: 118). Jung considers female homosexuality to be a cultural phenomenon and holds social changes responsible for the confusion regarding

sex roles and sexual identity (which he equates), whereas the fact of this confusion is viewed as negative.

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* Jung talks of the 'masculinisation of the white woman' as a possible consequence of the 'loss of her natural unity (shamba [her own plot of land], children, small animals, her own house and hearth)' and of her corresponding wish for 'compensation for her impoverishment'. Writes Jung: 'The most rational states blur the difference between the sexes the most. The role that homosexuality plays in modern society is enormous and is partly a result of the mother complex and partly a natural phenomenon of purpose. (The prevention of reproduction!)' (Jung 1965:239).

Jung therefore either explains female—as well as masculine—homosexuality as a result of a disturbed mother relationship, or, using a social-psychological explanatory approach, he describes it as an expression of animus obsession.

As far as I know, there are only two places in the Collected Works where Jung records his clinical observations about female homosexuality. In *The Development of Personality* (1934), he talks about an adolescent with homosexual fantasies and in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (1943), there is the single, somewhat more detailed casuistry of a female analysand.

In *The Development of Personality,* Jung describes the case of a 13-year-old adolescent girl, who is both intelligent and rebellious-aggressive. She develops homosexual fantasies about a female teacher, whose affection she wants and to whom she fantasises about showing herself naked. She dreams that her mother dies in the bath-tub and that she herself is unable to prevent her from drowning. Jung describes the mother as brilliant, ambitious and masculine. She seems to be incapable of loving her daughter as a child and treats her more like a doll. This is the reason, Jung asserts, why the girl 'craves love from her teacher, but of the wrong sort. If tender feelings are thrown out of the door, then sex in violent form comes in through the window' (Jung 1934:126). Jung writes that, in this case, it is actually the mother who needs therapy. If she went into analysis, her marriage might improve, which would then afford the child an appropriate role, and consequently access to her mother's love. The father is described as distant. Jung believes that the girl's homosexual fantasies are caused by the lack of maternal love and implicates the unconscious identification with the 'masculine' mother who rejects her husband as the source of these fantasies. Homosexual fantasies in this instance are denoted as an expression of misconceived love.

Jung's casuistic description of a homosexual female patient in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* occurs in the context of a description of his technique of synthetic analysis as distinguished from Freud's analysis. A dream of the patient, in which she is 'at the point' of crossing a wide stream, is central for the casuistry. Writes Jung, 'There is no bridge, but she finds a ford where she can cross. She is on the point of doing so, when a large crab that is laying hidden in the water seizes her by the foot and will not let her go' (1943:80). The patient is afraid when she wakes up. In her mind, the stream represents a boundary that is difficult to cross, an obstacle. She associates the ford, as a possible means of

overcoming this obstacle, with therapy. And she interprets the crab as the deadly carcinoma of which a friend died and as a fight she had with her current female partner.[1] This woman is idealised by the patient, as is her mother, who is already dead. At the same time, the relationship between the patient and her partner is one of lustful-torturous combat, in which the patient assumes a rather masochistic position in, as Jung writes, a predominantly masculine-phallic sexual fantasy in her inner life. Following the patient's idea that the crab/cancer in the dream represented her friend, Mrs X., who had died of cancer, Jung now elucidates the patient's unconscious identification with her, an identification which inwardly threatens the patient, but also serves to protect her. She remembers Mrs X. as a funny and joyous widow who had many relationships with men, including one with an artist whom the patient found both fascinating and sinister. Here, Jung reminds the patient of her fears about being foolhardy and about an 'immoral way of life' and interprets the grasping animal in the dream as the animal *per se,* the bestial in her, and equates this with an instinctive desire that is directed towards men. Jung comes to the conclusion that the patient holds on to her current homosexual relationship as a defence against heterosexuality: 'So as not to fail victim to this other tendency, which seems to her much more dangerous. Accordingly, she remains at the infantile, homosexual level because it serves her as a defence' (Jung 1943:85). Jung subsequently traces the masculine role that the patient plays, according to him, in the relationship with her female partner back to an unconscious identification with Mrs X. and her personal world, to which the artist friend belonged. Mrs X. herself, like the patient's female partner, was supposedly an 'extremely feminine woman'. According to Jung, the crab/cancer in the dream represents an uncontrolled part of the libido. Unconscious contents keep the patient in the homosexual relationship, which is, however, tantamount to an illness, since she suffers in the relationship and has become neurotic because of it. At this point, Jung pinpoints the dangerous and fascinating aspect of the unconscious identification with the artist as a split-off part of the transference (next to an idealising part of the transference) which is projected on to Jung himself. After Jung has verbalised the negative part of the transference, the patient is able to articulate feelings of hate and contempt with regard to her partner. In this moment in the transference, Jung feels himself as analyst to be equated with the imago of the demonic artist; he then changes, remarkably, the level of the interpretation. He understands the 'demon', personified in the artist and in the patient's unconscious identification with him, as an archetypal image and the patient's fear as 'a primitive fear of the contents of the collective unconscious'. According to Jung, the patient first has to reflect upon this fear. She cannot yet leave her neurotic situation, since the dream did not provide any positive indications of help from the unconscious. At the end of the case description, we see the patient still trapped in a highly ambivalent homosexual relationship, confronted by an analyst who does not accept the offer of the negative transference (i.e. of the artist/man who has caused the deathly illness as introject,

of the patient's deathly hate of her partner), but rather, through a change in the interpretative level from the personal to the collective unconscious, to an archetypal transference, maintains the splitting off of the negative transference.

It remains to be stressed that, for Jung, the homosexual woman represents a masculinised woman, i.e. one who is not sufficiently feminine. Her homosexuality, Jung believes, originates from an identification with an internally masculinely fixated woman/mother, whereas the lived-out homosexuality fulfils a defence function with reference to heterosexuality.

As far as I am aware, there are only four places in the remaining literature of analytical psychology that include specific discussions of female homosexuality. In contrast, however, the comprehensive Jungian literature about the development of femininity and its forms of representation contains numerous unconsciously homosexual structures, fantasies and dreams.

In the context of projected identification, Betty de Shong Meador describes in detail her own erotic-sexual reactions of countertransference on to female patients and her growing competence in treating lesbian patients after she had worked through this countertransference. She disguises her account, however, as a fairy tale portrayal of the relationship between two women and defensively uses a mythologisation of the analytic process about the Inanna myth as legitimisation (De Shong Meador 1984).

Marion Woodman discusses homosexuality-shaping dreams, taken from her own analyses, as important steps in the development of one's own femininity. This, however, is ultimately understood in the context of a wholeness, whose internal image is hermaphroditic (Woodman 1985). Christine Downing thematicises the positive-regressive desire to establish a relationship with motherliness, a concept which she understands as archetypal, and discusses Jung's case sketches, mentioned above, in a thoroughly critical manner. In my opinion, however, Downing avoids perceiving the actual analytic process through mythologisation (Downing 1995).

June Singer impressively describes the positive development of a female patient as a result of her increasing acceptance of her homosexuality. As an analyst, Singer at first feels uncomfortable with this course of therapy, but then accepts it for herself as well. Although she amplifies the material from this analysis through the help of the Amazon myth, she does not engage in any defensive-reductive mythologisation.

One limitation of this work is, in my opinion, that Singer uses this casuistry, among others, in order to support her concept of androgyny (Singer 1979:289–94). She bases this concept on the assumption of an ideal balance of masculine and feminine parts, parts in one and the same personality, and, exactly like Jung, presupposes that the conceptual pair masculine/feminine is clearly defined in terms of opposition. It is exactly this constructed opposition, founded on postulated attempts at integration and totality, that is in need of criticism, however. On closer analysis, the androgynous ideal—i.e. the dynamic integration of so-called masculine and feminine parts in one personality—does not, in my

opinion, constitute real progress. Although this concept is indeed emancipatory in approach, because it expresses a discontent with the culture (Freud's *Unbehagen an der Kultur*), it nevertheless remains bound to biological presuppositions and does not reflect the social context in which masculinity and femininity are actually discussed.

III

More recent reflections on gender identity

In 1920, Freud wrote in reference to the analysis of homosexuals:

> Man muß sich sagen, daß auch die normale Sexualität auf einer Einsehränkung der Objektwaht beruht, und im allgemeinen ist das Unternehmen, einen voll entwickelten Homosexuellen in einen Heterosexuellen zu verwandeln, nicht viel aussichtsreicher als das Umgekehrte, nur daß man dies letztere aus guten praktischen Gründen niemals versucht. [One must remember that normal sexuality too depends upon a restriction in the choice of object. In general, to undertake to convert a fully developed homosexual into a heterosexual does not offer much more prospect of success than the reverse, except that for good practical reasons the latter is never attempted.]
>
> (Freud 1920:276)

As a result of the women's movement and more recent findings in the areas of sexology and sociology, a new interdisciplinary discussion about the concept of gender identity has developed since the middle of the 1960s. Since the beginning of this discussion at the latest—in the context of which we also need to consider the reception of Kinsey's investigations, which were published in 1948 and 1953, as well as the writings of Foucault and de Beauvoir—it was no longer possible to speak of 'self-evident' knowledge of what is 'masculine' and 'feminine'.

The current state of this discussion can be summarised as follows:

Gender identity is to be understood as a complex structure, which consists of four factors that interact with each other:

1 *Core gender identity* (Stoller 1968, 1985; Money and Ehrhardt 1996). This factor concerns the primordial, conscious and unconscious experience and knowledge with regard to one's biological sex (sex as opposed to gender). Beginning with birth, this knowledge develops through a combination of biological and psychological influences and is established as a relatively conflict-free certainty by the end of age 2. A wealth of experiences in the sen-sory-motor and psychosexual area thicken into a perception, inscribed in

the body, which is both unconscious and incapable of reflection. All of the parents' conscious—and to a large extent unconscious—expectations for their child have an effect on the formation of this core gender identity, including the mother's fantasies during pregnancy.

2 *Gender role identity* (Person and Ovesey 1993). This further component of gender identity is distinguished by its higher symbolic and linguistic level. It shapes the totality of expectations that an individual has for his or her own behaviour as well as that of the partner in terms of the respective sex. This part of the gender identity also comprises unreflected, unconscious facets; these at least possess, however, the ability to become conscious. Gender role identity is predominantly determined by cultural and social expectations. The contents that fill out this part of the identity vary greatly from individual to individual and are, as opposed to the core gender identity, subject to a lifelong process of change. The breadth and flexibility of an individual's gender role identity is determined by the breadth of the positive and negative identifications with both parents (Benjamin 1991).
3 *Sexual identity* (Cass 1984). With sexual identity, the issue involved is the individual's labelling of his or her own sexual orientation as heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual. This self-labelling begins after the latency period, but develops primarily during adolescence.
4 *Sexual object choice.* This refers, at the behavioural level, to the sort of partner one chooses with respect to the partner's biological sex.

If we take these internal structurings in the area of sexual and gender identity seriously, it becomes clear that a female-homosexual development does not have to be conflict-ridden; in other words, it is not necessarily pathological. (A woman could be certain of her biological sex, could see herself—and appear to others as expressing her own, distinctive femininity, while at the same time acknowledging conflict and optional changes, label herself as a lesbian and choose a female partner.)

Female homosexual developments that are conflictual—and thus perhaps also lead to therapy—could be caused primarily by the following:

1 Insecurity relating to core gender identity. (A frequent characteristic of borderline syndromes and psychoses.)
2 Pathological experience of unamibiguity and lack of conflict in the area of gender role identity (with the possible development of perversions or of perverse structural parts coupled with neurotic disorders) (Kaplan 1992; Springer 1996).
3 Insecurity about self-labelling with regards to sexual identity. (This helps to explain, among other things, the homophobic facets of homosexual women that can frequently be observed.)

4 Insecurity in the choice of object as an expression of an external and internal pressure to conform, the background of which can be a neurotic disorder. This is not, however, specific to homosexuality *per se*.

When I consider those of my female analysands who live as homosexuals, I find all variations of these described disorders represented among them. It can therefore be a legitimate objective of therapy to help a female analysand strive for a successful life as a homosexual. This is neither a resignation nor a result of an ideological fixation on the part of the analysand, the analyst, or both.

IV

If I apply these thoughts to Jung's case about the woman with the crab/cancer, the following picture results. With reference to core gender identity, the patient does not seem to have any serious problem. A physical feature of biologically determined masculinity is only attributed by the analyst here; he describes her feet in the text as masculinely large. According to Jung's text, in the area of sexual identity, the patient gained a certain degree of confidence in characterising herself as a homosexual woman during the course of the treatment. The patient also does not seem to seek fundamental change in terms of the biological sex of the love object. Her main problem obviously consists in a neurotic resolution of conflict in the area of gender role identity. According to my understanding, the patient, associating to the dream and in the transference, discovers a deadly disease-inducing, aggressively grasping and feeding part of her relationship to women. She places this part in the childlike relationship to her mother and in a relationship to a widowed friend, who later died, and her fascinating artist friend as a repetition of the mother- and parent-imago. I believe that one can clearly perceive in the case description that Jung—as a man and an analyst bound to his time, culture and the theory he had developed—is unable to analytically accompany the patient's search for a mother who is not idealised. Taking up this concern would mean making room in the analysis for the actual aggressive-destructive tendencies directed towards the mother (replayed in the partnership or in auto-aggression). The female analysand offers a divided mother transference; the male analyst identifies himself, however, with the fascinating and frighteningly demonic father. Thus, in all probability, the infantile drama of the patient repeats itself; the mother's love is not achieved through the splitting off of the aggressive-destructive parts, but is still longed for and sought after, and the father is not available for the patient's desire for identification. The objective of a homosexual partnership that is not *per se* pathological is inconceivable to the analyst, since, in principle, he proceeds from a masculine identification of the female patient, which he then believes he finds evidence of in the case material and in the transference as well. Here would also be the place to discuss how the shift to an archetypal understanding of the transference can possess the character of a defence against countertransference. Jung makes an important comment

about this problem when he writes: The recognition of the archetypes takes us a long step forwards. The magical or daemonic effect emanating from our neighbor disappears when the mysterious feeling is traced back to a definite entity in the collective unconscious' (Jung 1943, para. 155)

The case Jung describes about the female adolescent with homosexual fantasies can also be considered from the perspective of a divided mother-imago. In my opinion, the girl is not seeking 'misconceived' love from the female teacher, but rather love from her mother, which has been disturbed through murderous aggression and which is also of a sexual nature, As in the previous case, the father is also not available for identification here.

The possibility of such a perspective is also possible within the Jungian theoretical framework, however. In his work *The Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype,* Jung writes that 'Only in women is it possible to examine the effect of the mother archetype without admixture of animosity, and even this has prospects of success only when no compensating animus has been developed' (1938/1954: para 175).

V

Conclusions

1 A critical review of those texts of Jung in which he explicitly takes a position on female homosexuality reveals a temporally and culturally caused complex of prejudices. Jung believes that homosexuality is a pathology and that the homosexual woman has no connection to animus, but is, rather, identified with negative animus.
2 Anima and animus as constructs, whose respective integration is supposedly necessary for individuation, are too comprehensive in their establishment of a fundamental, reciprocal delimitation and consequent bipolarity. They are, in other words, too unspecific. In the definitions of these constructs, sex and gender are intermingled and the heterosexual couple has normative value in the inner and outer world. Even the assumption of possible homosexual couple formations in the interior world, as developed by Verena Kast, does not, in my opinion, solve this problem. Two footnotes in *The Psychology of the Transference,* which mention homosexuality, also reveal the massivity of Jung's prejudices. There he talks about the combination of equals, which supposedly remains infertile (Jung 1946: footnote to para 357 and footnote to para 419).
3 Normative evaluations, i.e. how men and women are supposed to be, enter the descriptive definitions of anima and animus in Jung's texts. This has been repeatedly discussed by male and female Jungians. I think it would be meaningful to abandon anima and animus as constructs, both in the sense of complexes, as suggested by Young-Eisendrath and Wiedemann as well as by

Baumgardt (Young-Eisenrath and Wiedemann 1987; Baumgardt 1994, esp. pp. 221–2), and in the sense of archetypal structures. At most we should consider a striving for comprehensive emotional, affective, sexual and spiritual intimacy and encounter as archetypal.

VI

Female Homosexuality in the Analytic Process

Conflict-ridden homosexual developments should not be considered in isolation, but rather within the overall context of the personality and its development, as Jung himself emphasises (Jung 1922). It is, however, necessary and particularly valuable in this regard to determine the substructure in the area of identity development that is particularly conflictual. It can arise that homosexuality serves, for example, as a defence against heterosexuality; this, however, should not be seen as the norm.

In my experience, for the work in the transference, it is especially important with female homosexual patients to work through the aggressive-sadistic impulses and fantasies that they direct towards their own bodies. These attacks on the female body are, almost as a rule, first assigned to the father/man in the context of an idealising, eroticising/sexualising transference. The female patient, in the attack on her own body and on that of the mother, is identified with him (connecting with actual offers of identification and real behaviour of the father). She is also seen as wanting to protect the mother and herself from him. Behind this, however, we find hate for the mother and self-hate in terms of an identification with a part of the mother, which prevents the love for the mother and the woman. It is very tempting for the female analyst who is not homosexual to evade this offer of negative transference, since she will be reminded of her own, very early and partly preverbal feelings of love and hate for her mother and of her own struggle to forge a sexual and social identity. I agree, however, with Eisenbud, in whose text I find evidence of my own practical experience with corresponding problems of analysis, when she writes:

> Men created the image of dread Lillith, the phallic, castrating woman, and the images of lesbian women still reflect this dread stereotype. The lesbian woman is often selectively perceived as revengeful, competitive with a male, possessive and sadistic with a woman victim. The analyst with a feminist outlook both refuses the classic reductionist understanding of lesbian choice as one of regression and fixation and also shuns any 'vilification' that might give aid and comfort to the bigot. Sometimes the liberal analyst, in order to deny any negative, turns to theories of moral exoneration. Difficulty in dealing with lesbian destructive hate or fear or

> insecurity creates a strong preference for elevating benign theories. This kind of protective analysis is especially defensive.
>
> (Eisenbud 1986:222)

She concludes her work about the transference problems in female homosexual patients with the words:

> Conflict between the primary investment in caring and a counteractive hate of injustice mobilizes creative solutions. For emancipation, the lesbian woman needs to be neither sadistic nor masochistic, but on the way she needs to confront the negative.
>
> (ibid.: 233)

Note

1 In German, the language in which the dream both occurred and was related, *Krebs,* can mean both crab and cancer. In order emphasise their connection, *Krebs* will hereafter be translated as crab/cancer. [Translator]

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Chapter 12
Contrasexuality and the dialectic of desire

Polly Young-Eisendrath

> The confrontation with alterity will not let us rest... until we have somehow come to terms with its assault on who we had been prior to being interrupted by it.
>
> (Ogden 1994:3)

The term 'alterity' comes primarily from the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan and his followers, and refers to what we Jungians might call the archetype of the Opposite or the Other (capitalised throughout to distinguish from the interpersonal other). It recognises the fundamental sense of otherness that developmentally precedes the notion of sexual otherness. Alterity manifests first in the distinction of self and other, that begins with the cell mass which grows from conception against a background of otherness, and eventually becomes the contained subjectivity of body-being. Alterity also refers to an irreducible otherness that lies outside the subject and is not predicated on projection or identification. This Otherness is awesome in an unimaginable way.

The archetype of the Other is originally experienced in the development of selfconsciousness—the experience of having or being a self 'in here' while something else exists 'out there'—and is signalled by the eruption of self-conscious emotions. These emotions, often called 'secondary' because they do not emerge until about the second half of the second year of life, are pride, shame, envy, guilt, jealousy and embarrassment. This development begins the process of self-protection and self-promotion that will continue syntonically and dystonically in our relating to others (who may become internal Others too) over time.

The first emotional Otherness that we encounter is embodied in parental Others, whom we fantasise and perceive as the king and the queen, the demons and giants and monsters and angels of our earliest years. (Cognitive Otherness proceeds through the development of categories of 'animal' and 'physical object' as distinguished from human being by 3 years of age.)

The next major developmental thrust of Otherness is the experience of difference from the opposite sex. The ability to name surface differences between the sexes can be found in children as young as 2 years, but the

categorical distinction between the sexes is not completed until the age of 6 or 7 when children understand the emotional logic of a divided world: two exclusive gender clubs. At this point, children tend to segregate into same-sex peer groups and to develop an identity with self-claimed gender.

This chapter examines the approach I take to understanding and intervening in problems of desire between the sexes. Mostly I speak here to the consequences of sex difference rather than similarity. Consequently I address primarily heterosexual desire, although some implications arise also for homosexual desire. Focusing on heterosexuality is an expedient way of pointing out the difficulties of desire between the sexes. Desire in homosexual couples—as I have seen in working with female and male couples in psychotherapy—has a different profile, one often with greater ease in intimacy (more common ground) and greater problems in differentiation.

This chapter lays out a synthesis of Jungian and object-relations theory to examine the contrapuntal play of assimilation and accommodation (to use the terms of developmentalist Jean Piaget) in forming and sustaining the gendered self and the gendered other. *Assimilation* means fitting new experiences into old schemata, and can be used interchangeably with projection where old emotional meanings are imposed on new experiences. *Accommodation* means changing old schemata to adapt to new experiences, and can be used interchangeably with differentiation. (As someone once said, human beings assimilate when they can and accommodate when they must.) The contrapuntal play of projection and differentiation is the dialectic of desire between the sexes. It is a rhythm of unconscious complex and conscious awareness, of paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, of the imaginary and the symbolic in reaching for self-completion through fantasies of Otherness.

My orientation toward desire and Otherness owes much to Jung, object relations, neo-Piagetian theories of gender conservation, feminism, Buddhism, gender studies and clinical work with couples and individuals over the past twenty years. This wide array of frameworks is still not adequate to the topic. There is a respectable mystery about Otherness—how it comes about and how it should be mediated —even after one has studied it from a variety of angles.

I consider myself to be of the 'developmental approach' (Samuels 1997) as a Jungian analyst, believing that individuation is a lifelong process of differentiation and integration, beginning in the womb. I am fascinated by the dilemmas that arise around self-consciousness—the 'I-ness' that we often refer to as 'ego' in sensing ourselves as separate from others. On the one hand, this capacity distinguishes us as theory-making, self-reflective beings and on the other hand, it puts us at strong risk of running amok with our competence and control needs, our unconscious desire to dominate the Otherness that sustains us.

As a psychoanalyst and psychologist, I work with patients individually in one to three meetings a week. Some people work on the couch, but the vast majority see me in a face-to-face encounter. Additionally I see couples in a form of psychotherapy originated by myself and my husband, Edward Epstein. It is

called dialogue therapy and draws on Jung, feminism, gender studies, object-relations theory, and psychodrama for its theory and methods (Young-Eisendrath 1984, 1993, 1997a, 1997b).

My clinical training and background are in both developmental psychology and social work, but my doctoral work is in psychology. As a psychologist I approach my analytic work with a respect for empirical studies. I have also done psychological research in ego development (e.g. Young-Eisendrath 1996) and resilience. In fact, I am at present completing a study on psychiatrically hospitalised adolescents. The study was designed to look for a profile of possible predictors of resilience in this group, and to measure that against the actual experience they had in hospital. I have been fascinated with the 'alchemy of suffering', turning lead into gold, and have directed many of my research efforts towards studying this poorly understood phenomenon. My therapeutic work with couples has opened my eyes to how much we create our own suffering through enacting destructive emotional dynamics that may have been adaptive in our original relationships of infancy and childhood, but are no longer.

Fundamentally I believe that psychoanalysis is a 'human science'—to be distinguished from 'natural science'—that stands to gain much from doing peopleoriented research that reaches beyond the consulting room. The human sciences use tools such as narrative records, participant observation, experience-sampling and others to investigate the nature of human subjectivity. Psychoanalysis is a study of human subjectivity in the context of refined subjective-objective interpretations or insight that take place in a 'private context'. Developing our own research methods and drawing on other human sciences (psychology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology, politics, history), we benefit in opening our framework of understanding, in bringing to our patients and ourselves a wider array of lenses through which to look at the multifaceted material we examine in our consulting rooms. With all this in mind, I want to discuss the topics of gender and contrasexuality.

Gender and contrasexuality

The universal division of the human community into two sexes, known through the signs and symbols of gender, has enduring psychological effects on us as individuals, couples and groups. We are all born into an ongoing drama, within a family and a community, about our own and the opposite sex, and we form strong internal images of femininity and masculinity. We identify with one of these genders and evolve an array of projections, fantasies and experiences with the other. Under these conditions, most of us develop a self-concept that is gendered and an internal Other or Opposite that tends to cluster into a psychological complex, having the core of the archetype of Other, alterity. Fusing the complexity of sex, gender and alterity, the complex of the Other of the opposite sex—one's own *contrasexuality* in Jungian terms—is a multilayered mix of experience, fantasy, longing, envy and hatred.

Gender is a central organiser of our interpersonal connections. It carries so much meaning that we feel compelled to get it established quickly, both at the birth of a child and in an encounter with a stranger. 'What is this person's sex?' is a question that opens the way to fantasy, symbol and speech. If we cannot clarify gender quickly, we feel anxiety, frustration, sometimes even rage (as is evidenced in some social reactions to 'cross-gendered' people who do not let their gender be clearly known). How can I address this person unless I am sure about the category that will determine so much of what I expect and perceive? is more a demand than question.

I start from the premise that sex and gender are two different categories of meaning, although gender is predicated on sex. Sex, in the sense of 'sex differences', refers to the hormonal, structural and functional properties of the body that express its male or female nature and functions. Gender is the category of meaning that arises from being assigned a male or female identity, based on body characteristics. Our bodies are read by the elders at (or now sometimes before) birth and we are assigned to one of two exclusive groups. The division into two exclusive genders makes this difference so universally important to human development, in my view.

As you might imagine, there are many conscious and unconscious consequences of this division into opposites. These consequences have not been adequately addressed in depth psychology because sex differences have largely been tied to essentialist or biological assumptions that men and women are 'born that way'. Believing that the array of Otherness associated with the opposite sex can be reduced to biology or evolution has robbed us of the nuance and mystery that are so clearly associated with contrasexuality and desire. Because alterity and the desire for completion (or wholeness) are so central to our fantasies and feelings about gender and sex differences, we are poorly served by formulas of what this or that sex envies and desires.

Since most theories of depth psychology have been androcentric (taking male people to be the standard for health and success, see e.g. Young-Eisendrath and Wiedemann 1987; Tavris 1992), most psychoanalytic theories have described female people in terms of their deficits—lack of penis, power, intellect, moral fibre, cultural strivings—and have assumed that they are therefore 'naturally' depressed, narcissistic, envious or enraged. Although there have been exceptions to this trend (especially among the contemporary feminists who see envy belonging to both sexes and/or may see women having the 'superior' position in regard to developmental potentials), most psychodynamic theorising of gender has been flawed by reducing differences to stereotypes and describing the male person as the norm.

Jung's psychology is, in some ways, an exception to this. Jung calls our attention to one important theme that is often overlooked in other theories: the opposite sex as a projection-making factor. He asks us to trace the shadow of Otherness back to its owner. Yet, his theory *is* rooted in assumptions of biological essentialism: that contrasexuality develops from genetic, hormonal

and morphological traces of the opposite sex in each individual into a sub-personality of Otherness.

This Otherness then has a life of its own, sometimes dissociated, almost always projected—into the opposite sex, the same sex, taboos, fetishes, even cultural institutions (such as church or school). This Otherness functions as a strong defence against anxiety and conflict about one's own gender, and may take on extensive and powerful meanings of alterity. Inevitably our contrasexual personality will express itself in fantasies and actions of dominance and submission because we respond to the background of Otherness by wanting to bring it into our possession and under our control.

Jung's theory of contrasexuality was cursed or blessed, depending on your perspective, with the Latin names of *anima* (for male contrasexuality) and *animus* (for the female counterpart). Typically, Jung described anima and animus as archetypes, not complexes (e.g. Jung 1959). Although he was not always consistent about it, he generally described anima and animus as biological consequences of the archetypal feminine and masculine, as having the content that was universally an expression of categorical difference between the sexes. He accepted the nineteenthcentury version of these differences that depicted a major split between culture (masculine) and nature (feminine).

The anima was usually described in terms of idealised femininity: as enlivening, inspiring, life-giving, exciting. Or it was described in terms of its emotional vulnerabilities: moodiness, pouting, hysteria, bitchiness. When the female animus was described by Jung, it was less idealised than the anima, and frequently sounded like a badly flawed masculinity: opinionated, demanding, bossy, full of poorly differentiated ideas. The strength of the animus—that it was to be a bridge to spiritual life and wholeness for woman—was often overshadowed by its weaknesses.

The essentialist theorising of anima and animus had all the problems of sexual stereotyping: it reduced the two sexes and their contrasexuality to predictable formulas, based on a play of desire. This version of anima and animus rests on a complimentary division between the sexes, which may reduce (or even eliminate) the psychological usefulness of a theory of contrasexuality—that which we find lacking in ourselves, but appears to us in the opposite sex, in our partners, lovers or strangers. As Juliet Mitchell says in her introduction to Jacqueline Rose's English translation of Lacan 's *Feminine Sexuality,* 'Sexuality belongs in this area of instability played out in the register of demand and desire, each sex coming to stand …for that which could satisfy and complete the other' (Mitchell and Rose 1982:33).

Reducing Otherness to formulas of complementary differences and social complaints (about the others) eradicates our curiosity about, and interest in, discovering our own or another's contrasexuality—those unknown aspects of the personality.

In my theorising of contrasexuality, I have gradually come to refrain from using the Latin terms because I believe they continue to hark back to an

essentialist theory of sex differences, a theory rooted in stereotypes and destined to be abused and abusive in practice. Instead I find it most useful to call Jung's theory of Otherness a theory about our' complexes of contrasexuality.' I find this approach to be extremely useful in psychotherapy with couples and in analysing transference in individual psychotherapy.

Nonessentialist contrasexuality

Feminist studies and interpretations of gender and sex differences have guided my thinking about contrasexuality in the clinical domain. From all available evidence, it appears that no long-standing personality traits—such as initiativetaking, dependence, intelligence or aggression—are consistent differences between the sexes over the lifespan (see e.g. Maccoby 1990; Unger 1989). Instead, it appears that gender differences are culturally assigned roles, identities and categories that permit societies to assign women and men different potentials and tasks. We have also discovered, from some of the same studies, that when people of the opposite sex are in direct relationship, they will think and act in accord with some of the stereotyped beliefs that they have been socialised to hold about the two sexes, although they tend not to be limited by those habits when they are in same-sex groups.

Those studies which appear to demonstrate biological sex differences that determine gender meanings—for example, the supposedly greater capacity of girls and women to be relational or empathic—always start from the premise that sex differences exist in personality and social functioning. Biological investigations of brain chemistry and structure, for instance, have begun with the assumption that predictable differences can be explained; they do not begin with the question of whether or not expectable differences exist between the sexes. Through the influences of feminism and gender studies over the past twenty-five years or so, we have finally been able to open the question 'Are there lasting differences between the sexes?' and the answer seems to be 'No'. Gender varies from context to context, both between groups and within individuals over time.

My practice of analytical psychology has been strengthened in recognising both the flexibility of gender, and the universal consequences of the division of genders. I agree with Freudian colleague Schafer (1992:76) who has written on gender issues in psychoanalytic theory,

> logically, there is no right answer to the questions of what is masculine and what is feminine and what is active and what is passive. There are no preconceptual facts to be discovered and arrayed, There are only loose conventions governing the uses and groups of the words in question.

Rather than assign preconceived categories to female and male people and their contrasexuality, I prefer to discover the meaning people bring to psychotherapy. How, for instance, does a young American man of Iranian descent view his

masculinity in comparison to a mid-life Amer-Asian man? I have seen great contrast, for example, between the masculine identity of a mid-life American man from Puerto Rico and his counterpart in age and class who is American and Jewish. Similarly, should I judge the flamboyant dress of a male drag queen as 'feminine' because it espouses 'femininity', or 'masculine' because it has been invented and promoted by men? How would a 19-year-old lesbian college student respond to the question 'What is feminine in your identity?' versus a middle-aged woman returning to college after rearing four children?

Obviously I do not ignore the broad cultural categories of gender—especially those particular to age cohorts—but I want to stay interested in the fluidity and ambiguity of gender as well. In terms of age cohorts, often body image meanings (slenderness, muscularity, etc.) will be determined by one's age cohort gender requirements more than by other individual or family influences. For example, women in their forties (my generation) tend to be preoccupied with slenderness in a way that reflects the influences of Twiggie and Jane Fonda on body image whereas younger and older woman are not. Adolescent and young adult women have different body-image possibilities from older women of all ages. Marking the body with rings and tattoos, and gaining weight (in certain places such as the stomach), may be chic in the younger group. Even though I use some conventional categories to map a person's gender and Otherness, I stay open to hearing news, and regard gender as very much influenced by context, in the moment and over time.

Some people, often young men in my experience, long for the clarity of gender differences that they imagine existed in the past (in the 1950s, for instance). They would like to 'return' to a time when it was clear what it meant to be a man and what it meant to be a woman. Instead of assuming that there was a time when this was clear (which I don't believe because earlier definitions of gender were predicated on male norms and female Otherness as the unknown and often unnamed), I want to look more deeply into the confusion they feel. Often the problem is that the man feels that he's too 'wimpy' or lacks some trait or body part that would really *confirm* that he is masculine. Perhaps he identified more with the mother while growing up. I raise the question to him of what masculinity is, what it means. Eventually he discovers that whatever his identity is, he arrived at it through being male, and so it is marked by his own subjectivity, struggles and ideals.

When I allow people to explore the meaning of self-identified gender, I can also see what is left out, what is Other and projected on to the opposite sex. (Here I will not get into homosexual contrasexuality which can project Other on the same sex, as when the homosexual man sees the heterosexual man as Other.) For instance, a middle-aged Puerto Rican-American man, in dialogue therapy, tells us his 'requirements' to sustain his male identity: he has to have a big car, certain jewellery, certain clothes and a tough attitude. He desires the complement in his wife: frilly lingerie, expensive jewellery, make-up. He cannot bear to let her direct her own appearance because she dresses in sporty clothes, wears little

or no make-up and hates fancy jewellery. Her appearance is of constant distress to him.

In effect he tells us that he cannot imagine his contrasexuality in any other way because his conscious gender identity depends on being 'macho'. His desire is constrained by the counterpart of a 'feminine' image which he projects and tries to control in his wife. This couple eventually divorced, in large measure due to the rigidity of the husband's conscious and unconscious gendered personalities.

As the conscious personality develops from its earliest images, fantasies and experiences of gender, body and self, alongside develops a complementary Otherness —a sub-personality of images, fantasies, experiences at the core of which is the archetype of Otherness. If I identify myself, for example, as being compliant and accommodating, I will tend not to see myself as aggressive and demanding. If I conceive of these latter qualities as 'opposite' of me and believe that they are in the character of the opposite sex, they will become elaborated in fears and fantasies of my own contrasexuality.

Contrasexuality becomes our 'strange gender' and it takes on specific meanings in childhood when we come to realise that the two sexes are grouped in mutually exclusive ways—and that we can be in only *one* of those groups. The others become strangers, and we look in at them from the perspective of outsiders. We desire and fear them in large part because they are coloured by alterity, by the sense that they are fundamentally different and part of the background to us.

Although children begin to think in gender categories almost as soon as they can identify an embodied self, at around eighteen months to 2 years, they do not understand the permanence and exclusivity of gender until much later. Very young children easily refer to known characteristics such as boys having penises and short hair and girls not having penises and wearing dresses, but they do not grasp the power of this difference until they can understand that it will last a lifetime.

Quite a few 3-, 4- or 5-year-olds will change their names, hairstyles, dress styles and play in order to try to change into the opposite sex. Only with the mental maturity of 'practical thought operations' (Piaget's term) at age 6 or 7 are children capable of 'gender conservation'. I will be a girl *forever;* you will be a boy *forever*. No matter what clothes I wear, how I cut my hair, what I call myself, I am stuck here forever, limited by my embodiment and this identity (see Kohlberg 1966; Ruble 1983 for more details).

Otherness drives us, with fantasies of dominating or submitting to, of overpowering or incorporating, of desiring or becoming free of the opposite sex. Of course this stuff of our contrasexual complex is also coloured by earlier emotional adaptations, by our parental and sibling complexes, by our conscious experiences and trauma. But the force of contrasexuality is unique: it is that which is human, but not-I. In the shadows of contrasexuality loom the archaic

and primitive themes of Otherness —energised by the self-conscious emotions of pride, shame, guilt, embarrassment and envy.

By the time we reach adolescence, our contrasexuality has been coloured by ideals and fears, by shame and envy, by all forms of alterity, but generally by little actual knowledge of our opposite-sex peers, our 'equals'. In our own peer groups, from media and our families, we have learned a mix of gossip, allusion, illusion and story. By the time I was 15, I had experienced little face-to-face acquaintance with male peers (except for some prelatency play with a cousin), but I had powerful images of my ideal lover and his opposite, the negative male.

Getting acquainted with potential mates and learning about our opposite sex peers is fired by and burdened with our contrasexual projections, infused with the lust of adolescent hormones. It's a wonder that any marriages survive! As feminist writer Mairs (1993:122) has put it,

> When I think of how poorly couples are prepared for this undertaking [commitment to each other in marriage], I'm astonished that only one marriage out of two fails. People who wouldn't dream of permitting a child to set off into the wilderness without providing maps and charts, a compass, a Swiss army knife, raingear…send the same child into marriage with the equivalent of a new pair of tennis shoes and maybe a handful of bandaids.

Even in the contemporary world with its greater gender flexibility, we are still driven by contrasexual fears and desires. They are the product of dividing the human community into opposites: the others are destined to be our major Others from the start Although some constraints of gender limitation are biological (i.e. our embodiment) and others are social (i.e. roles), my concern is with the psychological meanings of these constraints in the dialectic of desire.

Melanie Klein's (1975) contribution to understanding jealousy and envy is critical to a knowledge of the dialectic of desire between the sexes. In her framework, *envy* is a form of hatred—a desire to destroy the resources of another because one feels that one cannot possess them for oneself. *Jealousy,* on the other hand, is the desire to possess what another has. In jealousy one feels capable of the possibility of attaining what the other has, but in envy one does not. Where envy leads to attack and emptying out, jealousy leads to competition and initiative-taking. Nothing new can develop from envy, but something new can develop from jealousy.

Chronic envy in a couple relationship will eventually deaden intimate (and often sexual) desire because the other is so belittled and emptied out of resources that one feels only pity or disparagement. Chronic jealousy, while it can be exhausting, may also be enlivening as partners compete for resources and feel each other to be 'worthy opponents'.

The flip side of envy is, of course, idealisation. During the romance—the time when partners believe they will be 'completed' and 'made whole' by the other

idealisation often covers the actual flaws in a partner. The other is seen as full of potentials and qualities and supplies that one wants for oneself. Biological differences can be idealised—size of penis or breast, capacity for upper body strength or childbearing—and then envied during the disillusionment.

Idealisation also plays out in the arena of gender. Women tend to envy what they regard as the greater earning potential and career freedom of men, whereas men envy what they regard as the lesser responsibilities and greater opportunities for close relationships of women. What happens after the romance has ended? Women disparage men's earnings as 'unimportant in comparison with relational intimacy' and men belittle women for 'making so little money and spending all your time on the telephone'.

Envy, jealousy and the desire to defeat are strongly motivating emotions in most people's contrasexual complexes. They are in conflict with love, empathy, and the desire to sustain one's partner and relationship. When people come for dialogue therapy they often complain of a dead relationship—one that has little vitality in sex, intimacy, work, leisure and/or parenting together.

In the move from romance to disillusionment—a natural outgrowth of romance for any couple—the partners' contrasexuality has been projected in a negative manner. Over time, chronic projective identification may come to cripple any free, spontaneous dialogue and sexual communication. Each partner is being held hostage to the other's fears and fantasies of dominance or abandonment by the Other, and each one is playing out enough of the other's intrapsychic fantasies to be suitable for the assigned projection.

Jane and Bob

In the following composite sketch of such a dead marriage, I try to show how the projective identification of contrasexuality oppresses freedom of contact and expression between partners. After mapping out the parts played by Jane and Bob in their desireless marriage, I will describe briefly how one could work with them in therapy to restore vitality. They present an omnipresent pathology of desire: lack of self-determination.

In their late thirties with two elementary-school age children, Jane and Bob sought psychotherapy because their sex life had 'no spark', had all but disappeared. Jane says that she does not desire sex. She says she is 'willing' under some circumstances to do it, and often enjoys it when she does, but that she has no independent motivation for it. She relates her lack to Bob's 'inability to be intimate. He treats me like an object, a piece of furniture,' she says. She is 'angry' and 'will never again pretend to want sex when I don't—or to give into his desires when I don't feel any of my own.' Jane feels good about this decision and believes she has 'taken control' of her body and does not want to give up this control unless Bob changes. She feels that sex was 'about satisfying his needs'.

Bob sees things differently. He says he feels and has always felt 'rejected' by his wife's lack of sexual desire. He believes that he would become

uncontrollably angry and attack Jane if he were to become close and affectionate (as he believes she wants him to be, and as they both agree he was during the courtship), and then be rejected in sex. In order to cope with the fierce conflict between his fear of attacking Jane and his actual affection for her, he decided 'some years ago to become more aloof and muted and distant to protect myself from becoming emotionally vulnerable to her'. Bob says he 'isn't happy with this solution', but it's the best he can do in order to treat Jane with respect. Bob says that he is pained by her not wanting him. He believes that she doesn't really love him if she does not want him sexually.

Jane's contrasexuality was shaped in part by her idealisation of a father whom she saw as 'strong and sensitive and protective'—without any vulnerability or weakness—but who was rarely available for actual contact with his children. Bob's contrasexuality was influenced by a depressed, somewhat narcissitically wounded mother who 'stayed at home to devote herself to her children' and always implied it had been a huge sacrifice. Bob would try to protect his mother from pain and to make few claims on her time and energy.

Alongside these parental complexes, which had fused in part with contrasexuality, were other themes that depict the issues of Otherness in a way that resonates for many of us. Jane first learned how to feel sexy by looking sexy, by being wanted, by being the object of desire. In her late adolescent and young adult years, she saw herself as 'potentially attractive' to the opposite sex, with 'enough basic material to make more'. She 'worked on' her self-image with advice from women's magazines and her friends, and she felt 'really good' when she had on the right clothes and make-up and someone—especially a man—would light up with interest in her. This attention made her feel 'alive and sexually aroused'. It brought her pleasure.

But Jane never learned how to have reliable sexual pleasure. Instead of learning and practising orgasm, she did what 'nice girls did' which was to neck without having intercourse, or perhaps having occasional clumsy intercourse. She never felt that sexual arousal was under her control; it just seemed 'to happen when I looked good enough to feel good'. If someone got excited by her —even a stranger —she might be able to get excited too. Jane didn't worry about this state of affairs because it 'seemed normal' among her 'girlfriends'.

Jane never felt she was having sex for herself because she had no clear sexual desire. Because desire emanates from lack, one has to experience pleasure or gratification in order to feel desire. Jane never 'had' sexual pleasure during intercourse or other sex encounters (apart from masturbation which she took up only reluctantly when she reached her late twenties). Intercourse with Bob had often seemed 'boring' although she liked the cuddling and foreplay. She had tried to get Bob to bring her to orgasm through masturbation, but 'it took too long; his arm almost fell off', and Jane just ended up feeling more inadequate and self-conscious. Jane envied Bob's sexual desire and did not feel she could have it for herself.

Additionally, Jane no longer believes that she is attractive enough to be sexy. She says that she 'couldn't really attract a man' because her thighs are too heavy, she has sagging wrinkles around her mouth and her hair has thinned. Her contrasexual projection into Bob is of a negative, rejecting subject of desire, an agent or actor who finds her unattractive and stays away in emotional retreat. Even when she reluctantly 'gives in to his sexual needs', she feels that he is focused only on his own pleasure which never seems open to her. He is the Other who has all the sexual resources and excitement and does not share them with her.

Bob, of course, seems to play out Jane's contrasexuality in his decision not to be close emotionally and not to ask for much attention or affection. Bob makes few claims on Jane for sexual or sensual contact. In his inner drama, though, Bob plays a different role from the one in which Jane has cast him. His contrasexual complex is of a partner who has openly rejected his body and his warmth. Jane, though an intelligent and discerning person, has claimed that she has no sexual interest, which he believes is a lie. Instead, Bob thinks he is the 'wrong man for Jane' who deserves someone who could excite her. Although he tries in every way to please her, through doing lots of household chores and more than his share of childcare, he finds it difficult to be open and vulnerable with her because he is certain that she 'would prefer a different partner'. Bob's contrasexual projection is of a woman whom he cannot satisfy, a woman whom he cannot deeply reach.

Bob has believed that Jane's lack of sexual desire is fundamentally his 'fault'. He cannot believe that she is 'so passive as not to learn about her own sexual pleasure' and he cannot understand what Jane means when she says she feels physically unattractive, because he finds her enormously attractive.

Neither partner budges in this sexual standstill. It is as though someone has turned off the key to self-determination and both Jane and Bob are waiting for someone else to come along and turn it on again.

From deadness to desire

As I said, desire depends on recognising a lack or the absence of a presence. The presence is generally identified with something or someone that has supplied resources of pleasure, meaning or satisfaction. For desire to be felt in ongoing couple relationships *after* the romance has ended, the psychic space must be relatively clear of chronic projective identification. The projective identifications of disillusionment will tend to be repetitions of negative parental complexes, of dominance—submission patterns of power struggle, of envy and fear.

In the case of Bob and Jane, Bob obviously experiences Jane—through his contrasexual complex—as a woman whom he cannot reach. Her emotional needs are either too much for him or they are never satisfied by him. In the presence of this fantasy about Jane, Bob feels emptied of resources, defeated and unable to be her partner. All he can do is 'carry out her orders' and do the childcare and

housework and other routine tasks that Jane 'requires'. Jane, on the other hand, perceives Bob through the lens of the rejecting subject of desire. He has all of the desire and he cannot be attracted to her because of her physical flaws, her lack of attractiveness. The fact that Bob doesn't cuddle, reach out to her, show her his emotional needs, etc. is used by Jane to fuel the notion that she is unattractive and fundamentally unlovable. In this way, Jane identifies with her depressed, negative mother complex that feels inferior and unworthy—almost empty in relation to the father who is filled with the exciting resources of the idealised object. The more that Bob and Jane invest these disclaimed contrasexual images with the power of alterity, the mystery of unknown Otherness, the more they will feel overwhelmed and held hostage by a locked-in system of projective identification.

In an effective couple psychotherapy, they must learn to awaken vitality and desire by opening up the psychic space between them and allow what Jung called the 'transcendent function'. In my view this function is identical with what Winnicott named the 'potential space' or the 'play space'. It is an attitude of mind in which unconscious meanings can be known without being overwhelmingly destructive or threatening, in which meanings can be 'played with'. The transcendent function is the capacity to hold open and examine possible different meanings and experiences, without allowing the tension of conflict or impulse to send one into one or another 'gut reaction'. Because our gut reactions can easily be mixed with the primitive emotions of psychological complexes, they cannot be trusted to guide us to the truth regarding our partners (or anyone else, for that matter).

In dialogue therapy, the co-therapists work with the couple to help them recognise the images and fantasies that are aroused in projections of contrasexuality, and then to claim these as one's own subjective life. This is a gradual process of recognising the fears, envy, idealisations that are one's Otherness externalised—the Otherness one tries to control in a partner. A couple engaged in a projective identification during a therapy session can discover a living knowledge of the dynamics of contrasexuality in a single session. This kind of insight begins to free the partners to engage in the transcendent function of holding tensions in the moment, of showing respect for a partner, and discovering the psychological origin of an impulse or feeling or image. This leads to the conscious commitment to refrain from discharging primitive rage, aggression and other destructive impulses at each other. Partners begin to feel the ease and freedom of expression in a 'safe' couple relationship.

To initiate or restore pleasure and play and emotional intimacy—all lending themselves to a satisfying sensual and sexual life—partners discover that they need to commit themselves to the following:

1 ask questions of each other rather than make assumptions about what the other is feeling or thinking (even after years of cohabiting)

2 paraphrase and listen carefully to be sure one understands what the other is saying before responding
3 never use attacking or knee-jerk reactions during emotional conflict (although one may make mistakes here, the idea is to commit oneself to conscious awareness)
4 take the responsibility for maintaining a 'play space' or 'sacred space' as the ground of a healthy relationship in which both partners can grow and develop as individuals, protecting this space from primitive enactments of early dominance-submission patterns.

When these steps have been taken by a couple like Bob and Jane, they can then begin to talk about engaging in sensual pleasures together. In Jane's case she would have to discover what brings her pleasure in active involvement with Bob; and in Bob's case he would have to discover that he is 'man enough' for Jane, capable of being a fully engaged partner. In this process, both individuals must awaken to the tone and style and meanings of their own contrasexuality. These meanings are mostly, and primarily, aspects of their individual intrapsychic lives, frozen over time. Once contrasexuality has been integrated and understood, the images tend to change and develop. It appears that contrasexuality (like the conscious gendered self) both develops and regresses, depending on context, in the healthy personality. It is stuck, rigid and repetitive when it is projected and/or otherwise strongly split off and defended against.

As we develop the capacity to hold the transcendent function in the face of impulses to project and control our contrasexuality in a limited way, it seems that we also develop more fluid gender, both conscious and unconscious. This fluidity leads neither to confusions about body image nor problems in sexual orientation. It is rather a greater capacity to appreciate ambiguity, paradox and the dialogue with Otherness in ourselves and others.

In terms of the dialectic of desire, the openness to authentic dialogue with others, and an on-going awareness of our own motives, will lead to a process of discovery over a lifetime in the realm of contrasexuality. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the mystery of Otherness is vast and infinitely fascinating. Alterity is the background on which we depend.

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Part VII

Academe

Chapter 13
Twisting and turning with James Hillman
From anima to world soul, from academia to pop

David Tacey

James Hillman is a complex figure in the post-Jungian world, and there are many facets to his prodigious output (twenty-four books, including co-authored and edited volumes) and his writing career spanning four decades. My intention here is to provide a brief outline of his career, and to critically explore some of the twists, turns and reversals of his thought. Hillman's career combines intellectual brilliance, subtlety and elusiveness, tricksterism, self-contradiction, and moments of silliness where he outwits himself. But above all, Hillman presents an image of an 'inspired' thinker who must be taken seriously precisely because what drives him is of genuine archetypal significance. Hillman dramatically polarises his audience, so that there are those who greatly admire him and champion his cause, and those who vehemently oppose his voice. As I will argue, his work is primarily governed by two archetypal styles: a 'Hermes' pattern that insists on fluidity, openness and complexity, and an 'anima' emotionality that produces high-flown rhetoric, extremism and dramatic reversals.

I have been asked to briefly introduce myself. I am an academic at La Trobe University in Melbourne, who was trained as a literary scholar at the University of Adelaide in the 1970s. I experienced a second 'training' or re-education as a psychologist of culture at the hands of James Hillman in Dallas, Texas, in the 1980s. At La Trobe, I am currently Head of Psychoanalytic Studies, which is a new academic field brought into existence by the virtual banning of psychodynamic theories from the narrowly circumscribed academic discipline of psychology. Since Freud, Jung and their descendants are not taught in psychology, a new area has emerged, often with connections to clinical training institutes, to accommodate the considerable student and professional demand for depth psychology. It is within this context that my own engagement with Jungian and post-Jungian work arises.

Four incarnations of James Hillman

I would suggest that James Hillman has experienced at least four separate intellectual incarnations. First (from the late 1950s to late 1960s), he was a conventional but immensely articulate and forceful Jungian analyst, whose

works of this period showed his capacity for originality within the limits of classical Jungian theory (Hillman 1960, 1964, 1967, 1971). Even at this early stage, his desire to 'go beyond' the Swiss-German master was evident. Second (from the early 1970s to early 1980s), Hillman emerged as the leading spokesperson and polemicist of a self-consciously styled 'post-Jungian' movement known as 'archetypal psychology' (Hillman 1972, 1975a, 1975b, 1979, 1983a, 1983b). This movement operated partly within the context of the contemporary American university, and involved the revisioning of Jungian thought to fit in with the tastes and fashions of postmodern intellectual tradition. Third (from the early 1980s), Hillman appeared to drop much of the intellectual sophistication of archetypal psychology in favour of a new 'ecopsychological' discourse concerned with the 'soul of the world', a Neoplatonic idea to be reworked in psychological ways (Hillman 1982, 1983c, 1985, 1992a, 1995a; Hillman and Ventura 1993). This ecological discourse vigorously attacked the 'inward' and intrapsychic focus of all forms of psychotherapy, including those based upon archetypal psychology itself.

Finally (from the early 1990s), Hillman has emerged as a popular writer with flair but with little concern for the scholarly integrity or depth of argument that he once so passionately displayed (Hillman 1995b, 1996). He still holds the same 'ecological' perspective, but his eagerness for commercial success, together with his desire to become widely recognised, has led to a new stage as a 'pop ecopsychologist'. Embarrassing to some of us is the astonishing political naïvety with which Hillman purportedly 'tackles' the big social issues of the day, including power politics, authority and gender. He claims to have entered the 'real' world, but his discourse is still so saturated with myth and devoid of social-political conscience that one cannot help feeling that he has simply extraverted his mythic sense, rather than fully engaged the fabric of social relations.

Nevertheless, each of the four stages of his writing career has a central focus related to his changing professional environment: first, the clinic and the Zurich training institute; second, the American university and contemporary intellectual tradition; third (coinciding conveniently with his retirement from clinical practice), the 'real world' beyond clinic and academy; and finally, the general public, the popular men's movement, the New Age, TV-talk, the international lecture and media circuit, and bestseller book lists.

From an academic perspective, this represents a 'downhill' career, one which appears to be sliding into the morass of popularism and commerciality. The academic nose (my own included) is offended by the smell of fast money, the push for fame and fortune, and the apparent vulgarity of popular success. However, Hillman may simply be enacting the compulsions of his daimon, which may be viewed in terms of the mythical figure of Hermes. Hermes is not afraid of rapid movement across fixed boundaries, self-creation and illusion-making, dramatic reversals of direction, market-place trading, and the wide commercial world. It is perhaps only the Apollo in us that finds aspects of this world 'vulgar', distasteful, offensive. Hermes is destined to offend the

Apollonian stance, and yet in return for his indignities, Hermes awards Apollo the lyre which will bring a universe of lyricism, poetry and rhythm into the psychic domain of this solar and upright God. This is virtually a summation of my own response to Hillman: I have found him outrageous, wild, offensive, but he has brought the gift of lyricism and poetry, and for this gift I am personally grateful.

Those few who have wished to 'follow' Hillman have found him to be an exhausting role model, a leader who resists being followed, who always changes his tack, so that his disciples fail to recognise where he has gone and what he has become. The things he had previously despised (for instance, politics and the economy, or, in another context, metaphysical categories) can suddenly become the cornerstone of his new work, and a passionately held precept in one book can completely disappear from view a year later. He is all and none of his various incarnations, and a new mask or pose may already be in the making, although he is now of advanced years and his mercurial pace may be slowing down.

The rise and fall of Hillman's 'anti-essentialist' academic incarnation

In the mid-1970s I was impressed by Hillman's creative and sinuous writing, his command of literary style and argument, and his grasp of philosophical scholarship. In particular, I was refreshed by Hillman's capacity to turn conventional understandings on their head and to reverse standard truths. His was an enquiring, vigorous and penetrating mind, and it was clear that if he was not already inside the precincts of academia, he was heading in that direction. As I later discovered, during this period he was taking leave of the Jung Institute in Zurich and returning to his native America, where he held teaching positions at Syracuse, Yale, Chicago and Dallas. The fact that Hillman had left Zurich in controversial circumstances, and that he had been involved in various alleged ethical misdemeanours, undoubtedly added urgency to his search for a new professional context. Hillman, I felt, could breathe new life into our field, since too much of the Jungian literature was 'in-house' and self-referential, that it failed to address readers who had not already been 'converted' to Jung, and that it showed precious little engagement with, or even awareness of, contemporary intellectual tradition. Perhaps Hillman, I wondered and hoped, would carry Jung's work beyond the small circle of initiates and clinical training institutes into the intellectual mainstream of our culture. He certainly had the capacity to be the message-bearer of the archetypal vision to the intellectual world, but as he carried the message across various borders and boundaries he also strove to change it.

I often get the impression that the Jungian world had chosen to ignore Hillman, though this could appear to some as an exaggeration. True, Joseph Henderson in San Francisco regularly reviewed Hillman's works, and London analyst Andrew Samuels seriously engaged Hillman's 'archetypal psychology' school in his

comprehensive and influential text, *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (Samuels 1985). There was also a puzzling essay from New York analyst Walter Odajnyk, in which Hillman is constructed as a 'failed artist' (Odajnyk 1984). But it often appears that the Jungian tradition as a whole turns a blind eye to Hillman and carries on as if his writings—and his frequent challenges to basic Jungian positions—do not exist. Is this because Hillman destroys the Jungian ghetto that other Jungians want to cherish? Or perhaps the silence derives from envy, spite or contempt for the man who has constructed himself as the *enfant terrible* of the post-Jungian world? Perhaps a more obvious reason for the resounding silence is that Hillman's passions are more philosophical than clinical. In his writings, Hillman wrestles with ideas and theories, not with clients or 'cases', and his insights, as powerful and revealing as they are, give the clinical analyst little or nothing to work with. The clinical analyst with a focus on praxis and with little time to devote to abstract thought would undoubtedly find Hillman an acquired taste.

Ironically, although Hillman claims he is speaking on behalf of 'soul', many Jungians believe there is no soul at all in his work, if by 'soul' we mean something to do with the experienced and embodied reality of psychic life. There appears to be alarm that the work of the soul has been 'taken prisoner' by the intellect, and Hillman has suffered enormously from this negative assessment of his research, which is sometimes dismissed as a 'head trip'. Reacting against his intellectual isolation within the Jungian world, Hillman rudely declared that 'Jungians are not interested in ideas' (Hillman 1983c: 35). This sort of attack certainly did not improve his status; much less so his announcement that Jungians are 'second rate people with third rate minds' (ibid.: 36). There is some evidence to suggest that Hillman has been the victim of an anti-intellectual current in the Jungian world, although I am not inclined to press this charge too strongly, because Hillman does present an intensely abstract and 'disembodied' version of intellectuality, a version perhaps rightly criticised by those whose job it is to bring psyche and physis, mind and body, together in clients and patients.

Hillman may also have been neglected as a result of his hyperbolic, showy and adversarial style, rather than because of what he says. His Joycean love of language, word tricks and multi-layered significations may be extremely off-putting to those who do not have an appreciation of the modernist style. It is worth realising that one of Hillman's postgraduate degrees was on James Joyce and literary modernity. Hillman sometimes plays word games at the reader's expense, and this can appear arrogant or irritating to those who like to have their psychological messages 'straight' and uncomplicated. Jung was an original thinker, but he certainly was not a gifted stylist, and the followers of Jung may not be prepared to appreciate the literary subtleties and sophistries of James Hillman. In this sense, as Hillman himself has said (Hillman 1983c: 48–74), he has more in common with the Freudian tradition, with its complicated hermeneutical strategies and its fascination for the complexities and textures of language. When in full flight, Hillman's anima or inspiratrice is also inclined to

boastful assertions, exaggerations and self-praise, and while literary people like myself can forgive this indulgence, and recognise it as part of the grandiosity that often attaches to high-level creativity, I feel that analysts and clinicians who are trained to dislike inflation and to counter any signs of hubris may not be so accepting. In a word, Hillman simply rubs many Jungians the wrong way.

As Hillman felt rejected by the very tradition that had given birth to his wisdom, he felt all the more inclined to impress the world of the intellectual academy. As a wandering, exilic identity with a deep need to find an appropriate 'home', it looked like his homecoming would take place in the postmodern university. There is much in postmodernism that suited Hillman's natural style. As Bernie Neville has argued, postmodernism appears to be governed by the character of HermesMercurius, with its slipperiness of style, its open epistemology, its fast pace, fondness for illusion, absence of certainty, and distrust of absolute truth (Neville 1992). Hillman appeared to thrive in the postmodern moment, although there is precious little evidence in his work that he has actually studied the writings of the major postmodern philosophers. Hillman is frequently 'compared' with postmodern thinkers (Adams 1992), but my guess is that he has never read them. It seems to be more a case of breathing in the atmosphere of postmodern discourse by virtue of his own archetypal predisposition towards Hermes.

Hillman was determined to make archetypal theory 'palatable' to contemporary intellectual taste. His 1972 Terry Lectures at Yale University were meant to appeal to the iconoclastic modern temper, with its grudge against religion, its profound distrust of Christendom, and its loathing for any 'totalising' narrative or grand design. This meant deconstructing Jung's metaphysics, disposing of Jung's Christian theology, abandoning his moral earnestness and humanistic temper, and getting rid of his emphasis on unity and integration of personality. A new model of mind had to be fashioned, and the materials on the cutting-room floor were substantial. In Hillman's post-Jungian world, diversity replaced unity, phenomenology replaced metaphysics, imagination replaced the unconscious, and uncertainty and openness ('not knowing' or *via negativa*) replaced knowing. Hillman also threw out individuation, goal-directedness, mandalas, and the emphasis on progress and ego-consciousness. In a sense, Hillman had constructed an archetypal psychology without archetypes, a Jungian psychology without Jung, and a personality theory without development. This was either a work of great genius or a system of cunning illusion; or perhaps it was a mixture of both. Whatever archetypal psychology was, it was a product of Hermes-based postmodernism, where big nouns were replaced by verbs, substance by style, and where 'process', reified as 'soul-making', reigned supreme.

Perhaps inevitably for a self-confessed 'puer type' (Hillman 1992b: xiii), Hillman emerged wounded and hurt from his engagement with academia. The academy simply could not take him seriously. What was all this positive talk about the gods as if we were back in pre-Homeric Greece? The suspicious

academic mind sensed atavistic regression to pre-Enlightenment categories. Hillman's style may be postmodern, fluid, open, but the gods were still too much to cope with. All the postmodern strategies could not hide the fact that Jungian thought was, after all, a psychology of religious experience. Hillman protested that we could have the Gods without 'religion': a somewhat unlikely argument, but one that he adopted with considerable passion (Hillman 1975b: 167). The passion, one felt, was not so much for the argument itself as for the consequences of the argument: whether or not Hillman could find his home or 'place' in the postmodern academy. Despite certain mystical gestures in postmodern philosophy (the pursuit of uncertainty, openness, the Other), the academy itself remains decidedly secular, and Hillman smelled badly of religion with his talk of soul, spirit and gods. Even if, according to Hillman's own reckoning, the gods or archetypes did not 'exist' in metaphysical space (but only in metaphorical space), the entire direction of his work demanded that we thought about gods and archetypes *as if* they existed. The reverential tone, the relativisation of the ego, the receptivity to mystery, were all clear signs that Hillman was some kind of 'believer', even if it could not be determined what exactly he believed in. He could have been helped by post-metaphysical theology (and Whiteheadian theory), but he had abandoned theology and cosmology at a time when he was vulnerable and in need of reinforcements.

For all his brilliance, the academy remained singularly unimpressed, and the book meant to dazzle audiences at Yale University, *Re-Visioning Psychology,* was regarded as a gnostic oddity by all except a few followers. Once again, however, it could be argued that it was Hillman's style more than his content that put off the professional audiences. The hyperbolic speech, romantic assertions and intensely poetic style may have blocked any academic appreciation of Hillman's deconstructive strategies and fluid epistemology. Although the argument seemed to be fashionably anti-metaphysical and phenomenological, the reader of his works was struck by the apparent anachronisms and archaisms of his thought. The academic world was not ready for Hillman, and especially the discipline of psychology could not swallow his gods or his tendency to subordinate everything under the banner of 'soul-making'. The series of events that led to Hillman's departure from academia is not our business here; anyway, these events are incidental to the larger pattern I am delineating. Hillman had not found his home, and the revolution that he wished to champion would not take place within the university.

Back to beyond: the unashamed essentialist

> If anything, the depth psychology of soul-making as I have been formulating it is a *via negativa*. No ontology. No metaphysics. No cosmology.... Something further is needed, and I have known this for some time.
>
> (Hillman 1989:214)

Although Hillman had expended a great deal of energy on presenting an 'antiessentialist' reading of archetypal theory, as soon as he left academia he began to feel the hollowness of his own former position, and of postmodern theory generally. Despite the fact that various academics, including Paul Kugler, Michael Vannoy Adams, David Miller, Peter Bishop and several others had by this time rallied to Hillman's support and had further developed his anti-essentialist perspectives, Hillman himself had already moved on from archetypal phenomenology. He began to write essays with the titles 'Back to Beyond', 'Something Further is Needed', and even 'Back to the Invisibles', indicating that he no longer felt bound to uphold his archetypal theory without archetypes (Hillman 1989,1996). Suddenly, 'essentialist' categories were back, archetypes were back, and the gods were recovering their subtle bodies. To hell with Derrida; Hillman was reaching out again for Plato and Jung.

The Kantian basis of Jungian thought became appealing again, and Hillman's treatment of Jung became less critical and more reverential. But were the Jungians noting these changes in temperature and feeling? Hillman's very significant, but ultimately abortive, flirtation with postmodernity was over, but who was there to congratulate him at the end of this journey? The postmodern post-Jungians felt puzzled and betrayed, and the classical Jungians had already given up on him. For very good reason, Hillman has often felt himself to be intensely alone and culturally disoriented, and only his binding commitment to his ruling daimon has supplied security and solidity throughout.

What Hillman's career has shown, I think, is not just his failure to be an academic, but the failure of academia to accommodate and serve the soul. It seems that the soul needs essential categories, and that the eternal verities cannot be dispensed with quite as easily as constructivist intellectuals believe. Archetypal theory cannot float in mid-air without a grounding in philosophical realism and in metaphysics. Late Hillman has gone the way of the late Heidegger: away from intellectualism and towards the world of religion. The 'thought of the heart' in older and wiser scholars cannot find nourishment in the shallow waters of social constructivism or phenomenology.

In his latest book, *The Soul's Code* (1996), Hillman unleashes a veritable torrent of essentialist thinking, gleefully thumbing his nose at postmodernism and at all who emphasise the 'visibilities' at the expense of metaphysics. He strongly condemns the fact that in the modern world 'invisibility has been removed from backing all the things we live among' (Hillman 1996:110). In a fierce backlash against a constructivist world which only believes in cultural inscriptions on the human body, Hillman writes in praise of such old-fashioned baggy monsters as destiny, fate, providence, calling, beauty, truth, vision, inspiration, genius, daimon. 'We should not be afraid of these big nouns,' he challenges us; 'they are not hollow.' 'They have merely been deserted and need rehabilitation' (Hillman 1996:10). This is far too rich for academia to digest, but

huge numbers of people have purchased and read this recent volume, which is the biggest-selling Hillman text so far in his career. If the soul needs essentialist categories, so do 'the people', which is problematical in a time when 'street-wise' postmodern academics like to think they speak on behalf of popular culture. Hillman writes: 'When the invisible forsakes the actual world…then the visible world no longer sustains life, because life is no longer invisibly backed.' Here we think immediately of the biblical injunction: 'When there is no vision, the people perish' (Proverbs 29:18). Hillman, Jewish by birth, may be returning to his (unconscious?) religious heritage, despite spending his entire career since *Insearch* hitting out at both Judaism and Christianity (both dismissed as 'Hebrewism').

Anima mundi: a psyche the size of the earth

As the bonds that tied Hillman to academia were loosened, the idea of an *anima mundi* psychology loomed large. He was obviously disenchanted by the irreligiousness of his own former position, and he turned to his philosophical grounding in Neoplatonism and the Florentine Renaissance (Ficino, Bruno, Vico) to construct a kind of postmodern mysticism. But this mysticism would have social 'relevance' because Hillman would envisage 'a psyche the size of the earth'; a sense of psychical reality that would infuse the entire world and provide a psycho-philosophical foundation for the newly emerging ecological awareness. Hillman would argue that 'if psychology is the study of the subject, and if the limits of this subject cannot be set, then psychology merges willy-nilly with ecology' (Hillman 1995a). *Anima mundi* mysticism would develop an aesthetics of divine immanence, subordinate the ego and the human project to a greater power, inspire a sense of awe and wonder, and contribute to the healing and ecological recovery of the sick and dying biophysical world.

When I arrived at Hillman's study in Dallas in October 1982, his philosophical confusion and sadness were clearly apparent to me. He was still the brilliant professor of philosophical psychology who could dance lightly in postmodern space, but there was indeed something missing. Would I become just another academic anxious to restore his interest in the nonessentialist, phenomenological project? Hillman seemed suspicious of me at first, and uncertain of what my claims upon him might be. The irony was that I had arrived at his doorstep, funded by the Harkness Foundation of New York, to pursue a two-year post-doctoral academic fellowship with a scholar who had just departed from academia. The Harkness Foundation was a little confused by all of this: first I wanted to go to Texas, of all places ('no good can come out of Texas', the Manhattan president had warned me), and now I had chosen to work with a scholar who was no longer working within a recognised university. The New York group flew down to Dallas to check all this out, and left probably more uneasy than when they had arrived, although obviously seduced by Hillman's social wit and charm. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of Hermes to me, however

undignified and in whatever circumstances, was such that I clung on in this precarious situation. Hillman converted our private 'tutorials' into clinical sessions ('if we are going to discuss soul, we might as well make it as we go'), our reservations towards each other gradually disappeared, and I think we both immensely enjoyed this very awkward, fragmented and typically postmodern opportunity for exploration.

At our first meeting in a common-room, Hillman kicked off his hot and sweaty sandshoes and placed his huge, ugly feet upon the coffee-table in front of us. The obligatory indignities of Hermes had begun. He had just published his seminal essay, '*Anima Mundi:* The Return of the Soul to the World' (Hillman 1982) and his sights were firmly set on the worldly dimensions of the soul. He glared at me and said: 'We don't just walk through the world; we also walk through the soul of the world.' He waited for me to wriggle out of this or look embarrassed. However, his words immediately caught my imagination. As the descendant of a line of Irish mystics on my mother's side, and with my own childhood steeped in the animistic dreamings of the Aboriginal people of central Australia, I had no difficulty in accepting this claim. I did not know at the time that he was quoting the Italian Renaissance philosopher, Marsilio Ficino, but further reading made it clear to me that his sources were Florentine and Neoplatonic. I was not a representative of mainstream academia, but saw myself as a religious thinker swimming against the tide of postmodernity, in search of a Logos that would provide a framework for understanding the mystery and oneness of the universe.

What exactly is 'soul of the world'? How to conceptualise it, how to imagine it —and above all else, how to get it back? Hillman has argued that the splendour and playfulness of primal animistic vision will have to be recovered: 'We have to go back before Romanticism, back to medieval alchemy and Renaissance Neoplatonism …and also out of Western history to tribal animistic psychologies that are always concerned with the soul of things ('deep ecology' as it's now called) and propitiatory acts that keep the world on its course' (Hillman and Ventura 1993:51). Like D.H. Lawrence before him, Hillman believes that the reactivation of animistic vision must not involve a full cultural regression, but that we must experience the enchantment of the world in a new way: not in terms of ancestor spirits or literal deities, but in terms of the mysterious depths of the *anima mundi,* or world-psyche. In *Re-Visioning Psychology,* Hillman had already argued that psyche must be revisioned not as something belonging only to human beings, but as a dimension or depth of the world. Hillman (1975b: 173) argued that psyche had been too narrowly confined to the human sphere and habitually (mis)represented as the 'human psyche':

> Human does not enter into all of soul, nor is everything psychological human. Man exists in the midst of psyche; it is not the other way around. Therefore, soul is not confined by man, and there is much of psyche that extends beyond the nature of man. The soul has inhuman reaches.

If the natural world is granted soul or anima, then we must extend the metaphor of 'innerness' to the world itself. To contact the soul one still needs to go 'in', but that 'innerness', as Hillman argues, is not exclusive to the human subject. We can, with an attuned consciousness, find interiority in the world around us, so that as we go forth into the world we can see ourselves as walking through the soul of the world.

Hillman's intriguing argument in *We've Had A Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World's Getting Worse* (Hillman and Ventura 1993) is that our modern age rediscovers the soul of the world first through pathology and illness. This view actually derives from Jung, who wrote that 'the Gods have become diseases' (Jung 1929: 54), and who believed that the deepest forces in the human psyche are made clearly evident in neurosis, psychosis and mental disease. Hillman extends this same view to the larger world, claiming that the serious illnesses of the environmental web actually foreshadow a future ecological spirituality:

> In the nineteenth century people didn't talk about psyche, until Freud came along and discovered psychopathology. Now we're beginning to say, 'The furniture has stuff in it that's poisoning us, the microwave gives off dangerous rays.' The world has become toxic and full of symptoms. Isn't that the beginning of recognizing what used to be called animism? The world's alive—my god! It's having effects on us. 'I've got to get rid of those fluorocarbon cans.' 'I've got to get rid of the furniture because underneath it's formaldehyde.' 'I've got to watch out for this and that and *that*.' So there's pathology in the world, and through that we're beginning to treat the world with more respect.
>
> (Hillman and Ventura 1993:4)

Hillman has been unrelenting in his attack on therapy and on all schools of psychoanalysis for their limited conception of the soul. 'We still locate the psyche inside the skin,' he says.

> You go inside to locate the psyche…. By removing the soul from the world and not recognizing that the soul is also *in* the world, psychotherapy can't do its job any more. The buildings are sick, the institutions are sick, the banking system's sick, the schools, the streets—the sickness is out *there*.
>
> (Hillman and Ventura 1993:3)

But Hillman is completely unfair to suggest that there is some causal relationship between the rise of therapy and the fall of the world. This is an example of how his anima emotionality overwhelms his better judgement. Surely the actual object of his attack is not therapy but the soulless, 'disenchanted' condition of Western consciousness! It is not 'therapy' but 'patriarchy' which is responsible

for the idea that the living element called psyche or soul exists only in human subjectivity and is not also a dimension of the world.

Psychotherapy could only be said to have made the world 'worse' insofar as it has failed to challenge the philosophical bases upon which our alienated consciousness is predicated. But therapists would argue that challenging these bases is not the task of psychotherapy at all, and that Hillman's bomb has been thrown into the wrong camp. It is as if Hillman has so much pent-up rage against contemporary alienation that he feels compelled to attack and violate in order to express his feeling. Like a domestic violator or suburban terrorist, his rage is indiscriminate and directed at whatever 'target' (in his case, therapy) is familiar and close at hand.

Diminishing father Jung

Hillman takes broad swipes at Freud and Jung, arguing that both these pioneers of depth psychology focused on interior psychic reality at the expense of the outside world. The new 'anima mundi psychology', Hillman boasts in *Inter Views,* is 'far away from Jung and Freud and their nineteenth-century concern with science, and their consequent romantic concern with the subjective soul which for them was localized in individual persons' (Hillman 1983c: 145). At a public lecture I attended at the Dallas Institute of Humanities in 1982, Hillman briefly summarised the 'differences' between his archetypal psychology and Jung's analytical psychology. His main protest was that Jung's concept of psyche was private and internal. 'For Jung,' he said, circling his own skull with both hands to illustrate the sense of entrapment, 'psyche is inside, whereas for our post-Jungian archetypal school, psyche is more out there, in the world.' 'We aren't interested in being shut inside the head, or shut out from the world.' Here again, however, Hillman loses credibility in his dismissive extremism, and in his exaggeration of his own importance and originality. The 'Jung' whom Hillman sets up, and demolishes, is a product of Hillman's fantasy, bearing little relation to the actual Jung.

The entire thrust of Jung's research was to extend the psyche temporally and spatially into culture, history and physicality. After his separation from the Freudian School, Jung moved away from the psychologistic worldview, which wanted to reduce everything to human subjectivity. Jung became more impressed by the objective dimension of psychic experience: although we feel psyche is 'inside' us, psyche reveals itself as a cosmos in its own right. Jung greatly valued ancient philosophical traditions because of their keen perception of the objectivity of the soul. His theory of synchronicity, which posited a meaningful 'acausal' relationship between human subjectivity and events in the world, was predicated on the assumption of a psychic continuity between inner and outer reality. The theory of an acausal connecting principle made Jung intensely alert to the findings of the new physics, which posited a relationship between observer and observed, and which exploded the old mechanistic understanding of matter

in preference for a new, dynamic, interactive view of material reality. He was moved to suggest that 'since psyche and matter …are in continuous contact with one another, it is not only possible but fairly probable that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing' (Jung 1947:418).

Jung was not far from postulating a kind of postmodern animism, and in this sense he is far more 'post-Jungian' than Hillman's archetypal psychology will allow. It may be a perceptual error, or the 'tyranny of chronology', that makes Hillman *appear* so radically new. What is written 'after' Jung is secretly invested with higher value, and is felt to supersede Jung, or to go 'beyond' him. But forty years before Hillman, with much less fanfare and bravado, Jung had already (re) discovered the Neoplatonic idea of *anima mundi* (Jung 1947:393). Jung may not have had access to the specifically 'ecological' discourse of Hillman's own era, but his research was constantly resisting the encapsulation of psyche or soul within the human subject.

The changing face of anima, or, Hillman as recent convert to the real world

Hillman's critical claims against Jung could be turned against himself. It could be argued that in attacking the 'inward' focus of psychotherapy, Hillman is denouncing, and reversing, the model of reality that his own 'archetypal psychology' has upheld for two decades. Hillman is a vigorous convert to the 'real' only because he has shut out the world for so long. It is worth bearing in mind that just as Hillman attacked psychotherapy for being out of touch with the physical environment, Wolfgang Giegerich complained, as an 'insider' within Hillman's circle, that post-Jungian archetypal psychology was caught within a 'bubble of irreality' (Giegerich 1993:10). And Walter Odajnyk, who is passionate about the psyche-world connection, and who had authored *Jung and Politics* in 1976, had complained that Hillman 'tended to dismiss everyday reality in his therapeutic practice' (Odajnyk 1984:39).

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hillman had little time for political and social issues, even arguing in impatient moments that social reformers were merely 'acting out' the hero myth and the slaying of 'slimy dragons' on the sociopolitical stage. 'Earthshakers, world-movers, and city-planners,' he wrote, are trying to 'materialize spiritual acts in some aspect of concrete reality' (Hillman 1973:81, 87). As far as Hillman was concerned such acting out was a waste of time, and it was also anachronistic, since the heroic-masculinist phase in Western history was finished, and we had to replace the longing for a 'better' world with a more 'feminine' longing for soul, interiority and depth. His concern was 'to articulate a psychology that reflects the passionate importance of the individual soul' (Hillman 1979:6), This is certainly not the language of an ecopsychologist!

From *Insearch* (1967) to *The Dream and the Underworld* (1979), Hillman's radicalising tendencies were all marshalled to the service of interior reality. In the early pages of this later work he argued that we should follow a one-way

movement into the mythic underworld, and let the world—and its psychic representative, the ego—go hang. 'We must sever the link with the day-world. We must go over the bridge [into the underworld] and let it fall behind us, and if it will not fall, then let it burn.' 'Depth psychology means digging ever deeper, a bridge downward' (Hillman 1979:13, 6). Hillman was wholly unambiguous about his dislike of the world, his sense that it was condemned to superficiality and artifice, that it lacked soul. Despite Hillman's frequent attacks on the 'transcendentalism' of Jewish or Christian religion, there is a definite otherworldly and apocalyptic strain in his own major work. He just manages to hold himself back from fierce denunciation of the fallen and corrupt state of the created world.

Hillman's dramatic *volte-face* can probably best be understood in the context of anima transformation. Anima, who is the personification of interiority and subjectivity, appeared to Hillman in the beginning as the seductive inspiratrice who lures a man into the depths of his own unconscious life. In her guise as enchantress, anima led Hillman into the deepest reaches of the underworld. But he moved so far into the realm of the soul that he actually entered a level of reality (for Jung, the 'psychoid') where the line between 'inner' and 'outer' is blurred. Mystical language often describes this process of moving so far 'inward' that one breaks through to the 'other side', where the landscape of the soul becomes synonymous with' world' again. In meditation practice, the world is at first 'too much with us', then it is dissolved by interiority, and then it arises again. 'First there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.'

In archetypal terms, the 'personal' anima dissolves and is transformed into the *anima mundi*. The fantasy of 'my' specialness, 'my' interiority, is lost, and one reawakens to the awesome mystery and 'otherness' of the outside world. But it is no longer an 'otherness' that excludes 'me' or that makes me feel alien; on the contrary, it is a mystery that is co-extensive with my own deepest being, and in the face of the world I find the reflection and likeness of 'my' own soul. This is the psychological process that holds out the hope of our recovering the ecological and spiritual wisdom of ancient animistic peoples. This is the revolution that will bring about the ecological *metanoia* that the world so desperately requires, and James Hillman has shown us how it can be done; or rather, how it has been 'done' to him!

For Hillman, and for those who follow him on this less travelled path, concern for the invisible and indwelling soul suddenly shifts to concern for the 'inwardness' or 'interiority' of the world itself. 'The self-knowledge that depth psychology offers is not enough if the depths of the world soul are neglected' (Hillman 1985: 109). He becomes immediately and passionately embroiled in environmental aesthetics, deep ecology and ecopsychology. The aesthetic 'display' of the world becomes crucial, because in that display the beauty and truth of the soul can be discerned. The world sparkles, is sexy, and is enchanted once again. According to the logic of this spiritual odyssey, psychology is suddenly 'irrelevant' and a hindrance, because it insists on a private, interior, personal

domain that Hillman's anima no longer wants. A fusion with the sensuousness of the world takes place, and we are instructed to live, Zen-like, as if everything mattered, as if the mundane were charged with meaning, as if the 'otherworld' were glowing in and through *this* world. Like Paul Eluard, he can say, 'There is another world, but it is in this one'.

In *Symbols of Transformation,* Jung writes of the 'Virgin anima', an anima under the sway of the mother archetype, 'who is not turned towards the outer world and is therefore not corrupted by it'. 'She is turned rather toward the "inner sun" ' (Jung 1912:497). Under the influence of this kind of anima, the world loses its interest and is not personally significant. This condition, which arguably the entire Western world suffers from, is close to the psychiatric state of 'derealisation'; namely, a condition in which the outer world is alien and has lost its affective presence and reality. In this typically modern condition, the lonely ego goes in search of a soul which is narrowly focused and morbidly personalistic. From this perspective, the widespread neuroses of narcissism, selfishness, egotism, and other affective disorders and social pathologies are the result of the Western capitalist 'privatisation' of the soul, a process that is reversed as soon as the soul is allowed to develop and to move where it wants to go.

Hillman in the 1970s and in the 1990s is entreating us to entertain mutually exclusive philosophical positions. In 1979, Hillman wrote: 'The dream has nothing to do with the waking world, but is the psyche speaking to itself in its own language' (Hillman 1979:12). In this same text he actually chides mainstream therapies for being too concerned with the day world! 'Most psychotherapy…has become a straight one-way street of all morning traffic, moving out of the unconscious toward the ego's city. I have chosen to face the other way. [Mine] is a different one-way movement, into the dark' (Hillman 1979: 1). Now this devotee of the 'virgin anima', untouched by the world, is the disciple of a new kind of soul that urges us to abandon the dark places of the psyche and embrace the light of day. Has the anima as shy, elusive, withdrawing Diana or Daphne been replaced by the anima as Athena, Goddess of the *polis*?

In the 1990s, Hillman quotes not the romantic poets, but the Aristotelian injunction that 'Man is a political animal'. Hillman says we should go out and join social action groups, political parties, and become involved in the life of the *polis*. In a 1991 interview on the sense of community (in the men's movement), Hillman declares: 'Each man should sit down and make a list of the five most critical areas that disturb his life. And then find groups or agencies active in those areas. I'm talking about major public issues effecting the entire nation, not just saving the dolphins' (Hillman 1991:11). The trumpet-call to social action has been sounded, because the world is now saturated with eros, desire, anima. Hillman has ventured into many new areas, including architecture, food processing, transport problems, community cohesion, gender (mostly male) issues, ecology and social process. The world interests him as never before, and with this change 'men of action' are no longer portrayed as foolish heroes hoping

to 'slay some slimy dragon of public evil', but are constructed as lovers of the *anima mundi,* working on the body of the world-soul.

Hillman's shift from a purist interiority to a completely opposite 'social conscience' standpoint is sensational enough, but his tendency to attack all therapies for *their* solipsism suggests that he is not yet conscious of, and has failed to accept responsibility for, his own extremism. This is disturbing in a psychoanalyst who has been trained in the art of identifying projections. Hillman is now looking at all forms of psychotherapy through the distorting lens of his own 'virgin anima' complex. But only a certain kind of fanatical, introverted anima wants to escape from the real world, and only 'mystical' therapies lead clients away from social engagement. Most Jungian analysts, as far as I can discern, are more concerned with grounding their clients in the real, in the 'shadow' and the body than they are in leading them into the otherworldly depths of the collective unconscious. It is surprising to find how many 'mystical' clients enter Jungian therapy looking for a transcendental experience, only to discover that they have been confronted more fully and painfully than before with the social and physical realities around them. Post-Freudians, for instance, have replaced Freud's pleasure principle as the primary biological drive with the idea of the *need for relationship and relatedness* as our most basic human longing. Wherever we turn across the psychodynamic spectrum, we see therapy more concerned with engagement, and more critical of all forms of disengagement, especially narcissism and other disorders of relatedness.

Hillman's negative construction of all psychotherapies is misinformed, dangerously naïve and the product of his own neurotic complexes. Because his own 'Jungian' phase operated under the domination of an anti-world anima, that is no reason to assume that Jungians, Freudians and psychotherapeutic others work on the soul in a closet of world-denying introspection. The context of Hillman's 'road to Damascus' conversion helps us to understand where he is coming from, and it also enables us to see through the anger and accusation that he levels at others.

A lack of coherence: problems with the cult of anima

When Hillman's anima changed, his work ceased to be driven by a force which wanted to draw everything into the vortex of the underworld, and his daimon worked in reverse: a centrifugal, sweeping force took control, making larger and ever-more inclusive gestures towards the great world. In his latest mode as public celebrity, psychologist to the business world and industry, co-leader of the popular men's movement, TV-talk interviewee, and writer of fast but shallow narratives, Hillman has completely *literalised* the centrifugal rhythm of his worldly anima. The 'bubble of irreality' of which Giegerich complained has gone 'pop', exposing Hillman to a completely new life and making him an 'authority' on any topic that the public, or the media, may wish to hear about.

This is a dangerous position to adopt, because Hillman is often skating on thin ice, and constructed as an 'expert' on too many topics. The *anima mundi* may be limitless and expansive, but Hillman's learning is not, and although his new public life is undoubtedly exhilarating, it sometimes makes him look foolish because he is frequently unable to offer an informed contribution to public discourse. When discussing matters of political authority, social power, gender and men's rights, for instance, Hillman often seems like some right-wing troglodyte, and I feel like hanging my head in shame. He is trying to 'engage the world', but he has no background in social theory, Foucault, the complexities of political authority, or the injustices inscribed into the construction of gender and sex. Feminist scholars rightly complain about his enormous insensitivity in the area of gender studies. His recent flirtation with right-wing thinking derives from ignorance, I would argue, and from a lack of education in social and political matters. His book *Kinds of Power,* for instance, is hopelessly inadequate, and fails dismally in its bid to 'inform' the business community about the energies and powers with which it is working. A colleague of mine read this book, and was staggered by Hillman's lack of critical awareness about social power and the construction of authority in modern society. 'Where has Hillman been for the last twenty-five years?' I was asked, and was forced to reply: 'In the underworld, away with the virgin nymphs, and beyond the slow-moving planets.' The fact is that an expert on myth, dream and psyche is sometimes a clod when he tries to present himself as an expert on social relations. Andrew Samuels, who belongs to a different generation of Jungians who are seeking *rapprochement* between inner and outer worlds, has negotiated the shift from 'psyche' to 'society' more successfully precisely because he enters the political arena with an appropriate political awareness (Samuels 1993; Brien 1995:1–11).

Hillman's shift into pro-masculinist activism, his co-leadership of the popular men's movement with the reactionary Robert Bly, may all be some kind of compensatory behaviour against the power that the 'feminine' anima has over him (Hillman *et al.* 1994). I am not sure how else we might explain his dramatic reversal in gender politics. Bly's silly men's movement is about conjuring up lost images of Iron John or Hercules, and it enjoins men to discover the 'wild man' within themselves. Bly, Hillman, and Meade encourage men to beat their chests and 'win back' the 'primal' masculinity that social change, feminism and the decline of patriarchy has 'taken' from them. The collisions here with the Hillman of old are staggering. In 1972, Hillman wrote: 'Analysis cannot constellate [a] cure until it is no longer masculine in psychology. The end of analysis coincides with the acceptance of femininity' (Hillman 1972:292). But even more telling is his announcement that 'Assertive masculinity is suspicious. Somewhere we know that it must be reactive to feminine attachment' (Hillman 1973:193). Today, we can only read these statements in terms of 'dramatic irony', i.e. arguments put forward by the younger Hillman in self-damning condemnation of his own late 'incarnation' as Robert Bly's right-hand man.

Although there is intellectual energy and vigour to be gained from swinging from one extreme to another, Hillman's reversals and contradictions do not inspire confidence in his work. Jung's emphasis on maintaining a balance between the world of the ego and the world of the unconscious looks like great and gentle sanity beside Hillman's angry and wild vacillations. While Hillman criticises Jung for being a dualist, it is James Hillman who, in the last analysis, is the ultimate dualist, because he can never reconcile inner and outer, psyche and society, ego and underworld, therapy and activism. Jung encourages dialogue and debate between the two psychic systems, never privileging the one above the other, always prepared to speak on behalf of the 'other', even at risk of contradicting himself. But it is because Jung held the pairs of opposites *in a state of consciousness* that he was not prone to the radical swings in temperament and orientation that we find in Hillman. In the realm of depth psychology, it is Jung who is able to sustain the opposite worlds and to generate a creative dialogue between them. Hillman's inability to grasp paradox leads to the disastrous outbreak of overt contradiction.

Although Hillman argues that Jung suffers from a *horror animae,* Jung's tendency to downplay the anima in favour of the archetype of wholeness, to emphasise the anima's role as bridge and guide rather than 'goal', now deserves reconsideration in light of Hillman's strangely discordant cult of anima. For Jung, the anima is a hugely important contributor to the goal, but she cannot *become* the goal. Like the ego, anima must ultimately serve what is greater than herself. If this centring 'greatness' is missing we are at the anima's mercy, swinging from side to side, from one extreme to another. When Hillman threw out the archetype of wholeness, or Jung's idea of the Self, early in his career, he may not have known what he was doing. The Self makes possible the regulation of the opposites, the balancing of inner and outer demands, and the compensatory mechanisms of psychic life. The Self disallows extremism of any kind, and, through the agency of the 'transcendent function', works actively to undermine extremism before it becomes chronic and established.

Hillman found all this talk of balance, integration and wholeness intellectually unfashionable. Not just Hillman, but our entire age, is now virtually 'allergic' to the idea of wholeness and balance, reading any attempt at unity as an undesirable 'imposition' of order. I believe we have to educate ourselves out of this postmodern complex, and re-experience the liberating and healing contribution of wholeness, by experiencing anew the powerful symbols of wholeness which are now almost banned from our postmodern vocabulary. Today we are still reacting against the oppressive unities of old, still rebelling against the religions and philosophies that grew corrupt under their own political weight and social power. In that sense we are not postmodern at all, but only most-modern, excited by fragmentation, plurality, bits and gaps. But the psyche or soul is not controlled by the laws of fashion, and it may be demanding a new experience of unity which our age is still unable to respond to.

The international conference held at Notre Dame, Indiana in 1992 to honour the work of James Hillman was overwhelmed with ideological splits, intellectual factions and emotional divisions. The almost unworkable atmosphere of this conference gave Hillman pause for reflection, and in a public letter sent out to all conference participants he wrote:

> This divisive insistence still makes me uncomfortable. I felt riven by the conflicting intolerance and the fast opinions. I think this divisiveness—that what happens must meet our personal expectations—derives in part from the many-sidedness of the polytheistic background to an archetypal psychology. It does invite pandaemonium. But I also think the divisiveness reflects our *zeitgeist,* fanatic devotion to single issue agendas, and a kind of desperate clinging to a single identity by standing inside a single viewpoint. Monotheism appears within psychological polytheism as contentious demands and intrusive invasions. Even in the names of soul, beauty, and *Gemeinschafstgefuhl,* we push each other around and can't listen. In men's groups we make room for ritualizing conflict, and it might have been salutary had we prepared more along those lines.
>
> (Hillman 1992c)

One might comment that a conference controlled by so many conflicting and discordant elements within Hillman's psyche and career could only lead to pandemonium! On the one hand, there were people there (scholars, academics) who were still following the virgin, otherworldly anima of 'archetypal psychology', and other people (activists, revolutionaries) attracted to Hillman's *anima mundi* and ecopsychology. There were those inspired by the anti-essentialist, postmodern Hillman, and those attracted to the passionate return of essentialist, metaphysical categories. There were those who were drawn to Hillman's cult of anima and powerful defence of the feminine, and those most recent (and rowdy) followers who were inspired by Hillman's reactionary masculinism and the discourse about 'men's rights'.

I think it is time that 'unity' and 'balance' stopped receiving such a bad press, and that we get over our phobic response to wholeness. Even in the above quotation, the term 'monotheism' appears as a code-word for pathology. We still live under the shadow of 'bad unities' (Christendom, Fascism, Communism), and this continues to block our pathway to the *new unities* that might want to emerge in society and psyche alike.

The continuing value of Jung's Self, that 'umbrella' archetype which brings warring elements into dialogue and relationship, may not be in its bad currency in intellectual society, but in its *efficacy* in psychic and public life. The fact is that we do need very large concepts, ideals or deities to deal with the primal opposites such as inner and outer, masculine and feminine, which threaten to tear us apart if we side with one at the expense of the other. To be sure, these unities do become corrupt and have to be turned aside. But to worship plurality (the

postmodern deity) as an end in itself is a perversity that the psyche will not tolerate. From this perspective, Hillman's career provides a sort of negative proof for the need for a reconciling vision of coherence and unity.

Coda

Although I have been vigorously critical of Hillman, it has not been my intention to condemn him. I have pointed to the strengths and weaknesses of his work, realising at times that a weakness, such as his extremism, can also be a strength insofar as it challenges and extends the field. For me, Hillman remains a wise, tough and respected analyst, a powerful ideologue, an artist of ideas, a risk-taker, and an inspiring exponent of a revived *anima mundi* philosophy. However, he has, like Hermes, got away with murder, and has always ducked for cover when strong criticism looked like coming his way. Along with many sensitive artists, he has shielded his opus from the glare of outside scrutiny. Again, this could be the work of the virgin anima, an anima who cannot stand the light of day, and who contrasts her own divine 'authority' with the hurtful 'opinions' of the uninitiated. In this sense, my own impulse towards vigorous criticism could relate to Giegerich's desire to burst the 'bubble of irreality' surrounding this pristine opus.

I strongly recommend that my students in psychoanalytic studies read Hillman, but as I recommend him I also issue a warning: enjoy his sensuous style and the lively footwork, but don't be seduced by the theoretical apparatus. Much of what Hillman says is for rhetorical effect only, and the arguments are often tried on for size, or tested for their mythopoetic suggestiveness, and then dropped. As I found in Dallas, Hillman doesn't always believe what he says, and the trickster Hermes in him is often astounded by the fact that others (including me) take him so 'literally'. 'My way of working is to take something already in place and twisting it, turning it, give it your own turn' (Hillman 1983c: 27). Thinking and writing for Hillman is a form of play, and he often seems amazed—almost like a passive onlooker—at all the 'moves' (as he calls them) performed by his inner trickster and his anima guide. In Hillman we see and admire an ancient, premodern stance: the power and autonomy of an inspirational muse, and the writer's devotional subordination to the daimon who drives him.

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